THE 

M^KINLEYAND  ROOSEVELT 
ADMINISTRATIONS 

1897-1909 
JAMES  FORD  RHODES 


GIFT   OF 


U£* 


THE   McKINLEY  AND  ROOSEVELT 
ADMINISTRATIONS 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK  •    BOSTON   •   CHICAGO  -   DALLAS 
ATLANTA  •   SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  LIMITED 

LONDON  •    BOMBAY  •    CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  LTD. 

TORONTO 


THE 

McKINLEY  AND  ROOSEVELT 
ADMINISTRATIONS 

1897-1909 


BY 
JAMES   FORD   RHODES,   LL.D.,  D.LITT. 

AUTHOR  OF  THE  HISTORY  OF  TIIK  UNITED  STATES  FROM  TUB 

COMPROMISE  OF  1S50  TO  THE  FINAL  RESTORATION  OF  IIOMK 

RULE  AT  THE  SOUTH  IN  1877  ',  HISTORICAL  ESSAYS  J 

LECTURES  ON  THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR 

DELIVERED   AT   OXFORD  ;    HISTORY 

OF  THB  CIVIL  WAR  ;     FROM 

HAYES  TO  MCKINLKY 


gorfe 

THE   MACMILLAN   COMPANY 
1922 

All  rights  reserved 


PRINTED   IN   THE    UNITED   STATB8   OF   AMERICA 


COPYBIGHT,   1922, 

BY  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.    Published   November,  1922. 


J.  S.  Gushing-  Co.  —  Berwick  <fc  Smith  Co. 
Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 

PAGE 

MARK  HANNA 1 

MARK  HANNA  SECURES  McKiNLEY's  NOMINATION  .        .        .12 

THE  ST.  Louis  CONVENTION 13 

McKlNLEY  AND   HANNA,    BlMETALLISTS 13 

THE  RESOLUTION  OF  THE  CONVENTION  FOR  GOLD    .        .        .15 

NOMINATION  OF  McKlNLEY 16 

GOLD  AND  SILVER 17 

NOMINATION  OF  BRYAN 18 

BRYAN  AN  EFFECTIVE  CAMPAIGNER 20 

COIN'S  FINANCIAL  SCHOOL 22 

REPUBLICAN  FIGHT  AGAINST  FREE  SILVER        ....  23 

MCKINLEY'S  "FRONT  PORCH"  SPEECHES 25 

MCKINLEY'S  ELECTION 29 

CHAPTER  II 

HANNA'S  FIGHT 30 

SECRETARY  SHERMAN 31 

SENATOR  HANNA 35 

THE  DINGLEY  TARIFF 37 

McKlNLEY  AND  ARBITRATION  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN        .        .  40 

THE  CUBAN  QUESTION 41 

CHAPTER  III 

CLEVELAND  AND  CUBA 44 

McKlNLEY   AND   CUBA 46 

THE  MAINE 49 

THE  PRESIDENT'S  ULTIMATUM  TO  SPAIN 53 

SPANISH  PROCRASTINATION 54 

v 


4^0542 


vi  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

McKiNLEY  AVERSE  TO  WAR 60 

THE  WAR  MIGHT  HAVE  BEEN  AVOIDED 62 

DECLARATION  OF  WAR  AGAINST  SPAIN 66 

CHAPTER  IV 

GEORGE  DEWEY.        . 69 

BATTLE  OF  MANILA 73 

GEORGE  DEWEY. 75 

GERMAN  AND  FRENCH  OPINION 76 

GERMAN  ACTION 79 

PROGRESS  OF  THE  WAR 81 

THEODORE  ROOSEVELT 83 

SAN  JUAN  HILL -85 

AMERICAN  DEPRESSION,  JULY  3 87 

SPANISH  DESPAIR 88 

BATTLE  OF  SANTIAGO 91 

DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  SPANISH  FLEET 93 

THE  ORIENT .  .        .96 

THE  DEFEAT  OF  SPAIN 97 

CHAPTER  V 

SPAIN  RELINQUISHED  CUBA 99 

THE  PROTOCOL .  .101 

THE  PHILIPPINES 102 

SENATOR  GRAY'S  OPINION 104 

McKiNLEY  AND   THE   PHILIPPINES 106 

THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 109 

THE  PHILIPPINE  INSURRECTION Ill 

HAWAII       .......                                        -  H2 

J.  P.  MORGAN    .        %               115 

THE  STEEL  INDUSTRY 117 

GOLD  STANDARD  LEGISLATION 119 

JOHN  HAY  .        .        .        .......        .        .        .                        -  120 

HAY,  SECRETARY  OF  STATE 124 


CONTENTS  vii 

PAGE 

THE  "OPEN  DOOR" 126 

CHINA  —  THE  BOXER  UPRISING 127 

PEACE  WITH  CHINA 131 

CHAPTER  VI 

THE  PRESIDENTIAL  CAMPAIGN  OF  1900 132 

THEODORE  ROOSEVELT,  VICE-PRESIDENT 135 

WILLIAM  J.  BRYAN,  DEMOCRATIC  CANDIDATE    .        .        .        .136 

THE  CONTEST  OF  1900 139 

MARK  HANNA 140 

ROOSEVELT 141 

THE  ELECTION  OF  1900 143 

J.  P.  MORGAN 144 

ANDREW  CARNEGIE 145 

UNITED  STATES  STEEL  CORPORATION 148 

ANDREW  CARNEGIE 151 

J.  P.  MORGAN 154 

THE  STOCK  PANIC  OF  1901 155 

JOHN  D.  ROCKEFELLER 157 

THE  STANDARD  OIL  Co 159 

McKiNLEy's  SECOND  INAUGURAL  ADDRESS        ....  169 

ASSASSINATION  OF  McKiNLEY 170 

McKlNLEY   AND    THE    TARIFF 173 

McKiNLEY   AND    ClVIL   SERVICE    REFORM 174 

CHAPTER  VII 

PUERTO  Rico 176 

CUBA 177 

THE  PHILIPPINES 183 

THE  ANTI-IMPERIALISTS 188 

THE  SCHURMAN  COMMISSION 190 

THE  FILIPINOS 194 

ELIHU  ROOT,  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 195 

THE  TAFT  COMMISSION  197 


viif  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

ROOT'S  INSTRUCTIONS 198 

END  OF  GUERILLA  WARFARE     .......  202 

TORTURE  BY  AMERICAN  SOLDIERS 203 

ROOT,  CREATOR;    TAFT,  ADMINISTRATOR 206 

TAFT  AND  THE  SUPREME  COURT 208 

ROOSEVELT  AND  TAFT 210 

THE  PHILIPPINES 212 

CAMERON  FORBES 213 

ELIHU  ROOT 213 

ARCHIBALD  C.  COOLIDGE 215 

CHAPTER  VIII 

ROOSEVELT  AS  PRESIDENT 218 

THE  NORTHERN  SECURITIES  CASE 221 

BOOKER  WASHINGTON 227 

THE  CHARLESTON  EXPOSITION 231 

ROOSEVELT'S  NEW  ENGLAND  TOUR 233 

ROOSEVELT'S  ACCIDENT 235 

CHAPTER  IX 

THE  ANTHRACITE  COAL  STRIKE  OF  1902 236 

ROOSEVELT  —  HANNA  —  BAER 239 

GROVER  CLEVELAND 240 

ROOSEVELT'S  PLAN 242 

THE  SETTLEMENT 243 

GERMANY  —  VENEZUELA 247 

THE  ALASKA  BOUNDARY  DISPUTE 254 

ROOSEVELT'S  IDEA  OF  THE  BRITISH  NAVY        ....  260 

CHAPTER  X 

THE  FIRST  HAY-PAUNCEFOTE  TREATY 261 

THE  SECOND  HAY-PAUNCEFOTE  TREATY 262 

THE  PANAMA  CANAL  . 263 

THE  HAY-HERRAN  TREATY        .                266 

THE  PANAMA  REVOLUTION 268 


CONTENTS  ix 

PAGE 

THE  HAY-BUNAU-VARILLA  TREATY 275 

BRYCE  ON  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 276 

CHAPTER  XI 

ROOSEVELT'S  EXTRAORDINARY  ABILITY 279 

ROOSEVELT — HANNA          .                         281 

THE  CONVENTION  OF  1904 288 

DEATH  OF  HANNA 289 

CHARACTER  OF  HANNA 289 

CHAPTER  XII 

RECORD  OF  THE  REPUBLICAN  PARTY 292 

PARKER'S  CHARGES 293 

RESULT  OF  THE  ELECTION  OF  1904 295 

ATTACK  ON  THE  FINANCIAL  INTERESTS 296 

"OuR  FRIENDS  WHO  LIVE  SOFTLY" 297 

ROOSEVELT  No  DEMAGOGUE 299 

THE  ST.  Louis  FAIR 300 

CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR 302 

PEACE  OF  PORTSMOUTH 307 

DEATH  OF  HAY 310 

ROOT,  SECRETARY  OF  STATE 311 

MOROCCO  AFFAIR 312 

ALGECIRAS  CONFERENCE 314 

ROOSEVELT — THE  KAISER 315 

SAN  DOMINGO 318 

CHINA 319 

CHAPTER  XIV 

RAILROAD  RATE  LEGISLATION  OF  1905 323 

THE  HEPBURN  BILL 324 

THE  SENATE  BILL      .....                 ...  325 

RATE  MAKING  BY  INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION    .        .  327 


x  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

MEAT  INSPECTION  ACT  AND  PURE  FOOD  LAW  ....  334 

MUCKRAKING      .                        .        .        .        .        .        .        .  337 

THE  BROWNSVILLE  AFFRAY 339 

JAPAN 341 

THIRD  INTERNATIONAL  CONFERENCE 342 

CHAPTER  XV 

THE  PANIC  OF  1907 344 

J.  P.  MORGAN 348 

THE  PRESIDENT  .        . 348 

IRRIGATION 354 

THE  RECLAMATION  ACT 356 

THE  CONVENTION  OF  GOVERNORS 360 

CHAPTER  XVI 

CUBA 364 

THE  NAVY  .     . 366 

THE  VOYAGE  AROUND  THE  WORLD 369 

JAPAN 376 

CHAPTER  XVII 

REPUBLICAN  CONVENTION  OF  1908 378 

ROOSEVELT  FOR  TAFT 379 

HENRY  CABOT  LODGE,  CHAIRMAN 380 

TAFT,  NOMINATED 381 

ROOSEVELT  AND  THIRD  TERM 383 

ROOSEVELT,  A  BOOKISH  MAN 390 

OLIVER  P.  MORTON 392 

THE  PRESIDENT  AND  HIGH  FINANCE 394 

ANDREW  JACKSON       ....        .        .        .        .        .        .  396 

ROOSEVELT,  BROAD-MINDED     < 397 

ROOSEVELT,  NOT  IMPULSIVE 398 

ROOSEVELT,  WONDERFUL  BRAIN 399 


THE   McKINLEY  AND  ROOSEVELT 
ADMINISTRATIONS 


THE  McKINLEY  AND  ROOSEVELT 
ADMINISTRATIONS 

1897-1909 


CHAPTER  I 

THIS  volume  naturally  begins  with  the  political  cam 
paign  of  1896  during  which  three  men  absorbed  public 
attention  —  McKinley,  Bryan  and  Marcus  Alonzo  Hanna, 
or,  as  he  was  familiarly  called  and  will  be  known  in  this 
book,  Mark  Hanna.  Of  McKinley  and  Bryan,  up  to 
1896,  the  student  of  affairs  will  have  had  some  idea, 
but  Mark  Hanna  deserves  an  introductory  notice  before 
the  last  eight  years  of  his  crowded  life  are  related.  Called 
an  enigma  in  New  York  City,  he  was  no  enigma  whatever 
to  his  intimates,  except  that  they  failed  to  gauge  his 
towering  ability.  They  knew  him  for  a  shrewd  money- 
getter,  able  and  diligent  in  business,  but  they  could  not 
believe  that  he  would  reach  a  high  position  in  public 
affairs  —  that  during  one  administration  he  would  be 
known  as  the  "king  maker'7  and  during  another  the 
champion  of  the  financial  magnates  against  Theodore 
Roosevelt  —  that  he  would  at  least  divide  with  Roose- 

i 


2  CLEVELAND'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1896 

velt  the  allegiance  of  the  Labor  Unions.  In  all  essentials 
except  political  ability  he  was  no  enigma  to  his  friends, 
for  he  wore  his  heart  upon  his  sleeve. 

New  York  City  is  a  good  point  of  survey  and  from  this 
point  Hanna's  appearance  in  public  life  was  like  that  of  a 
comet  in  the  sky.  Although  fifty-nine  years  old  in  1896, 
he  had  gradually,  but  with  steady  ambition,  been  working 
up  to  the  place  from  which  he  was  now  to  begin  his 
most  important  achievements.  His  restless  mind  had 
always  cast  about  for  a  new  enterprise  and,  not  being  a 
student  or  reader  of  books,  and  having  no  sympathy  with 
a  man  who  devoted  his  whole  ability  to  the  acquirement 
of  money,  he  entered  the  field  of  politics.  Before  he  was 
thirty-two  he  made  an  informal  alliance  with  an  enter 
prising  young  man  of  Cleveland  to  break  up  the  Repub 
lican  machine  that  dominated  city  politics.  Both  were 
good  Republicans  but  objected  to  the  manner  in  which 
city  affairs  were  conducted.  Somewhat  later  when  the 
Republican  machine  nominated  one  of  their  representa 
tive  men  for  mayor,  Hanna  led  a  revolt  against  the 
machine  and,  with  the  aid  of  a  number  of  independent 
associates,  nominated  a  Democrat  of  excellent  business 
ability  and  elected  him 1  although  the  rest  of  the  Repub 
lican  ticket  was  chosen.  In  city  and  ward  politics,  he 
was  always  noted  for  his  independent  action  and  often 
showed  no  hesitation  in  supporting  Democrats  when  they 
were  better  men  than  the  Republican  nominees. 

At  the  age  of  forty-three  he  was  recognized  as  one  of  the 
prominent  business  men  of  Cleveland.  His  business  was 
coal,  iron  ore  and  pig  iron ;  in  1867  he  had  been  started 
in  it  by  his  father-in-law,  an  iconoclast  in  society  and 

i In  1873. 


CH.  I.]  MARK  HANNA  3 

trade  and  an  uncompromising  Democrat  in  politics. 
Hanna's  independence  however  did  not  come  from  any 
family  association ;  it  was  inherent  in  himself  and  gained 
for  him  the  dislike  of  the  solid  financial  men  of  Cleveland, 
who  had  built  up  the  city  and  were  naturally  the  dominant 
figures  in  its  financial  circles.  In  spite  of  the  dislike  of 
these  magnates,  Hanna  pushed  ahead  until  in  1880,  the 
year  of  the  Garfield  campaign,  he  was  known  as  a  reliable 
Republican  and  had  acquired  a  very  considerable  local 
prominence.  He  was  head  and  front  of  the  business 
men's  meetings  in  Cleveland  and  fully  favored  making 
the  campaign  on  the  tariff  and  business  issue  rather  than 
on  the  "  bloody  shirt."  Closely  connected  with  the 
Pennsylvania  railroad  through  business  relations,  he 
formed  a  link  between  that  great  organization  and  the 
candidate  of  his  party,  afterwards  president-elect.  From 
that  time  on  he  never  lost  an  opportunity  to  identify  him 
self  with  any  Republican  movement.  Although  he  had 
never  read  Cicero,  he  shared  the  Roman's  belief  that 
he  must  keep  himself  constantly  before  the  public. 

Hanna  was  attracted  to  the  Civil  Service  Reform 
movement  and  attended  the  meeting  of  local  organization 
in  Cleveland.1  He  had  no  hope  of  being  the  president  of 
the  Cleveland  association,  but  he  did  aspire  to  the  chair 
manship  of  the  Executive  Committee.  The  organization 
was  controlled  by  men  who  did  not  like  Hanna  and  who 
entirely  ignored  him  in  their  dispositions,  not  even 
awarding  him  the  consolation  of  membership  on  the  Exec 
utive  Committee,  of  which  he  would  have  liked  to  be  the 
directing  head.  From  that  night,  Hanna  must  have 
argued,  there  is  a  ring  of  reformers  as  well  as  a  ring 

1  Either  in  January  or  February,  1882. 


4  CLEVELAND'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1896 

of    politicians.     I    think    the    politicians  will    suit    me 
better. 

His  failure  to  secure  election  as  district  delegate  to  the 
Republican  National  Convention  of  1884  and  his  sub 
sequent  success  in  being  chosen  delegate  at  large  gave  him 
an  inkling  of  what  was  needed  for  political  success.  At 
the  Convention  he  was  an  avowed  supporter  of  John 
Sherman,  whose  candidacy  met  with  little  favor.  He 
opposed  Elaine,  yet  when  the  Convention  named  him  as 
its  candidate  Hanna  gained  prominence  in  his  party  by 
his  earnest  and  sincere  efforts  for  Elaine's  election;  but 
no  sooner  was  Elaine  defeated  than  Hanna  began  to  work 
for  Sherman's  nomination  in  1888.  Securing  the  unani 
mous  support  of  Ohio,  a  portion  of  Pennsylvania  and 
many  delegates  from  the  Southern  States,  he  went  to  the 
Convention  as  a  delegate  confident  of  success.  In  my 
last  volume  I  have  told  how  Harrison's  nomination  came 
to  be  made  but,  soon  after  Sherman's  defeat,  Hanna  real 
ized  that  under  certain  circumstances  McKinley  might 
have  been  the  man;  accordingly  he  decided  no  longer 
to  put  his  money  upon  the  wrong  horse  and  became  an 
open  advocate  of  McKinley's  nomination  for  the  next 
presidency.  Between  1890  and  1892  Hanna  had  serious 
business  troubles  which,  to  a  certain  extent,  distracted  his 
attention  from  politics  and  he  was  not  as  powerful  a  factor 
in  the  Convention  of  1892  as  he  had  been  four  years  be 
fore  ;  he  might  have  been  thought  to  be  losing  his  grip 
on  politics  but  he  was  simply  biding  his  time.  After  the 
astounding  Republican  victory  in  the  election  of  1894, 
he  went  to  his  younger  brother,  then  a  business  partner, 
and  told  him  that,  for  the  future,  he  purposed  giving  more 
time  to  politics  and  less  to  business.  Arrangements  were 


CH.  I.]  MARK  HANNA  5 

made  with  this  end  in  view  and  thenceforward  he  gave 
nearly  his  entire  attention  to  securing  the  nomination  of 
McKinley  in  1896. 

Boston,  apart  from  a  few  men  in  State  Street,  did  not 
like  Hanna.  His  brusque  manner,  unconventional  talk, 
ignorance  of  literature  and  art  alienated  many,  and  he 
did  not  always  live  up  to  the  moral  ideals  in  politics  that 
were  professed  in  this  city.  The  general  opinion  was 
afterwards  well  stated  by  Henry  S.  Pritchett,  a  true  West 
erner,  although  at  that  time  living  in  Boston,  the  efficient 
President  of  the  Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology. 
uThe  papers  to-day,"  he  said  in  a  speech  to  the  Bowdoin 
Alumni  Association  on  February  16,  1904,  "have  been  full 
of  the  life  of  an  interesting  man,  who  now  lies  dead  in 
Washington.  He  was  a  strong  man,  a  man  of  noble  parts, 
of  splendid  personal  power  and  of  high  ability  for  service 
and  he  has  played  a  great  part  as  a  leader  in  this  country. 
He  deserves  for  all  that  high  praise.  And  yet  we  can 
never  forget  in  estimating  him  as  a  public  man  that  he 
must  be  judged,  not  only  for  his  high  personal  qualities 
but  also  for  the  quality  of  his  public  service.  One  cannot 
fail  to  regret  in  looking  back  over  that  life  that  it  should 
have  carried  with  it  the  noble  qualities  of  devotion,  of 
energy,  of  ability  and  of  loyalty  to  a  friend  and  yet  have 
not  had  with  it  also  a  higher  level  of  what  public  service 
means  .  .  .  and  a  higher  estimate  of  moral  and  intel 
lectual  force  rather  than  pecuniary  force  in  politics."  1 

New  York  City  and  other  communities  may  have  had 
their  opinions  influenced  by  the  prevalent  caricatures 
which  always  have  something  to  do  with  the  formation 
of  public  sentiment.  Hanna  once  said  that,  although 

1  Boston  Herald,  Feb.  17,  1904. 


6  CLEVELAND'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1896 

his  ancestry  was  Scotch-Irish  there  was  more  Irish  than 
Scotch  in  his  composition ;  thus  with  a  plausible  exaggera 
tion  of  his  features  he  was  often  portrayed  as  a  bloated 
whiskey-drinking  Irishman.  A  much-repeated  cartoon 
showed  him  and  McKinley  sitting  over  a  bottle  of  whiskey 
in  earnest  confabulation.  These  caricatures  caused  his 
friends  no  little  amusement,  so  entirely  were  they  un 
founded  in  fact.  Hanna  drank  no  wine  until  he  was 
past  middle  life,  did  not  care  for  it,  and  used  stronger 
liquors  only  for  medicinal  purposes.  McKinley  pre 
ferred  water  to  wine  at  a  banquet  or  dinner  or  any  other 
occasion.  Indeed,  if  the  cartoonist  had  shown  McKinley 
and  Hanna,  sitting  calmly  together  over  a  bottle  of  Wau- 
kesha  or  Poland  water  drinking  to  the  toast  "  Here's  to 
honest  water  which  ne'er  left  man  i'  the  mire,"  he  would 
have  been  much  nearer  the  truth. 

"I  shall  never  forget,"  said  Senator  Scott  of  West  Vir 
ginia,  "one  morning  during  the  campaign  of  1896  when 
Hanna  handed  me  a  New  York  paper  containing  a  car 
toon  of  himself  pictured  as  a  huge  monster,  clad  in  a  suit 
covered  over  with  dollar  marks,  smoking  an  immense 
cigar,  and  trampling  under  foot  women  and  children  until 
their  eyes  protruded  from  the  sockets  and  their  skeleton 
forms  writhed  in  agony.  After  I  had  looked  at  it  for  a 
moment  he  said  to  me,  'That  hurts.'  "  1 

This  was  a  favorite  caricature,  Hanna  covered  all  over 
with  the  dollar  mark,  the  implication  being  that  he  be 
lieved  money  could  buy  anything.  The  Nation  wrote 
during  the  heated  political  campaign  of  1908:  "The 
frankly  commercial  spirit  in  which  Mark  Hanna  man 
aged  the  two  campaigns  in  which  he  was  chairman  is  no- 

i  Address,  April  7,  1904,  39. 


CH.  I.]  MARK  HANNA  7 

torious.  A  prominent  and  honored  Ohio  Republican  has 
said  of  Mr.  Hanna  that  his  only  notion  of  political  activ 
ity  was  'to  go  out  and  buy  somebody.'  "  *  This  remark, 
born  probably  of  factional  hostility,  was  unjust.  Hanna 
paid  the  penalty  of  talking  too  frankly  about  the  use  of 
money,  but  no  one  knew  better  than  he  that  money  would 
not  accomplish  everything  and,  after  he  had  gained  power 
and  influence,  nothing  perturbed  him  more  than  to  be 
looked  upon  simply  as  an  office-broker. 

Collecting  money  for  a  political  party  must  be  regarded 
differently  from  getting  means  for  the  support  of  a  church, 
a  university  or  a  charitable  institution  and,  according 
to  the  cynical  view  of  politics  that  obtains  in  certain 
quarters,  the  corruption  of  voters  seems  to  inhere  in  the 
use  of  the  party  chest.  But  many  voters  looked  upon 
the  Republican  party  as  something  sacred,  whose  control 
was  necessary  to  the  well-being  and  perpetuity  of  the 
Republic.  The  man  who  raised  money  in  order  to  insure 
its  continuance  in  power  was  looked  upon  by  them  as 
doing  holy  work.  Some  such  idea  must  have  passed 
through  Hanna' s  mind  when,  without  concealment,  he 
continually  preached  the  use  of  money  to  save  the  party. 

His  outspoken  scorn  of  bookish  men  and  respect  for 
those  who  had  money  to  contribute  lent  color  to  The  Na 
tion's  criticism,  but  in  this  matter  and  in  others  Hanna 
stood  in  need  of  a  certain  hypocrisy  which  was  lacking 
in  his  nature.  Making  no  bones  of  confessing  his  igno 
rance  of  Shelley  and  Pasteur,  he  loved  Shakespeare  as  he 
saw  his  plays  acted  on  the  stage  and  took  delight  in  a 
good  performance  of  "  School  for  Scandal,"  in  Joseph 
Jefferson's  "Rip  Van  Winkle,"  " Rivals"  and  " Cricket 

1  Oct.  8,  p.  328. 


8  CLEVELAND'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1896 

on  the  Hearth.'*  During  the  fifties  when  the  Lyceum 
system  was  at  its  height,  he  was  a  constant  attendant  and 
liked  above  all  the  lectures  of  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson. 

It  is  ordinarily  thought  that  men  in  active  life  are  apt 
to  become  victims  of  wine,  woman  or  play.  Judged  by 
this  standard,  Hanna  was  a  severely  moral  man  who 
needed  no  refuge  in  the  dictum  of  the  preacher,  "The 
moral  man  is  he  who  is  not  found  out."  A  generous  giver 
of  dinners,  he  was  a  spare  eater  except  for  an  insatiable 
fondness  for  sweets  to  which  his  corpulence  and  rheu 
matism  in  later  life  were  due.  Loving  the  society  of  re 
fined  and  well-bred  women,  he  might  be  looked  upon  as 
a  model  of  chastity.  Passionately  fond  of  cards,  he  pre 
ferred  whist  or  bridge  without  a  money  stake ;  he  never 
played  draw  poker  except  when  a  party  for  his  favorite 
whist  was  unavailable  and  then  only  in  what  was  known 
as  a  "  small  game."  He  had  a  pure  mind,  rarely  told  a 
smutty  story  and  did  not  relish  hearing  one  unless  there 
was  something  in  it  that  he  thought  clever.  He  was 
nevertheless  rather  undiscriminating  in  his  response  to 
humorous  fancies  and,  though  some  of  his  intimates 
found  in  him  an  amusing  companion,  it  was  mainly  his 
whole-hearted  audacity  that  made  them  laugh.  He 
gravitated  toward  the  society  of  the  best  men.  Amongst 
those  one  met  at  his  dinner  table  in  Washington  were 
Root,  Justice  White,  Taft,  Long,  0.  H.  Platt,  Hobart, 
Allison,  Aldrich  and  occasionally  Secretary  Hay  and 
Senator  Lodge. 

Popular  knowledge  of  a  man  of  action  who  left  few 
letters,  did  not  keep  a  diary  nor  write  a  book  depends 
largely  upon  his  biographer  and,  in  this  respect,  Hanna 
was  exceptionally  happy.  His  son  selected  Herbert  Croly, 


CH.  I.]  MARK  HANNA  9 

who  made  the  work  a  labor  of  love  and  has  presented  the 
real  Mark  Hanna  with  remarkable  perspicacity  and  skill. 
Some  of  Hanna's  friends,  on  hearing  of  the  selection,  may 
have  shuddered  at  the  thought  of  an  author  with  social 
istic  proclivities  undertaking  the  biography  of  a  strong 
individualist;  yet  the  accomplished  editor  of  the  Amer 
ican  Statesmen  series  had  chosen  Carl  Schurz,  an  avowed 
tariff  reformer,  to  write  the  life  of  Henry  Clay  and  the 
wisdom  of  this  selection  had  been  fully  demonstrated. 
Even  so  was  the  choice  of  Herbert  Croly  to  write  the  life 
of  Mark  Hanna.  One  may  learn  from  that  book  what 
manner  of  man  was  Hanna  when  he  determined  to  bend 
all  his  energies  to  the  nomination  of  McKinley  in  1896. 
Hanna  and  McKinley  were  warm  personal  friends. 
They  had  first  met  in  1876  in  the  Court  House  at  Canton, 
Ohio,  where  were  being  tried  one  miner  for  assault  with 
intent  to  kill  and  a  number  of  others  for  being  engaged 
in  a  riot.  Hanna  as  head  of  his  Coal  Company  was  active 
in  prosecution  and  McKinley  was  one  of  the  attorneys 
of  the  Stark  County  bar  who  had  volunteered  for  the 
defence.  It  was  a  trial  in  which  bitterness  developed  on 
both  sides  and  McKinley  won  attention  from  the  prose 
cution  by  his  personal  resemblance  to  Daniel  Webster, 
and  by  his  gentle  consideration  for  the  men  who  had 
deemed  it  their  duty  to  prosecute  the  offending  miners. 
In  the  same  autumn  McKinley  was  elected  to  Congress 
and  by  degrees  he  and  Hanna  became  intimate  acquaint 
ances.  At  the  National  Convention  of  1884,  they  shared 
an  apartment  at  a  hotel;  their  relations  were  cordial 
although  McKinley  was  for  Elaine  and  Hanna  for  Sher 
man.  The  Convention  of  1888,  when  they  both  supported 
Sherman,  increased  the  mutual  attachment.  Each  saw 


10  CLEVELAND'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1896 

qualities  in  the  other  that  drew  them  together  and,  as 
both  were  working  for  the  same  end,  they  were  now  in 
complete  sympathy. 

Hanna's  admiration  for  McKinley  was  profound.  He 
shared  his  belief  in  the  protective  tariff  as  something 
sacred  and  not  to  be  touched  by  profane  hands.  A  man 
put  forward  for  the  presidential  nomination  should  lose 
no  opportunity  of  seeing  influential  men  in  the  several 
States  and  commending  himself  to  them  by  his  personal 
bearing.  Once  when  Hanna  had  with  some  difficulty 
secured  an  assemblage  of  men  to  meet  the  prospective 
candidate  in  an  Eastern  city,  McKinley  sent  regrets  on 
account  of  the  illness  of  an  invalid  wife.  This,  for  the 
moment,  irritated  Hanna  as  he  thought  that  the  wife 
might  in  her  chronic  condition  have  been  left  to  the  care 
of  a  doctor  and  nurse,  as  she  was  by  no  means  danger 
ously  ill  and  that  McKinley  might  have  kept  the  engage 
ment  which  would  have  been  a  signal  aid  to  his  candidacy. 
This  misfortune  seemed  to  Hanna  a  considerable  obstacle 
in  the  path  of  McKinley's  advancement  yet  he  was  so 
struck  with  the  man's  sublime  devotion  to  his  invalid 
wife  that  he  could  not  help  exclaiming,  "  McKinley  is 
a  saint." 

Hanna  "had  not  a  single  small  trait  in  his  nature," 
declared  Roosevelt.  "  I  never  needed  to  be  in  doubt  as 
to  whether  he  would  carry  through  a  fight  or  in  any  way 
go  back  on  his  word."1 

Hanna's  friendship  with  Ben  Butterworth  embodied  a 
rare  unselfishness  that  dignified  his  strenuous  and  success 
ful  career.  Croly  prints  some  letters  from  Butterworth 
to  Hanna  that  are  charming  in  the  devotion  shown  by 

1  Croly,   361. 


CH.  I.]  MARK  HANNA  11 

him  who  stuck  to  the  lesser  man  through  thick  and  thin. 
Butterworth  was  of  too  independent  and  impulsive  a 
nature  to  be  successful  in  politics  but  his  honest  appear 
ance  and  conduct  gave  him  a  standing  with  leaders  that 
he  seemed  unable  to  acquire  with  the  mass.  When  he 
was  unsuccessful  in  politics  Hanna  redoubled  his  assist 
ance  and  when  at  last  he  fell  fatally  ill  Hanna  watched  by 
his  bedside  in  a  Cleveland  hotel  with  the  same  devotion 
that  he  would  pay  to  a  brother. 

The  campaign  for  the  nomination  was  proceeding  apace 
when  McKinley  gave  it  a  set-back  through  his  own  finan 
cial  failure.  He  made  himself  liable  by  endorsements  to 
help  a  friend  for  one  hundred  and  thirty  thousand  dollars, 
a  large  sum  in  1893  and  an  enormous  one  for  the  Gover 
nor  of  Ohio.  He  had  no  other  idea  than  that  the  debt 
must  be  paid  in  full  and  it  seemed  to  him  as  if  the  labor 
necessary  to  this  end  meant  the  close  of  his  political  career. 
But  Hanna,  Myron  T.  Herrick,  H.  H.  Kohlsaat  and  many 
others  came  to  his  aid  and  saved  him  from  bankruptcy. 
These  facts  were  more  or  less  publicly  known  and 
McKinley  was  reproached  with  having  put  himself  in 
the  power  of  these  men  by  accepting  financial  favors  for 
which  they  would  expect  repayment  in  some  way.  But  it 
does  not  appear  that  any  of  them  asked  for  consideration 
nor  that  anything  was  done  for  the  raisers  of  the  fund 
except  for  Hanna  and  Herrick  who  received  McKinley's 
support  on  entirely  different  grounds.1 


1  In  this  characterization  I  have  been  helped  by  Life  of  Hanna,  Herbert 
Croly;  Mark  Hanna,  Solon  Lauer,  Cleveland,  1901 ;  William  Allen  White's 
article,  McClure's  Magazine,  Nov.  1900;  Murat  Halstead,  Review  of 
Reviews,  Oct.  1896 ;  the  contemporary  cartoons ;  many  newspaper  notices 
of  Hanna's  death  in  Feb.  1904.  My  son,  Daniel  P.  Rhodes,  was  private 
secretary  of  Mark  Hanna  for  a  year  and  a  half  covering  1897  and  a  part 
of  1898 ;  to  him  I  owe  a  careful  revision  of  this  whole  chapter. 


12  CLEVELAND'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1896 

Croly  has  related  in  sufficient  detail  Hanna's  labor 
in  securing  the  nomination  of  McKinley.  From  January 
1,  1895,  his  whole  attention  was  devoted  to  the  work  and 
everything  that  energy,  social  entertainment,  political 
blandishment  and  the  judicious  use  of  money  could  ac 
complish  was  forthcoming  in  full  measure.  He  spent, 
said  Croly,  "  something  over  $100,000"  (which  would 
not  now  1  be  considered  a  large  amount)  obtaining  almost 
no  assistance  from  his  friends.  "  Corrupt  methods  were 
always  expressly  and  absolutely  forbidden,"  wrote  Croly, 
but  when  Hanna  put  in  his  own  time  and  energy  he  could 
make  a  dollar  go  a  great  way,  as  he  did  in  this  case  al 
though  he  had  opposed  to  him  Quay  and  Thomas  C. 
Platt,  adepts  in  all  the  arts  of  political  management,  as 
well  as  a  hearty  New  England  backing  of  Thomas  B. 
Reed  who,  by  common  consent,  was  well  fitted  for  the 
place.  Yet  it  was  not  Hanna's  work  alone  that  won  the 
prize.  McKinley,  in  capacity  and  manner,  was  well  fitted 
for  the  White  House;  moreover,  since  1893,  affairs  had 
been  working  his  way.  The  panic  of  1893  had  been  fol 
lowed  by  a  commercial  crisis  and  business  was  extremely 
bad.  The  Republicans  ascribed  the  evil  condition  to 
Democratic  success  and  to  the  avowed  promise  of  a  re 
duction  of  the  tariff.  The  tariff  was  reduced  during  the 
summer  of  1894  and  the  autumn  elections  for  Congress 
men  showed  a  complete  change  in  public  sentiment.  It 
was  natural  that  a  distracted  public  should  turn  to  the 
arch-protectionist  for  relief.  McKinley  was  reflected 
Governor  of  Ohio  in  1893  by  an  increased  majority  2  and 
in  geographical  and  all  other  respects  was  an  available 
candidate. 

1 1919.  2  For  McKinley's  first  election  see  my  vol.  viii.  374. 


CH.  I.]  THE  ST.  LOUIS  CONVENTION  13 

Henry  Clay  said  in  the  bitterness  of  his  disappoint 
ment  at  failing  to  receive  the  Whig  nomination  in  1840, 
"If  there  were  two  Henry  Clays,  one  of  them  would  make 
the  other  President  of  the  United  States."  J  But 
McKinley 's  and  Hanna' s  relations  were  so  intimate  that 
Hanna  might  be  called  an  alter-ego.  What  one  could 
not  do,  the  other  could.  McKinley  knew  the  men  in 
public  life  through  and  through,  and  Hanna  learned  how 
to  manipulate  conventions  and  secure  delegates ;  and  he 
thought  that  he  was  serving  party  and  country  well  in 
putting  to  the  fore  an  arch-protectionist.  By  May  1, 
1896,  if  not  before,  Hanna  felt  that  McKinley's  nomi 
nation  was  assured,  but  before  the  Convention  met  on 
June  16  in  St.  Louis  the  question  of  platform  was  the 
most  important  one,  and  the  only  portion  on  which  there 
was  a  marked  divergence  of  opinion  related  to  silver ; 
this  difference  grew  as  the  time  for  the  assembling  of  the 
Convention  approached.  When  the  delegates  began  to 
come  together,  the  Committee  on  Resolutions,  of  which 
Foraker  was  the  chairman  and  Senator  Lodge  the  Massa 
chusetts  member,  had  many  declarations  to  consider  but, 
out  of  the  confusion  and  heat  of  convention  days,  only 
two  resolutions  are  important  for  the  historian ;  these 
are  the  McKinley-Hanna  resolution,  which  Hanna  brought 
with  him  to  Chicago,  and  the  resolution  finally  adopted 
by  the  Convention,  on  which  the  canvass  of  1896  was 
made. 

Both  McKinley  and  Hanna  were  bimetallists.  While 
in  Congress,  McKinley  had  in  1877  and  1878  voted  for 
free  silver,  for  the  Bland- Allison  bill  and  for  its  passage 
over  President  Hayes's  veto ;  but  in  his  support  of  silver 

1  Schurz's  Clay,  ii.  181. 


14  CLEVELAND'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1896 

he  was  backed  by  both  senators  from  Ohio  and  all  the 
representatives  except  James  A.  Garfield.  In  the  dis 
cussions  of  Garfield's  course,  which  were  of  daily  occur 
rence  among  business  men  in  Cleveland,  his  dissenting 
voice  was  generally  approved,  but  Hanna  vigorously 
opposed  his  position  and  endorsed  that  of  the  other  mem 
bers,  especially  of  the  representative  from  Cleveland,  who 
was  a  personal  and  political  friend.  Thus  McKinley  and 
Hanna  had  been  favorable  to  silver  for  eighteen  years 
when  it  fell  to  them  to  decide  the  issue  on  which  the  cam 
paign  of  1896  should  be  made.  And  they  both,  for  ob 
vious  reasons  to  anyone  who  understands  their  political 
careers,  desired  to  have  the  paramount  issue  the  tariff, 
while  silver  should  be  relegated  to  a  subsidiary  place. 

In  1896  in  Ohio  it  was  no  disgrace  to  be  a  bimetallist. 
It  was  much  easier  to  favor  a  single  gold  standard  in 
New  York  or  Boston;  yet  in  Boston  some  of  the  most 
eminent  statesmen,  authors,  business  men  and  politi 
cians,  under  the  brilliant  leadership  of  General  Walker, 
had  embraced  the  doctrine  of  silver  and,  though  opposing 
the  free  coinage  of  the  metal,  were  eager  for  its  adoption 
as  a  money  standard  by  international  agreement.  Be 
tween  1894  and  1896  many  of  these  Bostonians  were  con 
verted  to  a  single  gold  standard  although  they  still  held 
to  the  fiction  of  international  agreement  which,  as  the 
wisest  of  them  knew,  was  out  of  the  question.  This  con 
version  was  undoubtedly  due  to  the  great  work  of  Grover 
Cleveland  and  while  most  Republicans  would  have 
spurned  the  idea  of  having  been  so  influenced  yet  to  the 
historian  it  appears  that  they  were  thus  unconsciously 
swayed. 

In  the  pre-Convention  days  in  St.  Louis  the  Eastern 


CH.  I.]  GOLD  AND  SILVER  15 

men,  whose  leader  may  be  said  to  have  been  Senator 
Lodge,  were  eager  for  the  mention  of  gold ;  many  from 
the  Middle  West  desired  a  plank  which  could  be  inter 
preted  as  favoring  gold  in  the  East  and  yet  not  condemn 
ing  silver  in  the  West.  The  McKinley-Hanna  resolu 
tion  read:  The  Republican  party  " would  welcome 
bimetallism  based  upon  an  international  ratio,  but,  until 
that  can  be  secured,  it  is  the  plain  duty  of  the  United 
States  to  maintain  our  present  standard,  and  we  are  there 
fore  opposed  under  existing  conditions  to  the  free  and 
unlimited  coinage  of  silver  at  sixteen  to  one."  Before 
these  words,  it  spoke  of  "  maintaining  all  the  money  of 
the  United  States  whether  gold,  silver  or  paper  at  par 
with  the  best  money  in  the  world  and  up  to  the  standard 
of  the  most  enlightened  governments."  The  resolution 
adopted  by  the  Convention,  which  was  agreed  to  by  Sen 
ator  Lodge  and  his  associates,  read:  uWe  are  opposed 
to  the  free  coinage  of  silver  except  by  international  agree 
ment  with  the  leading  commercial  nations  of  the  world, 
which  we  pledge  ourselves  to  promote,  and  until  such 
agreement  can  be  obtained  the  existing  gold  standard 
must  be  preserved.  All  our  silver  and  paper  currency 
must  be  maintained  at  parity  with  gold  and  we  favor  all 
measures  designed  to  maintain  inviolably  the  obligations 
of  the  United  States  and  all  our  money,  whether  coin  or 
paper  at  the  present  standard,  the  standard  of  the  most 
enlightened  nations  of  the  earth."  It  is  easy  to  see  that 
the  controversy  turned  on  a  few  words.  Should  the  Re 
publican  party  " maintain  our  present  standard"  or  pre 
serve  "the  existing  gold  standard"?  To  the  historian 
conversant  with  the  action  of  Grover  Cleveland,  the  dif 
ference  does  not  seem  great,  but  to  the  framer  of  platforms 


16  CLEVELAND'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1896 

and  the  campaigner  it  was  immense.  One  resolution 
declared  in  favor  of  gold  by  name,  the  other  did  not; 
hence  it  turned  out  that  the  Republicans  were  known 
throughout  the  campaign  as  the  party  of  gold,  the  Dem 
ocrats  as  the  party  of  silver.  It  is  no  wonder,  then,  that 
the  adoption  of  this  resolution  is  considered  so  important 
an  episode  in  the  history  of  the  Republican  party  and  of 
the  country,  and  that  so  many  lay  claim  to  a  paramount 
influence  in  securing  its  insertion. 

When  Hanna  saw  that,  owing  to  the  sentiment  devel 
oped  among  the  delegates,  his  own  view  could  not  pre 
vail,  he  accepted  the  result  gracefully  and  persuaded 
McKinley  to  do  likewise.  The  Committee  agreed  on  the 
financial  plank  and  reported  it  to  the  Convention,  which 
adopted  it  by  a  vote  of  812 J  to  110^.  Before  the  adop 
tion  of  this  plank,  Senator  Teller  of  Colorado  offered  a  sub 
stitute  demanding  the  free  coinage  of  silver  but  obtained 
only  105|  votes  against  818^;  this  vote  foreshadowed 
the  adoption  of  the  financial  plank  by  nearly  the  same 
majority.  After  making  some  pathetic  remarks,  he, 
with  thirty- three  others,  seceded  from  the  Convention. 
The  rest  of  the  platform  was  then  adopted  by  acclama 
tion.1 

McKinley  was  then  nominated  by  661 1  votes,  his  lead 
ing  opponent,  Thomas  B.  Reed,  receiving  84J.  Garret 
A.  Hobart  of  New  Jersey  was  named  for  Vice  President. 


1  Life  of  Hanna,  Croly ;  Foraker,  Notes  of  a  Busy  Life,  i. ;  Charles 
Emory  Smith,  Philadelphia  Press,  June  24,  1896,  cited  by  Boston  Daily 
Advertiser;  The  Autobiography  of  T.  C.  Platt;  MS.  statement  of  Eben 
S.  Draper,  Chairman  of  the  Mass,  delegation,  Jan.  9,  1900 ;  H.  H.  Kohl- 
saat's  story,  N.  Y.  Eve.  Post,  April  30,  1910;  Letter  of  Frank  S.  Wither- 
bee,  N.  Y.  Eve.  Post,  April  13,  1910;  W.  A.  White,  McClure's,  Nov. 
1900 ;  Halstead  in  Review  of  Reviews,  Oct.  1896 ;  Lodge,  Speeches 
and  Addresses,  1900 ;  Stanwood,  Hist,  of  the  Presidency. 


CH.  I.]  GOLD  AND  SILVER  17 

On  June  18  when  McKinley  was  nominated,  Republi 
can  success  was  deemed  more  than  probable.  Mark 
Hanna  was  made  Chairman  of  the  Republican  National 
Committee  but  thought  of  taking  a  yacht  cruise  along 
the  New  England  Coast  to  obtain  a  needed  rest  after 
"the  great  strain"  imposed  by  the  work  resulting  in 
McKinley's  nomination.  "I  would  have  been  glad,"  he 
wrote  in  a  private  letter,  "to  have  escaped  the  responsi 
bility  of  managing  the  campaign,  but  there  was  no  way 
out  of  it  and  I  feel  that  I  am  '  enlisted  for  the  war '  and 
must  win."  This  letter  was  written  on  July  3  when 
Hanna  had  no  idea  that  he  had  an  easy  victory  before 
him;  as  between  June  18  and  July  3  public  sentiment 
showed  that  the  Republican  party  in  identifying  itself 
with  gold  had  run  the  risk  of  losing  some  of  the  Western 
States.  "I  must  get  the  work  of  education  started,"  he 
said,  "  before  I  can  take  my  necessary  recreation."  "The 
fight  will  be  in  the  Mississippi  Valley  States,"  he  added. 
"The  'gold'  basis  is  giving  us  lots  of  work."  l 

The  Democratic  Convention  in  Chicago,  meeting  on 
July  7,  defined  the  issue  plainly  between  gold  and  silver 
and  changed  the  hoped-for  victory  of  the  Republicans 
into  a  premonition  of  defeat.  There  were  many  indica 
tions  that  the  Democrats  would  espouse  the  cause  of  free 
silver.  Richard  P.  Bland  of  Missouri  was  their  idol, 
leader  and  probable  candidate  for  the  presidency  and  he 
had  publicly  said  that  the  Democracy  of  the  West  was 
convinced  that  "the  gold  standard  meant  bankruptcy" 
and  that  the  Convention  would  declare  for  the  "free 
coinage  of  silver  at  16  to  I."2  The  delegates  who  were 

1  Letter  from  Cleveland. 

2  Twenty  Years  of  the  Republic,  Peck,  492. 


18  CLEVELAND'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1896 

known  as  Cleveland  men  made  a  valiant  fight,  but  their 
financial  plank  was  rejected  by  303  to  626  and  their  en 
dorsement  of  Cleveland's  administration  by  357 :  564. 
During  the  discussion  of  the  financial  resolution,  William 
J.  Bryan  leaped  into  prominence  through  a  speech  that 
carried  the  Convention.  "Upon  which  side  will  the  Dem 
ocratic  party  fight,"  he  asked,  "upon  the  side  of  the  idle 
holders  of  idle  capital  or  upon  the  side  of  the  struggling 
masses?  .  .  .  Having  behind  us  the  producing  masses 
of  this  nation  and  the  world,  supported  by  the  commer 
cial  interests,  the  laboring  interests  and  the  toilers  every 
where,  we  will  answer  their  demand  for  a  gold  standard 
by  saying  to  them :  '  You  shall  not  press  down  upon  the 
brow  of  labor  this  crown  of  thorns,  you  shall  not  crucify 
mankind  upon  a  cross  of  gold.' "  l  The  platform  as  re 
ported  by  the  Committee  on  Resolutions  was  adopted 
by  628  to  301.  It  declared  that,  "Gold  monometallism 
is  a  British  policy  and  its  adoption  has  brought  other 
nations  into  financial  servitude  to  London.  .  .  .  We 
demand  the  free  and  unlimited  coinage  of  both  silver  and 
gold  at  the  present  legal  ratio  of  sixteen  to  one  without 
waiting  for  the  aid  or  consent  of  any  other  nation." 2 
Some  of  the  other  resolutions  were  judged  to  be  "anar 
chistic";  they  were  certainly  extremely  radical  for  1896. 

Bryan's  speech,  especially  the  last  clause  of  the  last 
sentence  cited  above,  made  him  the  Democratic  candi 
date  for  the  presidency. 

"The  Chicago  convention  has  changed  everything," 
wrote  Hanna  in  a  private  letter  on  July  16.  It  has 
knocked  out  my  holiday  and  cruise  along  the  New  Eng 
land  coast.  The  campaign  "will  be  work  and  hard  work 

1  Bryan,  The  First  Battle,  206.  *  Stanwood,  542. 


CH.  I.]  THE  MONEY  QUESTION  19 

from  the  start.  I  consider  the  situation  in  the  West  quite 
alarming  as  business  is  all  going  to  pieces  and  idle  men 
will  multiply  rapidly.  With  this  communistic  spirit 
abroad  the  cry  of  'free  silver7  will  be  catching/7  Both 
Hanna  and  McKinley  felt  that  the  Republican  party  was 
united  on  the  tariff  but  divided  on  the  silver  question. 
During  a  conference,  probably  before  Bryan's  nomina 
tion,  McKinley  said,  "I  am  a  Tariff  man  standing  on  a 
Tariff  platform.  This  money  matter  is  unduly  promi 
nent.  In  thirty  days  you  won't  hear  anything  about 
it,"  when  William  R.  Day  l  remarked,  "In  my  opinion  in 
thirty  days  you  won't  hear  of  anything  else."  2  Even 
after  the  Chicago  Convention,  Hanna  expressed  himself 
as  not  wishing  to  allow  the  tariff  issue  to  be  over 
shadowed  by  the  financial.3  But  the  logic  of  events 
taught  both  McKinley  and  Hanna  that  a  determined 
fight  must  be  put  up  against  free  silver  in  the  Western 
States ;  and  in  point  of  fact  their  belief  in  bimetallism, 
but  only  on  an  international  basis,  proved  as  effective  in 
the  conduct  of  the  campaign  as  if  they  had  been  uncom 
promising  advocates  of  the  single  gold  standard. 

The  Republican  secession  affected  the  vote  in  some  of 
the  Western  States  but  the  Democratic  "bolt"  was  more 
significant.  It  took  two  forms :  one,  the  nomination  of 
separate  candidates  for  President  and  Vice  President 
known  as  gold  Democrats,  and  the  other  votes  given  di 
rectly  to  McKinley  as  the  surest  means  of  beating  Bryan. 

There  is  no  question  that  business  was  much  depressed 
and  that  many  men  were  out  of  employment.  The  Re 
publicans  had  hoped  to  charge  this  condition  to  the  Dem- 


Justice  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  (1919). 
2  Life  of  McKinley,  Olcott,  321.  3  Life  of  Foraker,  i.  492. 


20  CLEVELAND'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1896 

ocratic  administration  and  to  the  Tariff  bill  of  1894,  and 
therefore  McKinley,  who  represented  protection  more 
than  any  other  man  in  the  country,  was  the  logical  can 
didate.  He  was  the  "advance  agent  of  prosperity"  and 
promised  the  "full  dinner  pail";  prosperity  was  to  be 
secured  by  a  return  to  the  protective  tariff  of  the  Repub 
lican  party.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Bryan  Democrats, 
though  agreeing  to  the  Republican  estimate  of  present 
conditions,  promised  an  entirely  different  remedy  for  the 
hard  times,  and  proposed  a  different  policy  for  reducing 
the  army  of  the  unemployed.  Remonetize  silver,  coin  it  at 
the  ratio  of  16  to  1,  stop  measuring  money  by  the  English 
standard  but  increase  its  volume,  they  averred,  and  the 
distress  of  men  in  legitimate  business  and  of  honest  la 
borers  out  of  employment  will  disappear.  The  demone 
tization  of  silver  enhanced  the  value  of  the  circulating 
medium  and  was  in  the  interest  of  the  creditor;  restore 
it  to  its  proper  place,  they  argued,  and  the  augmented 
circulation  will  enable  the  debtor  to  pay  his  debts  and 
start  all  the  wheels  of  industry  going. 

Bryan  proved  an  effective  campaigner,  although  his 
first  move  was  not  successful.  Determined  to  open  the 
campaign  in  "the  enemy's  country"  he  formally  accepted 
the  nomination  in  a  speech  in  Madison  Square  Garden, 
New  York  City.  But  he  committed  an  error  in  reading 
the  speech  which  he  had  carefully  written  out.  For 
Bryan,  though  an  orator,  was  a  poor  reader.  Other 
conditions  were  against  him.  The  weather,  even  for  the 
second  week  of  August,  was  extremely  hot  and  the  noti 
fication  speech  unduly  long.  The  large  audience  who 
had  expected  to  laugh  at  "his  free  Western  sallies  and 
audacities"  found  him  "transformed  into  a  Professor 


CH.  I.]  WILLIAM  J.   BRYAN  21 

Dryasdust  prosing  through  two  mortal  hours.  .  .  .  No 
wonder  that  they  fled  before  his  portentous  pile  of 
manuscript  with  cries  of  'Good-night,  Billy.' "  l 

New  York  and  other  Eastern  financial  centres  breathed 
a  sigh  of  relief.  They  had  been  greatly  alarmed  at 
Bryan's  stirring  speech  before  his  nomination  and  his  short 
addresses  on  the  way  from  Lincoln  to  New  York  City,  but 
now  they  heard  or  read  a  dull  economic  argument,  which 
could  not  carry  conviction  to  thinking  men  and  which 
utterly  failed  to  rouse  the  proletariat.  Depression  at 
the  fear  that  Bryan  and  his  financial  fnl^tr-ies  would  carry 
the  country  was  succeeded  by  a  momentary  and  undue 
elation  of  the  conservative  forces. 

But  when  Bryan  began  his  trip  through  the  country, 
his  native  ability  as  an  orator  and  his  sincere  belief  in 
the  fallacies  that  he  advocated  gained  him  large  audiences 
and  shaped  convictions.  Farmers,  obliged  to  accept 
a  low  price  for  their  products,  and  laborers,  who  desired 
work  but  could  not  get  it,  were  glad  to  learn  that  free  sil 
ver  was  the  one  simple  remedy  for  their  trouble.  The 
distress  was  indeed  grave.  If  we  subtract  from  Dr.  Tal- 
mage's  remarks  what  they  contained  of  rhetorical  ex 
aggeration,  an  extract  from  his  non-partisan  sermon  will 
give  us  an  excellent  idea.  "  Never  within  my  memory/' 
he  said,  "have  so  many  people  literally  starved  to  death 
as  in  the  past  few  months.  Have  you  noticed  in  the 
newspapers  how  many  men  and  women  here  and  there 
have  been  found  dead,  the  post-mortem  examination 
stating  that  the  cause  of  death  was  hunger?  There  is 
not  a  day  when  we  do  not  hear  the  crash  of  some  great 


1  The  Nation,  Aug.  20,  134. 


22  CLEVELAND'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1896 

commercial  establishment  and  as  a  consequence  many 
people  are  thrown  out  of  employment.  Among  what  we 
considered  comfortable  homes  have  come  privation  and 
close  calculation  and  an  economy  that  kills.  Millions 
of  people  who  say  nothing  about  it  are  at  this  moment 
at  their  wits'  end.  There  are  millions  of  people  who  do 
not  want  charity  but  want  work."  1 

Gold  win  Smith,  a  keen  observer,  felt  Bryan's  "  pre 
ternatural  power  of  clap- trap  declamation."  2  The  Dem 
ocratic  National  Committee  cooperated  skilfully  with 
their  candidate  and  made  their  appeal  for  funds  in  an 
attractive  manner.  Their  pressing  need  was  the  hiring 
of  speakers  and  the  distribution  of  documents  "for  the 
dissemination  of  the  truth."  One  hundred  and  twenty- 
five  thousand  of  " Coin's  Financial  School"  were  circu 
lated,  a  device  that  showed  how  clever  they  were.  This 
little  book  was  made  up  of  addresses  purporting  to  be 
delivered  daily  to  large  Chicago  audiences,  that  were 
hereby  instructed  in  the  science  of  money  by  Coin,  a 
" smooth  little  financier."  The  fascination  of  his  manner, 
his  ready  argument,  apparent  fairness,  cannot  fail  to 
charm  even  the  reader  of  to-day  who  knows  that  the 
school  was  a  fiction  designed  to  serve  as  the  subject  of  an 
attractive  book  in  which  fallacious  arguments  might  be 
presented  that  would  otherwise  remain  unheard.  So  this 
amiable-looking  little  man  was  supposed  to  deliver  six  lec 
tures  from  the  platform  of  a  large  hall  of  the  Art  Insti 
tute  ;  and  these  were  attended  fictitiously  by  men  promi 
nent  in  business  and  finance,  who  were  argued  with  and 
either  convinced  or  refuted.  This  was  not  a  difficult 


1  Sept.  27.     The  First  Battle,  Bryan,  474. 
*Sat.  Rev.,  Oct.  31,  462. 


CH.  I.]  "COIN'S  FINANCIAL  SCHOOL"  23 

task  as  the  opponents  were  men  of  straw,  and  the  sym 
pathetic  reader  of  the  book  was  quite  ready  to  believe 
that  "the  little  financier  could  not  be  cornered." 

England  cannot  always  be  defended,  but  it  was  un 
merited  ill-luck  that  her  work  in  the  cause  of  sound 
finance  should  be  bandied  about  in  the  course  of  an  ex 
cited  political  campaign.  " Coin's  Financial  School"  is 
illustrated  with  rude  but  effective  wood-cuts  and,  when 
Cleveland  or  Sherman  is  lampooned,  such  illustrations 
can  be  considered  only  proper  game ;  but  the  comity  of 
nations  is  transcended  when  Uncle  Sam  is  pictured  firing 
a  cannon  to  the  utter  discomfiture  of  England  with  the 
amiable  little  Coin  standing  by,  doffing  his  silk  hat  to 
the  hurrah,  "What  our  answer  to  England  should  be." 
This  sentiment  he  elaborated  in  his  last  lecture :  "A  war 
with  England,"  he  said,  "would  be  the  most  popular  war 
ever  waged  on  the  face  of  the  earth.  If  it  is  true  that  she 
can  dictate  the  money  of  the  world  and  thereby  create 
world-wide  misery,  it  would  be  the  most  just  war  ever 
waged  by  man."  ! 

To  no  better  team  could  the  defence  of  the  financial 
honor  of  the  country  have  been  confided  than  to  McKin- 
ley  and  Hanna.  When  they  came  to  appreciate  that  the 
fight  must  be  against  free  silver,  they  wrought  like  vet 
erans  in  the  cause.  Hanna  exerted  his  wonderful  talent 
of  organization  and  threw  himself  into  the  contest  with 
unstinted  energy.  He  raised  the  necessary  funds.  Soon 
gaining  the  confidence  of  New  York  City  financial  men, 
he  obtained  from  them  important  contributions  to  his 
campaign.  Some  concerns  were  assessed  by  Hanna  ac- 

1  Coin's  Financial  School,  by  W.  H.  Harvey,  150  pages  and  64  illus 
trations.  Popular  edition,  25  cents;  Cloth,  $1.00.  This  book  sold  well. 


24  CLEVELAND'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1896 

cording  to  what  he  conceived  to  be  their  financial  interest 
in  the  canvass,  a  uniform  assessment  of  one  quarter  of 
one  per  cent  being  levied  on  the  banks.  He  systematized 
the  expenditure  and  had  the  books  kept  on  true  business 
principles.  The  Republican  National  Committee  spent 
between  three  and  three  and  a  half  millions  and  had  also 
in  reserve  a  guarantee  fund  which  was  not  called  upon. 
Hanna  early  perceived  that  this  was  to  be  a  campaign 
of  education.  Six  hundred  thousand  dollars  were  spent 
for  documents  that  were  printed  in  German,  French, 
Spanish,  Italian,  Swedish,  Norwegian,  Danish,  Dutch 
and  Hebrew,  as  well  as  English ;  among  those  which  were 
carefully  distributed  were  Sherman's,  Carlisle's  and 
McKinley's  speeches.  The  New  York  Evening  Post's  Free 
Coinage  Catechism  was  much  in  demand  and  gladly  sup 
plied.  It  was  written  by  Alexander  D.  No  yes,  the  Post's 
financial  editor,  and  two  million  copies  of  it  were  circu 
lated.  Carl  Schurz  was  induced  to  enter  the  canvass  on 
behalf  of  McKinley,  and  one  million  and  a  half  copies  of  a 
clear  and  convincing  speech  of  his  were  scattered  abroad. 
This  speech  lent  itself  to  sententious  quotations ;  hence 
the  leaflets  called  Schurz  nuggets  that  were  placed  before 
many  readers.  Innumerable  speakers  of  lesser  note  pre 
sented  the  case  against  free  silver.  Men  in  every  county 
of  the  pivotal  Western  States  were  supplied  with  sound 
money  literature ;  and,  as  they  could  not  give  their  time 
for  nothing,  they  were  hired  to  read  and  explain  the  pam 
phlets  and  talk  to  the  few  or  many  who  might  gather  at 
the  school-houses  or  other  places  of  resort  to  hear  ex 
pounded  the  political  issue  of  the  day.  Probably  the 
most  effective  speaker  in  gaining  votes  was  McKinley 
himself.  Declining  to  emulate  Bryan  in  his  "  whirlwind 


CH.  I.]  McKINLEY'S   "FRONT  PORCH"   SPEECHES  25 

tour/'  he  spoke  from  the  front  veranda  of  his  house  in 
Canton  to  many  deputations,  some  of  them  spontaneous, 
others  arranged  for,  discussing  mainly  the  financial  ques 
tion.  He  almost  always  knew  what  the  visiting  spokes 
man  was  going  to  say  so  that  he  was  often  able  to  revise 
his  own  address  beforehand.  These  speeches  of  McKin- 
ley's  were  carefully  prepared,  as  he  well  knew  that  he  was 
addressing  the  newspaper-reading  public  of  the  whole 
country  as  well  as  the  men  who  had  travelled  some  dis 
tance  to  greet  their  candidate  in  person.  Close  students 
of  the  art  of  guiding  public  sentiment  assert  that  people 
will  often  read  in  the  newspaper  a  speech  that  has  been 
orally  delivered  while  they  pass  by  an  essay  or  letter  in 
the  same  type  and  given  the  same  prominence.  McKin- 
ley's  efforts  were  called  his  "front  porch" Speeches  and, 
in  their  general  tenor  were  of  a  piece  with  the  formal  letter 
of  acceptance  that  was  given  to  the  public  on  August  26. 
Acknowledging  that  the  money  question  was  the  chief 
issue  of  the  campaign  he  gave  it  the  first  and  most  prom 
inent  place  in  his  letter.  "The  meaning  of  the  coinage 
plank  adopted  at  Chicago,"  he  wrote,  "is  that  anyone 
may  take  a  quantity  of  silver  bullion,  now  worth  fifty- 


1  John  Hay  said  in  his  Memorial  Address  on  McKinley  delivered  in  the 
Capitol  at  Washington  on  Feb.  27,  1902:  "From  the  front  porch  of  his 
modest  house  in  Canton  he  daily  addressed  the  delegations  which  came 
from  every  part  of  the  country  to  greet  him  in  a  series  of  speeches 
so  strong,  so  varied,  so  pertinent,  so  full  of  facts  briefly  set  forth,  of 
theories  embodied  in  a  single  phrase,  that  they  formed  the  hourly  text 
for  the  other  speakers  of  his  party  and  give  probably  the  most  convincing 
proof  we  have  of  his  surprising  fertility  of  resource  and  flexibility  of  mind. 
All  this  was  done  without  anxiety  or  strain.  I  remember  a  day  spent 
with  him  during  that  busy  summer.  He  had  made  nineteen  speeches  the 
day  before;  that  day  he  made  many.  But  in  the  intervals  of  these  ad 
dresses  he  sat  in  his  study  and  talked,  with  nerves  as  quiet  and  free  from 
care  as  if  we  had  been  spending  a  holiday  at  the  seaside  or  among 
the  hills." 


26  CLEVELAND'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1896 

three  cents,  to  the  mints  of  the  United  States,  have  it 
coined  at  the  expense  of  the  Government  and  receive  for 
it  a  silver  dollar  which  shall  be  legal  tender  for  the  pay 
ment  of  all  debts,  public  and  private.  .  .  .  Until  in 
ternational  agreement  is  had,  it  is  the  plain  duty  of  the 
United  States  to  maintain  the  gold  standard.  It  is 
the  recognized  and  sole  standard  of  the  great  commercial 
nations  of  the  world  with  which  we  trade  more  largely 
than  with  any  other.  Eighty-four  per  cent  of  our  for 
eign  trade  for  the  fiscal  year  1895  was  with  gold  standard 
countries  and  our  trade  with  other  countries  was  settled 
on  a  gold  basis."  Addressing  himself  to  the  argument 
that  the  "  present  industrial  and  financial  depression 
was  the  result  of  the  gold  standard,"  he  declared,  "Good 
money  never  made  times  hard." 

JSanna  had  a  high  opinion  of  the  influence  of  the  Fourth 
Estate  and  knew  the  hold  that  the  weekly  county  journals 
had  on  their  readers.  He  sent  them  specially  prepared 
matter,  plates  and  ready  prints.  It  was  fortunate  that 
nearly  all  of  the  large  daily  newspapers,  whether  Demo 
cratic  or  Republican,  were  ardent  advocates  of  the  cause 
of  sound  money ;  copies  of  these  were  industriously  dis 
tributed.  "Of  course,"  wrote  Croly,  "cartoons,  posters, 
inscriptions  and  buttons  were  manufactured  by  the  car 
load  —  the  most  popular  poster  being  the  five-colored, 
single-sheet  lithograph,  bearing  a  portrait  of  McKinley 
with  the  inscription  underneath,  'The  Advance  Agent 
of  Prosperity."'*) 

During  August  Hanna  was  somewhat  staggered  by  the 
poll  of  Iowa  which  indicated  that  this  sure  Republican 
State  would  cast  her  electoral  vote  for  Bryan.  Yet  ad- 

i  P.  218. 


CH.  I.]  McKINLEY  — BRYAN  27 

mitting,  for  the  moment,  that  Iowa  must  be  placed  in 
the  doubtful  column,  he  was  still  confident  of  McKinley's 
election,  believing  that  at  the  worst  it  would  be  a  close 
shave,  while  he  really  hoped  for  a  stampede.  At  any 
rate,  the  campaign  was  to  him  too  serious  a  matter  for 
any  phase  of  it  to  be  left  to  chance ;  indeed,  he  and 
McKinley  had  decided  that,  if  matters  got  desperate, 
McKinley  should  take  the  stump  in  Illinois,  Indiana, 
Michigan,  Iowa  and  Kansas. 

The  Methodist,  the  Roman  Catholic  and  the  other 
churches  were  mainly  on  the  side  of  sound  money  and 
many  preachers  did  not  hesitate  to  bring  politics 
into  the  pulpit  during  their  Sunday  exhortations.  Na 
ture  gave  a  welcome  help  to  Hanna  in  an  advance  in  the 
price  of  wheat.  Now  do  something  for  corn  came  a 
witty  demand  from  the  Indian  corn-growing  States. 

To  Bryan's  oratory  more  than  to  any  other  one  cause 
was  due  the  impression  that  the  campaign  was  one  of  the 
masses  against  the  classes.  Some  of  the  resolutions  of 
the  Chicago  platform  were  deemed  anarchistic  l  and  in 
fluenced  votes  against  Bryan  who  thought  it  wise  to  deny 
the  imputation.  "We  have  been  called  anarchists,"  he 
said.  "I  am  not  an  anarchist.  There  is  not  beneath 
the  flag  a  truer  friend  of  government  or  a  greater  lover 
of  law  and  order  than  the  nominee  of  the  Chicago  con 
vention."  2  It  is  difficult  to  describe  with  strict  impar 
tiality  a  heated  political  campaign  in  one's  own  country 
and  one's  own  time,  but  a  keen  observer  from  England 
should  have  been  able  to  view  the  events  of  1896  with  a 
comparative  lack  of  bias.  "I  have  never  thought  the 
Republic  in  [such]  serious  peril  as  I  do  now, "  wrote  Gold- 
1  Ante.  2  Speech  in  Baltimore  during  September,  463. 


28  CLEVELAND'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1896 

win  Smith,  "when  I  see  the  organization  of  the  Demo 
cratic  party  captured  by  Anarchism  and  Repudiation. 
Bimetallism,  you  will  understand,  is  the  least  part  of  the 
matter;  even  Repudiation  is  not  the  greatest.  The 
greatest  is  the  uprising  of  disorder,  in  all  its  forms  and 
grades  against  the  institutions  of  the  American  Repub 
lic.  .  .  .  Bryanism  is  a  vast  cave  of  Adullam,  in  which 
are  combined  all  the  distressed,  all  the  discontented,  all 
who  have  nothing  to  lose  and  may  hope  to  gain  by  a 
general  overturn.  ...  In  November  the  Republic  of 
the  Fathers  will  be  fighting  for  its  life."  1 

During  October  the  stampede  to  McKinley  took  place. 
General  J.  D.  Cox,  who  was  then  living  in  Cincinnati, 
Ohio,  wrote  on  October  26  in  a  private  letter:  "When 
I  went  East  in  June  I  am  sure  nine-tenths  of  the  Ohio 
Republicans  were  ardent  bimetallists,  with  more  leaning 
to  free  silver  than  to  gold  monometallism.  Now  nearly 
every  man  seems  to  rival  his  neighbor  in  putting  gold 
forward  as  the  single  standard.  .  .  .  The  claim  of  Re 
publican  managers  that  there  is  a  '  landslide '  going  on  in 
McKinley 's  favor,  I  assume  to  be  sufficiently  true  to  war 
rant  a  confident  expectation  of  his  election." 

Bryan  made  a  wonderful  canvass,  travelling  18,000 
miles  and  addressing  audiences  almost  every  day.  The 
mere  fact  of  his  bearing  the  physical  strain  he  was  under 
going  and  the  eagerness  of  people  to  see  and  hear  this 
famous  orator  must  have  counted  in  his  favor.2 


1  Saturday  Review,  Aug.  1,  Sept.  5,  Oct.  31. 

8  In  this  account  of  the  campaign  of  1896,  I  have  been  assisted  by 
Croly's  Life  of  Hanna;  Olcott's  Life  of  McKinley;  Bryan,  The  First 
Battle;  Peck;  Stanwood,  Hist,  of  the  Presidency;  The  Nation,  passim; 
Goldwin  Smith's  articles  in  the  Saturday  Review;  Foraker,  Notes  of  a 
Busy  Life,  i. ;  Conversations  with  Mark  Hanna,  Aug.  23,  Dec.  20. 


Courtesy  of  Mrs.  Medlll  McCormlck. 


CH.  I.]  THE  ELECTION   OF    1896  29 

On  Tuesday,  November  3,  nearly  fourteen  millions 
voted.  McKinley  was  triumphantly  elected.  He  was 
to  receive  271  electoral  votes  to  Bryan's  176,  a  majority 
of  95.  His  plurality  in  the  popular  vote  was  somewhat 
over  six  hundred  thousand.  "No  President  since  U.  S. 
Grant,"  wrote  Croly,  "entered  office  supported  by  so 
large  a  proportion  of  the  American  people  as  did  William 
McKinley."  l  Bryan  congratulated  McKinley  on  his 
election  and  the  successful  candidate  made  a  graceful 
reply. 

McKinley  carried  the  New  England  States,  New  York, 
New  Jersey  and  Pennsylvania  by  large  majorities.  The 
Middle  Western  States  gave  him  their  electoral  votes. 
He  invaded  the  solid  South,  carrying  Delaware,  Kentucky, 
West  Virginia  and  Maryland,  Maryland  by  an  imposing 
plurality.  Bryan  carried  Kansas  and  Nebraska,  all  the 
mining  States  except  California,  and  also  Washington, 
while  Oregon  voted  for  McKinley.  North  Dakota  did 
likewise,  while  South  Dakota  gave  her  electoral  vote  to 
Bryan  by  a  small  plurality.  Ohio,  the  State  of  McKinley 
and  Hanna,  was  a  disappointment  to  the  Republicans. 
While  they  never  regarded  seriously  the  boasts  of  the 
Bryanites  that  they  would  carry  the  State,  yet  her  plu 
rality,  being  less  than  that  of  Michigan  and  about  one 
third  that  of  Illinois,  showed  that  Ohio  was  somewhat 
uncertain.  For,  in  the  August  forecast,  Michigan  was 
set  down  as  very  doubtful  and,  while  Illinois  was  con- 
side^-ed  less  doubtful,  she  was  not  regarded,  like  Ohio,  as 
safe  beyond  perad venture  for  McKinley. 

iR  227. 


CHAPTER  II 

AFTER  the  election  of  McKinley,  Mark  Hanna  occupied 
an  enviable  position.  Had  it  been  usual,  the  freedom  of 
Cleveland  would  have  been  conferred  upon  him.  "He 
can  own  this  city/'  said  an  enthusiastic  financial  adherent. 
"What  a  glorious  record  Mark  Hanna  has  made  this 
year!"  wrote  John  Hay  in  a  private  letter.  "I  never 
knew  him  intimately  until  we  went  into  this  fight  together, 
but  my  esteem  and  admiration  for  him  have  grown  every 
hour.  He  is  a  born  general  in  politics,  perfectly  square, 
honest  and  courageous  with  a  coup  d'ceil  for  the  battle 
field,  and  a  knowledge  of  the  enemy's  weak  points  which 
is  very  remarkable.  I  do  not  know  whether  he  will  take 
a  share  in  the  government,  but  I  hope  he  will."  *  McKin 
ley  desired  him  to  accept  a  Cabinet  position  and  for  a 
while  he  revolved  in  his  mind  whether  he  would  not  take 
the  post  of  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  a  place  which  he 
was  entitled  to  and  which  he  would  have  admirably  filled. 
On  looking  into  the  matter,  however,  he  found  the 
routine  and  confinement  of  the  office  objectionable ;  more 
over,  he  aspired  after  the  senatorship  from  his  State  — 
an  office  that  would  give  him  the  influence  he  desired  to 
exert,  and  yet  effectually  preserve  his  independence. 
Therefore  he  made  public  the  declaration  that  he  would 
accept  no  office  from  the  McKinley  administration. 


Croly,  228. 
30 


Cn.  II.]  SECRETARY  SHERMAN  31 

Hanna  did  not  appreciate  that  this  statement  would 
rise  up  to  plague  him.  For  he  had  conceived  the  idea  of 
inducing  the  President  to  appoint  Senator  John  Sherman 
Secretary  of  State  and  of  being  appointed  by  the  Governor 
of  Ohio  to  succeed  him  for  his  unexpired  term  in  the  Sen 
ate  [March  4,  1899].  During  his  many  interviews  and 
conferences  with  McKinley  he  canvassed  the  matter, 
with  the  result  that  on  January  4,  1897,  the  President 
elect  offered  to  Sherman  the  position  of  Secretary  of  State 
in  his  administration,  and  this  was  promptly  accepted.1 
The  course  of  events  gave  efficient  support  to  those  who 
wished  to  attack  McKinley  and  Hanna,  as  it  demonstrated 
that  the  appointment  was  utterly  unfit  owing  to  mental 
failure  on  the  part  of  the  Secretary  of  State.  The  critics 
averred  that  Sherman  had  given  way  to  unusual  excite 
ment,  both  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate  and  in  a  newspaper 
interview,  that  his  memory  had  been  failing  for  two  or 
three  years,  that  this  fact  was  so  presented  to  Hanna 
and  McKinley  that  they  ought  to  have  recognized  it, 
staying  their  hands  from  such  procedure ;  that  it  was  in 
short,  a  case  of  an  aged  statesman  being  "  kicked  up 
stairs"  to  make  a  place  for  Mark  Hanna.  Sherman  him 
self,  after  the  resignation  of  the  office  of  Secretary  of  State 
[April  25,  1898]  by  newspaper  interview  and  private  let 
ter,  confirmed  this  criticism.  "No  doubt/'  he  wrote  con 
fidentially  on  November  8,  1898,  "I  ought  to  have  re 
mained  in  the  Senate  during  my  term,  which  would  not 
have  expired  until  the  4th  of  March  next.  At  that  time 
I  regarded  McKinley  as  a  sincere  and  ardent  friend,  whom 
I  had  assisted  and  whose  election  I  had  promoted.  When 


Life  of  McKinley,  Olcott,  329. 


32  CLEVELAND'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1897 

he  urged  me  to  accept  the  position  of  Secretary  of  State, 
I  accepted  with  some  reluctance  and  largely  to  promote 
the  wishes  of  Mark  Hanna.  The  result  was  that  I  lost 
the  position  both  of  Senator  and  Secretary.  .  .  .  They 
deprived  me  of  the  high  office  of  Senator  by  the  tempo 
rary  appointment  as  Secretary  of  State."  l 

Wisdom  after  the  event  is  the  source  of  much  criticism, 
and  so  it  is  in  this  case  when  the  well-meant  plan  of 
Hanna  and  McKinley  turned  out  badly.  Hanna  had 
twice  supported  Sherman  for  the  presidential  nomina 
tion,  and  had  a  high  idea  of  his  wisdom,  not  only  in 
finance  but  in  foreign  affairs ;  seeing  something  of  his  work 
as  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  in 
the  Senate,  he  admired  his  clear  comprehension  and  ef 
fective  statement,  and  as  he  felt  in  a  measure  responsi 
ble  for  the  success  of  the  McKinley  administration,  he 
really  thought  that  he  was  contributing  to  it  by  helping 
Sherman  to  the  leading  place  in  the  Cabinet.  His  atti 
tude  to  the  stories  that  came  to  him  regarding  Sherman's 
mental  failure  was  characteristic ;  he  had  such  confidence 
in  Sherman's  ability  and  so  desired  the  succession  to  the 
Senate  that  he  did  not  believe  the  stories,  even  though 
some  of  them  must  have  been  endorsed  by  his  New  York 
financial  friends  to  whom  he  had  been  drawn  closely  by 
the  exigencies  of  the  political  campaign.  He  knew  Sher 
man  well  socially;  was  aware  that  he  had  always  been 
temperate  in  eating  and  drinking,  moderate  in  all  of  his 
pleasures  and,  although  nearly  74,  could  not  see  that  there 


1  Notes  of  a  Busy  Life,  Foraker,  i.  508.  Sherman  died  in  1900. 
letter  was  handed  to  Foraker  by  General  Miles,  March  1,  1902,  but  was 
not  printed  until  the  first  edition  of  this  book,  which  was  published  in 
February,  1916. 


CH.  II.]  SECRETARY  SHERMAN  33 

was  any  reason  for  thinking,  apart  from  the  stories  that 
were  afloat,  that  he  might  not  be  physically  and  mentally 
fit  for  six  years  to  come.  The  Nation,  which  became  a 
severe  critic  of  the  appointment,  said  in  an  editorial  on 
August  20,  1896:  "  Senator  Sherman  can  make  a  good 
speech  when  he  tries  to  do  so.  His  speech  at  Columbus 
on  Saturday  was  one  of  the  best  he  has  ever  made."  l 

McKinley's  first  impression  against  Sherman's  appoint 
ment  was  entirely  different  from  the  result.  The  Sena 
tor  was  generally  considered  as  the  leader  of  his  party  in 
his  State  and  McKinley  feared  that  on  account  of  his 
masterfulness  he  would  wish  to  dominate  the  adminis 
tration.  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  with  this 
idea  fixed  in  his  mind  McKinley  should  have  made  little 
account  of  the  reports  that  he  heard  of  Sherman's  mental 
failure  and  should  write  to  Joseph  Medill  on  February 
8,  1897:  "I  concur  in  your  opinion  that  the  stories  re 
garding  Senator  Sherman's  ' mental  decay'  are  without 
foundation  and  the  cheap  inventions  of  sensational  writers 
or  other  evil-disposed  or  mistaken  people.  When  I 
saw  him  last  [this  was  January  15,  1897]  I  was  convinced 
both  of  his  perfect  health  physically  and  mentally,  and 
that  his  prospects  of  life  were  remarkably  good."  2 

Sherman  was  glad  to  accept  the  Secretaryship  of 
State.  He  exchanged  two  years  in  the  Senate  with  a 
doubtful  succession  for  apparently  a  four  years'  tenure  of 
the  Cabinet  head  of  the  new  Republican  administration, 
which  was  undoubtedly  a  promotion.  It  was  not  un 
usual,  however,  for  Senators  to  decline  Cabinet  appoint- 


1  P.  134 ;    see  also  June  24,  1897. 

2  Life  of  McKinley,  Olcott,  i.  334. 


34  CLEVELAND'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1897 

ments,  and  it  was  open  to  Sherman  to  do  so,  but  as  matter 
of  fact  the  prospect  was  attractive.  He  had  enjoyed 
himself  in  the  Treasury  Department  under  Hayes,  hav 
ing  great  influence  with  the  President  and  he  might  well 
have  thought  that  a  similar  experience  now  awaited 
him. 

The  important  question  was,  would  Governor  Asa 
Bushnell  appoint  Hanna?  The  two  belonged  to  different 
factions  in  the  Republican  party  in  Ohio  and  there  was 
no  love  lost  between  them.  Sherman  used  his  influence 
to  get  the  Governor  to  name  Hanna  as  his  successor,  and 
the  President-elect  wrought  powerfully  in  his  friend's  be 
half.  Nevertheless  the  Governor  did  not  want  to  appoint 
a  factional  enemy  and  he  authorized  his  personal  and 
political  friend,  Joseph  B.  Foraker,  to  offer  the  place  to 
Theodore  E.  Burton  of  Cleveland,  then  a  Representative  in 
Congress  who,  however,  declined  it.  During  the  first 
part  of  February,  McKinley  must  have  despaired  of  the 
carrying  out  of  this  part  of  the  program,  as  he  still  urged 
Hanna  to  accept  a  Cabinet  position,  writing  to  him  on 
February  18,  1897,  "I  have  hoped,  and  so  stated  to  you 
at  every  convenient  opportunity,  that  you  would  yet 
conclude  to  accept  the  Postmaster-Generalship. "  The 
Treasury  was  no  longer  at  the  President-elect's  disposal, 
as  on  January  28  he  had  authorized  the  announcement 
that  he  had  selected  for  that  post  Lyman  J.  Gage  of 
Chicago.1  "  You  have  as  often  declined,"  McKinley  con 
tinued  in  this  letter  to  Hanna,  "and  since  our  conversation 
on  Tuesday  last  (February  16)  I  have  reluctantly  con 
cluded  that  I  cannot  induce  you  to  take  this  or  any  other 


The  Nation,  Feb.  4. 


CH.  II.]  SENATOR  HANNA  35 

Cabinet  position.  You  know  how  deeply  I  regret  this 
determination  and  how  highly  I  appreciate  your  life-long 
devotion  to  me.  You  have  said  that  if  you  could  not 
enter  the  Senate  you  would  not  enter  public  life  at  all." 

Those  who  like  to  consider  the  " might  have  been" 
may  conjecture  whether,  if  Hanna  had  even  now  decided 
to  go  into  the  Cabinet,  McKinley  would  have  induced 
Sherman  to  withdraw  his  acceptance  of  the  office  of  Secre 
tary  of  State  on  the  ground  that  he  would  prefer  not  to  have 
two  men  from  Ohio  in  his  Cabinet  ?  In  which  event  he 
would  have  appointed  as  Secretary  of  State  a  man  flatly 
opposed  to  a  warlike  intervention  in  favor  of  Cuba,  as 
at  that  time  McKinley  was  himself. 

Hanna,  more  persistent  than  McKinley,  had  no  idea 
of  giving  up  the  game.  Bushnell  was  a  candidate  for  the 
Republican  nomination  for  Governor  who  would  be  elected 
in  the  autumn  of  1897,  and,  if  he  failed  to  appoint  Hanna 
Senator,  he  would  jeopardize  materially  his  chance  of  nom 
ination.  Finally,  through  fear  of  failing  to  receive  the 
renomination  he  desired,  and  from  the  unmistakable  sen 
timent  in  the  Republican  party  in  Ohio  that  Hanna 
should  have  the  place,  he  determined  to  appoint  his  an 
cient  enemy,  and  wrote  to  him  on  February  21,  "I  wish 
to  communicate  to  you  my  conclusion  to  appoint  you  as 
the  successor  of  Senator  Sherman  when  his  resignation 
shall  have  been  received."  1 

William  McKinley  was  inaugurated  on  March  4,  1897, 
and  in  his  address  made  clear  the  immediate  policy  of  the 


1  Life  of  Hanna,  Croly,  240.  This  book  has  been  used  freely  in  this 
account.  Also  Foraker,  Notes  of  a  Busy  Life,  i. ;  Life  of  McKinley, 
Olcott;  John  Sherman,  Theodore  E.  Burton;  do.  W.  S.  Kerr,  ii.;  The 
Nation,  passim. 


36  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1897 

government.1  There  were  "  depression  in  business,  dis 
tress  among  the  people."  The  government  needed  more 
revenue  and  ought  to  get  it  by  an  increase  in  tariff 
taxation.  On  this  point  he  spoke  to  a  united  party 
and  had  Congress  and  Republicans  with  him;  to  carry 
out  this  purpose  he  summoned  an  extra  session  for 
March  15. 

The  position  which  McKinley  took  need  not  have  sur 
prised  anyone ;  nevertheless,  the  gold  Democrats  who  had 
supported  him  were  disappointed  that  he  did  not  put  the 
money  question  to  the  fore  and  advocate  legislation 
which  should  fix  by  law  permanently  the  gold  standard  ; 
this  development  received  fit  expression  in  the  speeches 
of  ex-President  Cleveland  and  ex-Secretary  Carlisle  at  the 
New  York  City  Reform  Club  dinner  of  April  24.  Cleve 
land  could  speak  with  authority,  as  he  was  the  hero  of 
the  gold  standard  even  as  McKinley  was  the  apotheosis  of 
a  protective  tariff.  And  Cleveland  and  his  Cabinet  had 
given  McKinley  a  hearty  welcome,  unusual  in  a  change  of 
one  party  administration  to  its  opponent.  But  McKin 
ley  was  wiser  than  his  critics  in  declaring  that  the  securing 
of  adequate  revenue  must  precede  financial  legislation. 
So  far  as  finance  was  concerned  he  must  endeavor  to  effect 
international  bimetallism ;  until  that  was  decided,  the  ex 
isting  gold  standard  would  be  maintained.  The  Presi 
dent  knew  that  no  act  such  as  he  desired  could  pass  the 
existing  Senate,  and  his  foresight  was  confirmed  by  that 
body  adopting,  within  less  than  a  year,  a  resolution  which 
declared  that  the  principal  and  interest  of  the  govern 
ment  bonds  were  payable  in  silver  dollars  at  the  option 

1  The  Inaugural  Address  is  printed  in  Cong.  Record,  xxx.  Pt.  1.  For 
McKinley's  Cabinet,  see  Peck,  521. 


CH.  II.]  THE  DINGLEY  TARIFF  37 

of  the  administration.1  McKinley  made  a  sincere  at 
tempt  to  obtain  international  bimetallism  but,  when 
Great  Britain  blocked  the  way,2  he  appreciated  that  busi 
ness  in  the  United  States  must  be  conducted  on  the  single 
gold  standard.  In  the  attempt  to  secure  this  by  proper 
legislation,  he  said,  in  a  confidential  talk  with  Senator 
Hanna  and  Secretary  Alger  on  one  of  the  last  evenings 
of  August,  1897,  the  Republican  party  may  go  down  and 
I  may  go  down  with  it  but,  after  that  temporary  sacrifice, 
the  Republican  party  devoted  to  such  a  noble  cause  will 
rise  again. 

Everything  was  in  proper  shape  to  enact  a  protective 
tariff  to  take  the  place  of  the  Democratic  Act  of  1894. 
It  had  been  tacitly  agreed  that  Thomas  B.  Reed  should 
be  reflected  Speaker  of  the  new  House,  and  Nelson 
Dingley,  also  of  Maine,  should  be  chairman  of  the  Com 
mittee  on  Ways  and  Means ;  this  tacit  agreement  was  at 
once  carried  into  effect.  This  Committee,  which  was 
substantially  the  same  as  that  of  the  preceding  Congress, 
had  at  that  session,  after  hearing  abundant  testimony, 
prepared  a  tariff  bill  which  was  now  introduced  into  the 
House  and  passed  on  March  31.  The  Senate  offered 
many  amendments  and  did  not  pass  their  bill  until  July 
7,  when  it  went  to  a  Committee  of  conference  whose  re 
port  was  adopted  by  the  House  on  July  19  by  yeas  187, 
nays  116,  and  by  the  Senate  on  July  24  by  yeas  40,  nays  30  ; 
on  this  day  the  President  signed  it  and  it  became  a  law. 

"We  expect,"  Dingley  had  written  in  a  private  letter, 
"to  cut  nearly  all  our  duties  considerably  below  those  of 


1  Life  of  McKinley,  Olcott,  i.  358.  It  was  a  concurrent  resolution. 
It  passed  the  Senate  by  a  vote  of  47  :  32  on  Jan.  28,  1898,  and  was  rejected 
by  the  House  on  Jan.  31,  the  vote  standing  133  :  181.  2  Ibid.,  355. 


38  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1897 

the  Act  of  1890."  *  To  no  better  man  could  the  tariff 
bill  have  been  confided.  No  one  in  public  life,  except 
McKinley  and  Senator  Aldrich,  understood  the  subject 
better.  For  Dingley,  it  was  a  labor  of  love,  and  with  the 
assistance  especially  of  Sereno  E.  Payne  of  New  York  and 
John  Dalzell  of  Pennsylvania,  fellow  members  of  the  Com 
mittee,  he  presented  to  the  House  "a  fairly  good  pro 
tectionist  measure."  2  As  showing  the  confidence  felt  in 
him  by  the  President,  he  had  been  offered  the  Treasury 
Department  which,  on  account  of  a  question  of  health,  he 
had  declined,  but  saying  at  the  same  time  that  he  could 
do  more  for  the  success  of  the  administration  as  chair 
man  of  the  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means  than  he  could 
in  the  Treasury.3  The  measure  is  quite  properly  called 
the  Dingley  Act  and  is  so  known  in  history. 

When  Nelson  W.  Aldrich  of  Rhode  Island  reported  the 
bill  from  the  Senate  Committee  on  Finance,  he  said  that 
it  was  "  thoroughly  understood  throughout  the  country 
in  the  last  political  campaign,  that  if  the  Republican  party 
should  be  again  entrusted  with  power,  no  extreme  tariff 
legislation  would  follow." 4  Dingley  and  Aldrich  ex 
pressed  the  idea  of  the  Republican  leaders  and,  while  the 
House  was  readily  controlled  by  the  power  of  the  Speaker 
Thomas  B.  Reed,  it  was  quite  different  when  the  tariff 
question  was  opened  up  in  the  Senate.  It  was  as  John 
Sherman  had  previously  said,  "When  Republicans  and 
Democrats  together  are  framing  a  tariff,  each  Member  or 
Senator  consults  the  interest  of  his  ' district'  or  State."  6 


1  Tarbell,  Tariff  in  Our  Time,  242.  2  Ibid.,  243. 

3  Life  and  Times  of  Nelson  Dingley,  413. 

4  Stan  wood,  American  Tariff  Controversies,  ii.  384. 
6  Recollections,  ii.  1085. 


CH.  II.]  THE  DINGLEY  TARIFF  39 

A  feature  of  the  case  in  hand  is  told  by  Edward  Stan  wood, 
"The  plans  of  the  Republican  leaders  were  overturned 
...  by  senators  who  were  more  in  favor  of  silver  than  of 
a  protective  tariff."  l  The  Dingley  Act,  when  it  became  a 
law,  had  rates  of  duty  higher  than  they  had  been  under 
any  preceding  tariff.2  The  McKinley  Act  was  a  49|  per 
cent  tariff,  the  Wilson,  40  to  41  f,  while  the  percentage  of 
the  Dingley  Act  ran  from  49J  to  52.3 

McKinley  enjoyed  the  first  few  months  of  his  presi 
dential  life  more  than  the  later  ones.  As  he  did  the  hon 
ors  of  the  White  House,  he  appeared  to  have  lived  there 
always,  so  well  did  he  fit  into  the  place.  He  had  a  gen 
uine  liking  for  his  predecessor.  "Fine  old  fellow,  wasn't 
he?"  was  a  not  uncommon  remark  to  his  Secretary. 
Alive  to  the  power  and  influence  of  the  presidential  office, 
he  said  to  Cleveland  as  they  drove  together  to  the  Capi 
tol  on  Inauguration  Day,  "  What  an  impressive  thing  it  is 
to  assume  tremendous  responsibilities!"4  And  Cleve- 

^tanwood,  ii.  386.  'Ibid.,  391. 

»  Noyes,  Amer.  Finance,  269. 

The  Dingley  Act  reimposed  the  duties  on  wool ;  brought  about  a  duty 
on  hides  that  had  been  on  the  free  list  since  1872 ;  imposed  lower  duties 
on  cotton  goods  than  those  of  1890  but  higher  on  silks  and  linens;  re 
stored  the  rates  on  chinaware  of  1890.  Iron  ore  was  dutiable  at  40^,  pig 
iron  at  $4,  steel  rails  $7.84  per  ton,  the  same  as  in  1894.  Tin  plate  under 
the  Act  of  1890  paid  2ft,  in  1894,  1#,  and  in  1897,  1#  per  pound.  On 
sugar  the  differential  was  the  same  as  under  the  act  of  1894.  "But  the 
moral  effect  was  very  different.  The  House  in  1897  had  adopted  the  plan 
of  leaving  things  as  they  were  and  had  successfully  resisted  the  effort  of 
the  refining  monopoly  to  secure  more."  —  Taussig.  Tariff  History, 
5th  ed.,  328,  332,  335,  336,  342,  347,  352.  See  also  correspondence  in 
Life  and  Times  of  Dingley,  424  et  seq. 

"  The  Dingley  Act  restored  the  duty  on  works  of  art,  free  under  the  Tariff 
of  1894."  —  Tarbell,  243.  "  European  travellers  could  bring  in  free  only  one 
hundred  dollars  worth  of  goods  bought  abroad."  —  Dingley,  443.  "The 
tariff  of  1897  like  that  of  1890  was  the  outcome  of  an  aggressive  spirit  of 
protection."  —  Taussig,  358. 

4Olcott,ii.  367. 


40  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1897 

land  returned  the  liking  and  respect.  "  McKinley  was  dis 
tinguished,  great  and  useful,"  he  declared  in  his  Memorial 
address  at  Princeton,  "  patriotic  and  faithful  as  a  soldier, 
honest  and  upright  as  a  citizen,  tender  and  devoted  as  a 
husband  and  truthful,  generous,  unselfish,  moral  and 
clean  in  every  relation  of  life."1 

Cleveland  and  Olney  had  negotiated  "a  treaty  for  the 
arbitration  of  all  matters  in  difference  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain"  which  Cleveland  had  trans 
mitted  to  the  Senate  during  January,  1897,  where  it  was 
pending  when  McKinley  took  the  oath  of  office.  Believing 
that  politics  should  cease  at  the  water's  edge,  he  took  the 
rather  unusual  course  of  approving  emphatically  a  treaty 
negotiated  by  a  preceding  administration,  which  was  that 
of  a  partisan  opponent.  "We  want  no  wars  of  conquest," 
McKinley  said  in  his  inaugural  address;  "we  must  avoid 
the  temptation  of  territorial  aggression.  War  should 
never  be  entered  upon  until  every  agency  of  peace  has 
failed ;  peace  is  preferable  to  war  in  almost  every  contin 
gency.  Arbitration  is  the  true  method  of  settlement  of 
international  as  well  as  local  or  individual  differences.  .  .  . 
Since  this  treaty  [the  Olney-Pauncefote  treaty  of  Jan.  11, 
1897]  is  clearly  the  result  of  our  own  initiative,  since  it 
has  been  recognized  as  the  leading  feature  of  our  foreign 
policy  throughout  our  entire  national  history — the  adjust 
ment  of  difficulties  by  judicial  methods  rather  than  by 
force  of  arms  —  and  since  it  presents  to  the  world  the 
glorioas  example  of  reason  and  peace,  not  passion  and 
war,  controlling  the  relations  between  two  of  the  greatest 
nations  of  the  world,  an  example  certainly  to  be  followed 


1  This  address  was  delivered  on  Sept.  19,  1901,  Andrew  F.  West,  Cen~ 
tury  Magazine,  Jan.,  1909. 


CH.  II.]  THE  CUBAN  QUESTION  41 

by  others,  I  respectfully  urge  the  early  action  of  the  Sen 
ate  thereon,  not  merely  as  a  matter  of  policy  but  as  a 
duty  to  mankind.  The  importance  and  moral  influence 
of  the  ratification  of  such  a  treaty  can  hardly  be  over 
estimated  in  the  cause  of  advancing  civilization."  1  The 
Senate  acted  on  the  treaty  but  failed  to  ratify  it,  the  vote 
on  May  5, 1897,  standing  43,  to  26,  less  than  the  necessary 
two  thirds.  The  result  was  a  disappointment  to  the 
President  and  his  intimate  friends. 

McKinley  felt  fully  competent  to  deal  with  the  tariff, 
which  was  one  of  the  absorbing  questions  during  his  first 
months  in  the  White  House,  and  he  gave  efficient  aid  to 
the  supporters  of  the  Dingley  Act.  The  Cuban  ques 
tion  troubled  him  from  the  first.  With  Cleveland  at  the 
White  House  on  the  evening  before  his  inauguration,  he 
manifested  the  subject  uppermost  in  his  mind  —  the 
threatened  conflict  with  Spain  and  the  horrors  of  war. 
"Mr.  President,"  he  said,  "if  I  can  only  go  out  of  office 
at  the  end  of  my  term,  with  the  knowledge  that  I  have 
done  what  lay  in  my  power  to  avert  this  terrible  calamity, 
with  the  success  that  has  crowned  your  patience  and  per 
sistence,  I  shall  be  the  happiest  man  in  the  world."  2 
Sherman's  failure  disturbed  him,  but  during  April3  he 
called  to  his  aid  William  R.  Day  as  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State.  Day  had  inherited  his  essential  qualities  from  his 
father  who  was  of  fine  subtle  fibre  all  through  and  a  re 
tiring  nature.4  William  R.  Day  was  a  fellow  practitioner 


1  Moore,  International  Law  Digest,  vii.  75  et  seq. 

2  Parker's  Rec.,  249. 

3  1897.     Day  was  nominated  April  24.     The  nomination  was  not  re 
ceived  in  the  Senate  until  May  3.    He  was  confirmed  on  the  same  day. 

4  Riddle,  Rec.,  234. 


42  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1897 

of  McKinley  at  the  Canton,  Ohio,  bar,  and  was  known  by 
the  President  as  one  comes  to  know  one's  daily  associates 
and  competitors.  The  two  now  wrought  together  in  en 
tire  harmony  and,  so  far  as  one  may  judge  by  the  diplo 
matic  correspondence,  foreign  relations  did  not  suffer 
from  the  defection  of  Sherman.  Sherman,  however,  could 
not  brook  his  relegation  to  an  inferior  place  and  he  there 
fore  resigned  on  April  25,  1898,  leaving  Day  the  nominal 
as  well  as  the  real  Secretary  of  State.1  For  a  long  while 
McKinley  thought  that  he  could  settle  the  Cuban  ques 
tion  without  war  and  that  he  would  have  the  country  at 
his  back,  but  he  was  hampered  in  the  choice  of  a  minister 
to  Spain.  He  wanted  Seth  Low,  and  he  thought  that  he 
might  have  persuaded  him  to  undertake  the  difficult  job 
could  he  have  induced  him  to  visit  Washington.  His 
next  choice  fell  upon  General  J.  D.  Cox,  an  admirable 
appointment,  who  for  personal  reasons  was  obliged  to  de 
cline  it.  McKinley  would  have  liked  John  W.  Foster,  but 
finally  he  named  Stewart  L.  Woodford 2  whose  work 
turned  out  much  better  than  might  have  been  expected. 
From  his  inauguration  to  the  assembling  of  Congress 
at  its  regular  session  in  December,  1897,  McKinley  tasted 
the  sweets  of  office.  After  the  adjournment  of  Congress 
on  July  24,  he  took  a  trip  East,  stopping  at  a  hotel  on  the 
New  York  side  of  Lake  Champlain.  One  day  he  crossed 
over  into  Vermont  and  was  struck  with  the  sturdy  patriot 
ism  of  the  men  of  the  Green  Mountain  State  and  their 
devotion  to  Republican  party  ideals.  Returning  to  his 
own  State,  he  paid  a  memorable  visit  to  Mark  Hanna, 


*Day  was  nominated  as  Secretary  of  State  and  confirmed  on  April 
26,  1898. 

2  Woodford  was  nominated  on  June  16,  1887. 


CH.  II.]  McKINLEY  43 

whose  hospitality  he  enjoyed  for  a  number  of  days,  meet 
ing  men  connected  with  his  administration  and  Republi 
cans  whom  he  looked  to  for  countenance  and  support. 
Of  a  genial  nature  and  possessing  attractive  manners,  he 
commended  himself  to  all  sorts  and  conditions  of  men  and, 
at  this  time,  might  sincerely  have  felt  that  his  influence 
was  second  to  that  of  no  other  man  in  the  country. 


CHAPTER  III 

McKiNLEY's  opinion  expressed  to  Cleveland  regarding 
his  treatment  of  Cuban  affairs  was  thoroughly  sincere, 
and  at  this  distance  may  be  justified.  "  Patience  and 
persistence "  were  well  applied  to  Cleveland's  and  Olney's 
management.  The  Cuban  insurrection  began  in  Febru 
ary,  1895,  and  failed  to  be  suppressed  by  a  humane 
governor-general  who  conducted  the  war  in  accordance 
with  civilized  usage.  He  was  succeeded  less  than  a  year 
later  by  Weyler,  who  adopted  at  once  drastic  methods, 
the  most  important  of  which  was  his  proclamation  re 
quiring  a  concentration  of  inhabitants  at  military  head 
quarters  in  the  provinces  still  under  his  control.  To  re 
quire  people  to  quit  their  plantations  and  villages  where 
they  might  secure  a  living  and  herd  together  in  towns 
subject  to  starvation  and  disease  was  extreme  cruelty  and 
deserved  McKinley's  statement  that  "it  was  not  civil 
ized  warfare"  but  "extermination."  1 

During  the  spring  of  1896,  both  Houses  of  Congress 
adopted  a  concurrent  resolution  declaring  that  in  their 
opinion  the  United  States  should  accord  to  the  insur 
gents  belligerent  rights 2  but  Cleveland  and  his  Secretary 

1  Annual  Message,  Dec.  6,  1897.     "The  cruel  policy  of  concentration 
was  initiated  February  16, 1896  "  —  ibid.     See  The  Relations  of  the  United 
States  and  Spain,  Diplomacy,  Chadwick,  431.     This  valuable  book  will 
be  referred  to  as  Chadwick. 

2  The  Resolution  as  finally  passed,  April  6,   1896,  declared  that  the 
United  States  should  be  strictly  neutral  granting  belligerent  rights  to 
both  parties  and  that  the  president  should  offer  the  friendly  offices  of  the 
United  States  to  Spain  for  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  Cuba. 
The  resolution  as  passed  was  the  Senate  one.     The  milder  one  of  the 
House  was  rejected  by  the  Senate  and  the  House  receded. 

44 


CH.  III.]  CLEVELAND'S   CUBAN   POLICY  45 

of  State  Olney  declined  to  act  in  accordance  with  this  ad 
vice,  not  deeming  that  the  insurgents  had  acquired  a 
condition  of  proper  belligerency.  In  his  last  Message  to 
Congress,  Cleveland  told  clearly  the  actual  state  of  af 
fairs.  While  Spain  held  "  Havana  and  the  seaports  and 
all  the  considerable  towns,  the  insurgents  still  roam  at 
will  over  at  least  two  thirds  of  the  inland  country.  .  .  . 
If  Spain  has  not  yet  reestablished  her  authority,  neither 
have  the  insurgents  yet  made  good  their  title  to  be  re 
garded  as  an  independent  state.  .  .  .  The  excesses  on 
both  sides  have  become  more  frequent  and  more  deplor 
able.  .  .  .  The  rural  population  is  required  to  concen 
trate  itself  in  the  towns."  The  industrial  value  of  the 
island,  consisting  very  largely  in  its  capacity  to  produce 
sugar,  was  fast  diminishing.  In  most  of  Cuba  a  state  of 
anarchy  existed,  where  property  was  no  longer  protected 
and  life  was  unsafe.  Despite  the  avowed  sympathy  of 
the  inhabitants  of  the  United  States,  the  number  of  resi 
dent  Cubans  ready  to  help  their  brother  insurgents,  and 
the  utter  ruin  threatening  a  neighboring  and  fertile  coun 
try,  our  obligations  to  Spain,  so  Cleveland  asserted,  had 
been  duly  observed.  But  he  uttered  a  note  of  warning 
when  he  said  that  a  situation  may  be  presented  "in  which 
our  obligations  to  the  sovereignty  of  Spain  will  be  su 
perseded  by  higher  obligations."  * 

Reviewing  carefully  the  last  two  years  of  Cleveland's 
administration,  his  conduct  and  that  of  his  Secretary  of 
State  Olney  in  regard  to  Cuba  merit  commendation; 
they  might  easily  have  brought  on  a  war  with  Spain. 

The  Cuban  question  was  inherited  by  McKinley.     The 


1  Message  of  Dec.  7,  1896. 


46  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1897 

Senate  at  the  special  session  called  in  March,  1897,  passed 
a  resolution  in  favor  of  recognizing  the  belligerency  of  the 
Cuban  insurgents,  but  it  was  never  acted  upon  by  the 
House,  as  Speaker  Reed  had  not  appointed  a  Committee 
on  Foreign  Affairs  to  which  it  should  properly  be  referred. 
Anarchy  in  Cuba  continued.  In  the  destruction  of  prop 
erty  and  disregard  of  life,  the  insurgents  were  equally  to 
blame  with  the  Spaniards.  "The  deliberate  destruction 
of  the  support  of  a  people,"  wrote  Chadwick,  "shown  in 
the  orders  of  Gomez  [the  insurgent  leader]  are  deep  stains 
upon  the  conduct  of  the  Cuban  cause."  A  large  number 
of  sugar  mills  were  wrecked  and  this  wreckage  involved 
deprivation  of  work,  and  consequent  suffering  and  death 
to  vast  numbers  of  working  people.  "Historic  truth," 
Chadwick  added,  "demands  the  setting  forth  of  the  fact 
that  Cuban  and  Spaniard  were  alike  regardless  of  the  mis 
ery  caused  by  their  methods  and  of  its  extent."  1 

During  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1897,  McKinley 
gave  the  subject  much  anxious  thought  which  was  ap 
parent  in  his  first  annual  Message  to  Congress.  He  re 
ferred  with  elation  to  the  performance  of  its  full  duty  ac 
cording  to  the  law  of  nations  by  the  United  States.  The 
Government  had  "successfully  prevented  the  departure  of 
a  single  military  expedition  or  armed  vessel  from  our 
shores  in  violation  of  our  laws."  He  argued  against  the 
recognition  of  the  belligerency  or  the  independence  of 
Cuba  and  did  not  deem  it  wise  to  intervene  for  the  pres 
ent  in  the  contest.  Rather  should  we  await  the  result  of 
the  entire  change  of  policy  promised  by  the  new  ministry 
in  Spain.2  The  reactionary  premier  had  been  assassi- 


1  P.   524.         *  Message  of  Dec.  6,  1897. 


CH.  III.]  CUBA  AND  SPAIN  47 

nated  and  Sagasta,  a  Liberal,  had  succeeded  to  the  head  of 
the  new  ministry  which  was  in  sympathy  with  his  aims. 
When  John  Hay  was  first  Secretary  of  Legation  to  Spain, 
he  wrote  in  his  Diary  during  1869  :  "  Sagasta  is  the  hardest 
hitter  in  the  Cortes.  Everybody  calls  him  a  scamp  and 
everybody  seems  to  admire  him  nevertheless.  He  is  a 
sort  of  Disraeli  —  lithe,  active,  full  of  energy  and  hate."  l 
A  writer  in  the  Encyclopaedia  Britannica  said  that  Sa 
gasta  was  a  "  leader,  skilful  in  debate,  a  trimmer  par  ex 
cellence."  He  now  appreciated  in  some  degree,  if  not  fully, 
the  pressure  from  the  United  States.  His  ministry  "  re 
called  the  commander  whose  brutal  orders  inflamed  the 
American  mind  and  shocked  the  civilized  world ;  it  modi 
fied  the  horrible  order  of  concentration  and  has  under 
taken  to  care  for  the  helpless  and  permit  those  who  de 
sire  to  resume  the  cultivation  of  their  fields  to  do  so." 
It  also  proclaimed  by  decree  a  scheme  of  autonomy  to  be 
come  effective  upon  ratification  by  the  Cortes.2  It  was 
extremely  doubtful  whether  the  Spanish  mind  under 
stood  autonomy  as  did  the  British  and  American,  and  a 
self-governing  colony  as  was  Canada  could  hardly  be  ex 
pected,  but  Sagasta  was  sincere  in  offering  autonomy  as  he 
understood  it. 

It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  President  hoped  for  a  peace 
ful  solution  despite  the  fact  that  the  Sagasta  scheme  was 
not  satisfactory  to  the  extremists  on  either  side.  Riots  oc 
curred  in  Havana,  which  was  loyal  to  Spanish  interest, 
directed  against  the  governor-general  and  autonomy; 
owing  to  the  prevailing  excitement  the  United  States 
Gonsul-General  in  Havana  thought  that  it  might  be  neces- 

1  Life  of  Hay,  W.  R.  Thayer,  i,  321. 
•  McKinley  Message,  Dec.  6,  1897. 


48  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

sary  to  send  a  war-ship  thither  for  the  protection  of  the 
American  residents.  The  President  considered  the  mat 
ter  and  determined  to  send  the  battleship  Maine  to  Ha 
vana,  but  the  statement  was  made  to  the  Spanish  minis 
ter  that  it  was  "an  act  of  friendly  courtesy "  and  it  was 
so  given  out  to  the  press.  Spain  looked  upon  "the  pro 
posed  visit  of  the  Maine"  as  a  proof  of  "cordial  friend 
ship,"  and  replied  that  "wishing  to  reciprocate  such 
friendly  and  courteous  demonstrations  we  shall  arrange, 
also,  that  vessels  of  our  squadron  may  visit  the  ports  of 
the  United  States  in  passing  to  and  from  the  island  of 
Cuba."  *  While  the  President  feared  that  the  scheme  of 
autonomy  had  come  to  nothing,  he  nevertheless  exhibited 
his  continued  friendship  to  Spain.  At  the  diplomatic 
dinner  of  January  27,  1898,  he  showed  marked  attention 
to  the  Spanish  minister  and  congratulated  him  on  the 
fact  that  "we  have  only  good  news."  2 

These  friendly  relations  were  interrupted  by  an  indis 
cretion  on  the  part  of  the  Spanish  minister  in  Washington, 
de  L6me.  A  confidential  letter  written  by  him  during  the 
previous  December  to  a  friend  sojourning  in  Cuba  was 
"surreptitiously,  if  not  criminally  obtained"3  and,  on 
February  9,  published  by  a  New  York  newspaper.  De 
L6me  said :  "The  message  [the  President's  of  December 
6,  1897]  has  been  a  disillusionment  to  the  insurgents 
who  expected  something  different;  but  I  regard  it  as 
bad  [for  us].  Besides  the  ingrained  and  inevitable  ill- 
breeding  with  which  is  repeated  all  that  the  press  and 
public  opinion  in  Spain  have  said  about  Weyler,  it  once 
more  shows  what  McKinley  is,  weak  and  a  bidder  for  the 


1  Spanish  Corr.  and  Docs.,  68,  69.  *  Ibid.,  71. 

«  Day,  Foreign  Relations,  680. 


OH.  III.]  THE  MAINE  49 

admiration  of  the  crowd,  besides  being  a  would-be  poli 
tician  who  tries  to  leave  a  door  open  behind  himself  while 
keeping  on  good  terms  with  the  jingoes  of  his  party."  l 
De  Lome's  folly  was  astounding.  It  was  well  known  in 
Spain  that  while  Congress  was  for  war,  the  President  was 
earnest  for  peace  and  no  one  could  be  in  daily  relations 
with  him  without  feeling  the  sincerity  of  his  purpose. 
The  aim,  therefore,  of  a  Spanish  diplomatist  should  have 
been  to  humor  the  President,  not  to  impugn  his  motives. 
So  far,  however,  as  McKinley  was  concerned,  he  found  most 
objectionable  the  intimation  further  on  in  the  letter  that 
the  negotiations  for  commercial  reciprocity  with  the  au 
tonomous  government  of  Cuba  might  be  "for  effect" 
only.  But  as  Assistant-Secretary  of  State  Day  wrote, 
"The  publication  of  the  letter  created  a  good  deal  of  feel 
ing  among  Americans."  2  De  L6me  at  once  cabled  to 
Madrid  his  resignation  which  was  promptly  accepted. 
Day  conducted  the  affair  with  discretion  and  on  March 
3  was  glad  to  tell  Stewart  L.  Woodford,  our  minister  to 
Spain  that  the  de  Lome  incident  was  "fortunately 
closed."  3 

Meanwhile  an  occurrence  took  place  in  Havana  which 
prevented  the  peaceful  solution  that  the  President  sought. 
At  forty  minutes  past  nine  on  the  evening  of  February 
15,  the  Maine,  lying  peacefully  at  anchor  in  the  harbor, 
was  destroyed  by  an  explosion  with  a  loss  of  two  officers 
and  258  men.  The  Spanish  Government  and  the  Cuban 
authorities  expressed  at  once  their  sympathy  with  the 
United  States  on  account  of  this  dreadful  occurrence,  and 
their  immediate  action  was  all  that  could  be  desired. 


1  Foreign  Relations,  1007. 

2  March  3.     Foreign  Relations,  680.  s  Ibid. 


60  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

The  Court  of  Inquiry  into  the  disaster  was  composed  of 
three  members  and  a  judge  advocate  of  the  American 
Navy.  Captain  William  E.  Sampson  was  at  its  head 
and  another  member  was  Captain  French  E.  Chad  wick, 
whose  excellent  book  on  "The  Relations  of  the  United 
States  and  Spain,  Diplomacy,'7  gives  an  account  of  the 
transaction.  "The  situation,"  wrote  Chad  wick,  "pre 
cluded  any  haste,  and  the  inquiry  was  carried  on  deliber 
ately,  carefully,  and  searchingly  for  twenty-three  days  and 
with  every  effort  to  reach  a  fair  and  just  finding."1  The 
question  in  the  official  and  public  mind  was,  did  the  de 
struction  take  place  from  an  external  or  an  internal  explo 
sion  ?  Chadwick  was  one  of  the  two  members  of  the  Court 
who  had  thought  the  explosion  was  internal,  and  he  and 
his  colleague  were  convinced  against  their  prepossessions.2 

On  March  28,  1898,  Congress  and  the  public  were  in 
formed  of  the  finding  of  the  Court  by  a  special  message  of 
the  President  to  Congress.  The  Court  determined  that 
the  disaster  was  not  in  any  respect  due  to  the  fault  or 
negligence  of  officers  or  crew.  "In  the  opinion  of  the 
Court  the  Maine  was  destroyed  by  the  explosion  of  a 
submarine  mine  which  caused  the  partial  explosion  of  two 
or  more  of  the  forward  magazines.  The  Court  has  been 
unable  to  obtain  evidence  fixing  the  responsibility  for  the 
destruction  of  the  Maine  upon  any  person  or  persons."  3 

John  D.  Long,  who  at  this  time  was  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  in  his  book  published  in  1903,  wrote  :  "The  mystery 
of  the  loss  of  the  Maine  remains  yet  to  be  solved."  4 
Chadwick,  however,  had  keener  insight,  writing  in  his 


i  P.  543.  2  Chadwick,  562  n. 

8  Senate  Doc.     Destruction  of  Battleship  Maine. 

4  The  New  American  Navy,  i.  144. 


CH.  Ill:]  THE  MAINE  61 

book  published  in  1909  that  he  "  would  welcome  an  exam 
ination  of  the  wreck  by  a  complete  exposure  of  it  as  it 
lies.  It  could  only  result  in  substantiating  the  description 
of  the  injuries  by  the  Court  whose  examination  was  too 
complete  to  leave  chance  of  serious  error." *  Chad- 
wick's  expressed  wish  was  gratified.  In  1911,  by  a  fine 
piece  of  engineering,  the  wreck  was  exposed  and  a  board  of 
one  army  and  four  navy  officers  made  an  examination  of 
it,  reporting  on  December  1,  1911,  that  the  destruction 
was  due  to  "the  explosion  of  a  charge  of  a  low  form  of 
explosive  exterior  to  the  ship.  .  .  .  This  resulted  in  ig 
niting  and  exploding  the  contents  of  the  6-inch  reserve 
magazine,  said  contents  including  a  large  quantity  of 
black  powder.  The  more  or  less  complete  explosion  of 
the  contents  of  the  remaining  forward  magazines  followed. 
The  magazine  explosions  resulted  in  the  destruction  of  the 
vessel."  2 

Contemporaneous  material  and  many  later  books  at 
tribute  much  influence  to  Senator  Redfield  Proctor's 
speech  in  the  Senate  on  March  17,  which,  owing  to  the 
confidence  reposed  in  him  by  the  country,  held  their  at 
tention.  "My  trip/'  he  said,  "was  entirely  unofficial 
and  of  my  own  motion."  Of  the  six  provinces  in  Cuba, 
"my  observations  were  confined  to  the  four  western  prov 
inces  which  constitute  about  one  half  of  the  island.  The 
two  eastern  ones  are  practically  in  the  hands  of  the  in 
surgents,  except  the  few  fortified  towns.  .  .  .  All  the 
country  people  in  the  four  western  provinces,  about 
400,000  in  number,  remaining  outside  the  fortified  towns 


1  Chadwick,  563  n. 

2  House  Docs.  62d  Cong.  2d  Sess.  No.  310. 


52  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

when  Weyler 's  order  was  made,  were  driven  into  these 
towns,  and  these  are  the  reconcentrados.  They  were  the 
peasantry,  many  of  them  farmers,  some  landowners, 
others  renting  lands  and  owning  more  or  less  stock,  others 
working  on  estates  and  cultivating  small  patches ;  and 
even  a  small  patch  in  that  fruitful  clime  will  support  a 
family.  .  .  .  General  Blanco' s  [the  governor-general 
succeeding  Weyler]  order  of  November  13  last  somewhat 
modifies  the  Weyler  order  but  is  of  little  or  no  practical 
benefit.  ...  In  fact  though  the  order  was  issued  four 
months  ago  I  saw  no  beneficent  results  from  it  worth 
mentioning/'  "I  am  not  in  favor  of  annexation,"  he 
declared;  and  while  Senator  Proctor  suggested  no  plan 
it  is  easy  to  see  that  intervention  would  have  from  him 
powerful  support.  "To  me,"  he  said,  "the  strongest  ap 
peal  is  not  the  barbarity  practised  by  Weyler,  nor  the  loss 
of  the  Maine  .  .  .  terrible  as  are  both  these  incidents, 
but  the  spectacle  of  a  million  and  a  half  of  people,  the  en 
tire  native  population  of  Cuba,  struggling  for  freedom  and 
deliverance  from  the  worst  misgovernment  of  which  I 
ever  had  knowledge."  1 

The  Spanish  minister  2  in  Washington  was  much  im 
pressed,  telegraphing  to  the  home  government  that  Sen 
ator  Proctor's  speech  had  "produced  great  effect  because 
of  his  temperate  stand.  He  set  forth  in  black  colors  the 
situation  of  the  reconcentrados,  declared  that  the  country 
was  opposed  to  autonomy  and  favorable  to  independence. 
.  .  .  Before  making  the  speech  he  had  seen  the  President 


1  Cong.  Record,  2916  et  seq.  Senator  Proctor  gave  also  the  estimated 
population  of  Cuba  with  its  racial  divisions.  He  also  discussed  the  mili 
tary  and  political  situations.  Proctor  had  been  Secretary  of  War  under 
Harrison. 

*  Polo,  who  succeeded  de  L6me. 


CH.  III.]  THE  MAINE  63 

and  Day,  for  which  reason  more  importance  is  attached 
to  his  words.  My  impression  is  that  the  President  will 
try  to  withstand  the  powerful  public  sentiment  in  favor 
of  the  insurrection."  1 

As  early  as  March  20  the  President  learned  confiden 
tially  that  the  naval  board  would  make  a  "  unanimous  re 
port  that  the  Maine  was  blown  up  by  a  submarine 
mine."  2  This  knowledge  and  Proctor's  account  dictated 
Day's  midnight  telegram  of  March  25  to  Woodford  at 
Madrid:  "The  concentration  of  men,  women  and  chil 
dren  in  the  fortified  towns  and  permitting  them  to  starve 
is  unbearable  to  a  Christian  nation  geographically  so 
close  as  ours  to  Cuba.  ...  It  was  represented  to  the 
President  in  November  that  the  Blanco  government  would 
at  once  relieve  the  suffering  and  so  modify  the  Weyler 
order  as  to  permit  those  who  were  able  to  return  to  their 
homes  and  till  the  fields  from  which  they  had  been  driven. 
.  .  .  The  reconcentration  order  has  not  been  practi 
cally  superseded.  There  is  no  hope  of  peace  through 
Spanish  arms.  .  .  .  The  Spanish  government  seems  un 
able  to  conquer  the  insurgents.  .  .  .  We  do  not  want 
the  island.  .  .  .  Peace  is  the  desired  end."  3  Be  it  re 
membered  that  Congress,  the  country  and  Spain  had  the 
report  of  the  Naval  Board  concerning  the  destruction  of 
the  Maine  on  Monday,  March  28.  Next  day  was  sub 
mitted  to  the  Spanish  ministry  what  turned  out  to  be  the 
President's  ultimatum.  Premising  that  "the  President 
instructs  me  to  say  that  we  do  not  want  Cuba,"  Wood- 
ford  said  in  conversation  with  Sagasta,  with  the  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  Minister  for  the  Colonies,  who, 


1  Spanish  Corr.  and  Docs.,  95. 

2  Foreign  Relations,  692.  3  Ibid.,  704,  712. 


64  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

being  well  acquainted  with  English,  acted  as  interpreter, 
"we  do  wish  immediate  peace  in  Cuba."  The  President 
"  suggests  an  immediate  armistice  lasting  until  October  1, 
negotiations  in  the  meantime  being  had  looking  to  peace 
between  Spain  and  the  insurgents  through  the  friendly 
offices  of  the  President  of  the  United  States.  He  wishes 
the  immediate  revocation  of  the  reconcentration  order. " 

With  effect,  does  Chadwick,  in  recounting  the  history 
of  the  diplomacy  of  these  days,  speak  of  Spain's  "  fatal 
habit  of  procrastination."1  On  March  31,  two  days  after 
Woodford' s  conversation,  she  showed  this  in  her  answer 
to  the  President's  reasonable  request.  Far  from  accept 
ance  of  the  suggestion  relating  to  the  Armistice  and  con 
sequent  negotiations,  it  laid  down  propositions  utterly  in 
admissible.  Well  did  Woodford  write  to  McKinley  on 
April  1,  "  Yesterday's  conference  was  a  sorrow  to  me,  for 
I  have  worked  hard  for  peace."  2 

On  March  30,  the  day  between  the  President's  request 
and  Spain's  answer,  Day  apprised  Woodford  of  the  state 
of  affairs  in  Washington.  "You  should  know  and  fully 
appreciate,"  he  telegraphed,  "that  there  is  profound  feel 
ing  in  Congress  and  the  greatest  apprehension  on  the  part 
of  most  conservative  members  that  a  resolution  for  inter 
vention  may  pass  both  branches  in  spite  of  any  effort 
which  can  be  made.  Only  assurance  from  the  President 
that,  if  he  fails  in  peaceful  negotiations  he  will  submit  all 
the  facts  to  Congress  at  a  very  early  day,  will  prevent  im 
mediate  action  on  the  part  of  Congress."  3 

It  was  evident  that  submission  of  the  question  to  Con 
gress  meant  a  declaration  of  war  against  Spain.  Public 


1  P.   654.  2  Foreign  Relations,  727.  8  Ibid.,  721. 


CH.  III.]  SPAIN  AND  CUBA  55 

sentiment  had  been  worked  up  by  the  sensational  press, 
frequently  called  the  " yellow  press";  it  had  manipu 
lated  the  real  news,  spread  unfounded  reports,  putting  all 
before  their  readers  with  scare  headlines.  Newspaper 
editors  and  their  assistants  differed  from  those  between 
1850  and  1860,  who  made  their  appeals  to  the  electorate 
by  cogent  editorials  directed  against  the  slave  power. 
Now  recourse  was  had  to  the  news  columns  in  which 
Spain  was  painted  as  perfidious  and  untrustworthy.  Af 
ter  the  Naval  Board  had  made  its  report  in  regard  to  the 
Maine,  it  was  impossible  to  convince  the  multitude  that 
Spain  had  not,  in  some  way  or  other,  touched  off  the  sub 
marine  mine  which  caused  the  explosion.  "  Remember 
the  Maine"  became  the  watchword.  Appeal  was  made 
to  what  England  would  have  done  under  like  circum 
stances,  whose  " commonest  phrase "  was,  "I  wish  you 
would  take  Cuba  at  once.  We  wouldn't  have  stood  it 
this  long."  1  Public  sentiment  acted  effectually  upon 
Congress,  a  dominant  majority  of  which  wanted  war  with 
Spain.  "Every  Congressman,"  said  Boutelle  of  Maine, 
"had  two  or  three  newspapers  in  his  district  —  most  of 
them  printed  in  red  ink  .  .  .  and  shouting  for  blood."  2 
It  may  be  affirmed  that  if  a  referendum  had  been  taken 
on  April  1,  1898,  a  majority  would  have  voted  for  war 
with  Spain  in  order  to  expel  her  from  Cuba.  But  the 
financial  and  business  interests  of  the  country  were  op 
posed  to  the  war,  as  they  deemed  it  needless  and  they 
shrunk  from  its  horrors  and  expense.  The  Jingoes  taunted 
men  who  held  this  view  with  being  influenced  by  Wall 
Street,  and  it  proved  an  effective  taunt,  but  really  Wall 

1  Life  of  Hay,  Thayer,  ii.  166. 

a  Oct.  22,  1898.     Boston  Herald,  Oct.  23. 


56  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

Street  was  only  one  part  of  this  sentiment  which  was 
shared  by  business  men  throughout  the  country  whose 
fit  representative  was  Mark  Hanna.  "I  am  not,"  he 
declared,  "in  favor  of  heedlessly  precipitating  the  coun 
try  into  the  horrors  of  war"  on  account  of  the  Maine  in 
cident  or  Spain's  attitude  to  Cuba.1  As  late  as  April  5, 
he  wrote  in  a  private  letter  that  in  his  opinion  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  ought  to  pass  a  resolu 
tion  giving  the  President  some  discretion ;  otherwise,  he 
added,  "War  cannot  be  avoided,  and  even  under  the  most 
favorable  circumstances  it  must  come  unless  Spain  backs 
down,  which  I  believe  she  will  do." 

A  phase  of  the  reflecting  and  intelligent  part  of  the  com 
munity  was  well  represented  in  the  private  letters  of  Gen 
eral  J.  D.  Cox.  "The  dreadful  accident  to  the  Maine," 
he  wrote,  "ought  to  make  everybody  sober  and  reasonable 
in  thinking  of  foreign  affairs.  It  ought  to  be  a  very  good 
cause  that  would  justify  a  war  in  which  such  things  might 
be  happening  any  day.  I  don't  envy  the  public  man  who 
should  have  to  look  back  on  an  unnecessary  war  as  in 
any  part  the  work  of  his  hands ;  and  to  rush  into  it  for 
mere  wantonness,  as  many  seem  inclined  to,  is  such  un 
speakable  folly  as  to  make  one  wonder  that  it  is  possible 
in  an  enlightened  age."  Again,  on  March  2,  "It  is  en 
tirely  incredible  that  a  civilized  government  should  have 
ordered  or  approved  the  destruction  of  a  ship  in  her 
port  in  time  of  peace."  And  on  March  29,  "as  to  inter 
vention,  the  whole  island  and  everybody  on  it  are  not 
worth  the  American  volunteers  who  would  inevitably 
die  of  yellow  fever  if  we  sent  an  army  there." 

The  officers  and  men  who  went  forth  to  fight  Spain, 

1  Interviews,  N.  Y.  Tribune,  Feb.  24,  27. 


CH.  III.]  ROOSEVELT  67 

obedient  to  a  dominant  public  sentiment  and  the  fiat  of 
Congress,  might  have  used  the  words  with  a  variation 
suitable  to  the  time  and  country,  which  Philip  Gibbs  put 
into  the  mouth  of  British  soldiers  who  suffered  and  fought 
in  the  trenches  during  the  great  World  War:  "I  don't 
want  to  die  —  I  want  to  live.  Why  should  I  be  sacri 
ficed  to  please  the  politicians  of  the  world  —  those  fools 
who  are  the  cause  of  all  this?  People  at  home  don't 
understand  what  we  have  to  suffer.  They  don't  care. 
Those  infuriated  old  females  in  England,  those  compla 
cent  old  bald-heads  in  St.  James  Street  Clubs  would  see 
us  all  smashed  to  pulp,  and  die  to  the  last  man,  without  a 
question.  They  think  it  natural  and  nice,  'Dulce  et  de 
corum  est,'  etc."1 

A  phase  of  the  sentiment  of  "literary  fellows"  was  re 
flected  by  Theodore  Roosevelt,  Henry  Cabot  Lodge  and 
John  Hay.  "When  the  Maine  was  blown  up  in  Havana 
harbor,"  wrote  Roosevelt  in  1913,  "war  became  inevita 
ble."  2  He,  in  1898,  was  impatient  that  the  President  did 
not  act  more  promptly  and  wrote  in  a  private  letter/ 
"The  blood  of  women  and  children,  who  have  perished 
by  the  hundred  thousand  in  hideous  misery,  lies  at  our 
door ;  and  the  blood  of  the  murdered  men  of  the  Maine 
calls  not  for  indemnity  but  for  the  full  measure  of  atone 
ment  which  can  only  come  by  driving  the  Spaniard  from 
the  New  World.  I  have  said  this  to  the  President  before 
his  Cabinet ;  I  have  said  it  to  Judge^Day  .  .  .  ;  and  to 
my  own  chief;"3  and  again,  "McKinley  has  no  more 
backbone  than  a  chocolate  Eclair!"  4 


1  Boston  Herald,  May  4,  1919.     2  Autobiography,  232. 
8  Letter  of  March  21  to  Brooks  Adams,  J.  B.  Bishop.     Scribner's  Mag 
azine,  November  1919,  524.  4  Peck,  642. 


58  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

Henry  Cabot  Lodge  wrote  in  1899:  "The  outside  en 
gine  of  destruction  [of  the  Maine]  was  a  government  sub 
marine  mine  and  had  been  exploded  without  the  author 
ity  or  knowledge  of  the  Spanish  government  by  men  who 
wore  the  uniform  of  Spain.  .  .  .  The  result  had  been 
inevitable  since  the  fatal  15th  of  February,  although  men 
did  not  understand  it  at  the  moment  and  still  thought 
they  could  stay  the  current  of  events  which  had  been 
gathering  strength  for  seventy  years  and  broken  loose  at 
last."  * 

On  May  8,  1898,  John  Hay,  now  our  Ambassador  to 
England,  wrote  in  a  private  letter  :  "I  detest  war  and  had 
hoped  I  might  never  see  another,  but  this  was  as  neces 
sary  as  it  was  righteous.  I  have  not  for  two  years  seen 
any  other  issue."  2 

One  may  wonder  if  Roosevelt,  Lodge  and  Hay  took 
fully  into  account  the  Spanish  habit  of  procrastination. 
Did  Roosevelt  with  his  habit  of  omnivorous  reading  come 
across  the  reported  remark  of  Lord  Clarendon:  " Span 
ish  dynasties  go  and  come ;  Spanish  queens  go  and  come, 
and  Spanish  ministries  go  and  come;  but  there  is  one 
thing  in  Spain  that  is  always  the  same  —  they  never  an 
swer  letters"  ?3 

Senator  Lodge  of  course  knew  all  about  Lowell's  mis 
sion  to  Spain,  and  he  might  have  read  before  the  Spanish 
War  his  impressions  of  the  people  to  whom  he  was  ac 
credited.  "I  like  the  Spaniards  very  well  so  far  as  I 
know  them,"  Lowell  wrote,  "and  have  an  instinctive 
sympathy  with  their  want  of  aptitude  for  business." 


1  The  War  with  Spain,  31  et  seq. 

8  Life  of  Hay,  Thayer,  ii.  167. 

8  Life  of  Lord  Granville,  Fitzmaurice,  1905,  ii.  31. 


CH.  III.]  THE  SPANIARDS  59 

"They  are  unenterprising  and  unchangeable."  " Spain 
is  as  primitive  in  some  ways  as  the  books  of  Moses,  and 
as  Oriental."  "They  fancy  themselves  always  in  the  age 
of  Charles  V,  and  the  perfect  gravity  with  which  they  al 
ways  assume  the  airs  of  a  Great  Power  is  not  without  a 
kind  of  pathetic  dignity.  We  all  wink  at  the  little  shifts 
of  a  decayed  gentleman,  especially  when  he  is  Don  Quix 
ote,  as  this  one  certainly  is."  l 

John  Hay  in  Spain,  as  first  Secretary  of  Legation  in 
1869-1870,  during  the  earlier  insurrection,  was  impressed 
with  her  procrastination.  Sagasta  was  one  of  the  minis 
try  and  defended  the  government  "with  wonderful  vigor 
and  malice."  "This  government,"  wrote  Hay  in  1870, 
"wants  to  sell  Cuba  but  dares'not,  and  has  no  power  to 
put  a  stop  to  the  atrocities  on  the  island.  The  only  thing 
left  to  our  government  is  to  do  nothing  and  keep  its  mouth 
shut;  or  interfere  to  stop  the  horrors  in  Cuba  on  the 
ground  of  humanity  or  the  damage  resulting  to  Ameri 
can  interests."  2 

The  pressure  upon  the  President  in  1898  to  refer  the 
matter  to  Congress  was  great.  The  Secretary  of  War, 
Russell  A.  Alger,  said  to  a  senator :  "I  want  you  to  ad 
vise  the  President  to  declare  war.  He  is  making  a  great 
mistake.  He  is  in  danger  of  ruining  himself  and  the 
Republican  party  by  standing  in  the  way  of  the  people's 
wishes.  Congress  will  declare  war  in  spite  of  him.  He'll 
get  run  over  and  the  party  with  him."  A  bellicose  sen 
ator  said  to  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  :  "Day,  don't 
your  President  know  where  the  war-declaring  power  is 


1  Dec.  23,  1877,  Apr.  14,  1878,  May  2,  1879,  Dec.  30,  1879.     Letters 
of  James  Russell  Lowell  (1894),  ii.  205,  213,  241,  246. 

2  Life  of  Hay,  Thayer,  i.  324. 


60  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

lodged?  Tell  him  that  if  he  doesn't  do  something,  Con 
gress  will  exercise  the  power/'  1  Congressman  Boutelle, 
who  was  opposed  to  the  war,  is  authority  for  the  state 
ment  that  forty  or  fifty  Republican  members  of  Congress 
held  a  caucus,  sent  a  committee  to  the  President  and  told 
him  that  unless  he  sent  an  aggressive  message  to  Con 
gress,  they  would  introduce  a  resolution  for  war  and  vote 
with  the  Democrats  to  carry  it  through.2  Olcott,  the 
biographer  of  McKinley,  is  authority  for  the  statement 
that  the  Vice  President  and  a  number  of  senators  who 
were  opposed  to  war  polled  the  Senate  in  order  to  see  if 
they  could  sustain  a  veto  should  a  war  resolution  be  pre 
maturely  passed ; 3  but  this  must  have  been  only  a  mo 
mentary  thought,  as  for  the  President  to  veto  a  declara 
tion  of  war  by  Congress  was  hardly  to  be  considered. 

McKinley  was  averse  to  war.  He  said  to  Senator 
Fairbanks:  "It  isn't  the  money  that  will  be  spent  nor 
the  property  that  will  be  destroyed,  if  war  comes,  that 
concerns  me;  but  the  thought  of  human  suffering  that 
must  come  into  thousands  of  homes  throughout  the  country 
is  almost  overwhelming."  4  But  he  was  much  perturbed 
at  the  idea  that  his  action  might  break  up  the  Republi 
can  party.  He  could  not  sleep  without  sleeping  powders. 
During  the  week  when  he  sent  what  turned  out  to  be  his 
ultimatum  to  Spain  he  was  much  cast  down  but,  on  re 
ceiving  her  rejection  of  his  terms,  he  determined  to  go 
with  the  war  party  and  to  turn  the  affair  over  to  Congress. 
"Congress,"  wrote  Senator  Lodge,  "has  no  diplomatic 
functions  or  attributes.  With  a  foreign  nation  it  has 


1  Life  of  McKinley,  Olcott,  ii.  28. 

2  Boston  Herald,  Oct.  23,  1898.  3  Olcott,  ii.  28. 
4  Life  of  McKinley,  Olcott,  i.  400. 


CH.  III.]  McKINLEY  61 

but  one  weapon  —  the  war  power ;  and  when  a  President 
calls  in  Congress  in  a  controversy  with  another  nation, 
his  action  means  that  Congress,  if  it  sees  fit,  must  exer 
cise  its  single  power  and  declare  war."  1  The  President 
had  decided  to  send  his  message  to  Congress  on  Monday, 
April  4 ;  he  postponed  it  until  the  6th,  then  until  Mon 
day,  April  llth,  on  account  of  an  urgent  request  from  the 
Consul-General  in  Havana  to  delay  it  in  order  that  he 
might  insure  the  safe  departure  of  Americans  from  Cuba. 
On  that  day  [April  llth]  the  message  went  to  Congress: 
this  action  meant  war  with  Spain. 

No  one  can  go  through  carefully  the  diplomatic  des 
patches  without  thinking  that  up  to  March  31  McKinley's 
conduct  of  the  affair  had  been  faultless.  The  pressure 
exerted  upon  the  Spanish  ministry  and  people  was  marked 
by  courtesy,  discretion  and  thorough  knowledge  of  the 
situation.  John  D.  Long  is  the  excellent  authority  for 
the  consideration  which  McKinley  and  his  Cabinet  showed 
for  the  susceptibilities  of  the  Spaniards.2  But  just  about 
as  the  President  was  to  succeed  completely  he  abandoned 
his  policy  and  went  over  to  the  war  party.  "To  the  peo 
ple  we  come  sooner  or  later,"  wrote  James  Bryce,3  and 
the  ministry  of  the  cabinet  government  of  Spain,  though 
eager  for  peace,  could  go  no  further  than  they  could  count 
upon  the  support  of  public  sentiment.  On  April  3,  Wood- 
ford  telegraphed  to  the  President :  "The  Spanish  Minis 
ter  for  Foreign  Affairs  assures  me  that  Spain  will  go  as 
far  and  as  fast  as  she  can.  ...  I  know  that  the  Queen 
and  her  present  ministry  sincerely  desire  peace,  and  that 
the  Spanish  people  desire  peace,  and  if  you  can  still  give 

1  The  War  with  Spain,  36.        2  American  Navy,  i.  133. 
8  American  Commonwealth,  i.  270. 


62  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

me  time  and  reasonable  liberty  of  action  ...  I  am  sure 
that  before  next  October  I  will  get  peace  in  Cuba,  with 
justice  to  Cuba  and  protection  to  our  great  American 
interests."  x 

For  the  sake  of  clearness  reference  will  again  be  made 
to  the  President's  ultimatum  of  March  2T-29.2  He  de 
manded  the  immediate  revocation  of  the  reconcentrado 
order  and  an  armistice  until  October  1.  The  revocation 
of  the  reconcentrado  order  was  at  once  made.  And  now 
the  Pope,  assisted  by  Archbishop  Ireland  of  St.  Paul, 
who  went  to  Washington  by  his  order,3  interfered  in  the 
interest  of  peace.  His  intervention,  supported  by  that 
of  "six  great  European  powers, "  induced  the  Spanish 
ministry  to  direct  on  April  9  the  governor-general  of 
Cuba  to  grant  immediately  an  armistice,  leaving  the 
length  of  time  to  himself.  Having  submitted  this  action 
to  Day,  Woodford  telegraphed  on  April  10  to  the  Presi 
dent  that  if  he  could  get  full  authority  from  Congress  he 
might  secure  a  final  settlement  "  before  August  1st  on 
one  of  the  following  bases :  either  such  autonomy  as  the 
insurgents  may  agree  to  accept,  or  recognition  by  Spain  of 
the  independence  of  the  island,  or  cession  of  the  island  to 
the  United  States.  I  hope  that  nothing  will  now  be  done 
to  humiliate  Spain,  as  I  am  satisfied  that  the  present 
government  is  going,  and  is  loyally  ready  to  go,  as  fast 
and  as  far  as  it  can."  4 

The  President  and  his  immediate  advisers  had  been 
brought  by  the  logic  of  events  to  see  that  no  permanent 


1  Foreign  Relations,  732. 

8  The  despatch  of  Day  to  Woodford  was  Sunday,  March  27 ;  the  sub 
mission  of  the  ultimatum  to  the  Spanish  ministry,  Tuesday,  March  29. 
The  report  on  the  Maine  went  to  Congress  on  Monday,  March  28. 

8  Spanish  Coir,  and  Docs.,  Ill,  112.        4  Foreign  Relations,  746,  747. 


CH.  III.]  McKINLEY  63 

peace  could  be  secured  unless  the  Spaniards  abandoned 
Cuba ;  and  in  this  they  agreed  with  the  war  party.  But 
the  Jingoes  desired  to  smash  Spain  and  were  "  spoiling 
for  a  fight"  ;  and  the  well-informed  men  of  the  war  party 
did  not  believe  that  Spain  would  give  up  Cuba  without 
war.  But  they  could  not  see  things  as  we  see  them  now. 
The  Spanish  ministry  feared  that  a  contest  with  the  United 
States  would  be  hopeless.  Whatever  might  happen 
at  first  they  appreciated  that  America  had  the  "  sinews  of 
war."  The  unanimous  passage  by  the  House  of  the  bill 
placing  fifty  millions  at  the  President's  disposal  did  not 
excite  the  Spaniards  but  " stunned  them."  l  On  March 
31,  Woodford  telegraphed  to  the  President:  "I  believe 
the  ministry  are  ready  to  go  as  far  and  as  fast  as  they  can 
and  still  save  the  dynasty  here  in  Spain.  They  know 
that  Cuba  is  lost.  Public  opinion  in  Spain  has  moved 
steadily  toward  peace."  "Speak  softly  and  carry  a 
big  stick,"  was  Theodore  Roosevelt's  idea  of  a  foreign 
policy.  Up  to  March  31  McKinley  had  spoken  softly, 
but  after  that  he  failed  to  continue  the  soft  speech  and 
yet  he  had  strong  and  what  might  have  been  efficient 
support.  The  Speaker  of  the  House,  the  Vice  President, 
all  of  his  Cabinet  but  two,  nearly  all  of  the  leading  Re 
publicans  in  the  Senate  were  with  him.3  For  it  seems 
clear  that  the  Spaniards  might  have  been  led  to  grant  in 
dependence  to  Cuba  through  negotiation.  Jules  Cam- 
bon,  Ambassador  from  France,  representing  on  the  part 
of  his  country  financial  and  personal  sympathy  with 


1  Woodford,  March  9.    Foreign  Relations,  684.  *  Ibid.,  727. 

8  Letters  of  T.  Roosevelt  to  Captain  Cowles,  March  29,  30,  1898;  to 
Douglas  Robinson,  March  30 ;  to  Elihu  Root,  April  5 ;  to  Dr.  Henry  Jack 
son,  April  6;  J.  B.  Bishop;  Scribn&r's  Magazine,  Nov.  1919,  524. 


64  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

Spain,  could  see  that  she  ought  not  to  go  to  war  with 
America,  and  labored  to  bring  about  a  peaceful  result. 
McKinley  feared  a  rupture  in  his  own  party,  and  on  ac 
count  of  that  fear,  had  not  the  nerve  and  power  to  resist 
the  pressure  for  war.  We  may  rest  assured  that  if  Mark 
Hanna  had  been  President  there  would  have  been  no  war 
with  Spain.  As  much  of  a  partisan  as  McKinley,  he 
would  have  had  the  self-determination  to  resist  the  war 
party  and  the  confident  belief  that  he  could  secure  the 
end  desired  without  war  and  without  the  rupture  of  the 
Republican  party ;  at  all  events  he  would  have  taken  the 
risk.1 

That  the  President  had  cast  his  lot  freely  with  the  war 
party  was  evident  from  his  reply  to  the  six  representatives 
of  Great  Britain,  Germany,  France,  Austria-Hungary, 
Russia  and  Italy,  who  hoped  that  further  negotiations 
would  lead  to  peace.  We  must  end  a  situation,  he  said, 
on  Wednesday,  April  6,  "the  indefinite  prolongation  of 
which  has  become  insufferable."  2 


1  John  W.  Foster  said  at  the  Conference  of  the  American  Society  for 
the  Judicial  Settlement  of  International  Disputes  on  Dec.  15,  1910:  "It 
is  well  known  that  President  McKinley  was  strongly  opposed  to  the  war, 
and  he  was  ably  supported  in  striving  for  peace  by  General  Woodford,  to 
whom  too  much  praise  cannot  be  given  for  his  conduct  of  the  negotiations. 
It  is  now  apparent  that  had  not  the  President  yielded  to  the  war  clamor 
in  the  country  and  the  demands  of  Congress,  the  war  might  have  been 
averted.  ...  In  the  light  of  the  Woodford  despatches,  we  must  con 
clude  that  had  President  McKinley  displayed  the  same  firmness  as  Grant 
and  Cleveland  and  continued  to  '  keep  hold  of  the  reins  of  diplomacy '  the 
Spanish  War  with  its  long  train  of  consequences  might  never  have  come 
upon  us."  See  the  Speeches  of  General  Woodford  and  Congressman 
Boutelle  before  the  Massachusetts  Club,  Oct.  22,  1898;  Boston  Herald, 
Oct.  23 ;  Chadwick,  575 ;  Remarks  in  the  Senate  by  Senators  Hale  and 
Depew,  May  25,  1908 ;  Boyle's  statement,  Columbus,  Ohio,  May  25.  Boyle 
was  private  secretary  of  McKinley  when  governor  of  Ohio,  and  after 
wards  his  appointee  as  consul  to  Liverpool.  Boston  Evening  Transcript, 
May  26,  1908;  Boston  Daily  Advertiser,  May  19,  1913;  Conversations 
with  Mark  Hanna  and  Henry  S.  Pritchett.  2  Foreign  Relations,  741. 


CH.  III.]  McKINLEY  65 

His  message  to  the  Congress  on  Monday,  April  11, 
brought  on  the  war.  "With  this  last  overture  in  the  di 
rection  of  immediate  peace"  [his  ultimatum  of  March 
27-29],  he  said,  "and  its  disappointing  reception  by  Spain, 
the  Executive  is  brought  to  the  end  of  his  effort."  1  The 
disaster  to  the  Maine  was  put  in  a  subsidiary  place  in 
his  message.2  The  President  said  toward  the  end  of  the 
message:  " The  issue  is  now  with  Congress.  .  .  .  I  have 
exhausted  every  effort  to  relieve  the  intolerable  condition 
of  affairs  which  is  at  our  doors.  Prepared  to  execute 
every  obligation  imposed  upon  me  by  the  Constitution 
and  the  law,  I  await  your  action."  3 

To  the  crowning  effort  of  his  diplomacy  of  being  able 
to  secure  peace  and  in  all  probability  Cuban  independ 
ence,  he  referred  in  the  last  two  paragraphs  of  his  mes 
sage  in  a  perfunctory  manner.  "Yesterday"  (Sunday, 
April  10),  he  said,  "and  since  the  preparation  of  the  fore 
going  message,  official  information  was  received  by  me 
that  the  latest  decree  of  the  Queen  Regent  of  Spain  di 
rects  General  Blanco,  in  order  to  prepare  and  facilitate 
peace,  to  proclaim  a  suspension  of  hostilities,  the  dura 
tion  and  details  of  which  have  not  yet  been  communicated 
to  me."  4 

Congress,  the  country  and  Spain  knew  that  this  message 
meant  war.  Congress  immediately  addressed  itself  to  the 
subject  and  after  certain  disagreements  united  in  the  fol- 


1  Foreign  Relations,  75.5. 

2  "In  any  event  the  destruction  of  the  Maine,  by  whatever  exterior 
cause,  is  a  patent  and  impressive  proof  of  a  state  of  things  in  Cuba  that 
is  intolerable.     That  condition  is  thus  shown  to  be  such  that  the  Spanish 
government  cannot  assure  safety  and  security  to  a  vessel  of  the  American 
Navy  in  the  harbor  of  Havana  on  a  mission  of  peace,  and  rightfully  there." 

8  Foreign  Relations,  760. 
4  Foreign  Relations,  760. 


66  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

lowing  resolutions,  which  were  adopted  on  April  19,  and 
signed  by  the  President  on  the  next  day.1  They  said : 
"  First.  That  the  people  of  the  Island  of  Cuba  are,  of 
right  ought  to  be,  free  and  independent. 

"  Second.  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to 
demand,  and  the  Government  of  the  United  States  does 
hereby  demand,  that  the  Government  of  Spain  at  once 
relinquish  its  authority  and  government  in  the  Island  of 
Cuba,  and  withdraw  its  land  and  naval  forces  from  Cuba 
and  Cuban  waters. 

"Third.  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  be, 
and  he  hereby  is,  directed  and  empowered  to  use  the  en 
tire  land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  and  to 
call  into  the  actual  service  of  the  United  States  the  mili 
tia  of  the  several  States  to  such  extent  as  may  be  neces 
sary  to  carry  these  resolutions  into  effect. 

"  Fourth.  That  the  United  States  hereby  disclaims  any 
disposition  or  intention  to  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdic 
tion  or  control  over  said  Island  except  for  the  pacification 
thereof  and  asserts  its  determination,  when  that  is  accom 
plished,  to  leave  the  government  and  control  of  the  Island 
to  its  people. "  2 

President  Taft  said  that  the  Spanish  War  was  an  al 
truistic  war.3  The  ground  on  which  such  a  statement 
may  be  defended  lies  in  the  fourth  resolution.  It  was  of 
fered  by  Senator  Teller  of  Colorado  and  agreed  to  hi  the 
Senate  without  a  division.  It  is  wonderful  that  the  United 
States,  large  and  powerful,  about  to  make  war  on 


1  The  stages  which  led  to  these  resolutions  and  the  disagreements  arc 
well  told  by  Henry  Cabot  Lodge  in  the  War  with  Spain,  35  et  seq. ;  see 
also  Chadwick,  582. 

8  Foreign  Relations,  liv.  *  John  W.  Foster,  I.e. 


CH.  III.]  DECLARATION  OF  WAR  67 

Spain,  weak  and  decadent,  should  renounce  solemnly 
any  desire  to  get  Cuba.  The  fertile  island,  the  Pearl  of 
the  Antilles,  Cuba,  had  long  been  coveted  by  America, 
and  now  when  the  plum  was  ready  to  drop  into  her  mouth 
she  abjured  the  wish  of  conquest.  But  it  seemed  impos 
sible  to  convince  the  Spaniards  that  our  aim  was  not  the 
annexation  of  Cuba.  This  resolution  had  the  sympa 
thetic  adhesion  of  the  President  and  many,  if  not  all,  of  his 
warmest  friends.  It  lightens  up  the  declaration  of  this 
unnecessary  war. 


CHAPTER  IV 

NOTHING  excites  a  nation  so  much  as  going  to  war.  The 
first  few  days  after  its  declaration,  tumult  reigns.  So 
it  came  to  pass  in  1898.  The  feeling  in  Congress  was 
intense  and  all  the  more  so  because  it  had  been  so  long 
suppressed,  awaiting  the  President's  action.  A  large 
majority  of  Congress  was  in  favor  of  war  to  expel  the 
Spaniards  from  Cuba,  and  most  of  the  Democrats,  assisted 
by  some  Republicans,  desired,  as  a  stage  in  the  pro 
ceedings,  to  recognize  the  republic  of  the  Cuban  insur 
gents.  Two  days  after  the  President's  Message  was  sent 
to  Congress,  the  members  of  the  House  met  in  "a  state 
of  frenzied  excitement"  with  " partisan  passion  running 
high."  During  a  passionate  colloquy,  a  Republican  mem 
ber  said  to  a  Democrat,  "You  are  a  liar,"  when  the  Demo 
crat  seized  a  bound  copy  of  the  Congressional  Record  and 
hurled  it  at  his  opponent.  The  missile  fell  short;  the 
two  members  rushed  for  one  another,  and  the  House, 
so  a  reporter  wrote,  "was  in  an  uproar.  Shouts  of  anger 
and  indignation  were  heard  on  every  hand.  Members 
in  the  crush  espoused  the  cause  of  the  two  original  com 
batants,  and  there  were  several  exciting  collisions  but  no 
blows  struck."  At  last,  owing  to  the  work  of  the  Speaker 
and  the  Sergeant-at-Arms,  the  efforts  of  a  dozen  muscu 
lar  members  and  an  impassioned  appeal  by  Dingley,  the 

68 


CH.  IV.]  GEORGE  DEWEY  69 

fighters  were  restrained,  the  angry  members  took  their 
seats  "and  a  resemblance  of  order  was  restored."  l 

"  Beware  of  entrance  to  a  quarrel,  but  being  in, 
Bear't  that  the  opposed  may  beware  of  thee."     , 

In  such  wise  did  the  McKinley  administration  conduct 
the  Spanish  War. 

Congress  formally  declared  that  war  with  Spain  had 
existed  since  April  21.  Excitement  had  given  way  to 
alarm  in  the  public  mind  lest  the  Navy  might  not  prove 
equal  to  the  job  when  the  country  learned  that  the  first 
successful  blow  had  been  struck  in  the  Orient  on  May  1 
by  the  Asiatic  squadron,  under  the  command  of  George 
Dewey.2 

During  the  autumn  of  1897,  Dewey  thought  that  we 
were  drifting  into  a  war  with  Spain  and,  of  all  things,  he 
desired  the  command  of  the  Asiatic  squadron.  Theo 
dore  Roosevelt,  in  his  position  of  Assistant  Secretary  of 
the  Navy,  had  made  up  his  mind  that  Dewey  was  the  man 
for  the  place,  but  political  influence  was  pushing  another 
officer  who  was  his  senior.3  "I  want  you  to  go,"  Roose 
velt  said  to  him.  "You  are  the  man  who  will  be  equal 
to  the  emergency  if  one  arises.  Do  you  know  any  sen 
ators?" 

"Senator  Proctor,"  4  was  the  reply,  "is  from  my  State. 
He  is  an  old  friend  of  the  family  and  my  father  was  of 
service  to  him  when  he  was  a  young  man." 


1  N.  Y.  Tribune,  Apr.  14 ;    Recollections  of  Henry  S.  Pritchett. 

1  "The  newspapers  of  May  2  had  a  brief  announcement  of  the  victory." 
Dewey,  Autobiography,  228.  These  first  (May  2)  announcements  were 
from  Spanish  sources  and  gave  no  adequate  idea  of  the  completeness  of 
the  victory;  the  reading  between  the  lines  made  it  possible  to  arrive  at 
a  conclusion  that  made  the  headlines  of  victory  justifiable. 

*  Theodore  Roosevelt,  Autobiography,  231. 

4  Redfield  Proctor,  "who  was  very  ardent  for  the  war."     Ibid. 


70  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  (1898 

"You  could  not  have  a  better  sponsor,"  Roosevelt  re 
joined.  "Lose  no  time  in  having  him  speak  a  word  for 
you."  Dewey  at  once  enlisted  the  favor  of  Senator  Proc 
tor,  whose  influence  with  the  President  secured  him  the 
appointment.1 

In  a  Japanese  harbor  on  January  3,  1898,  Dewey  took 
over  the  command  of  the  Asiatic  squadron  and  hoisted 
his  broad  pennant  on  the  Olympia.  In  his  accurate 
and  modest  account  of  his  work,  written  soon  after 
his  return  to  Washington  in  1899,2  he  told  of  the  care 
ful  preparation  that  he  made  for  an  attack  on  the 
Spanish  fleet  in  the  Philippines.  Before  he  heard  of 
the  disaster  to  the  Maine,  the  news  of  which  reached 
him  on  February  17,  he  had  decided  to  take  the 
squadron  to  Hong  Kong.  An  evidence  of  the  common 
working  of  two  minds  bent  on  war  is  Roosevelt's  despatch 
to  Dewey  of  February  25,  1898.  "Order  the  squadron 
to  Hong  Kong.  Keep  full  of  coal.  In  the  event  of  dec 
laration  of  war  Spain,  your  duty  will  be  to  see  that  the 
Spanish  squadron  does  not  leave  the  Asiatic  coast,  and 
then  offensive  operations  in  Philippine  Islands."3 

In  Dewey's  account  of  the  interchange  of  hospitalities 
among  the  ships  assembled  at  Hong  Kong  during  the 
month  of  March,  he  related  a  conversation  that  he  had 
with  Prince  Henry  of  Prussia,  brother  of  the  Kaiser,  who 
remarked  "that  he  did  not  believe  that  the  powers  would 
ever  allow  the  United  States  to  annex  Cuba." 

"We  do  not  wish  to  annex  Cuba,"  Dewey  answered, 
"but  we  cannot  suffer  the  horrible  condition  of  affairs, 


1  Dewey,  Autobiography,  168. 

2  Dewey,  Autobiography,  vi.   This  account  was  not  published  until  1913. 
8  Dewey,  Autobiography,  179. 


CH.  IV.]  GEORGE  DEWEY  71 

which  exists  at  present  in  that  island  at  our  very  doors,  to 
continue,  and  we  are  bound  to  put  a  stop  to  it." 

"And  what  are  you  after?  What  does  your  country 
want?"  the  Prince  asked  jokingly  on  another  occasion; 1 
and,  although  a  word  in  jest,  it  represented  the  European 
attitude  which  could  see  in  our  action  only  a  desire  to 
acquire  a  rich  territory. 

Having  served  under  Farragut,  Dewey  looked  upon  him 
as  a  master.  "  Valuable  as  the  training  of  Annapolis 
was,"  he  wrote,  "it  was  poor  schooling  beside  that  of 
serving  under  Farragut  in  time  of  war."  2 

On  April  25  came  this  word  from  Secretary  Long : 
"War  has  commenced  between  the  United  States  and 
Spain.  Proceed  at  once  to  the  Philippine  Islands.  Com 
mence  operations  at  once,  particularly  against  Spanish 
fleet.  You  must  capture  vessels  or  destroy.  Use  ut 
most  endeavors."  3  Two  days  later  Dewey  set  sail,  on 
his  600-mile  voyage  to  Manila  Bay.  The  Hong  Kong 
newspapers  stated  that  Manila  was  impregnable,  and  in 
the  Hong  Kong  club  which  was  British,  whose  members 
were  in  thorough  sympathy  with  the  United  States,  it 
was  not  thought  that  Dewey  would  be  successful  in  his 
attack.  Arriving  off  Manila,  he  signalled  for  all  the  com 
manding  officers  to  come  on  board  his  flag-ship  and  said 
to  them,  "We  shall  enter  Manila  Bay  to-night,  and  you 
will  follow  the  motions  and  movements  of  the  flag-ship 
which  will  lead."  4 

That  night  (as  he  told  the  story)   he  asked  himself, 


1  Dewey,  Autobiography,  185. 

2  Dewey,  Autobiography,  50. 

3  The  New  American  Navy,  Long,  i.  182. 

4  Dewey,  Autobiography,  206. 


72  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

"What  would  Farragut  do?"  and  he  thought  he  would 
have  done  exactly  as  proposed.1  On  April  30  at  11.30 
P.M.,  with  all  lights  masked,  the  gun  crews  at  their  guns, 
Dewey  entered  the  South  Channel,  and  with  eminent  suc 
cess  ran  by  the  batteries.  After  half  of  the  squadron  had 
passed,  a  battery  opened  fire  but  none  of  the  shots  took 
effect.2  Now  he  was  in  Manila  Bay  in  which  was  the 
Spanish  fleet  that  he  must  "capture  or  destroy." 

"In  action,"  Dewey  wrote,  "we  had  six  ships  to  the 
Spaniards'  seven,  but  we  were  superior  in  class  of  vessel 
and  in  armaments." 3  Proceeding  across  the  bay  at 
slow  speed  at  5.15  in  the  morning  of  May  1,  his  squadron 
was  fired  upon  by  three  batteries  at  Manila,  two  at  Ca- 
vite*4  and  by  the  anchored  Spanish  fleet.  Still  Dewey 
went  forward  to  the  attack,  leading  the  column  with  his 
flag-ship  Olympia;  the  rest  of  his  command  followed  with 
a  distance  of  400  yards  between  ships.  Two  submarine 
mines  exploded,  but  they  were  two  miles  ahead,  "too  far 
to  be  effective."  5  At  5.40  A.M.,  when  two  and  one  half 
miles  away  from  their  objective,  the  Spanish  fleet,  Dewey 
said  to  his  captain,  "You  may  fire  when  you  are  ready, 
Gridley."  6  At  once  the  squadron  opened  fire.  Firing 
without  cessation  as  they  moved,  three  runs  were  made 
from  the  eastward  and  two  from  the  westward  ;  the  length 
of  each  run  was  about  two  miles.  Approaching  on  the 
fifth  run,  when  nearest,  within  2000  yards,  this  rapid 


1  Autobiography,  60. 

2  Dewey's  report,  May  4.     Appendix  to  the  report  of  the  Chief  of  the 
Bureau  of  Navigation,  70.     This  will  be  referred  to  as  Crowninshield. 

8  Autobiography,  203;  see  also  212,  213. 

4  Cavit4  was  ten  miles  from  Manila,  had  5000  people,  a  navy  yard, 
arsenal  and  fortifications.     Lodge,  The  War  with  Spain,  53. 
6  Report,  Crowninshield,  70. 
6  Autobiography,  214. 


CH.  IV.]  BATTLE  OF  MANILA  73 

and  concentrated  fire  —  "  smothering/'  he  called  it  - 
demolished  the  Spanish  fleet.  At  7.35  A.M.,  an  erroneous 
report  was  made  to  the  Commodore  that  his  ship  was 
short  of  ammunition ;  this  caused  him  to  withdraw  the 
squadron  from  action,  and  gave  his  men  time  for  break 
fast,  as  they  had  made  the  fight  on  coffee  served  in  the 
early  morning.  All  but  one  of  the  Spanish  fleet,  however, 
had  been  destroyed,  and  as  Dewey  naively  remarked,  "  Vic 
tory  was  already  ours,  though  we  did  not  know  it."  1  At 
11.16  A.M.,  he  returned  with  the  squadron  to  the  attack. 
"By  this  time,"  he  said  in  his  report,  "the  flag-ship  and 
almost  the  entire  Spanish  fleet  were  in  flames,  and  at  12.30 
P.M.  the  squadron  ceased  firing,  the  batteries  being 
silenced  and  the  ships  sunk,  burnt,  and  deserted."  The 
Spaniards  lost  at  least  thirteen  vessels :  three  were  sunk, 
eight  burned  [only  seven  of  these  were  in  line  of  battle] ; 
two  tugs  and  a  number  of  small  launches  were  captured. 
Their  casualties  were  381  men.3  In  Dewey's  squadron 
none  was  killed  and  only  seven  slightly  wounded.  "The 
squadron,"  he  reported,  "is  in  as  good  condition  now  as 
before  the  battle."  4 

"The  completeness  of  the  result,"  wrote  Senator  Lodge, 
"which  is  the  final  test,  gives  Manila  a  great  place  in  the 
history  of  naval  battles  and  writes  the  name  of  George 
Dewey  high  up  among  the  greatest  of  victorious  admi 
rals."  5  The  rapid  and  concentrated  fire  of  the  Americans 
destroyed  the  Spanish  fleet.  This  disconcerted  the  Span 
iards  whose  valor  was  remarkable  but  whose  fire  was 
hasty  and  inaccurate.  Dewey  told  the  secret  of  his  suc- 


1  Autobiography,  218.  2  Crowninshield,  70. 

3  Ibid.,  71,  92. 

4  Ibid.,  71.  6  The  War  with  Spain,  67. 


74  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

cess.  "It  was,"  he  wrote,  "the  ceaseless  routine  of  hard 
work  and  preparation  in  time  of  peace  that  won 
Manila."  l  It  looked  "  'so  easy'  after  it  was  all  done."  2 
But  let  one  imagine  Dewey  with  his  Americans  on  the 
defence  in  the  position  of  the  Spaniards  with  their  many 
resources  and  incentive  to  preparation,  and  let  one  con 
ceive  the  Spanish  admiral  and  his  fleet  the  attacking  party, 
and  the  result  would  have  been  just  the  contrary.  But 
in  truth  the  Spanish  admiral  would  not  have  attacked, 
nor  would  any  American  of  "the  respectable  common 
place  type."  3  To  attack  a  foe  seven  thousand  miles 
from  a  base  was  a  risk  too  great  to  take  for  any  comman 
der  who  did  not  pattern  after  Nelson  and  Farragut,  as 
defeat  or  even  "failure  to  gain  a  decisive  victory"  would 
have  been  a  disaster.4  Dewey  was  long-headed  as  well 
as  daring  and  took  into  account  all  the  conditions  of  the 
game.  "In  the  event  of  defeat,"  he  wrote,  "no  ship  of 
our  Asiatic  squadron  would  have  been  afloat  to  tell  the 
story."  5 

Honors  and  congratulations  came.  The  President 
made  him  a  rear-admiral.  Congress  thanked  him,  his 
officers  and  men.  In  writing  to  him,  his  "old  friend" 
John  Hay  spoke  of  his  "mingled  wisdom  and  daring." 
Roosevelt,  who  appreciated  Dewey  before  and  admired 
him  greatly  after  the  battle,  cabled,  "Every  American 
is  your  debtor."  6 

It  was  the  "man  behind  the  gun"  that  did  the  business. 
The  Spanish  Captain-General  in  his  war  proclamation 


1  Autobiography,  231.  »  The  War  with  Spain,  62. 

8  Roosevelt  Autobiography,  231. 

4  Admiral  Luce,  cited  by  Dewey,  Autobiography,  189  ». 

6  Autobiography,  252. 

6  Dewey,  Autobiography,  229. 


CH.  IV.]  GEORGE  DEWEY  75 

had  declared  that  the  North  American  people  "were 
constituted  of  all  the  social  excrescences ;"  their  squadron 
was  "  manned  by  foreigners  possessing  neither  instruction 
nor  discipline."  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  percentage  of 
American-born  seamen  in  Dewey's  squadron  was  about 
eighty  all  told.  The  Archbishop  of  Manila  who,  it  was 
said,  had  written  the  Captain-General's  proclamation, 
visited  the  Olympia  some  months  afterwards  and  Dewey 
had  the  ship's  company  paraded  in  his  honor.  "As  he 
saw  the  fine  young  fellows  march  past,"  wrote  the  Ad 
miral,  "his  surprise  at  their  appearance  was  manifest." 
"Admiral,"  he  said,  "you  must  be  very  proud  to  com 
mand  such  a  body  of  men."  "Yes,  I  am,"  was  the  reply, 
"and  I  have  just  the  same  kind  of  men  on  board  all  the 
other  ships  in  the  harbor."  "Admiral,"  the  Archbishop 
rejoined,  "I  have  been  here  for  thirty  years.  I  have  seen 
the  men-of-war  of  all  the  nations  but  never  have  I  seen 
anything  like  this,"  as  he  pointed  to  the  Olympia' s  crew. 

Dewey  paid  tribute  to  his  officers  as  well  as  to  his  men. 
"I  doubt,"  he  said  in  his  report,  "if  any  commander-in- 
chief  under  similar  circumstances,  was  ever  served  by 
more  loyal,  efficient  and  gallant  captains  than  those  of 
the  squadron  now  under  my  command."  l 

The  moral  effect  of  Dewey's  victory  was  great.  It 
gave  the  country  confidence  in  her  navy.  It  was  gener 
ally  thought  that  on  paper  the  Spanish  Navy  was  supe- 


1  My  authorities  for  the  battle  of  Manila  Bay  are  Dewey's  account 
printed  in  his  Autobiography;  reports  of  Dewey,  Gridley,  Coghlan, 
Walker,  Dyer,  Wood,  Wildes,  Montojo,  the  Spanish  Admiral,  printed  by 
Crowninshield.  I  have  also  used  The  War  with  Spain,  Lodge ;  The  New 
American  Navy,  Long;  and  I  have  consulted  the  Autobiography  of 
Roosevelt;  Twenty  Years  of  the  Republic,  Peck;  America  as  a  World 
Power,  J.  H.  Latane"  (Hart's  American  Nation  Series) ;  The  Nation,  May 
5,  12,  1898. 


76  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

rior,  and  it  might  prove  so  in  action.  As  a  formidable 
fleet  would  certainly  be  sent  across  the  ocean,  imagina 
tion  ran  riot  as  to  the  destruction  it  might  cause  to  the 
seaboard  cities  and  to  the  summer  resorts  on  the  coast. 
Many  Boston  men  took  their  securities  inland  to  Worces 
ter  and  Springfield.  Roosevelt  spoke  of  it  as  a  "  fairly 
comic  panic"  and  wrote  truly,  "The  state  of  nervousness 
along  much  of  the  seacoast  was  funny  in  view  of  the  lack 
of  foundation  for  it."  l  For  the  authorities  in  Washing 
ton,  naval  and  otherwise,  had  perfect  trust  in  the  Amer 
ican  Navy  and  felt  that  with  a  fair  show  it  would  destroy 
any  Spanish  squadron  sent  across  the  water  to  take  a 
necessary  part  in  the  war.  Now  Dewey's  victory  showed 
the  stuff  in  the  officers  and  men  of  the  American  Navy 
and  imparted  a  confidence  to  the  general  public  that  was 
sorely  needed  at  the  commencement  of  hostilities. 

Sympathy  in  the  large  powers  of  Europe  on  the  con 
tinent  was  with  Spain,  and  especial  manifestations  were 
in  Paris  and  Berlin.  If  there  was  any  design  to  interfere 
in  the  conflict,  it  was  checked  by  the  attitude  of  England, 
who  favored  decidedly  the  United  States.  Dewey's  vic 
tory  strengthened  the  position  of  England  by  rendering 
any  intervention  on  the  part  of  the  continental  powers 
impossible.  Sentiment  on  the  continent  was  that,  in  the 
first  encounters,  Spain  would  be  victorious,  such  was  the 
confidence  felt  in  her  navy  and  distrust  in  the  American 
sea  power.  Andrew  D.  White,  our  Ambassador  to  Ger 
many,  gave  a  vivid  account  of  the  sentiment,  as  shown  in 
the  German  newspapers  and  in  an  interview  granted  by 
Mommsen,  on  the  conduct  of  the  United  States  toward 


Autobiography,   235. 


CH.  IV.]  GERMAN  AND  FRENCH  OPINION  77 

Spain.  This,  White  wrote,  "was  even  more  acrid  than 
his  previous  utterances  and  exhibited  sharply  and  at 
great  length  our  alleged  sins  and  shortcomings."  l  Fol 
lowing  the  Spanish  newspapers,  which  liked  to  call  their 
opponents  "  Yankee  pigs,"  the  "  continental  press  teemed 
with  the  grossest  caricatures,  in  which  the  Americans 
were  drawn  as  swine."  2 

Anatole  France  in  his  novel  "L'Anneau  d'Am6thyste  " 
(226),  published  in  1899,  gave  this  lively  account  of  a 
conversation  in  a  Paris  salon :  A  general  expressed  the 
opinion  that  "in  declaring  war  on  Spain  the  Americans 
were  imprudent  and  it  may  cost  them  dear.  Having 
neither  an  Army  nor  a  Navy  it  will  be  difficult  for  them 
to  maintain  a  conflict  with  a  trained  army  and  experi 
enced  sailors.  .  .  .  The  Americans  are  not  prepared 
for  war,  and  war  requires  long  preparation." 

"Now  then,  general,"  cried  a  lady,  "do  tell  us  that 
those  American  bandits  will  be  beaten." 

"Their  success  is  doubtful,"  replied  the  general.  "I 
should  say  that  it  would  even  be  absurd,  and  would 
amount  to  an  insolent  contradiction  of  the  whole  system 
in  vogue  among  military  nations.  In  short  the  victory 
of  the  United  States  would  constitute  a  practical  criti 
cism  of  principles  adopted  in  the  whole  of  Europe  by  the 
most  competent  military  authorities.  Such  a  result  is 
neither  to  be  expected  nor  desired." 

"What  luck!"  exclaimed  the  lady,  "Our  friends  the 
Spaniards  will  be  victorious.  Vive  le  roi !" 

"Certain  facts  seem  to  indicate  that  the  Americans  are 


1  Autobiography,  11,  160,  178.     White  saw  the  proof  sheets  of  the  in 
terview  but  it  was  never  published. 
» Peck,  544,  553. 


78  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

beginning  to  repent  of  their  rashness, "  said  a  gentleman 
of  the  party.  "It  is  said  that  they  are  terrified.  They 
expect  any  day  to  see  Spanish  warships  appear  on  their 
Atlantic  coast.  Inhabitants  of  Boston,  New  York  and 
Philadelphia  are  fleeing  in  great  numbers  toward  the  in 
terior  of  the  country.  It  is  a  general  panic." 

A  servant  brought  in  the  mail.  "  Perhaps  there  will 
be  news  of  the  war,"  said  the  gentleman  opening  a  news 
paper.  Amid  an  intense  silence,  he  read  aloud:  "Com 
modore  Dewey  has  destroyed  the  Spanish  fleet  in  the 
port  of  Manila.  The  Americans  did  not  lose  a  single 


man." 


"On  the  30th  of  April,  1898,"  wrote  Dewey,  "I  had  been 
practically  unknown  to  the  American  public.  In  a  day 
my  name  was  on  everyone's  lips.  The  dash  of  our  squad 
ron  into  an  Oriental  bay  seven  thousand  miles  from  home 
had  the  glamour  of  romance  to  the  national  imagina 
tion."  1 

After  the  battle  of  Manila  Bay,  Senator  Redfield  Proc 
tor  wrote  to  President  McKinley :  "Dewey  will  be  as 
wise  and  safe,  if  there  are  political  duties  devolving  on 
him,  as  he  is  forcible  in  action.  There  is  no  better  man 
in  discretion  and  safe  judgment."  2  The  sequel  showed 
how  profoundly  the  Senator  comprehended  the  Admiral. 
After  the  battle,  Dewey  established  a  blockade  of  Manila 
which  he  aimed  to  maintain  thoroughly  and  impartially. 
A  good  student  of  international  law,  he  was  guided  in  his 
conduct  by  the  best  of  authorities,  and  his  attitude  to  the 
men-of-war  sent  by  several  nations  to  Manila  Bay  for 
purposes  of  observation,  was  correct.  The  English,  who 


Autobiography,  289.  8  Ibid.,  228. 


CH.  IV.]  GERMAN  ACTION  79 

thoroughly  sympathized  with  the  United  States,  the 
Japanese,  who  partially  did  so,  and  the  French,  whose 
feeling  was  favorable  to  the  Spaniards,  respected  Dewey's 
authority  and  permitted  him  to  prescribe  rules  for  their 
guidance.  Not  so  the  Germans,  who  were  a  law  unto 
themselves  and  chafed  against  the  exercise  of  any  author 
ity  not  their  own. 

After  Dewey's  return  to  Washington,  at  a  dinner  at 
the  White  House  given  him  by  the  President,  the  Presi 
dent  desired  to  know  the  truth  of  the  statements  fre 
quently  made  in  the  newspapers  regarding  the  friction 
between  him  and  the  German  Vice-Admiral.  "  There  is 
no  record  of  it  at  all  on  the  files,"  McKinley  said.  "No, 
Mr.  President,"  Dewey  answered,  "as  I  was  on  the 
spot  and  familiar  with  the  situation  from  day  to  day,  it 
seemed  best  that  I  look  after  it  myself,  at  a  time  when 
you  had  worries  enough  of  your  own."  1  Dewey  came 
into  collision  with  the  Germans  a  number  of  times  before 
the  arrival  of  the  Vice-Admiral  von  Diedrichs.  On  June 
12,  he  came  in  on  his  flag-ship,  the  Kaiserin  Augwta 
making  the  third  German  cruiser  in  the  harbor ;  another 
was  expected  and  a  transport  had  already  arrived.  In 
accordance  with  naval  etiquette,  Dewey  made  the  first 
call  upon  Diedrichs  and  referred  to  the  large  German 
force  and  the  limited  German  interest  in  the  Philip 
pines.  The  British,  with  a  much  larger  commercial 
interest,  with  a  greater  number  of  resident  subjects,  with 
the  largest  naval  force  of  any  power  in  far  Eastern  waters, 
never  had  at  any  one  time  during  the  blockade  more  than 
three  warships  in  Manila  harbor.  To  Dewey's  gentle 


Dewey,  Autobiography,  252. 


80  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

remonstrance  Diedrichs  answered,  "I  am  here  by  order 
of  the  Kaiser,  sir/'  l 

Dewey  properly  entitled  his  chapter  "A  Period  of  Anx 
iety."  He  had  news  of  a  more  powerful  squadron  than 
his  own  on  the  way  from  Spain  to  the  Philippines;  he 
awaited  with  great  anxiety  intelligence  from  Sampson's 
fleet  in  the  Atlantic ;  at  the  same  time  it  was  evident 
from  the  action  of  the  Germans  that  they  did  not  accept 
his  interpretation  of  the  laws  of  the  blockade.  They 
were  on  the  most  cordial  social  terms  with  the  Spaniards 
in  Manila,  and  the  talk  of  the  town  was  that  the  Germans 
would  intervene  in  favor  of  Spain.  Dewey  addressed  a 
formal  letter  to  Vice- Admiral  von  Diedrichs  in  which  he 
said  :  "  As  a  state  of  war  exists  between  the  United  States 
and  Spain,  and  as  the  entry  into  this  blockaded  port  of 
the  vessels  of  war  of  a  neutral  is  permitted  by  the  blockad 
ing  squadron  as  a  matter  of  international  courtesy,  such 
neutrals  should  necessarily  satisfy  the  blockading  vessels 
as  to  their  identity.  ...  I  claim  the  right  to  communi 
cate  with  all  vessels  entering  this  port,  now  blockaded 
with  the  forces  under  my  command."  2  To  this  Died 
richs  demurred  and  notified  Dewey  that  "he  would  sub 
mit  the  point  to  a  conference  of  all  the  senior  officers  of 
the  men-of-war  in  the  harbor."  Only  Captain  Chichester 
of  the  British  ship  Immortalite  answered  the  call,  and  his 
expressed  opinion  was  decidedly  on  Dewey's  side.  Never 
theless  it  took  further  and  peremptory  action  on  the  part 
of  Dewey  to  convince  the  German  that  his  orders  in 
Manila  Bay  must  be  obeyed.3 

1  Dewey,  Autobiography,  257.  2  Dewey,  Autobiography,  265. 

8  My  authority  is  ch.  xvii.  of  Dewey's  Autobiography.  But  see  A. 
D.  White,  Autobiography,  ii.  160  et  seq.;  Chadwick,  the  Spanish- 
American  War,  ii.  364;  Long,  ii.  hi.;  Lodge,  195;  Peck,  578. 


CH.  IV.]  PROGRESS  OF  THE  WAR  81 

The  glamour  of  our  entrance  into  the  Orient  through 
Dewey's  victory  could  not  take  the  public  mind,  nor  that 
of  the  historian,  off  the  real  centre  of  the  war,  which  was 
in  Cuba,  and  from  the  direction  of  affairs,  which  lay  in 
Washington.  On  April  22,  President  McKinley  pro 
claimed  a  limited  blockade  of  Cuban  ports,  and  four  days 
later  he  declared  "that  the  policy  of  this  government  will 
be  not  to  resort  to  privateering  but  to  adhere  to  the  rules 
of  the  Declaration  of  Paris."  On  April  23,  he  called  for 
125,000  volunteers  and  a  little  over  a  month  later  for 
75,000  more.1  The  Secretary  of  War,  Alger,  wrote  that, 
as  events  turned  out,  the  additional  call  was  unnecessary, 
as  136,000  volunteers  did  not  leave  the  United  States.2 
But  it  is  a  tradition  in  American  administration  that 
Lincoln  in  his  first  call  for  75,000  demanded  too  small  a 
number,  so  that  McKinley,  if  he  erred  at  all,  was  bound 
to  err  on  the  safe  side;  but  a  prolongation  of  the  war 
would  have  justified  the  larger  number. 

Before  the  United  States  declared  war  the  President 
had  appointed  Captain  William  T.  Sampson  commander 
of  the  North  Atlantic  squadron.  Advanced  over  seven 
teen  other  officers,  he  was  made  rear-admiral  at  the  out 
break  of  the  war  and  placed  in  supreme  command  of  all 
operations  on  the  Atlantic  coast.  Appointed  rear- 
admiral  sixteen  days  before  Dewey,  the  appointment  came 
to  him  as  a  surprise,  causing  him  to  feel  deep  responsibil 
ity  rather  than  any  elation.3 

1  Richardson  x.  202  et  seq.  2  The  Spanish- American  War,   19. 

3  The  Relations  of  the  United  States  and  Spain :  The  Spanish  War, 
Chadwick,  i.  18  et  seq.  Chadwick  was  Captain  of  the  flag-ship  New  York 
and  also  Sampson's  chief  of  staff.  This  valuable  and  useful  work  is  in 
two  volumes  published  in  1911  and  will  be  referred  to  as  Chadwick,  The 
Spanish  American  War  i.  and  do.  ii. ;  see  also  The  New  American  Navy, 
Long,  i.  211. 


82  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

The  "sinews  of  war"  were  carefully  looked  after.  Two 
hundred  million  of  an  authorized  loan  of  double  that 
amount  was  offered  to  popular  subscription  and  eagerly 
grasped  at.  Although  paying  but  three  per  cent,  it  was 
oversubscribed  seven  and  one  half  times,  was  entirely 
taken  at  home  and  went  to  a  premium  of  six  per  cent 
within  three  months.1  A  revenue  bill  was  carefully 
framed  by  Dingley  and  his  Republican  associates  on  the 
Ways  and  Means  Committee  and  adroitly  piloted  through 
the  House  and  eventually  the  Senate;  it  became  a  law 
on  June  13. 2 

It  was  known  that  a  Spanish  fleet  under  command  of 
Admiral  Cervera  had  left  Cape  Verde  Islands  on  April  29, 
and  was  steaming  westward.  The  public  was  uncertain  as 
to  its  destination,  but  the  Navy  Department  felt  sure  that 
it  was  either  Puerto  Rico  or  Cuba.  As  it  proceeded  much 
more  slowly  than  was  estimated,  it  was  a  source  of  mysti 
fication  and  alarm;  it  arrived  at  Martinique,  a  French 
island,  on  May  12,  and  one  week  later  in  Santiago  harbor, 
Cuba.  Cervera's  choice  of  Santiago  and  decision  to 
remain  there  made  the  battle,  which  finally  took  place, 
the  decisive  one  of  the  war.  In  due  time,  his  fleet  was 
blockaded  so  that  he  could  not  make  a  sortie  without  a 
fight. 

The  President  appreciated  that  to  gain  a  decided  re 
sult  the  Army  must  cooperate  with  the  Navy,  and  Cer 
vera's  entrance  into  Santiago  fixed  that  place  as  the 
Army's  objective  point.  Consequently  an  expedition  was 
prepared  to  proceed  thither.  Theodore  Roosevelt,  a 
participator  in  the  war  and  the  historian  of  a  phase  of  it, 

1  Noyes,  American  Finance,  279. 

a  Life  of  Nelson  Dingley,  Jr.,  462  et  seq. 


CH.  IV.J  ROOSEVELT  83 

called  the  chapter  on  it  in  his  Autobiography  "The  War 
of  America  the  Unready/'  and  this  title  is  true  so  far 
as  it  applied  to  the  Army.  With  the  charitable  and  in 
telligent  view  of  men  and  affairs,  which  was  a  real  dis 
tinction  in  a  man  of  active  life,  he  wrote,  "  Secretary  Al- 
ger  happened  to  be  Secretary  when  war  broke  out,  and 
all  the  responsibility  for  the  shortcomings  of  the  Depart 
ment  were  visited  upon  his  devoted  head.  He  was  made 
the  scapegoat  for  our  National  shortcomings.  The 
fault  was  not  his ;  the  fault  and  responsibility  lay  with 
us,  the  people,  who  for  thirty-three  years  had  permitted 
our  representatives  in  Congress  and  in  National  executive 
office  to  bear  themselves  so  that  it  was  absolutely  im 
possible  to  avoid  the  great  bulk  of  all  the  trouble  that 
occurred,  and  of  all  the  shortcomings  of  which  our  people 
complained  during  the  Spanish  War."  1  But  it  was  dif 
ferent  in  the  Navy,  as  no  one  knew  better  than  Roosevelt, 
who  was  Assistant  Secretary  when  the  war  broke  out. 
"The  Navy,"  he  wrote,  " really  was  largely  on  a  war 
footing,  as  any  Navy  which  is  even  respectably  cared  for 
in  time  of  peace  must  be.  The  admirals,  captains  and 
lieutenants  were  continually  practicing  their  profession 
in  almost  precisely  the  way  that  it  has  to  be  practiced 
in  time  of  war.  Except  actually  shooting  at  a  foe,  most 
of  the  men  on  board  ship  went  through  in  time  of  peace 
practically  all  that  they  would  have  to  go  through  in 
time  of  war."  2 

If  one  desires  to  read  a  graphic  account  of  the  bad  man 
agement  and  confusion  attendant  upon  our  getting  18,000 
troops  3  from  Tampa,  Florida,  to  Santiago,  let  him  read 


1  The  Autobiography  (1913),  244.  2  Ibid.,  242. 

1  Chadwick,  The  Spanish-American  War,  ii.  77. 


84  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  (1898 

Roosevelt's  books.1  "We  were  kept  several  days  on  the 
transport/'  he  wrote,  " which  was  jammed  with  men,  so 
that  it  was  hard  to  move  about  on  deck.  Then  the  fleet 
got  under  way,  and  we  steamed  slowly  down  to  Santiago. 
Here  we  disembarked,  higgledy-piggledy,  just  as  we  had 
embarked.  Different  parts  of  different  outfits  were  jum 
bled  together,  and  it  was  no  light  labor  afterwards  to  as 
semble  the  various  batteries.  For  instance,  one  trans 
port  had  guns,  and  another  the  locks  for  the  guns;  the 
two  not  getting  together  for  several  days  after  one  of 
them  had  been  landed.  Soldiers  went  here,  provisions 
there ;  and  who  got  ashore  first  largely  depended  upon 
individual  activity."  2  In  some  way  or  other  the  Army 

1  The  Rough  Riders ;   Autobiography. 

Roosevelt  went  to  Cuba  as  Lieut.  Colonel  of  the  Rough  Riders  of  which 
Dr.  Leonard  Wood  was  the  Colonel.  In  a  private  letter  to  Dr.  W.  Sturgis 
Bigelow  of  March  29,  1898,  Roosevelt  wrote:  "I  do  not  know  that  I 
shall  be  able  to  go  to  Cuba  if  there  is  a  war.  .  .  .  But  if  I  am  able  to 
go  I  certainly  shall.  ...  I  like  life  very  much.  I  have  always  led  a 
joyous  life.  I  like  thought  and  I  like  action,  and  it  will  be  very  bitter  to 
me  to  leave  my  wife  and  children ;  and  while  I  think  I  could  face  death 
with  dignity,  I  have  no  desire  beforevmy  time  has  come  to  go  out  into  the 
everlasting  darkness.  So  I  shall  not  go  into  a  war  with  any  undue  exhila 
ration  of  spirits  or  in  a  frame  of  mind  in  any  way  approaching  reckless 
ness  or  levity." — J.  B.  Bishop.  Scribner's  Magazine,  Nov.  1919,  531. 

2  Autobiography,  255.     Roosevelt  wrote  in  his  diary  which  was  given 
in  1921  by  Mrs.  Theodore  Roosevelt  to  the  Roosevelt  Memorial  Associa 
tion  :   "  June  3  —  Reached  Tampa  in  morning.     Railroad  system  in  wild 
est  confusion ;  it  took  us  twelve  hours  to  get  into  camp  with  our  baggage. 

"June  5 — No  words  can  paint  the  confusion.  No  head;  a  breakdown 
of  both  the  railroad  and  military  systems  of  the  country. 

"June  6  — No  plans ;  no  staff  officers ;  no  instructions  to  us.  Each  officer 
finds  out  for  himself  and  takes  his  chances. 

"June  8 — Told  to  go  aboard  transport.  Worst  confusion  yet.  No  allotment 
of  transports ;  no  plans ;  utter  confusion."  —  Boston  Herald,  Sept.  29,  1921. 

Roosevelt  wrote  to  his  sister,  Mrs.  Robinson,  on  June  12:  "It  seems 
to  me  that  the  people  at  Washington  are  inexcusable  for  putting  us 
aboard  ship  and  keeping  us  crowded  to  suffocation  on  these  transports  for 
six  days  in  Tampa  harbor  in  a  semi-tropical  sun."  Previously  one  whole 
night  had  been  spent  "standing  up  opposite  a  railway  track  waiting  for 
a  train  to  come,  and  finally  taking  coal  cars  in  the  morning." — Mrs. 
Robinson's  Roosevelt,  169. 


CH.  IV.]  FIGHT  AT  SAN  JUAN  HILL  86 

was  entirely  ashore  by  June  27.1  The  General  in  com 
mand  was  Shafter,  a  regular  army  officer  of  talent.2 
but  entirely  unfitted  for  a  tropical  expedition.  Sixty- 
three  years  of  age,  weighing  over  300,  with  a  tendency 
to  the  gout,  mounting  a  horse  with  difficulty,3  his  physi 
cal  disabilities  weighed  upon  him  to  an  extent  to  unfit 
him  entirely  for  his  dangerous  and  responsible  job. 

"I  expect  to  attack  Santiago  to-morrow  morning," 
Shafter  wrote  to  Sampson  on  June  30. 4  He  was  as  good 
as  his  word,  and  the  battles  of  El  Caney  and  San  Juan 
Hill  resulted.  The  fort  at  El  Caney  was  captured,  but 
the  fight  at  San  Juan  Hill  was  the  more  important.  Cap 
tain  John  Bigelow,  who  was  a  captain  in  the  regular  cav 
alry  with  the  expedition,  wrote:  "The  enemy's  position 
was  about  as  nearly  ideal  as  a  real  position  can  be.  I 
have  seen  the  famous  stone  wall  at  Fredericksburg  backed 
by  Marye's  Heights.  It  is  hardly  a  circumstance  to  this 
position.  San  Juan  was  more  suggestive  of  Gettysburg 
than  of  Fredericksburg.  Our  attack  seemed  hardly  less 
desperate  than  that  of  Pickett's  division.  At  Gettys 
burg  a  cannonade  of  several  hours'  duration  designed  to 
shake  the  morale  of  the  defence,  preceded  the  advance 
of  the  attacking  infantry  which,  during  this  period  of 
preparation,  was  kept  out  of  fire.  At  San  Juan  there  was 


1  "The  Army  was  in  a  region  with  a  character  wholly  unlike  that  of  any 
in  its  experience.     Nearly  the  whole  of  the  regular  force  of  which  it  was 
composed  had  been  accustomed  to  harrying  Indians  over  treeless  plains 
or  arid  mountains.     In  this  case  however  it  found  itself  in  a  country  cov 
ered  with  brush  so  heavy  that,  almost  impassable  to  the  individual  man, 
it  was  altogether  so  to  troops  in  formation."     Chadwick,   The  Spanish- 
American  War,  ii.  62. 

2  Chadwick,  Spanish-American  War,  ii.  6;  Alger. 

1  Chadwick,  ii.  110;    R.  H.  Davis,  The  Cuban  and  Porto  Rican  Cam 
paigns,  185. 

4  Chadwick,  Spanish- American  War,  ii.  75. 


86  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  (1898 

hardly  any  preparation  by  artillery,  and  the  infantry  and 
dismounted  cavalry,  who  made  the  attack,  were  exposed 
to  the  enemy's  fire  for  about  an  hour  immediately  pre 
ceding  their  advance,  most  of  them  not  being  able  or 
permitted  to  fire  back."  l  The  work  was  done  by  the 
regular  troops,  "the  flower  of  the  American  standing 
army,"  Senator  Lodge  so  termed  them.2  They  were 
assisted  by  three  volunteer  regiments,  only  one  of  which, 
the  Rough  Riders,  under  the  command  of  Theodore  Roose 
velt,3  did  effective  service.  The  Cuban  insurgents  helped 
the  Americans  by  doing  their  part  in  cutting  off  the  sup 
plies  from  Santiago,  but  were  not  as  valuable  support  as 
had  been  expected.  San  Juan  Heights  was  taken  on 
this  July  first.  "The  attack,"  wrote  Chadwick,  "was 
indeed  one  of  high  heroism  ...  as  gallant  a  deed  as 
was  ever  done."  4 

No  word  of  praise  can  be  too  high  for  the  work  of  the 
soldiers  that  day,  but  their  creature  comforts  were  not 
looked  after.  They  fought  on  empty  stomachs,  as  the 
commissariat  was  badly  managed ;  they  were  also  short 
of  tobacco  so  highly  prized  by  soldiers  in  the  field.  "Their 
woolen  clothing,"  said  Roosevelt,  "was  exactly  what  I 


1  Reminiscences  of  the  Santiago  Campaign,  127. 

2  P.  130.     Chadwick  wrote  :    "Our  first  army  was  one  of  extraordinary 
quality;    such  probably  as  will  never  again  take  the  field,  as  the  condi 
tions  of  its  training  can  never  be  repeated.     It  was  the  product  of  long 
years  of  war  against  the   wiliest  and   most   capable  of  savage  races. 
Schooled  in  every  trick  of  savage  warfare,  inured  to  every  privation  of 
heat  and  cold,  individualized  as  no  other  soldier  ever  has  been,  these  men 
of  the  plains  were  accustomed  to  fighting  their  own  battles,  and  took  with 
them  to  San  Juan  Hill  the  qualities  and  character  which  made  this  a  force, 
which  it  is  not  too  much  to  say,  has  never  been  equalled  in  general  effi 
ciency."     ii.  12. 

8  Wood  had  been  advanced  to  a  brigade  command  which  made  Roose 
velt  colonel  of  the  Rough  Riders.  4  ii.  96. 


CH.  IV.]  AMERICAN  DEPRESSION  87 

would  have  used  in  Montana  in  the  fall."  *  The  Span 
iards  were  better  armed  and  equipped  and  had  a  larger 
supply  of  smokeless  powder.  Nevertheless,  the  events 
justified  the  charge  on  the  fortified  position,  as  Spanish 
firing  was  less  deadly  than  the  climate.  But  the  loss  at 
El  Caney  and  San  Juan  Hill  was  over  ten  per  cent  of  the 
men  engaged ;  the  casualties  among  the  officers  were 
unusually  heavy.2 

Next  day,  July  2,  while  the  Spaniards  made  no  attempt 
to  retake  San  Juan  Heights  they  kept  up  an  incessant  firing. 
This  and  the  heavy  losses  of  July  1  completely  demoralized 
Shafter  who,  suffering  from  malarial  fever,  almost  always 
accompanied  by  mental  depression,  was  thoroughly  de 
spondent  when,  on  July  3,  he  telegraphed  to  Washington, 
"I  am  seriously  considering  withdrawing  about  five  miles 
and  taking  up  a  new  position."  Other  officers  of  the 
army  shared  his  anxiety  but  nevertheless  two  captains  of 
the  regular  troops  came  to  Roosevelt  desiring  him  to  protest 
against  any  retirement.  Roosevelt,  who  always  disliked 
the  word  retreat,  cordially  agreed  with  them  "that  it 
would  be  far  worse  than  a  blunder  to  abandon  our  posi 
tion."  4  But  Shafter  had  not  forgotten  the  American 
game  of  bluff  and  at  8.30  that  morning  demanded  the 
surrender  of  Santiago,  which  was  peremptorily  declined 
by  the  Spanish  commander. 

Senator  Lodge  gave  a  graphic  account  of  the  feeling  in 
Washington  on  July  3.  "It  was  the  one  really  dark  day 
of  the  war,"  he  wrote,  "and  the  long  hot  hours  of  that 
memorable  Sunday  were  heavy  with  doubt,  apprehen- 

1  Chadwick,  ii.  66. 

2  Chadwick,  The  Spanish-American  War,  ii.  100. 

3  Chadwick,  The  Spanish- American  War,  ii.  109. 

4  The  Rough  Riders,  148;    Chadwick,  ii.  108. 


88  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

sion  and  anxiety."  l  But  if  the  administration  in  Wash 
ington  and  Shafter  could  have  known  the  sentiment  of 
the  Spanish  camp,  their  despondency  would  have  given 
way  to  elation.  For  Santiago  was  reaching  the  point 
of  capitulation;  while  the  fleet  had  food  for  about  a 
month  longer,  the  army  and  the  city  had  been  reduced 
to  rice.2  The  fleet,  however,  was  the  important  thing. 
"The  eyes  of  every  nation,"  wrote  Captain-General 
Blanco  to  Cervera  from  Havana,  "are  at  present  fixed 
on  your  squadron  on  which  the  honor  of  our  country 
depends."  3  Before  this  Blanco  had  suggested  to  Mad 
rid  that  all  the  land  and  naval  forces  in  the  Western 
waters  be  placed  under  his  supreme  command  and  his 
suggestion  had  been  complied  with.4  Admiral  Cervera, 
the  commander  of  the  Spanish  squadron,  was  discouraged 
at  the  outlook.  He  wrote  on  June  25,  eight  days  before 
the  dark  day  in  Washington,  to  the  Spanish  general  in 
command  at  Santiago ;  "I  have  considered  the  squadron 
lost  ever  since  it  left  Cape  Verde.  .  .  .  To-day  I  con 
sider  the  squadron  lost  as  much  as  ever,  and  the  dilemma 
is  whether  to  lose  it  by  destroying  it,  if  Santiago  is  not 
able  to  resist,  after  having  contributed  to  its  defence,  or 
whether  to  lose  it  by  sacrificing  to  vanity  the  majority 
of  its  crews  and  depriving  Santiago  of  their  cooperation, 
thereby  precipitating  its  fall.  ...  It  is  therefore  for 
the  Captain-General  to  decide  whether  I  am  to  go  out  to 
suicide,  dragging  along  with  me  those  2000  sons  of  Spain." 
On  the  same  day  he  telegraphed  to  the  Captain-General, 
"In  my  opinion  the  sortie  will  entail  the  certain  loss  of 


iP.  133. 

2Chadwick,  ii.   114.  'June  26,  ibid.,   119. 

4  June  20-25,  ibid.,  115. 


CH.  IV.J  SPANISH  DESPAIR  89 

the  squadron  and  majority  of  its  crews."  *  Blanco  de 
sired  the  escape  made  "from  that  prison  in  which  the 
squadron  is  unfortunately  shut  in"  on  a  dark  night  and 
in  bad  weather,  but  to  this  Cervera  replied,  "With  the 
harbor  entrance  blockaded  as  it  now  is,  the  sortie  at  night 
is  more  perilous  than  in  daytime,  on  account  of  ships 
being  closer  inshore."  2 

Thus  stood  affairs  until  the  army  made  the  attack  of 
July  1,  after  which  the  Spanish  general  in  command  re 
ported  the  "exhausted  and  serious  condition  of  Santiago." 
The  result  of  that  battle  brought  the  Spanish  authori 
ties  to  a  decision.  Cervera  had  lent  his  "landing  forces" 
to  the  army  for  the  defence  of  Santiago,  and  to  make  a 
proper  sortie  he  must  have  them  reembarked.  He  re 
ceived  an  order  from  Blanco  on  July  1  to  reembark  "the 
crews"  and  to  hasten  the  sortie  from  the  harbor.  This 
was  followed  up  by  a  despatch  next  day  to  go  out  immedi 
ately.  A  telegram  to  the  general  in  command  showed 
plainly  the  thought  that  dwelt  in  Blanco's  mind  :  "Main 
thing  is  that  squadron  go  out  at  once,  for  if  Americans 
take  possession  of  it,  Spain  will  be  morally  defeated  and 
must  ask  for  peace  at  mercy  of  enemy.  A  city  lost  can 
be  recovered ;  the  loss  of  the  squadron  under  these  cir 
cumstances  is  final  and  cannot  be  recovered."  3  It  was 
impossible  to  make  the  sortie  in  the  afternoon  of  July  2, 
so  the  morning  of  July  3  was  decided  upon. 

The  historian  is  able  to  look  into  both  camps  —  a 
look  of  course  impossible  to  either  Sampson  or  Cervera. 
There  was  friction  between  Sampson  and  Shafter  as  well 


»Chadwick,  ii.  116,  118.  2  Ibid.,  ii.  118,  119. 

3  Ibid.,  ii.  122,  124. 


90  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

as  between  the  Army  and  Navy  departments  in  Washing 
ton.  When  the  Naval  Board  announced  —  an  announce 
ment  which  was  endorsed  by  the  Secretary  —  that  it 
was  better  to  sacrifice  a  number  of  soldiers  rather  than  to 
lose  one  battleship,  such  an  opinion  was  regarded  as  in 
human  although  probably  based  on  good  naval  strategy. 
Shafter,  appalled  at  the  losses  of  July  1,  did  not  want  to 
sacrifice  further  his  men,  and  desired  Sampson  to  force 
an  entrance  into  the  harbor  on  the  Farragut  plan,  which, 
on  his  part,  Sampson  did  not  want  to  do  on  account  of 
the  risk  of  losing  a  battleship.  Shafter  was  ill  and  tele 
graphed  to  Washington  on  July  3 :  "I  have  been  unable 
to  be  out  during  the  heat  of  the  day  for  four  days,1  but 
am  retaining  the  command.  ...  I  am  urging  Admiral 
Sampson  to  attempt  to  force  the  entrance  of  the  harbor 
and  will  have  consultation  with  him  this  morning."  2 
This  conference  was  to  be  had  at  Shafter's  headquarters, 
for  which  place  Sampson  on  his  armored  cruiser,  the  New 
York,  started  on  the  morning  of  July  3.  The  port  at 
which  he  proposed  to  land  was  eight  miles  from  his  posi 
tion  in  the  blockading  squadron.  No  fortune  could  have 
been  worse  for  Sampson.  Since  June  1  he  had  main 
tained  a  perfect  blockade  of  Santiago  Harbor.  "The 
faithful  search-light"  3  made  him  feel  secure  at  night. 
"When  I  wake  up,"  he  said,  "and  can  see  from  where  I  lie 
the  operation  of  the  search-light,  I  can  fall  asleep  quite 
contented,  knowing  that  everything  is  all  right."  Among 
the  eventualities  which  he  considered,  was  the  escape  of 


1  On  July  4,  after  the  naval  battle  of  Santiago,  Shafter  wrote  to  the 
Adjutant-General  in  Washington,  "  I  am  still  very  much  exhausted,  eat 
ing  a  little  this  P.M.  for  the  first  time  in  four  days."     Chadwick,  ii.  192. 
2  Ibid.,  109.  3  Long,  ii.  7. 


CH.  IV.]  BATTLE  OF  SANTIAGO  91 

ships  from  the  harbor,  and  he  had  issued  the  order,  "If  the 
enemy  tries  to  escape,  the  ships  must  close  and  engage  as 
soon  as  possible,  and  endeavor  to  sink  his  vessels  or  force 
them  to  run  ashore";1  but  he  could  have  had  no  idea 
that  the  plan  of  battle  which  he  had  considered  and  care 
fully  thought  out  would  be  put  into  force  on  that  day. 
Not  only  was  the  commander-in-chief  and  his  cruiser 
New  York  absent,  but  the  Massachusetts  had  gone  away 
forty  miles  in  order  to  coal. 

The  Spanish  squadron  consisted  of  the  armored  cruisers 
Infanta  Maria  Teresa,  Oquendo,  Vizcaya,  Cristdbal  Coldn 
and  two  torpedo-boat  destroyers;  the  American,  of  the 
armored  cruiser  Brooklyn,  the  battleships  Texas,  Iowa, 
Oregon,  Indiana  and  the  auxiliaries  Gloucester  and  Vixen. 
The  Spanish  vessels  came  out  of  the  harbor  of  Santiago  on 
this  Sunday  morning,  July  3,  "a  superb  day,"  2  between 
9.35  and  10 ;  the  flag-ship  Maria  Teresa  was  in  advance 
and,  following  at  a  distance  of  about  800  yards,  were  the 
Vizcaya,  Cristdbal  Coldn  and  the  Oquendo  and  at  a  greater 
distance  the  torpedo-boat  destroyers.  The  men  on  the 
American  ships  were  at  Sunday  " quarters  for  inspection," 
which  was  to  be  followed  by  divine  service.  But  their 
officers  were  on  the  alert  and,  at  the  first  sight  of  the 
Spaniards,  the  American  ships,  carrying  out  Sampson's 
standing  orders,  closed  in  and  began  the  work  of  destruc 
tion  which  their  careful  labor  of  preparation  and  accurate 
firing  enabled  them  to  do.  The  Spaniards  advanced 
with  coolness  and  courage.  The  Maria  Teresa  "  presented 
a  magnificent  appearance,"  wrote  Robley  Evans,  Cap 
tain  of  the  Iowa,  and  the  fleet  "came  at  us  like  mad 


1  Long,  ii.  7.  2  Wilson,  The  Downfall  of  Spain,  295. 


92  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

bulls. "  l  At  first  the  fire  of  the  Maria  Teresa  was  rapid 
and  accurate,  but  as  the  American  fire  " smothered'7  her, 
it  grew  "ragged  and  inaccurate."  2  "I  felt  sure,"  wrote 
Cervera,  "that  the  disaster  was  inevitable  ...  al 
though  I  did  not  think  our  destruction  would  be  so  sud 
den."  3 

Between  ten  and  half  past  the  Maria  Teresa  andOquendo, 
"with  large  volumes  of  smoke  rising  from  their  lower 
decks  aft,  gave  up  both  fight  and  flight  and  ran  in  on  the 
beach"  when  about  seven  miles  from  Santiago.  At  quar 
ter  past  eleven  the  Vizcaya,  when  fifteen  miles  from  San 
tiago,  "turned  in  shore  and  was  beached";  she  "was 
burning  fiercely  and  her  reserves  of  ammunition  were 
already  beginning  to  explode."  4  Meanwhile  the  Spanish 
torpedo-boat  destroyers  had  been  smashed  by  the  fire 
of  the  battleships  and  especially  by  that  of  the  auxiliary, 
Gloucester,  a  converted  yacht.  Remained  "the  sleek 
foxy  Coldn,"  5  the  "best  and  fastest  vessel"  6  of  the  Span 
ish  fleet,  which  was  overhauled  by  the  Brooklyn  and 
Oregon;  at  twenty  minutes  past  one,  forty-eight  miles 
from  Santiago,  she  hauled  down  her  colors  and  sur 
rendered. 

"I  regard,"  wrote  Sampson  in  his  Official  Report,  "this 
complete  and  important  victory  over  the  Spanish  forces 
as  the  successful  finish  of  several  weeks  of  arduous  and 
close  blockade,  so  stringent  and  effective  during  the  night 
that  the  enemy  was  deterred  from  making  the  attempt 


*  A  Sailor's  Log,  445.        2  Ibid.,  446.        3  Chadwick,  ii.  138,  185. 

4  Admiral  Sampson's  Official  Report,  July  15.     Crowninshield,  507  et 
seq. 

6  Spears,  Our  Navy  in  the  War  with  Spain,  319. 

*  Sampson. 


CH.  IV.]  BATTLE  OF  SANTIAGO  93 

to  escape  at  night  and  deliberately  elected  to  make  the 
attempt  in  daylight."  1 

President  Roosevelt,  with  a  comprehension  of  naval 
affairs  such  as  few  or  no  civilians  had,  after  a  careful  re 
view  of  all  the  facts,  wrote,  "It  was  a  captains'  fight."  2 

The  casualties  of  the  Spanish  squadron,  which  num 
bered  2227,  did  not  exceed  474  and  were  probably  fewer ; 
the  American  loss  was  one  killed,  one  seriously  wounded.3 
"It  is  safe  to  say,"  wrote  H.  W.  Wilson,  an  English  au 
thority,  "that  most  Englishmen,  with  their  knowledge  of 
1812  and  the  feats  of  the  Civil  War,  confidently  ex 
pected  the  Americans  to  win.  It  is  equally  safe  to  say 
that  no  one  anticipated  that  two  important  victories 
would  be  secured  at  the  cost  of  but  one  American  life. 
.  .  .  After  less  than  five  hours'  fighting  a  modern 
squadron  was  completely  annihilated  with  infinitesimal 
loss  and  infinitesimal  damage  to  the  victors.  It  is  the 
low  cost  at  which  victory  was  purchased  that  renders 
this  great  battle  so  honorable  to  the  American  Navy."  4 

The  naval  battle  of  Santiago  was  a  great  victory  and 
decisive  of  the  war.  "Do  not  Europeans  regard  us  as 
barbarians?"  was  asked  of  a  man,  who,  though  not  a 


1  Crowninshield,  509.     Secretary  Long  wrote:  "The  battle  of  July  3 
was  actually  fought  and  the  great  victory  won  in  accordance  with  the 
plan  of  the  commander-in-chief,"  ii.  8.     President  Roosevelt  wrote,  Feb. 
18,  1902  :    "Sampson's  real  claim  for  credit  rests  upon  his  work  as  com 
mander-in-chief  ;    upon  the  excellence  of  the  blockade ;   upon  the  prepar 
edness  of  the  squadron;    upon  the  arrangement  of  the  ships   head-on  in 
a  semicircle  around  the  harbor ;   and  the  standing  order  with  which  they 
instantly  moved  to  the  attack  of  the  Spaniards  when  the  latter  appeared." 
Long,  ii'.  208. 

2  Long,  ii.  208. 

3  Chadwick,  ii.  176.     According  to  Spanish  authority  the  Spaniards 
had  323  killed  and  151  wounded. 

4  The  Downfall  of  Spain,  69,  334. 


94  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

native  American,  had  passed  enough  time  in  the  United 
States  to  speak  and  write  English  well  and,  although 
devoted  artistically  to  Europe,  had  gained  a  thorough 
comprehension  of  Americans.  "  They  did,"  was  the  reply, 
"until  you  smashed  two  Spanish  fleets,  but  they  think  so 
no  longer."  Such  is  the  judgment  of  the  civilized  world. 
Our  work  toward  the  elevation  of  humanity,  toward  the 
greater  diffusion  of  education,  are  counted  as  naught  in 
contrast  with  these  naval  victories. 

Noteworthy  as  was  the  victory  of  Santiago  it  was  sup 
plemented  by  humane  action.  "As  the  Maria  Teresa 
struck  the  rock,  the  tars  of  the  Texas  .  .  .  began  to 
cheer."  But  their  Captain  Philip  exclaimed,  "Don't 
cheer,  boys;  the  poor  devils  are  dying."  1  When  Cap 
tain  Robley  Evans  instantly  handed  back  the  surrendered 
sword  to  the  Captain  of  the  Vizcaya,  his  "blue  shirts" 
cheered  lustily.2  "So  long,"  he  wrote  in  his  report  of 
July  4,  "as  the  enemy  showed  his  flag  they  fought  like 
American  seamen ;  but  when  the  flag  came  down  they 
were  as  gentle  and  tender  as  American  women."  3  "This 
rescue  of  prisoners,"  wrote  Admiral  Sampson  in  his  re 
port,  "including  the  wounded  from  the  burning  Spanish 
vessels  was  the  occasion  of  some  of  the  most  daring  and 
gallant  conduct  of  the  day.  The  ships  were  burning  fore 
and  aft,  their  guns  and  reserve  ammunition  were  explod 
ing,  and  it  was  not  known  at  what  moment  the  fire  would 
reach  the  main  magazines.  In  addition  to  this  a  heavy 
surf  was  running  just  inside  of  the  Spanish  ships.  But  no 
risk  deterred  our  officers  and  men  until  their  work  of  hu 
manity  was  complete."  4  Cervera  in  his  report  eulogized 


'Long,  ii.  39.  2A  Sailor's  Log,  451.  •  Crowninshield,  539. 

*  Crowninshield,  509. 


CH.  IV.]  THE  SPANISH  FLEET  DESTROYED  95 

"the  chivalry  and  courtesy  of  the  enemy.  They 
clothed  the  naked,"  he  wrote,  "giving  them  everything 
they  needed ;  they  suppressed  the  shouts  of  joy  in  order 
not  to  increase  the  suffering  of  the  defeated,  and  all  vied 
in  making  their  captivity  as  easy  as  possible."  »  He 
wrote  to  the  Captain  of  the  St.  Louis  when  "at  sea"  on 
his  way  home,  "I  thank  you  for  the  delicate  and  mani 
fold  acts  of  kindness  through  which  you  have  endeavored 
to  alleviate  the  sore  burden  of  our  great  misfortune."  2 
In  other  words,  the  American  seamen  fought  like  gentle 
men  and  not  like  brutes.  Exactly  the  same  may  be  said 
of  the  American  soldiers  who  contended  before  Santi 
ago.3 

As  has  been  previously  stated,  the  naval  battle  of  San 
tiago  was  the  decisive  one  of  the  war.  Blanco  thought 
that  the  squadron  must  make  a  fight  to  save  Spanish 
honor  but  he  recognized  that  its  destruction  meant  that  the 
game  was  up.  The  annihilation  of  the  fleet,  wrote  Cap 
tain  Concas,  the  acting  chief-of-staff  of  Cervera,  deprived 
"Spain  of  the  only  power  still  of  value  to  her,  without 
which  a  million  soldiers  could  do  nothing  to  serve  her ; 
of  the  only  power  which  could  have  weight  in  a  treaty 
of  peace ;  a  power  which,  once  destroyed,  would  leave 
Spain,  the  old  Spain  of  Europe,  not  Cuba  as  so  many 
ignorant  persons  believed,  completely  at  the  mercy  of 
the  enemy."  4 

The  fall  of  Santiago  quickly  followed.  Puerto  Rico 
was  also  captured.  "In  comparison  to  the  Santiago 


1  Crowninshield,    562.     See    also    Cervera    to    Blanco  and  Sampson. 
Chadwick,  ii.  189,  190. 

2  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  798. 

«  Chadwick,  ii.  262;  Peck,  598.  4  Chadwick,  ii.  128. 


96  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

nightmare,"  wrote  Richard  Harding  Davis,  "the  Porto 
Rican  expedition  was  a  'fete  des  fleurs.'"  l 

Meanwhile  it  was  learned  that  the  reserve  fleet  of  Spain 
was  despatched  to  the  Philippines,  and  soon  thereafter  an 
American  squadron  was  collected,  the  destination  of 
which  should  be  the  Spanish  coast.  This  was  publicly 
announced.  The  reserve  Spanish  fleet  went  through  the 
Suez  Canal,  but  the  public  announcement  of  the  desti 
nation  of  the  American  fleet,  together  with  the  news  of 
the  destruction  of  Cervera's  squadron,  compelled  its  re 
turn  to  Spain. 

A  glance  must  now  be  had  at  the  Orient.  Troops  were 
sent  at  different  times  until  on  August  6  there  were  about 
8500  men  ashore  in  the  Philippines.  General  Merritt 
commanded  the  land  forces  and,  in  conjunction  with 
Dewey,  demanded  the  surrender  of  Manila  and  the  Span 
ish  forces  in  occupation.  On  August  13,  an  attack  was 
begun  which  soon  terminated,  as  arranged  through  "the 
good  offices  of  the  Belgian  consul,"  by  the  surrender.2 

The  10,000  Filipino  insurgents  under  Aguinaldo  had 
rendered  valuable  assistance  in  the  investment  of  Manila 
and  now  made  "a  passing  demand  for  joint  occupation 
of  the  city"  and,  as  the  situation  was  difficult,  Merritt 
and  Dewey  asked  for  instructions  from  Washington. 
President  McKinley  in  reply  directed  that  there  "must 
be  no  joint  occupation  with  the  insurgents."  3 

"Had  not  the  cable  been  cut,"  wrote  Dewey,  "there 
would  have  been  no  attack  on  August  13,  for  while  our 
ships  —  counting  the  twelve  hours'  difference  in  time 


1  The  Cuban  and  Porto  Rican  Campaigns,  296. 

'Chadwick,  ii.  408. 

1  Chadwick,  ii.  423;  Richardson,  x.  217. 


CH.  I V.J  THE  WAR  DECIDED  97 

between  the  two  hemispheres  —  were  moving  into  posi 
tion  and  our  troops  were  holding  themselves  in  readiness 
for  a  dash  upon  the  Spanish  works,  the  Protocol  was  being 
signed  at  Washington.  The  absence  of  immediate  cable 
connection  had  allowed  no  interruption  to  the  fateful 
progress  of  events  which  was  to  establish  our  authority 
in  the  Philippines/'  x 

The  smashing  of  the  two  fleets  decided  the  war,  and 
this  was  acknowledged  by  the  Spaniards  themselves. 
They  had  made  resistance  to  save  their  honor  but  recog 
nized  that,  when  the  fortunes  of  war  decided  against  them, 
it  was  useless  to  prolong  the  conflict.  Through  a  letter 
from  the  Spanish  Minister  of  State  to  President  McKin- 
ley 2  they  started  negotiations  through  Jules  Cambon, 
the  French  Ambassador,  who  showed  wonderful  qualities. 
Frankly  on  the  Spanish  side,  he  saw  clearly  the  American 
position,  appreciated  the  magnitude  of  the  naval  vic 
tories  and  the  helplessness  of  Spain.  He  found  McKin- 
ley  inflexible  and  disposed  to  drive  a  hard  bargain.  Be 
lieving  that  the  "  Conqueror  resolved  to  procure  all  the 
profit  possible  from  the  advantages  it  has  obtained,"  3 
he  advised  Spain  to  give  him  authority  to  sign  the  Pro 
tocol.  This  was  done  and  the  Protocol  was  signed  by 
him  and  Secretary  of  State  Day.4 

The  Protocol  provided  that  Spain  should  relinquish 
all  claim  of  sovereignty  over  Cuba,  that  she  should  cede 
to  the  United  States  Puerto  Rico  and  an  island  in  the 
Ladrones.  This  cession  was  in  lieu  of  a  pecuniary  in- 


1  Autobiography,  282.          2  Olcott,  ii.  59.          3  Chadwick,  ii.  440. 

4  Elihu  Root  said  when  Secretary  of  War  (Nov.  15,  1902)  that  Cambon 
was  an  "  ideal  ambassador,"  the  "  sympathetic  representative  and  de 
fender  "  of  Spain.  Miscellaneous  Addresses,  145,  147. 


98  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

demnity  for  the  cost  of  the  war.  Furthermore,  "The 
United  States  will  occupy  and  hold  the  city,  bay  and  har 
bor  of  Manila,  pending  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace 
which  shall  determine  the  control,  disposition  and  gov 
ernment  of  the  Philippines. " 

Five  Commissioners  on  the  part  of  the  United  States 
and  five  on  the  part  of  Spain  should  meet  in  Paris  not 
later  than  October  1  to  negotiate  and  conclude  a  treaty 
of  peace,  subject  to  ratification  by  the  constitutional  au 
thorities  of  both  countries.  This  Protocol  was  signed  on 
August  12  and  involved  a  total  suspension  of  hostilities.1 

The  war  was  over,  having  lasted  113  days  [April  21 
to  August  12],  less  than  four  months.2 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  828. 

2  Authorities  on  the  Spanish-American  War :     First,  and   foremost, 
the  two  volumes  of  Admiral  French  E.  Chadwick.     Chadwick  has  used 
the  Spanish  as  well  as  the  American  documents  with  the  result  that  he 
has  enabled  us  to  see  both  camps  at  the  same  time.     He  has  written  an 
impartial  account.     His  action  on  the  New  York  before  and  during  the 
naval  battle  of  Santiago  made  him  an  excellent  interpreter  of  the  docu 
ments,  showing  no  animosity  whatever  to  Spain.     At  the  end  of  Vol.  ii. 
he  has  given  an  excellent  bibliography. 

Reports  of  Battle  of  Santiago  by  Sampson;  Schley  and  Cook  of  the 
Brooklyn;  Chadwick  of  the  New  York;  Clark  of  the  Oregon;  Philip  of 
the  Texas;  Taylor  of  the  Indiana;  Evans  of  the  Iowa;  Wainwright  of 
the  Gloucester;  Report  of  Cervera;  Crowninshield,  506  et  seq.;  Auto 
biography  of  George  Dewey ;  Foreign  Relations,  1898 ;  The  New  Ameri 
can  Navy,  Long;  Lodge,  The  War  with  Spain;  Theodore  Roosevelt, 
Autobiography,  Rough  Riders ;  R.  A.  Alger,  The  Spanish- American  War ; 
Evans,  A  Sailor's  Log ;  John  Bigelow,  Jr.,  Reminiscences  of  the  Santiago 
Campaign;  H.  W.  Wilson,  The  Downfall  of  Spain;  R.  H.  Davis,  The  Cu 
ban  and  Porto  Rican  Campaigns;  F.  D.  Millet,  The  Expedition  to  the 
Philippines;  Spear's  Our  Navy  in  the  War  with  Spain;  Mahan,  Les 
sons  of  the  War  with  Spain ;  Peck ;  Latane,  America  as  a  World  Power, 
Hart's  American  Nation  series. 

Secretary  Long  wrote  that  the  trip  of  the  Oregon  "has  no  parallel  in 
history,"  ii.  54.  Admiral  Sampson  spoke  of  her  "brilliant  record"  under 
Captain  Clark,  Crowninshield,  510.  "Her  performance,"  wrote  Chad 
wick,  "was  one  unprecedented  in  battleship  history  and  was  one  which 
will  probably  long  preserve  its  unique  distinction,"  i.  16.  On  "the  Ore 
gon's  famous  run,"  see  Spear's  chap.  xii.  For  Hobson's  exploit,  see 
Chadwick,  i.  338;  Long,  ii.  71. 


CHAPTER  V 

IN  the  first  article  of  the  Protocol,  Spain  relinquished 
Cuba.  This  rich  island  might  fall  to  the  United  States. 
It  was  a  ripe  plum  x  that  needed  only  the  plucking.  But 
there  stood  in  the  way  the  sentiment  of  a  majority  of  the 
American  people  embodied  in  the  so-called  Teller  Amend 
ment  to  the  resolutions  adopted  by  Congress  when  the 
United  States  went  to  war  with  Spain.  Although  long 
a  favorite  policy  that  Cuba  ought  to  belong  to  the  Uni 
ted  States,  she  now  disclaimed  any  intention  of  taking 
the  island,  but  proposed  to  leave  it  to  the  Cubans  them 
selves.  Any  other  large  country  would  not  probably  in 
the  first  place  have  adopted  the  Teller  Amendment  but, 
even  had  it  done  so,  its  occupancy  would  have  been  made 
the  prelude  on  one  pretext  or  another  to  an  eventual  ab 
sorption.  Undoubtedly  a  powerful  minority  would  have 
supported  McKinley  in  such  a  policy,  but  he  deserves 
credit  that,  believing  in  the  terms  of  the  Teller  Amend 
ment  when  adopted,  he  held  to  them  firmly,  after  the 
quick  result  of  the  war,  and  wrote  a  glorious  page  in  his 
country's  history  as  the  pledge  was  faithfully  carried  out. 
In  lieu  of  a  pecuniary  indemnity  for  the  cost  of  the  war 
and  because  it  was  desirable  that  Spain  should  quit  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  Puerto  Rico  and  other  islands  under 
the  Spanish  dominion  in  the  West  Indies  were  taken. 
Also  on  the  ground  of  pecuniary  indemnity  an  island  in 
the  Ladrones  was  required ;  this  article  resulted  in  the 


1  Substantially  the  same  remark  was  made  in  chap.  Hi. 


100  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

selection  of  Guam.  Remained  the  Philippines,  which 
caused  much  discussion  in  the  Cabinet,  country  and  with 
the  Spanish  Peace  Commissioners,  who  by  the  terms  of 
the  Protocol,  met  in  Paris  those  sent  from  the  United 
States  to  negotiate  a  treaty  of  peace. 

When  the  letter  of  the  Spanish  Minister  of  State  was 
received  [July  26] l  the  President  on  a  hot  afternoon  took 
the  members  of  the  Cabinet  on  a  lighthouse  tender  for  a 
trip  down  the  Potomac,  when  were  thoroughly  discussed 
the  terms  of  peace.  This  resulted  later  in  the  submission 
by  Secretary  Day  of  an  article  which  proposed  to  "  re 
linquish  all  of  the  Philippine  Islands  to  Spain  except  suf 
ficient  ground  for  a  naval  station/' 2  On  this  proposi 
tion  the  Cabinet  was  about  equally  divided.  It  is  easy 
to  see  that  had  the  President  then  decided  not  to  take  the 
Philippines  he  would  have  had  a  powerful  backing.  Dur 
ing  the  war  he  had  displayed  a  shrewd  trading  instinct 
thus  expressed,  "  While  we  are  conducting  war  and  until 
its  conclusion  we  must  keep  all  we  get ;  when  the  war  is 
over  we  must  keep  what  we  want."  3  Now  he  did  not 
desire  to  come  to  a  positive  decision,  and  preferred  to  leave 
the  matter  open  for  the  development  of  circumstances 
and  until  we  had  more  information  and  especially  some 
enlightening  word  from  Dewey.  The  President  said  to 
Jules  Cambon:  "The  negotiators  of  the  two  countries 
will  be  the  ones  to  decide  what  will  be  the  permanent  ad 
vantages  that  we  shall  demand  in  the  archipelago  and 
finally  the  control,  disposition  and  government  of  the 
Philippines.  The  Madrid  government  may  be  assured 
that  up  to  this  time  there  is  nothing  determined  d  priori 

1  This  is  printed  by  Olcott,  ii.  59. 

8  Life  of  McKinley,  Olcott,  ii.  61.          » Ibid.,  165. 


CH.  V.]  THE  PEACE  COMMISSIONERS  101 

in  my  mind  against  Spain;  likewise  I  consider  there  is 
nothing  decided  against  the  United  States."  l  Therefore, 
Article  III  in  the  Protocol,  agreed  to  with  Jules  Cambon, 
left  the  disposition  of  the  Philippines  until  a  formal  treaty 
of  peace  should  be  concluded. 

The  Protocol  provided  for  the  appointment  of  five 
Commissioners  to  meet  in  Paris  an  equal  number  from 
Spain.  The  President  named  William  R.  Day,  Cushman 
K.  Davis,  chairman  of  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Com 
mittee,  William  P.  Frye,  Senator  from  Maine,  Whitelaw 
Reid,  editor  and  proprietor  of  the  New  York  Tribune 
and  ex-minister  to  France,  and  George  Gray,  Senator 
from  Delaware,  the  only  Democrat  on  the  Commission. 
The  discussion  between  the  Peace  Commissioners  and 
the  different  despatches  of  the  Americans  to  Washing 
ton  make  interesting  reading,  but  it  is  apparent  that  the 
decision  of  the  main  points  rested  with  the  President, 
who  used  the  communications  from  the  Commissioners 
as  materials  on  which  to  base  his  own  judgment.  He 
decided  at  once  that  neither  the  United  States  nor  any 
government  which  she  might  set  up  in  Cuba  would  as 
sume  any  portion  of  the  so-called  Cuban  debt  which  had 
been  largely  incurred  in  fighting  two  insurrections. 

The  greatest  contention,  however,  was  in  regard  to  the 
Philippines.  These  consisted  of  a  number  of  islands  with 
a  combined  area  of  115,000  square  miles,  nearly  as  large 
as  England,  Scotland,  Ireland  and  Wales.  The  largest  is 
Luzon  with  nearly  41,000  square  miles,  substantially  the 
size  of  Ohio.  The  total  population  was  more  than  seven 
and  one  half  millions;  the  population  of  Luzon  was 


1  Despatch  of  Cambon  to  Spain,  Aug.  4,  Chadwick,  ii.  436. 


102  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

3,798,507  and  that  of  Manila,  the  chief  city,  219,928.1 
"The  Philippines  were  a  rich  prize  for  any  ambitious 
power,"  was  Dewey's  opinion  after  his  victory.2 

After  the  Protocol  was  signed,  the  President  inclined 
toward  taking  the  Philippines.  Of  his  five  Peace  Com 
missioners,  three,  Davis,  Frye  and  Reid,  were  avowed  im 
perialists.  In  his  instruction  to  the  Commission  of  Sep 
tember  16,3  he  wrote  that  we  must  have  the  island  of 
Luzon  and  on  October  26  he  had  his  Secretary  of  State, 
John  Hay,4  telegraph  as  follows  to  Commissioner  Day: 
"The  information  which  has  come  to  the  President  since 
your  departure  convinces  him  that  the  acceptance  of  the 
cession  of  Luzon  alone,  leaving  the  rest  of  the  islands 
subject  to  the  Spanish  rule,  or  to  be  the  subject  of  future 
contention,  cannot  be  justified  on  political,  commercial  or 
humanitarian  grounds.  The  cession  must  be  of  the  whole 
archipelago  or  none.  The  latter  is  wholly  inadmissible 
and  the  former  must  therefore  be  required.  The  Presi 
dent  reaches  this  conclusion  after  most  thorough  consid 
eration  of  the  whole  subject,  and  is  deeply  sensible  of  the 
grave  responsibilities  it  will  impose,  believing  that  this 
course  will  entail  less  trouble  than  any  other,  and  besides 
will  best  subserve  the  interests  of  the  people  involved, 
for  whose  welfare  we  cannot  escape  responsibility."  5 


*Life  of  McKinley,  ii.  145;  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  925.  "The  en 
tire  population,  according  to  the  census  of  1903,  was  7,635,426.  Of  these 
6,987,686  were  classed  as  civilized  and  647,740  as  wild.  The  civilized  na 
tive  inhabitants  are  practically  all  adherents  of  the  Roman  Catholic 
Church.  Of  the  wild  tribes  at  least  two-fifths  are  Mohammedan  Moros. 
With  the  exception  of  the  aboriginal  Negritos,  who  are  widely  dispersed 
through  the  mountain  regions,  all  the  natives  are  believed  to  be  Malays." 
Latane",  79. 

2  Autobiography,  251.  3  Foreign  Relations,  904. 

4  John  Hay  had  become  Secretary  of  State  succeeding  William  R.  Day. 

6  Hay  to  Day,  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  935. 


CU,  V.I  THE  PHILIPPINES  103 

Between  October  10  and  22  McKinley  visited  the 
Omaha  Trans-Mississippi  Exposition ;  in  going  thither  and 
returning  he  made  a  number  of  speeches  at  convenient 
rail  stops.1  Senator  Hoar  called  it  "his  famous  Western 
journey."  2  Unquestionably  Hoar  is  correct  in  attribut 
ing  to  McKinley  too  great  a  reliance  on  the  sentiment 
exhibited  by  the  enthusiastic  crowds  that  he  addressed, 
but  in  truth  his  deductions  from  the  meetings  only  con 
firmed  what  he  had  already  determined. 

By  direction  of  the  President,  General  Merritt  went 
from  Manila  to  Paris  and  gave  a  full  report  to  the  Peace 
Commission.  While  he  was  careful  not  to  express  himself 
positively  in  response  to  certain  questions,  a  fair  inference 
from  his  testimony  is  that  it  was  desirable  to  take  the 
whole  group.3 

The  President  had  before  him  Dewey's  report,  from 
which  it  may  be  gathered  that  the  Admiral  favored  the 
retention  of  Luzon  alone,  but  General  Greene,  who 
brought  to  the  White  House  this  report,  with  whom 
McKinley  had  a  "long  talk"  and  whom  he  found 
"thoroughly  well  informed,"  approved  decidedly  our 
taking  all  of  the  Philippines.4  The  President  had  also 


1  For  these  speeches,  see  New  York  Tribune,  Oct.  11-23,  1898. 

2  Autobiography,  ii.  311.  3  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  918. 

4  "Luzon  is  in  almost  all  respects  the  most  desirable  of  these  islands 
and  therefore  the  one  to  retain."  —  Dewey,  Aug.  29.  General  Greene 
said  in  his  Memorandum  of  August  27  which  represented  his  opinion  when 
he  had  the  "long  talk"  with  McKinley  on  September  28  :  "If  the  United 
States  evacuate  these  islands,  anarchy  and  civil  war  will  immediately 
ensue  and  lead  to  foreign  intervention.  The  insurgents  were  furnished 
arms  and  the  moral  support  of  the  Navy  prior  to  our  arrival,  and  we  can 
not  ignore  obligations,  either  to  the  insurgents  or  to  foreign  nations,  which 
our  own  acts  have  imposed  upon  us.  The  Spanish  Government  is  com 
pletely  demoralized  and  Spanish  power  is  dead  beyond  possibility  of  res 
urrection.  Spain  would  be  unable,  to  govern  these  islands  if  we  surren 
dered  them.  ...  On  the  other  hand,  the  Filipinos  cannot  govern  the 


104  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

before  him  the  opinion  of  the  several  members  of  the 
Peace  Commission  before  it  was  necessary  to  arrive  at  a 
final  decision.  The  opinions  of  the  three  imperialists, 
Davis,  Frye  and  Reid,  tallied  with  his  own ;  that  of  Day 
was  a  compromise,1  but  Senator  Gray's  opinion  deserves 
consideration.  .  "I  cannot  agree,"  he  said,  "that  it  is  wise 
to  take  Philippines  in  whole  or  in  part.  To  do  so  would  be 
to  reverse  accepted  continental  policy  of  country,  declared 
and  acted  upon  throughout  our  history.  Propinquity  gov 
erns  case  of  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico.  Policy  proposed 
introduces  us  into  European  politics  and  the  entangling 
alliances,  against  which  Washington  and  all  American 
statesmen  have  protested.  .  .  .  Attacked  Manila  as  part 
of  legitimate  war  against  Spain.  If  we  had  captured 
Cadiz  and  Carlists  had  helped  us,  would  not  owe  duty  to 
stay  by  them  at  conclusion  of  war.  On  contrary  interest 
and  duty  would  require  us  to  abandon  both  Manila  and 
Cadiz.  .  .  . 

"So  much  from  standpoint  of  interest.  But  even 
conceding  all  benefits  claimed  for  annexation  we  thereby 
abandon  the  infinitely  greater  benefit  to  accrue  from 
acting  the  part  of  a  great,  powerful  and  Christian  nation ; 
we  exchange  the  moral  grandeur  and  strength  to  be 
gained  by  keeping  our  word  to  nations  of  the  world  and 
by  exhibiting  a  magnanimity  and  moderation  in  hour  of 
victory  that  becomes  the  advanced  civilization  we  claim, 
for  doubtful  material  advantages  and  shameful  stepping 
down  from  high  moral  position  boastfully  assumed.  We 


country  without  the  support  of  some  strong  nation."  —  Senate  docs.  8,  no. 
62;  Treaty  of  Peace  between  United  States  and  Spain,  374,  383;  For 
eign  Relations,  1898,  915,  917. 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  932  et  seq. 


CH.  V.]  SENATOR  GRAY'S   OPINION  105 

should  set  example  in  these  respects,  not  follow  the  self 
ish  and  vulgar  greed  for  territory  which  Europe  has  in 
herited  from  mediaeval  times.  Our  declaration  of  war 
upon  Spain  was  accompanied  by  a  solemn  and  deliberate 
definition  of  our  purpose.  Now  that  we  have  achieved 
all  and  more  than  our  object,  let  us  simply  keep  our 
word."  l 

Admiral  Chadwick,  after  citing  Gray's  dissent,  wrote : 
"  There  is  no  questioning  the  cogency  of  Judge  Gray's 
argument,  nor  the  nobility  of  its  sentiment.  To  demand 
the  Philippines  was  undoubtedly  to  alter  the  moral  po 
sition  of  the  United  States  and  change  its  attitude  from 
one  of  altruism  to  one  of  self-interest.  This  much  is 
self-evident  and  scarcely  requires  statement."  2  But 
McKinley  stuck  to  his  determination  and  had  Hay  tele 
graph  it  to  Commissioner  Day  on  October  28  :  "The  sen 
timent  in  the  United  States,"  he  said, "  is  almost  universal 
that  the  people  of  the  Philippines,  whatever  else  is  done, 
must  be  liberated  from  Spanish  domination.  In  this  sen 
timent  the  President  fully  concurs.  Nor  can  we  permit 
Spain  to  transfer  any  of  the  islands  to  another  power.  Nor 
can  we  invite  another  power  or  powers  to  join  the  United 
States  in  sovereignty  over  them.  We  must  either  hold 
them  or  turn  them  back  to  Spain. 

"  Consequently,  grave  as  are  the  responsibilities  and 
unforeseen  as  are  the  difficulties  which  are  before  us,  the 
President  can  see  but  one  plain  path  of  duty  —  the  accept 
ance  of  the  archipelago.  Greater  difficulties  and  more  seri 
ous  complications,  administrative  and  international,  would 
follow  any  other  course.  The  President  has  given  to  the 


1  Oct.  25,  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  934.  2  ii.  461. 


106  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

views  of  the  Commissioners  the  fullest  consideration,  and 
in  reaching  the  conclusion  above  announced,  in  the  light 
of  information  communicated  to  the  Commission  and  to 
the  President  since  your  departure,  he  has  been  influenced^ 
by  the  single  consideration  of  duty  and  humanity.7'  l  ^* 

On  November  13,  the  President's  idea  was  further 
elaborated  by  Hay's  despatch  again  to  Commissioner 
Day.  "Do  we  not  owe  an  obligation  to  the  people  of 
the  Philippines  which  will  not  permit  us  to  return  them 
to  the  sovereignty  of  Spain?"  he  asked.  "You  are 
therefore  instructed  to  insist  upon  the  cession  of  the  whole 
of  the  Philippines  and,  if  necessary,  pay  to  Spain 
$10,000,000  to  $20,000,000.  .  .  .  The  trade  and  commer 
cial  side  as  well  as  the  indemnity  for  the  cost  of  the  war 
are  questions  we  might  yield.  They  might  be  waived  or 
compromised  but  the  questions  of  duty  and  humanity 
appeal  to  the  President  so  strongly  that  he  can  find  no 
appropriate  answer  but  the  one  he  has  here  marked  out."  2 

The  biographer  of  McKinley  shows  us  the  working  of 
his  mind  in  some  words  he  addressed  to  his  Methodist 
brethren:  "The  truth  is,"  he  said,  "I  didn't  want  the 
Philippines  and  when  they  came  to  us  as  a  gift  from  the 
gods,  I  did  not  know  what  to  do  with  them.  .  .  . 
I  sought  counsel  from  all  sides  —  Democrats  as  well  as 
Republicans  —  but  got  little  help.  I  thought  first  we 
would  take  only  Manila ;  then  Luzon ;  then  other  islands, 
perhaps,  also.  I  walked  the  floor  of  the  White  House 
night  after  night  until  midnight ;  and  1  am  not  ashamed 
to  tell  you,  gentlemen,  that  I  went  down  on  my  knees 


1  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  937. 

2  Ibid.,  949.     For  an  interesting  account  of  the  work  of  the  Peace  Com 
mission,  see  Life  of  Whitelaw  Reid,  Cortissoz,  ii.  chap.  xiii. 


CH.  V.]  McKINLEY  107 

and  prayed  Almighty  God  for  light  and  guidance  more 
than  one  night.  And  one  night  late  it  came  to  me  this 
way  —  I  don't  know  how  it  was,  but  it  came :  (1)  that 
we  could  not  give  them  back  to  Spain  —  that  would  be 
cowardly  and  dishonorable ;  (2)  that  we  could  not  turn 
them  over  to  France  or  Germany  —  our  commercial 
rivals  in  the  Orient  —  that  would  be  bad  business  and  dis 
creditable  ;  (3)  that  we  could  not  leave  them  to  them 
selves  —  they  were  unfit  for  self-government  —  and  they 
would  soon  have  anarchy  and  misrule  over  there  worse 
than  Spain's  was;  and  (4)  that  there  was  nothing  left 
for  us  to  do  but  to  take  them  all,  and  to  educate  the 
Filipinos,  and  uplift  and  civilize  and  Christianize  them, 
and  by  God's  grace  do  the  very  best  we  could  by  them  as 
our  fellow-men  for  whom  Christ  also  died.  And  then  I 
went  to  bed,  and  went  to  sleep  and  slept  soundly."  l 

It  is  true  that  McKinley  was  inconsistent  in  his  public 
words.  In  his  message  of  December,  1897,  he  had  said, 
" Forcible  annexation  .  .  .  cannot  be  thought  of;  that, 
by  our  code  of  morality,  would  be  criminal  aggression."  2 
One  cannot  read  the  proceedings  of  the  Peace  Commis 
sion  in  Paris  and  see  in  any  other  light  than  that  our  tak 
ing  of  the  Philippines  was  "  forcible  annexation."  In  his 
instructions  to  the  Commissioners  of  September  16,  1898, 
he  had  said  that  the  United  States  must  be  "  scrupulous 
and  magnanimous  in  the  concluding  settlement."  It 
should  not  be  tempted  into  "  excessive  demands  or  into 
an  adventurous  departure  on  untried  paths."  3  But  our 
attitude  to  Spain  denied  the  injunction  to  show  mag 
nanimity,  and  our  demand  for  and  the  taking  of  the 

1  Interview,  Nov.  21,  1899.     Life  of  McKinley,  ii.  109. 

2  Richardson,  x.  131.         3  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  907. 


108  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1898 

Philippines  was  an  excessive  demand  and  a  venture  on 
untried  paths. 

Yet  McKinley  was  entirely  sincere.  He  was  truly  re 
ligious,  and  when  he  told  his  Methodist  brethren  of  the 
working  of  his  mind,  he  told  exactly  the  truth  as  he  saw 
it.  When  he  wrote,  "The  war  has  brought  us  new  duties 
and  responsibilities  which  we  must  meet  and  discharge 
as  becomes  a  great  nation  on  whose  growth  and  career 
from  the  beginning  the  Ruler  of  Nations  has  plainly 
written  the  high  command  and  pledge  of  civilization,"  1 
he  meant  what  he  said ;  and  many  good  moral  and  re 
ligious  men  were  entirely  of  his  mind.  Indeed  it  was  a 
troublesome  question  to  decide.  The  opinion  of  a  ma 
jority  of  the  American  people  was  opposed  to  allowing  the 
islands  to  go  back  to  Spain;  and  yet  as  we  see  it  now, 
that  was  the  only  alternative.  They  and  the  Presi 
dent  did  not  believe  that  things  should  be  permitted  in 
the  Eastern  Hemisphere  that  they  had  gone  to  war  to 
stop  in  Cuba.  While  the  humanitarian  impulse  did  the 
President  honor,  he  had  no  right  to  commit  his  country 
to  a  dangerous  course,  to  run  the  risk  of  "an  adventurous 
departure  on  untried  paths,"  on  account  of  a  religious 
sentiment.  Despite  the  obvious  opinion  of  the  majority, 
which  with  "his  ear  close  to  the  ground"  2  he  well  knew, 
his  hold  on  the  country  was  so  great,  increased  as  it  was 
by  a  victorious  war,  that  he  could  have  led  it  to  accept 
any  conditions  that  he  deemed  necessary  for  the  con 
clusion  of  a  peace.  The  only  possible  alternative,  leav 
ing  the  islands  to  Spain,  might  have  been  done  under 
conditions  suggested  by  Commissioner  Day.3  Such  con- 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  907. 
2  Peck,  659.  8  Foreign  Relations,  1898,  926,  934. 


CH.  V.]  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  109 

ditions  would  have  filled  the  measure  of  humanity ;  but 
there  would  naturally  have  been  the  query  whether  Spain 
would  or  could  carry  them  out.1 

An  American  condition,  however,  should  have  influ 
enced  the  President  without  fail.  The  Monroe  Doc 
trine  had  come  to  be  regarded  as  sacred  and  the  spirit 
of  it,  if  not  the  letter,  was  violated  when  we  annexed  the 
Philippines.  We  held  that  no  European  Power  should 
take  territory  or  increase  what  she  possessed  in  the  West 
ern  Hemisphere.  In  other  words  we  said,  "You  keep 
away  from  us  and  we  will  keep  away  from  you."  2  By 
the  same  token  we  were  bound  not  to  encroach  on  the 
Eastern  Hemisphere.  A  cartoon  in  Punch  entitled  "  Doc 
trine  and  Practice"  represented  Dame  Europa  in  a  gar 
den,  her  attitude  haughty,  saying  coldly  to  an  intruder, 
"To  whom  do  I  owe  the  pleasure  of  this  intrusion?" 
The  intruder,  in  face,  figure  and  get-up  of  the  well-known 
type,  replied  " Ma'am  —  my  name  is  Uncle  Sam!" 
When  came  the  rejoinder,  "  Any  relation  of  the  late  Colo 
nel  Monroe?"  3  True  it  was  urged  that  we  had  grown 
too  large  to  be  confined  by  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  that 
the  teachings  of  Washington,  Monroe  and  John  Quincy 
Adams  applied  to  the  country  as  it  was  then  and  had  no 
longer  application.4  Others  reasoned  that  the  Monroe 


1  General  MacArthur  said  in  his  Testimony  before  the  Senate  Com 
mittee  on  the  Philippines  on  April  11,  1902:     "When  we  landed  [Mac- 
Arthur  sailed  for  Manila  from  San  Francisco  on  June  27,  1898]  we  found 
the  entire  population  [of  the  Philippines]  in  open,  violent,  vindictive  re 
sentment  against  Spain,  as  an  expression  of  their  desire  to  be  emanci 
pated  from  that  monarchy.  ...     I  think  if  they  had  been  granted   the 
reforms  which  were  extended  to  the  people  of  the  peninsula  [of  Spain] 
that  the  Filipinos  would  have  been  loyal  Spaniards  to-day. "  —  Part  ii.  1384. 

2  The  Nation,  Nov.  10,  1898,  345. 

»  Punch,  Aug.  6,  1898;  Winslow  Warren  in  Boston  Herald,  Apr.  18,  1919. 
4  See  The  Nation,  May  19,  1898,  376. 


110  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1899 

Doctrine  only  obliged  us  to  keep  out  of  Europe  and  had 
no  reference  to  Asia.1  But  it  was  entirely  easy  for  Presi 
dent  McKinley  to  set  aside  such  reasonings  did  he  so 
desire. 

The  Secretary  of  State,  John  Hay,  was  influenced  by 
the  opinion  of  England  as  she  had  been  the  sole  large 
European  power  on  our  side  during  the  Spanish  War. 
"The  dull  hostility  between  us  and  England  which  ex 
isted  a  year  ago,"  he  wrote  while  Ambassador,  has  been 
changed  into  a  firm  friendship.  "If  we  give  up  the  Phil 
ippines  it  will  be  a  considerable  disappointment  to  our 
English  friends.  ...  I  have  no  doubt  that  Germany 
has  been  intriguing  both  with  Aguinaldo  and  with  Spain. 
They  are  most  anxious  to  get  a  foothold  there;  but  if 
they  do  there  will  be  danger  of  grave  complication  with 
other  European  powers."  2 

With  the  determination  of  the  President,  events  moved 
forward  to  the  Treaty  of  Peace  which  was  signed  on  De 
cember  10,  1898.  It  followed  the  Protocol  as  regards 
Cuba,  Puerto  Rico  and  the  island  in  the  Ladrones  [Guam], 
but  it  further  provided  for  the  cession  of  the  Philippine 
Islands  and  the  payment  by  the  United  States  to  Spain 
of  twenty  million  dollars.  Neither  the  Cuban  nor  the 
Philippine  debt  was  assumed.  McKinley  had  a  difficult 
time  in  getting  his  Treaty  confirmed  by  the  Senate  which 
considered  it  from  January  4  to  February  6,  1899,  and 
finally  ratified  it  by  57 :  27,  only  one  vote  more  than  the 
necessary  two  thirds.  Senator  Gray  signed  the  Treaty, 
advocated  it  in  the  Senate  and  afterwards  accepted  the 
position  of  judge  from  President  McKinley.  Naturally 

1  Latane",  259. 
1  Letters  of  Aug.  2,  Sept.  9.    Life  of  McKinley,  ii.  135. 


CH.  V.]  THE  PHILIPPINE  INSURRECTION  111 

his  after-conduct  does  not  agree  with  the  heretofore 
cited  opinion  anent  taking  the  Philippines ;  but  in  a  news 
paper  interview  and  in  his  speech  in  the  Senate  for  the 
Treaty  he  explained  his  change  of  mind.1  Both  Senators 
Hoar  and  Hale,  Republicans,  opposed  it,  but  Bryan  came 
to  Washington  during  its  pendency  and  urged  enough  of 
Democrats  to  vote  for  it  to  secure  its  ratification.2 

Two  days  before  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty,  the  Fili 
pinos,  whose  leader  Aguinaldo  was  exasperated  at  the 
non-establishment  of  a  Philippine  Republic  with  him 
self  at  the  head  of  it,  attacked  the  American  soldiers  at 
Manila3  and  war  began,  which,  with  an  ensuing  guerilla 
warfare,  continued  for  more  than  three  years.  In  truth 
the  United  States  had  paid  twenty  millions  for  "a  white 
elephant."  It  was  " scarcely  comprehended,"  wrote 
Dewey,  "that  a  rebellion  was  included  with  the  pur 
chase."  4  It  cost  the  United  States  to  subdue  the  Philip- 


1  Jan.  20,  1899;  Jan.  31,  Feb.  1,  1899,  New  York  Tribune. 

2  Life  of  McKinley,    ii.  139;    George  F.  Hoar,  Autobiography,  ii.  322; 
Latane",  77. 

3  The  following  I  believe  to  be  the  truth  about  the  much  disputed  ques 
tion,  who  began  the  actual  hostilities  :  "About  8.30  on  the  night  of  Febru 
ary  4,  four  Filipinos  approached  within  five  yards  of  an  American  outpost 
near  the  San  Juan  bridge  and,  ignoring  the  command  to  halt,  were  fired 
upon  by  the  sentry.     A  Filipino  detachment  near  by  returned  the  fire 
and  the  firing  soon  became  general    along    the  entire  line.  .  .  .       The 
Filipinos  at  that  particular  hour  were  unprepared  for  attack  or  defence. 
The  expected  battle  came  when  they  were  off  their  guard,  most  of  the 
higher  officers  being  absent  at  Malolos."  —  The  Philippines,  Charles  B. 
Elliott  (1916),  i.  452.     J.  A.  Le  Roy  wrote:   "The  strained  condition  of 
affairs^between  the  American  and  Filipino  forces,  having  reached  a  climax, 
virtually  brought  on  trouble  of  itself ;   a  subordinate  Filipino  officer,  un 
checked  by  the  discipline  of  his  superiors,  was  the  chief  deus  ex  machina 
of  the  affray  of  February  4 ;   the  American  authorities  in  Manila,  having 
taken  a  more  positive  stand  at  the  close  of  that  week  regarding  encroach 
ments  upon  their  line,  let  loose  the  dogs  of  war  they  had  been  holding 
ready,  and  promptly  followed  up  the  provocation  given."      The  Ameri 
cans  in  the  Philippines  (1914),  J.  A.  Le  Roy,  ii.  16. 

4  Autobiography,  284. 


112  HARRISON'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1893 

pine  insurgents  nearly  one  hundred  and  seventy  millions,1 
while  the  cost  of  the  Spanish  War  was  three  hundred 
million.2  The  one  was  attended  with  glory,  the  other 
with  apology,  despite  the  splendid  results  accruing  from 
our  rule. 

Nearly  all  writers  agree  that  the  annexation  of  Hawaii 3 
was  brought  on  by  the  Spanish- American  War,  and  by  the 
taking  of  the  Philippines.  Hawaii,  wrote  John  W.  Fos 
ter,  was  a  link  in  the  chain  of  our  possessions  in  the  Pa 
cific.4  Like  Cuba  it  had  long  been  coveted  by  some  Ameri 
can  officials  and  a  crisis  occurring  in  January,  1893,  fur 
nished  the  fit  occasion.  "The  Hawaiian  pear  is  now  fully 
ripe,  and  this  is  the  golden  hour  for  the  United  States  to 
pluck  it,"  wrote  our  minister.5  A  revolution,  assisted  by 
the  United  States  forces,  took  place ;  the  corrupt  and  des 
potic  government  of  the  Queen  was  overthrown  and  a 
provisional  government  established  in  its  place.  This 
government  at  once  despatched  a  Commission  to  Wash 
ington  with  a  treaty  of  annexation  which  had  the  thorough 
sympathy  of  President  Harrison,  who  on  February  14, 
1893,  signed  it  and  submitted  it  to  the  Senate.  The 
Treaty  was  favorably  reported  but,  before  action  could 


1  Peck,  615;   Senate  docs.,  57th  Cong.  1st  Sess.  no.  416.  June  20,  1902. 
8  Life  of  McKinley,  ii.  112. 

3  "The  Hawaiian  Islands  constitute  a  group  of  several  islands  in  the 
mid  Pacific  having  a  total  area  of  6449  square  miles.     According  to  the 
United  States  census  of  1900  their  total  population  was  154,001  (or,  de 
ducting  274  persons  in  the  military  and  naval  service  of  the  United  States, 
153,727) .     The  latter  number  was  made  up  of  61, 122  Chinese,  25,742  Japan 
ese,  29,834  Hawaiians,  7835  part  Hawaiians,  28,533  Americans,  407  South 
Sea  Islanders,   and  254  Negroes."  —  Willoughby,     Territories  and  De 
pendencies  of  the  United  States,  61. 

4  American  Diplomacy  in  the  Orient,  384. 

6  February   1,    1893.     Pres.   Cleveland's   message  of   Dec.    18,    1893. 
Richardson,  ix.  464. 


CH.  V.]  CLEVELAND  —  HAWAII  113 

be  taken  on  it,  Cleveland  became  President  and  during 
March,  1893,  withdrew  it ;  in  his  special  message  of  De 
cember  18,  1893,  he  gave  the  reason  for  this  withdrawal 
and  for  his  subsequent  action.  Believing  that  a  grievous 
wrong  had  been  done  to  the  government  of  the  Queen 
by  the  United  States  forces,  he  endeavored  to  restore  her 
to  her  preexisting  power,  but  his  movement  was  defeated 
by  the  recalcitrant  action  of  the  Queen  herself.  With 
his  sturdy  sense  of  justice  Cleveland  could  do  no  other 
than  permanently  to  withdraw  the  treaty  of  annexation, 
but  his  attempt  to  restore  the  Queen  was  at  the  time  un 
popular  and  does  not  now  merit  approval.  As  the  United 
States  would  not  have  Hawaii  and  the  Queen's  govern 
ment  was  impossible,  the  revolutionary  parties  estab 
lished  a  republican  form  of  government  which  was  recog 
nized  by  the  Powers,  including  the  United  States.  This 
new  government  administered  affairs  "through  a  period  of 
four  years,"  so  John  W.  Foster  l  wrote,  "in  which  the 
country  enjoyed  unexampled  peace  and  prosperity. 
Never  before  in  its  history  had  there  been  such  honesty 
in  administration,  such  economy  in  expenditures,  such 
uniform  justice  in  the  enforcement  of  the  laws  and  re 
spect  for  the  officials,  such  advance  in  education  and  such 
encouragement  of  commerce  and  protection  to  life  and 
property." 

When  McKinley  became  President  Hawaii  was  annexed 
by  joint  resolution  of  Congress.3     This  form  was  used  as 


1  Foster  was  Secretary  of  State  under  Harrison  at  the  time  the  treaty 
of  annexation  was  presented. 

2  American  Diplomacy  in  the  Orient,  381. 

3  A  treaty  of  annexation  was  signed  June  16,  1897,  and  submitted  the 
same  day  to  the  Senate,  which  body  removed  the  injunction  of  secrecy  on 
it  the  next  day.  —  Senate  Jour.,  55th  Cong.  1st  Sess.,  181,  183. 


114  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1899 

doubt  existed  whether  a  two-thirds  vote  for  the  ratifica 
tion  of  a  treaty  could  be  secured  in  the  Senate.  "What 
is  to  be  thought  of  a  body,"  wrote  John  Hay  in  a  pri 
vate  letter  from  London,  "  which  will  not  take  Hawaii  as 
a  gift  and  is  clamoring  to  hold  the  Philippines?"  l  But 
on  July  7,  1898,  Hawaii  became  part  of  the  United  States 
by  a  two-thirds  vote  in  both  Houses,2  a  little  over  two 
months  after  Dewey's  victory  at  Manila. 

Had  it  not  been  for  the  foreshadowed  policy  in  regard 
to  the  Philippines,  it  was  a  case  of  let  well  enough  alone. 
A  good  government  under  a  republican  form  was  func 
tioning  in  Hawaii  and  it  was  taking  too  great  a  risk  to 
annex  territory  2089  miles  away.3 

"The  story  of  alternating  'booms'  and  panics,"  wrote 
Noyes,  "is  largely  the  story  of  modern  industrial  prog 
ress."  4  Those  who  believe  in  the  periodicity  of  panics 
and  recovery  therefrom  may  note  with  elation  that  it 
was  twenty  years  from  the  panic  of  1873  to  that  of  1893, 
and  twenty  years  from  the  "boom"  of  1879  to  that  of 
1899.  As  in  the  earlier  case,  recovery  began  sooner  than 
was  generally  appreciated  and  is  placed  by  Noyes  in  the 
middle  of  1897.5  Certain  it  is  that  the  revival  would 
have  been  in  full  swing  had  it  not  been  for  the  Spanish  War. 
War  is  a  disturbing  factor  in  finance  and  business  and, 
when  it  was  declared,  no  one  would  have  dared  to  proph 
esy  its  brief  duration.  The  "boom"  year  of  1899  re 
sembles  that  of  1879.  Both  were  the  result  of  recupera- 

1  May  27,  1898,  Life  of  Hay,  Thayer,  ii.  170. 

8  Foster,  383. 

1  Authorities :  Foster ;  Willoughby,  Territories  and  Dependencies 
of  the  United  States;  Cleveland's  special  message  of  Dec.  18,  1893; 
Peck. 

«  American  Finance,  258.  6  P.   262. 


CH.  V.]  JOHN  PIERPONT  MORGAN  115 

tive  years  after  panics  and  both  were  attended  with  large 
crops  in  the  United  States,  a  failure  in  Europe,  or,  as 
Noyes  expressed  it,  "A  European  famine  and  a  bumper 
crop  at  home,"  immense  exportations  of  breadstuff s,  an 
import  of  gold  and  a  buying-back  of  securities  which 
Europe  had  taken  in  former  years.  Hay  and  Adams  in 
their  walks,  discoursed  of  "the  insolent  prosperity  of  the 
United  States."  l  While  the  dominant  characteristics  of 
1879  were  an  advance  in  the  price  of  pig  iron  and  rail 
road  shares,  1899  was  noted  for  its  "boom"  in  industrials 
and  putting  railroads  on  their  feet. 

John  Pierpont  Morgan  is  the  hero  of  1899  and  of  the 
succeeding  years,  and  he  came  into  public  notice  from  his 
reorganization  of  railroads  which  had  been  badly  hurt  by 
the  panic  of  1893  and  by  conditions  prevailing  before 
and  after.  While  circumstances  favored  his  operations, 
they  were  really  marvellous  and  may  be  fully  appreciated 
by  putting  the  question  whether  any  other  man  in  the 
country  could  have  accomplished  what  he  did.  Not  by 
affability  and  not  by  any  strong  hold  on  public  sentiment 
did  he  work  his  results ;  for  he  was  reticent,  taciturn, 
decisive  and  blunt ;  his  manner  was  stern  and  brusque ; 
endowed  with  great  energy,  he  was  ruthless.  He  lacked 
a  wide  range  of  knowledge,  but  somehow  he  arrived 
quickly  at  decisions  involving  millions  to  the  amazement 
of  the  beholder.  He  rarely  read  books  and,  on  a  con 
stitutional  question,  he  once  displayed  an  ignorance  that 
would  have  disgraced  a  College  freshman.  But  the 
apologists  for  a  mathematical  training  may  point  to  Mor 
gan  as  a  shining  example.  From  the  English  High 


Hay,  Letters,  iii.  140. 


116  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1899 

School  of  Boston  he  went  to  the  University  of  Gottingen 
where  he  so  distinguished  himself  in  mathematics  that 
the  professor,  under  whom  he  sat,  wanted  him  to  remain. 
"You  would  have  been  my  assistant  as  long  as  I  lived," 
he  said,  "and  unquestionably  at  my  death  you  would 
have  been  appointed  professor  of  mathematics  in  my 
place."  l  This  incident  Morgan  used  to  tell  in  the  day  of 
his  success  with  justifiable  pride.  His  action  showed 
" precision"  and  "wariness  of  mind"  which  John  Stuart 
Mill  mentioned  as  some  of  the  "excellencies  of  mathe 
matical  discipline."  2 

The  railroads  had  tried  competition  with  the  result 
that  large  numbers  of  them  were  in  the  hands  of  receivers 
and  the  sounder  ones  had  difficulty  in  making  both  ends 
meet.  Morgan  substituted  combination  for  competi 
tion.  In  the  parlance  of  the  street  his  first  name  was 
Jupiter  and  this  was  properly  bestowed,  for  his  word 
was  "I  command."  Those  who  wished  a  reorganiza 
tion  of  their  railroads  must  accept  his  terms;  and  the 
result  proved  their  justification.  A  contrast  of  the  con 
dition  of  the  railroads  in  1899  and  before  that  year  is 
one  between  excellent  business  management  and  the 
proper  payment  of  interest  and  dividends,  and  a  cut 
throat  competition  that  did  no  one,  except  perhaps  spec 
ulators,  any  good.  Naturally  Morgan  added  to  his 
great  reputation  of  a  banker  that  of  a  reorganizer  of 
railroads.  He  always  bore  in  mind  what  his  father 
told  him.  Junius  S.  Morgan  was  one  of  America's  first 
men  of  business  who  developed  an  influential  London 
banking  house.  ,  This  was  the  advice  he  gave  to  his  son : 


Life  of  Morgan,  Hovey,  316.  2  See  my  vol.  ii.  333. 


CH.  V.]  THE  STEEL  INDUSTRY  117 

"  Remember  one  thing  always.  Any  man  who  is  a  bear 
on  the  future  of  the  United  States  will  go  broke.  There 
will  be  many  times  when  things  look  dark  and  cloudy  in 
America,  when  everyone  will  think  there  has  been  over 
development.  But  remember  yourself  that  the  growth  of 
that  vast  country  will  take  care  of  it  all.  Always  be  a 
'bull'  on  America."  l 

Along  with  the  reenhancement  of  the  railroads  was 
the  revival  of  industrial  conditions.  Captains  of  indus 
try  showed  their  ability  and  power  and  forged  to  the  front 
with  their  manufactures,  so  that  Europe  began  to  hear  of 
what  they  called  the  " American  invasion."  ''European 
nations,"  said  the  Austrian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
"must  close  their  ranks  and  fight  shoulder  to  shoulder,  in 
order  successfully  to  defend  their  existence."  2 

A  conspicuous  development  was  in  the  steel  industry 
which  is  fully  represented  in  a  report  of  Charles  M. 
Schwab,  dated  May  15,  1899.  "I  know  positively,"  he 
wrote,  "that  England  cannot  produce  pig  iron  at  actual 
cost  for  less  than  $11.50  per  ton,  even  allowing  no  profit 
on  raw  materials,  and  cannot  put  pig  iron  into  a  rail 
with  their  most  efficient  works  for  less  than  $7.50  per  ton. 
This  would  make  rails  at  net  cost  to  them  of  $19.00.  We 
can  sell  at  this  price  and  ship  abroad  so  as  to  net  us 
$16.00  at  works  for  foreign  business,  nearly  as  good  as 
home  business  has  been.  ...  As  a  result  of  this  we  are 
going  to  control  the  steel  business  of  the  world.  You 
know  we  can  make  rails  for  less  than  $12.00  per  ton, 
leaving  a  nice  margin  on  foreign  business."3  Schwab 


1  McClure's  Magazine,  Nov.,  1910,  16.  2  Noyes,  273. 

8  The  Inside  History  of  the  Carnegie  Steel  Co.,  Bridge,  314. 


118  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  (1899 

was  President  of  the  Carnegie  Steel  Co.  and  his  report 
was  to  Henry  Clay  Frick,  chairman,  his  superior  officer, 
but  both  were  under  Andrew  Carnegie,  who,  despite  his 
obvious  faults,  was  the  greatest  iron  master  of  the  world, 
was  now  at  the  head  of  the  best  equipped  steel  works  and 
could  make  steel  cheaper  than  anyone  else. 

"  Between  1893  and  1899  our  export  of  manufactures 
actually  doubled."  l 

In  the  old  school-books  it  was  set  down  that  the  de 
velopment  of  a  State  lay  in  commerce,  manufactures, 
and  agriculture.  Agriculture  was  the  largest  single  in 
terest  in  the  United  States  and  commerce  and  manu 
factures  owed  more  to  it  than  it  owed  to  the  others.  In 
1899  the  farmer  was  prosperous.  "  Every  barn  in  Kan 
sas  and  Nebraska  has  had  a  new  coat  of  paint."  "For 
anyone,"  wrote  Ray  Stannard  Baker,  "who  knew  the 
West  of  1895  and  1896,  with  its  bare  weather-stained 
homes,  its  dilapidated  barns,  its  farm  machinery  stand 
ing  out  in  the  rain,  its  ruinous  'boom'  towns,  its  discon 
tented  inhabitants  crying  out  for  legislation  to  relieve 
their  distress,  this  bit  of  observation  raises  a  picture  of 
improvement  and  smiling  comfort  such  as  no  array  of 
figures,  however  convincing,  could  produce.  The  West 
painted  again :  how  much  that  means !  The  farmer  has 
provided  himself  with  food  in  plenty  and  the  means  for 
seeding  his  fields  for  another  year;  he  has  clothed  him 
self  and  his  family  anew ;  he  has  bought  an  improved 
harvester,  a  buggy  and  a  sewing  machine ;  and  now  with 
the  deliberation  which  is  born  of  a  surplus  and  a  sturdy 
confidence  in  himself  and  in  the  future,  he  is  painting  his 


lNoyes,   275. 


CH.  V.]  LEGISLATION  FOR  GOLD  119 

barn.  Paint  signifies  all  of  these  preliminary  comforts. 
And  after  paint  comes  a  new  front  porch,  a  piano  and  the 
boys  off  to  college."  l  Baker  might  have  added  that 
cancelled  farm  mortgages  were  reckoned  by  the  carload.2 

Since  the  campaign  of  1896,  there  had  been  an  enor 
mous  increase  in  the  production  of  gold  so  that  circum 
stances  were  ripe  for  the  Republicans  to  fulfil  the  prom 
ises  they  had  made  in  their  platform  of  1896  and  during 
that  lively  canvass.  Unquestionably  the  gold  Demo 
crats,  who  had  supported  McKinley,  were  disappointed 
that  financial  legislation  was  not  enacted  as  the  result  of 
his  victory,  but  those  who  believed  in  a  protective  tariff 
dominated  the  councils  of  the  party  and  before  they 
tackled  the  subject  of  finance  they  felt  that  the  tariff  de 
manded  their  attention :  hence  the  Dingley  Tariff  Bill. 
McKinley  and  his  immediate  advisers  had  come  to  be 
lieve  in  a  gold  standard  and  were  right  in  their  convic 
tion  that  a  better  law  could  be  later  secured  than  in 
1897.  But  this  conviction  was  based  on  the  education 
of  their  party,  as  they  could  not  have  foreseen  how  Na 
ture  was  going  to  work  on  their  side. 

On  March  14,  1900,  a  law  was  enacted  declaring  the 
gold  dollar  to  be  the  standard  unit  of  value.  It  provided 
that  "  United  States  notes  [greenbacks]  and  Treasury 
notes"  issued  under  the  Act  of  1890  " shall  be  redeemed 
in  gold  coin ;  and,  in  order  to  secure  the  prompt  and  cer 
tain  redemption  of  such  notes,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  set  apart  a  reserve  fund  of 


1  Ray  Stannard   Baker,   The   New    Prosperity,   McClure's   Magazine, 
May,  1900,  86. 

2  In  addition  to  authorities  already  cited,  I  have  used  The  Nation  for 
1899,  and  conversations  with  Mark  Hanna  and  J.  P.  Morgan. 


120  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1899 

one  hundred  and  fifty  millions  in  gold,  which  fund  shall 
be  used  for  such  redemption  purposes  only."  If  that 
fund  should  fall  below  one  hundred  millions  it  should  be 
the  duty  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  replenish  it 
to  the  maximum  sum  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  millions, 
by  the  sale  of  three  per  cent  bonds,  of  which  the  interest 
and  principal  should  be  payable  in  gold.  The  proceeds 
of  these  bonds  should  not  "be  used  to  meet  deficiencies 
in  the  current  revenues."  United  States  notes,  when  re 
deemed  and  reissued,  should  be  held  "in  the  reserve 
fund  until  exchanged  for  gold."  The  legal  tender  quality 
of  the  silver  dollar  was  unaffected.1 

During  the  summer  of  1900  affairs  in  China  claimed 
the  attention  of  the  State  Department,  and  Hay  as  its 
head  directed  the  admirable  course  of  the  United  States, 
showing  great  ability  in  state-craft. 

John  Hay,  as  he  gave  an  account  of  himself,  "was  born 
in  Indiana,  grew  up  in  Illinois,  was  educated  in  Rhode 
Island.  I  learned  my  law,"  he  continued,  "in  Spring 
field  and  my  politics  in  Washington,  my  diplomacy  in 
Europe,  Asia  and  Africa."  2  He  had  an  innate  sense  of 
refinement  but  his  cultivated  manner  never  obscured  his 
Western  raciness.  He  loved  society  and  talk.  Residing 
ten  years  in  Cleveland,  he  organized  a  dinner  club, 
called  the  Vampire,  of  which  he  was  the  life.  Hay  used 
to  come  to  the  dinners  primed  with  circumstances  and 
anecdotes  and,  eating  and  drinking  little,  he  gave  him 
self  up  to  talk  and  was  listened  to  with  interest  and  de 
light.  Not  infrequently  one  of  the  wits  of  the  club 


1 U.  S.  Statutes,  xxxi.  45. 
8  Life  of  Hay,  Thayer,  i.  2. 


Copyright  by  Pack  Brothers. 


CH.  V.]  JOHN  HAY  121 

would  prod  Hay  and,  with  his  rare  sense  of  humor  a 
witticism  of  the  sort  served  for  an  additional  display. 
Occasionally  he  would  fall  into  a  serious  strain  and  talk 
of  political  events  or  his  acquaintances  in  New  York  or 
England,  but  always  replete  with  intelligence.  Some 
times,  although  with  seeming  reluctance,  he  would  speak 
of  his  work  on  Lincoln,  on  which  he  was  then  engaged, 
and  the  business  men,  who  gathered  at  that  round  table, 
were  eager  to  hear  of  the  processes  of  a  live  author.  But 
it  was  a  common  remark  that  he  never  repeated  himself. 

"  What  things  have  we  seen 
Done  at  the  Mermaid  [Union  Club  of  Cleveland]   heard  words  that 

have  been 
So  nimble  and  so  full  of  subtile  flame." 

"  There  is  no  longer  the  play  of  wit  and  raillery, " 
wrote  Professor  Matthews,  "the  brilliancy,  the  concen 
tration,  the  rapid  glancing  at  a  hundred  subjects  in  suc 
cession,  which  there  used  to  be  in  the  attic  nights  of  John 
son,  Burke,  Garrick  and  Sheridan."  l  But  had  the 
Professor  dined  with  the  Vampire,  when  Hay  was  at  his 
best,  he  might  have  thought  it  an  attic  night. 

Hay  was  the  soul  of  the  club  and  when  in  1879  he  felt 
compelled  to  accept  the  position  of  Assistant  Secretary 
of  State,  offered  him  by  William  M.  Evarts,  he  left  a 
void,  which,  although  the  dinners  went  on,  was  not  filled 
until  his  return  to  Cleveland,  when  he  was  welcomed 
with  glee. 

Hay  was  not  a  trained  historian  in  the  way  of  knowing 
thoroughly  the  masters  of  the  art.  He  did  not  read  with 
rapt  attention  Gibbon,  Macaulay,  Parkman  or  any  other 


1The  Great  Convergers  (1874),  42. 


122  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1899 

historian  except  Henry  Adams.  He  was  apt  to  have  at 
hand  some  high  class  French  novel  or  Memoirs.  He  was 
especially  fond  of  Tourgu6neff.  Is  there  in  literature, 
he  asked,  such  another  story  of  a  suicide  so  dramatically 
told,  as  that  of  Nejdanof  in  Terres  Viorges?  During  a 
long  acquaintance  I  never  heard  him  talk  of  historians 
except  of  his  friend  Henry  Adams,  but  he  had  at  his 
tongue's  end  what  we  used  to  call  belles-lettres  and  his 
conversation  thereon  was  a  profit  and  delight.  In  his 
familiar  letters  written  to  his  coadjutor  Nicolay  in  re 
gard  to  the  History,  when  he  spoke  of  condensation  or 
the  troubles  of  narration,  there  is  never  a  question  how 
Macaulay  or  Parkman  would  have  treated  the  one  or 
solved  the  other.  We  "must  seize  every  chance  to  con 
dense,"  he  wrote.  "We  could  cut  down  a  good  deal  and 
present  what  would  be  a  continuous  narrative  in  about 
half  the  space  we  have  taken  for  our  book."  l  Unques 
tionably  had  he  followed  out  this  idea,  the  History  would 
have  been  more  popular  and  less  criticized. 

Although  Hay  did  not  possess  the  power  of  generaliza 
tion  of  Gibbon  he  had  two  qualities  invaluable  for  a  his 
torian  —  that  of  narration  and  a  skepticism  that  influ 
enced  in  a  marked  degree  his  judgment  of  men  and  of 
events.  And  no  writers  in  America  ever  had  more  price 
less  material.  As  private  secretaries  of  Lincoln,  feeling 
that  he  was  the  central  figure  of  the  time,  thinking  that 
some  day  they  might  write  a  history  of  these  eventful 
years,  they  made  memoranda  and  garnered  up  their  im 
pressions.  Robert  T.  Lincoln,  the  President's  son,  had 
a  large  body  of  material  which  he  placed  at  their  dis- 


Thayer,  ii.  28,  35. 


CH.  V.]  JOHN  HAY  123 

posal.  The  two  merits  which  Gibbon  ascribed  as  those 
of  a  historian,  diligence  and  accuracy,  they  possessed. 
The  ten  volumes  of  the  History  testify  to  their  diligence ; 
that  they  rarely,  if  ever,  failed  in  the  correctness  of  a  quo 
tation  or  a  reference  is  a  warrant  of  their  accuracy. 

Hay  was  a  partisan  and  he  carried  partisanship  into 
his  historical  work,  but  he  aimed  at  impartiality.  "We 
ought  to  write,"  he  said,  "the  history  of  those  times  like 
two  everlasting  angels  who  know  everything,  judge  every 
thing,  tell  the  truth  about  everything,  and  don't  care  a 
twang  of  their  harps  about  one  side  or  the  other."  Yet 
in  the  same  letter  he  wrote,  "I  am  of  that  age  and  im 
bued  with  all  its  prejudices,"  and  "We  are  Lincoln  men 
all  through."  l  Therein  lay  an  unconscious  partisanship. 
Nicolay  and  Hay  made  Lincoln  out  a  saint  and,  when  he 
came  into  contact  with  other  men,  the  saint  was  always 
right. 

"No  man,"  Hay  wrote  in  a  private  letter,  "can  be  a 
great  historian  who  is  not  a  good  fellow."  A  "good  fel 
low,"  a  genuine  man  was  Hay  in  every  respect. 

An  earnest  Republican,  he  took  great  interest  in  poli 
tics  and  cooperated  with  the  managers  of  the  Republican 
cause  in  Ohio  and  in  the  country  at  large.  Those  who 
knew  him  best  thought  that,  until  McKinley  appointed 
him  in  1897,  his  ability  was  not  appreciated  by  those  high 
in  power,  as  the  offers  to  him  of  office  were  below  his 
merits.  He  helped  Hanna  in  the  nomination  of  McKin 
ley  and  when  McKinley  was  elected,  among  the  large 
number  of  well-backed  aspirants  for  the  English  mission, 
Hanna's  voice  was  for  Hay;  as  Hay  jocosely  wrote, 


1  Thayer,  ii.  33. 


124  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1899 

"Hanna  is  a  good  judge  of  men  and  he  recognizes  infalli 
bility  when  he  sees  it."  McKinley  named  him  Ambassa 
dor  to  Great  Britain,  a  position  which  pleased  him  im 
mensely  and  which  he  was  abundantly  qualified  to  fill. 

McKinley  and  Hay  took  to  one  another,  drawn  to 
gether  by  an  innate  sense  of  refinement,  for  McKinley 
appreciated  culture.  Hay  was  decidedly  a  cultivated 
man.  His  natural  propensity  for  culture  was  fostered 
by  the  reading  of  books  and  by  mingling  in  the  best 
society.  Having  a  notable  aptitude  for  acquiring  knowl 
edge  at  second  hand  he  used  this  knowledge  in  his  talk 
with  wonderful  skill.  Always  meeting  interesting  peo 
ple  he  absorbed  incidents  that  in  turn  set  off  his  own  con 
versation.  He  loved  wit  and  humor  and  any  manifes 
tation  of  them  was  to  his  latest  day  a  passport  to  his  favor. 
He  was  a  remarkable  dinner-table  talker  and,  in  a  dis 
cussion  of  the  subject,  a  man  of  wide  experience  could 
think  only  of  two  shining  lights  of  Boston  and  Cambridge 
who  were  his  equal  or  superior. 

In  August,  1898,  McKinley  offered  Hay  the  position  of 
Secretary  of  State  for  which  he  had  no  wish,  as  he  would 
have  preferred  to  remain  Ambassador  to  Great  Britain.1 
Thus  he  wrote  during  September  to  his  brother-in-law : 
"I  did  not  want  the  place  and  was  greatly  grieved  and 
shocked  when  it  came  —  but  of  course  I  could  not  refuse 
to  do  the  best  I  could.  It  was  impossible,  after  the  Presi 
dent  had  been  so  generous,  to  pick  and  choose,  and  say, 
'I  will  have  this  and  not  that/  But  I  look  forward  to  the 
next  year  with  gloomy  forebodings."  2 


1  The  Education  of  Henry  Adams,  364 ;   Life  of  Hay,  Thayer,  ii.  173 
et  seq. 

2  Thayer,  ii.  183. 


CH.  V.]  CHINA  125 

The  correspondence  between  McKinley  and  Hay,  when 
Hay's  first  canal  treaty  was  rejected  by  the  Senate,  is 
honorable  to  them  both.  Hay  showed  consideration  for 
the  President  in  offering  his  resignation  and  McKinley  in 
declining  it,  affirmed  his  loyalty  to  his  Secretary  of  State. 
"Your  administration  of  the  State  Department,"  he 
wrote,  "  has  had  my  warm  approval.  As  in  all  matters 
you  have  taken  my  counsel,  I  will  cheerfully  bear  what 
ever  criticism  or  condemnation  may  come." l  In  his  sym 
pathetic  eulogy  delivered  before  the  Congress,  Hay  rose 
to  a  sublime  height,  as  he  depicted  the  ability,  moral 
greatness  and  success  of  his  master.  His  countenance 
was  the  picture  of  his  mind  and  heart.  "His  face,"  he 
said,  "was  cast  in  a  classic  mold;  you  see  faces  like  it 
in  antique  marble,  in  the  galleries  of  the  Vatican  ;  .  .  .his 
voice  was  the  voice  of  the  perfect  orator." 

China,  devoted  to  Oriental  civilization,  did  not  wish 
for  Western  modern  improvements,  had  no  desire  for 
railroads  and  telegraphs,  the  importation  of  English  and 
American  cotton  fabrics  and  of  American  petroleum. 
She  could  see  no  use  in  them ;  they  disturbed  her  calcu 
lations  and  her  mode  of  life ;  she  was  satisfied  to  be  let 
alone.  To  the  European  nations  she  seemed  inert  —  a 
fat  goose  for  the  plucking  —  and  therefore,  on  one  ac 
count  and  another,  these  foreign  nations  claimed  and  ob 
tained  "spheres  of  influence  or  interest."  Especially 
was  this  the  case  with  Great  Britain,  Germany  and  Rus 
sia,  and,  from  their  point  of  view,  such  spheres  in  China 
were  economically  and  politically  like  their  own  terri 
tory.  The  China  trade  was  important  to  the  United 

1  Thayer,  ii.  228. 

2  Memorial  Address,  Feb.  27,   1902. 


12«  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1900 

States  and  the  American  manufacturers  desired  part  of 
the  consumption  of  the  three  hundred  and  fifty  million 
Chinese.  Did  these  nations  adopt  preferential  tariffs  in 
their  spheres  of  interest,  the  American  manufacturers 
would  suffer,  and  for  aid  they  looked  to  the  State  De 
partment  which  was  alive  to  the  situation. 

On  September  6,  1899,  Hay  addressed  a  note  to  Great 
Britain  in  which  his  English  predilection  tallied  with  her 
traditional  and  declared  policy  for  freedom  of  trade,  and 
he  asked  her  to  maintain  the  "open  door"  policy  which 
meant  that  the  commerce  and  navigation  of  the  world 
should  receive  equality  of  treatment  within  the  "spheres 
of  influence  or  interest. "  On  the  same  day,  he  addressed 
notes  to  Germany  and  Russia  pleading  to  these  protec 
tive  tariff  countries  for  the  "open  door"  policy  within 
their  spheres  of  interest,  although  to  them  he  did  not  use 
the  term  "open  door."  On  November  30  England  re 
plied  that  she  would  declare  for  the  "open  door"  pro 
vided  that  the  other  powers  concerned  would  do  likewise. 
During  December  Germany  and  Russia  answered,  af 
firming  the  principle  under  like  conditions.  Meanwhile 
Hay  addressed  similar  notes  to  Japan,  France  and  Italy, 
from  all  of  whom  he  received  satisfactory  answers.  This 
led  to  his  note  of  March  20,  1900,  to  the  several  six  na 
tions,  giving  the  course  of  his  negotiations  and  saying 
that  as  each  nation  had  "accepted  the  declaration  sug 
gested  by  the  United  States  concerning  foreign  trade  in 
China"  he  considered  the  assent  of  each  one  addressed 
"as  final  and  definitive."  l  Hay's  sanguine  anticipations 
were  substantially  realized. 

1  Corr.  concerning  Amer.  Commercial  Rights  in  China,  Foreign  Rela 
tions,  1899. 


CH.  V.]  THE  BOXER  UPRISING  127 

But  the  game  of  grab  had  received  a  check.  The  worm 
trodden  on  will  turn.  Before  1900,  there  were  mutter- 
ings  of  the  coming  storm  which  is  known  as  the  Boxer 
uprising.  The  Boxers  were  a  secret  Chinese  society 
and  their  name  may  be  freely  translated  as  "The  Fist  of 
Righteous  Harmony."  Sir  Robert  Hart  " looked  upon 
the  Boxer  movement  as  a  national  and  patriotic  one  for 
freeing  China  of  the  foreigners  to  whom,  rightly  or 
wrongly,  is  attributed  all  the  country's  misfortunes  dur 
ing  the  last  half  century."  l  Hart  was  properly  called  by 
the  Encyclopedia  Britannica,  an  Anglo-Chinese  states 
man  and  his  remark  was  made  after  the  suppression  of 
the  uprising  which  had  individually  cost  him  much ;  it 
stated  a  condition  that  the  Boxers,  dominated  by  the  fa 
natics,  sought  to  remedy,  but  the  remedy  was  worse  than 
the  disease.  The  Empress  Dowager  who  sympathized 
with  the  fanatical  Boxers  said  in  a  secret  edict,  "The  va 
rious  powers  cast  upon  us  looks  of  tigerlike  voracity,  hus 
tling  each  other  in  their  endeavors  to  be  the  first  to  seize 
upon  our  innermost  territories."  A  Chinese  politician 
declared  that  the  Boxer  movement  u  was  due  to  the  deep- 
seated  hatred  of  the  Chinese  people  towards  foreigners. 
China  had  been  oppressed,  trampled  upon,  coerced,  ca 
joled,  her  territory  taken,  her  usages  flouted."  3  While 
this  feeling  against  foreigners  as  such  was  undoubtedly 
the  main  cause  of  the  Boxer  uprising,  it  was  mixed  with 
antagonism  toward  Christian  missionaries  who  were  try 
ing  to  convert  the  Chinese  to  an  alien  religion.  Mate 
rial  conditions  likewise  fostered  the  movement.  In  De- 


1  Foreign  Relations,  1900,  207. 

2  Nov.  21,  1899.     Foreign  Relations,  1900,  85. 

1  J.  W.  Foster,  Amer.  Diplomacy  in  the  Orient,  416. 


128  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  11900 

cember,  1899,  our  minister  E.  H.  Conger  wrote  to  John 
Hay,  " Crops  have  failed  on  account  of  the  drought; 
great  poverty  and  want  prevail."  l  Little  wonder  was  it 
that  a  placard  was  issued  saying,  "The  Roman  Catholic 
and  Protestant  religions  have  ruined  and  destroyed 
Buddhism.  Their  adherents  .  .  .  have  irritated  heaven 
and  in  consequence  no  rain  has  fallen.  ...  If  foreigners 
are  not  swept  away  no  rain  will  fall."  2  Swayed  by  these 
different  impulses  the  Peking  Boxers  attacked  the  foreign 
legations.  On  June  11,  1900,  Conger  wrote  to  Hay :  "  We 
are  besieged  in  Peking,  entirely  cut  off  from  outside  com 
munication.  ...  In  a  civilized  country  of  course  there 
would  be  no  question  as  to  our  safety,  but  here,  with  prac 
tically  no  government,  and  the  army  only  a  mutinous 
horde  of  savage  ruffians,  there  can  be  no  predicting  what 
they  may  attempt."  3  Ordinarily,  government  soldiers 
would  protect  foreign  legations  but  in  this  case  the  armed 
Boxers,  who  were  looked  upon  as  patriots,  were  assisted 
by  the  Imperial  troops.  The  entire  city  of  Peking,  wrote 
Conger  on  June  15,  is  "in  the  possession  of  a  rioting,  mur 
dering  mob,  with  no  visible  effort  being  made  by  the  gov 
ernment  in  any  way  to  restrain  it."  4  Five  days  later 
the  German  Minister,  who  had  ventured  out  on  an  official 
errand,  was  murdered.  Nearly  all  the  foreigners  repaired 
to  the  British  legation,  which  was  made  a  veritable  for 
tress;  their  lines  of  defence  were  quickly  shortened  and 
straightened  ;  trenches  and  barricades  were  built.  "The 
Chinese  army,"  related  Conger  on  August  17  after  relief 
came,  "had  turned  out  against  us;  the  whole  quarter  of 


1  Dec.  7,  1899.     Foreign  Relations,  1900,  77. 

2  Apr.  30,   1900.     Foreign  Relations,  123.  s  Ibid.,  145. 
4  Foreign  Relations,  154. 


CH.  V.]  THE  BOXER  UPRISING  129 

the  city  in  which  the  legations  are  situated  was  sur 
rounded  by  its  soldiers,  firing  began  on  all  sides  and  the 
battle  against  the  representatives  of  all  foreign  govern 
ments  in  China  was  begun.  .  .  .  Until  July  17  there 
was  scarcely  an  hour  during  which  there  was  not  firing 
upon  some  part  of  our  lines  .  .  .  varying  from  a  single 
shot  to  a  general  and  continuous  attack  along  the  whole 
line.  Artillery  was  planted  on  all  sides  of  us."  1 

Culminating  by  July  17,  a  thrill  of  horror  ran  through 
Europe  and  the  United  States  at  the  idea  that  the  lega 
tions  to  an  ostensibly  friendly  country  were  besieged  and 
in  danger  of  massacre.  London,  Paris  and  Berlin  be 
lieving  that  the  worst  had  happened,  mourned  for  those 
who  had  suffered  this  conjectured  untimely  fate.  On 
July  16  it  was  stated  in  the  House  of  Commons  that  the 
government  entertained  "no  further  hope  for  the  safety 
of  the  foreign  community  in  Peking."  The  London 
Times,  the  most  conspicuous  journal  in  Europe,  which  con 
tained  this  news,  printed  in  the  same  issue  conventional 
eulogies  of  the  British  Minister,  of  the  Times  correspond 
ent  and  of  Sir  Robert  Hart,  and  gave  a  list  of  British 
officials  and  others  who  were  in  the  Chinese  capital. 
While  those  connected  with  the  American  press  were  in 
clined  to  the  belief  of  their  confreres  over  the  sea,  the  Chi 
nese  Minister  in  Washington,  Wu,  Secretary  John  Hay  and 
President  McKinley  doubted  the  story  of  a  general  mas 
sacre.  Amid  a  period  of  excitement  Hay  and  McKin 
ley  did  not  lose  their  heads  and  cooperated  in  efforts  to 
relieve  the  suffering  garrison.  Hay  was  determined  to 
get  correct  news  and  through  Minister  Wu  sent  a  des- 


Foreign  Relations,  162. 


130  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1900 

patch  to  Conger  on  July  11,  "  Communicate  tidings 
bearer."  Conger  replied  under  date  of  July  16,  received 
in  Washington  four  days  later :  "For  one  month  we  have 
been  besieged  in  British  legation  under  continued  shot 
and  shell  from  Chinese  troops.  Quick  relief  only  can  pre 
vent  general  massacre."  1  Five  days  later  (not  received 
in  Washington  until  August  5)  Conger  telegraphed 
through  the  Consul-General  at  Shanghai:  "All  well. 
No  fighting  since  16th  by  agreement.  Enough  provi 
sions  ;  little  ammunition.  Hope  for  speedy  relief."  2  In 
his  despatch  of  July  21,  Conger  was  somewhat  too  op 
timistic  as  the  situation  was  one  of  ebb  and  flow.  Nev 
ertheless  relief  was  at  hand  and  he  had  the  satisfaction 
of  announcing  on  August  14,  "We  are  safe."  3 

The  occupying  forces  4  restored  order  and  organized  a 
provincial  administration,  which  gave  way  eventually 
to  a  reestablished  Chinese  government.  Protracted  ne 
gotiations  followed,  with  the  result  that  suitable  punish 
ment  was  meted  out  to  the  guilty  and  an  indemnity  in  a 
lump  sum  agreed  upon.  The  success  of  President 
McKinley  and  Secretary  Hay  lay  in  their  confidence  in  the 
Southern  viceroys.  As  Hay  said  in  his  eulogy  on  McKin- 


1  Foreign  Relations,  155,  156.     "Your  telegram  was  the  first  communi 
cation  received  by  anyone  from  outside  since  the  siege  began  and  mine 
the  first  sent  out."     Conger  to  Hay,  ibid.,  161. 

2  Ibid.,  156. 

3  Ibid.,  160.     The  paraphrase  of  Conger's  message  of  Aug.  17  ran :  "Ex 
cepting  the  Imperial  palace  the  entire  city  is  occupied  by  2000  Americans, 
2000  British,  3000  Russians,  8000  Japanese  and  200  French  and  is  being 
apportioned  for  police  supervision.     The  Chinese  army  has  fled.     The 
Imperial  family  and  court  have  gone  westward.  .  .  .     There  are  no  rep 
resentatives   of   the   Chinese  government  in  sight.     The  palace  will  be 
taken  at  once.  .  .  .  Conditions  chaotic."     It  must  be  noted  that  our  rapid 
action  of  relief  was  due  to  our  having  troops  in  the  Philippines. 

4  For  what  the  occupying  forces  were  which  relieved  the  foreign  com 
munity  in  Peking,  see  note  3. 


CH.  V.]  PEACE  WITH  CHINA  131 

ley,  "  While  the  legations  were  fighting  for  their  lives 
against  bands  of  infuriated  fanatics,  the  President  de 
cided  that  we  were  at  peace  with  China ;  and  while  that 
conclusion  did  not  hinder  him  from  taking  the  most  en 
ergetic  measures  to  rescue  our  imperilled  citizens,  it  en 
abled  him  to  maintain  close  and  friendly  relations  with 
the  wise  and  heroic  viceroys  of  the  south,  whose  reso 
lute  stand  saved  that  ancient  Empire  from  anarchy  and 
spoliation."  l  They  also  believed  Minister  Wu  ;  and  their 
voices,  as  friends  of  China,  were  for  the  preservation  of 
her  integrity  and  for  moderation  in  every  respect. 
" Hay's  achievement,"  wrote  Thayer,  "in  this  Chinese 
contest  gave  him  an  immense  prestige.  Throughout  the 
world  he  was  now  looked  upon  as  a  statesman,  honest, 
disinterested,  resourceful  and  brilliant."  2  Reference  is 
had  to  the  "open  door"  correspondence  as  well  as  to  his 
conduct  during  the  Boxer  uprising ;  lapse  of  time  con 
firms  fully  this  effective  statement.  The  brother  Vam 
pires  who  listened  to  Hay's  brilliant  talk  when  he  was 
forty  were  not  surprised  at  the  development  of  his  parts 
until  he  became  Secretary  of  State.  They  were  prepared 
for  the  History,  knew  that  he  would  be  an  excellent  Am 
bassador  to  Great  Britain,  but  were  amazed  at  the  able 
statecraft  he  displayed  in  handling  Chinese  affairs.3 


1  Addresses,  162. 

2  Life  of  Hay,  ii.  249. 

3  Authorities  :   Foreign  Relations,  1900 ;   Life  of  Hay,  Thayer ;   Life  of 
McKinley,  Olcott;    President's  Messages  of  Dec.  1900  and  Dec.   1901; 
Peck. 


CHAPTER   VI 

PRESIDENT  making  was  a  concern  of  the  year  1900, 
which  in  this  case  meant  practically  the  action  of  the  Re 
publican  Convention  that  assembled  in  Philadelphia  dur 
ing  June.  There  was  no  difference  as  to  the  presidential 
candidate,  none  as  to  the  platform.  According  to  the 
prevailing  sentiment  McKinley  had  deserved  well  of  the 
party  and  the  country,  and  was  entitled  to  another  term. 
The  platform  was  on  the  point-with-pride  order  and  glo 
ried  in  the  achievements  of  the  Republican  party.  Mer 
ited  indeed  was  all  that  it  said  about  the  Republican 
opposition  to  the  free  coinage  of  silver  and  the  preserva 
tion  of  the  gold  standard ;  for  the  action  of  the  Republi 
can  party  had  been  in  line  with  what  believers  in  sound 
money  advocated.  While  the  platform  commended  the 
foreign  policy  of  the  President  it  could  not  ignore  entirely 
the  bloody  suppression  of  the  Philippine  rebellion  which 
was  still  on  foot,  so  that  the  statement  regarding  the 
Philippines  limped  and  took  no  account  of  patent  facts 
as  I  have  stated  them.  The  platform  was  adopted  with 
unanimity;  there  is  not  "a  particle  of  objection  to  it," 
a  delegate  from  New  Jersey  declared,1  and  he  spoke  the 
unanimous  voice  of  the  Convention. 

The  nomination  of  McKinley  and  the  platform  had 
practically  been  decided  by  public  opinion  freely  ex 
pressed  in  various  ways  in  a  pre-convention  canvass,  and 
traversed  Ostrogorski's  statement  that  a  National  Con 
vention  is  "a  colossal  travesty  of  popular  institutions."  2 

1  Official  Proceedings  of  the  Repub.  Nat.  Com.  of  1900,  108.      2  ii.  278. 

132 


CH.  VI. J  THEODORE  ROOSEVELT  133 

The  Convention  and  the  Republican  party  were  well  repre 
sented  in  the  words  of  Theodore  Roosevelt,  a  delegate 
at  large  from  New  York  State,  who  seconded  McKinley's 
nomination.  "We  nominate  President  McKinley,"  he 
said,  "  because  he  stands  indeed  for  honesty  at  home 
and  for  honor  abroad ;  because  he  stands  for  the  contin 
uance  of  the  material  prosperity  which  has  brought  com 
fort  to  every  home  in  the  Union ;  and  because  he  stands 
for  that  kind  of  policy  which  consists  in  making  perform 
ance  square  with  promise."  l 

The  whole  ticket  of  1896  could  not  be  renominated  as 
Hobart,  the  Vice-President,  had  during  the  year  previous 
passed  away.  A  new  candidate  must  therefore  be  chosen 
and  the  convention  is  remarkable  for  its  choice.  The 
services  of  Theodore  Roosevelt  during  the  Spanish- 
American  War  made  him  Governor  of  New  York  State, 
where  he  caine  into  collision  with  Senator  Platt  and  the 
Republican  organization  who  were  influenced  by  "the 
big  corporation  men."  Roosevelt  desired  a  renomina- 
tion  for  governor  by  the  New  York  State  Convention, 
which  would  be  held  subsequent  to  the  National  Con 
vention  in  Philadelphia,  as  the  governorship  interested 
him  and  he  had  policies  which  he  desired  to  perfect  and 
carry  out;  and  he  did  not  want  to  be  sidetracked  as 
Vice-President.  He  positively  declined  a  number  of 
times  to  be  a  candidate  for  that  office.  Hanna  regarded 
Roosevelt  as  erratic  and  "unsafe"  and  was  emphatically 
opposed  to  his  nomination  as  Vice-President.  The  natu 
ral  antagonism  between  the  two  became  publicly  known 
at  this  Convention.  Hanna  was  for  the  old  order  with  an 


1Ofl5cial  Proceedings,  119.  2  Roosevelt,  Autobiography,  110. 


134  McKINLEY'S    ADMINISTRATION  [1900 

important  modification,  Roosevelt  for  the  new.  And 
President  McKinley  in  an  unobtrusive  way  let  it  be 
known  that  he  did  not  want  Roosevelt  as  a  running  mate. 
Roosevelt  arrived  in  Philadelphia  on  Saturday,  June  16, 
and  next  day  had  an  interview  with  Hanna,  in  which  he 
said  frankly  to  the  Senator,  "I  am  not  a  candidate  for 
Vice-President  and  I  don't  want  the  nomination.  What 
I  want  is  to  be  Governor  of  New  York/'  1  Roosevelt's 
own  account  of  the  matter  may  be  set  down  as  true  his 
tory:  "  Senator  Hanna  appeared  on  the  surface  to  have 
control  of  the  Convention.  He  was  anxious  that  I  should 
not  be  nominated  as  Vice-President.  Senator  Platt  was 
anxious  that  I  should  be  nominated  as  Vice-President 
in  order  to  get  me  out  of  the  New  York  Governorship.  .  .  . 
My  supporters  in  New  York  State  did  not  wish  me  nom 
inated  for  Vice-President  because  they  wished  me  to  con 
tinue  as  Governor ;  but  in  every  other  State  all  the  people 
who  admired  me  were  bound  that  I  should  be  nominated 
as  Vice-President."  2  A  supplement  to  this  is  a  telephone 
despatch  to  President  McKinley  which  reached  him  late 
on  Sunday  evening,  June  17:  "The  Roosevelt  boom  is 
let  loose  and  it  has  swept  everything.  It  starts  with  the 
support  of  Pennsylvania  and  New  York  practically  solid 
and  with  California  and  Colorado  back  of  it  also.  The 
feeling  is  that  the  thing  is  going  pell-mell  like  a  tidal 
wave."  3 

On  this  Sunday  Hanna  and  Roosevelt  failed  to  reckon 
the  strength  of  popular  sentiment.  Roosevelt,  on  ac- 

1  Olcott,  ii.  275.  2  Autobiography,  332. 

3Olcott,  ii.  271.  In  the  midst  of  the  excitement  Mrs.  Robinson,  who 
had  hastened  to  Philadelphia  at  Roosevelt's  request,  found  him  in  his  hotel 
room  reading  the  "History  of  Josephus."  My  Brother,  T.  Roosevelt, 
Mrs.  Robinson,  196. 


CH.  VI]  ROOSEVELT   VICE-PRESIDENT  136 

count  of  his  course  during  the  Spanish-American  War 
and  the  governorship  of  New  York  was  one  of  the  most 
popular  men  in  the  country  especially  in  the  West,  of 
the  inhabitants  of  which  he  was  fond.  He  could  not 
ignore  the  manifestation  in  his  favor  and  was  forced  to 
bow  to  the  will  of  the  people  thus  expressed.  McKinley 
also  arrived  at  the  same  opinion  by  the  Tuesday  and  thus 
telephoned:  "The  President's  close  friends  must  not 
undertake  to  commit  the  Administration  to  any  candi 
date.  It  has  no  candidate.  The  convention  must  make 
the  nomination ;  the  Administration  would  not  if  it  could. 
The  President's  close  friends  should  be  satisfied  with  his 
unanimous  nomination  and  not  interfere  with  the  vice- 
presidential  nomination.  The  Administration  wants  the 
choice  of  the  convention  and  the  President's  friends  must 
not  dictate  to  the  convention."  l  As  soon  as  Hanna 
knew  of  the  President's  wishes,  he  abandoned  his  oppo 
sition  and  favored  unanimity.  This  was  effected  on 
Thursday,  June  21 ;  Roosevelt  received  on  the  ballot 
taken  the  vote  of  every  delegate  except  his  own.2 

The  Democratic  Convention  was  held  in  Kansas  City 
on  July  4.  Bryan  had  made  so  gallant  a  fight  four  years 
previously  that  no  one  else  was  talked  of  for  presidential 
candidate.  He  had  the  nomination  for  the  asking  and 
he  purposed  dictating  the  policy  of  his  party.  His  article 
in  the  North  American  Review  for  June  showed  what 
was  passing  in  his  mind.  "The  issue  presented  in  the 
campaign  of  1900,"  he  wrote,  "is  the  issue  between  plutoc- 


1  Olcott,  ii.  279. 

2  Besides  the  Life  of  McKinley  and  Roosevelt's  Autobiography  I  have 
used  freely  the  Life  of  Hanna  by  Croly,  and  the  Official  Proceedings.     I 
have  also  consulted  The  Nation,  passim;  the  Life  of  Foraker,  ii. ;   Platt's 
Autobiography,  chap.  xix. 


136  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1900 

racy  and  democracy.  All  the  questions  under  discussion 
will,  in  their  last  analysis,  disclose  the  conflict  between 
the  dollar  and  the  man."  Later  on  he  came  to  details. 
"  To-day,"  he  wrote,  "  three  questions  contest  for  primacy 
—  the  money  question,  the  trust  question  and  imperial 
ism."  *  In  placing  the  money  question  to  the  fore,  Bryan 
displayed  greater  consistency  than  wisdom,  but  as  he 
had  made  the  contest  of  1896  on  the  remonetization  of 
silver  on  the  basis  of  16  : 1,  he  was  determined  that  the 
question  should  not  now  be  ignored.  He  dominated 
the  committee  on  resolutions  and  the  Convention  in  Kan 
sas  City.  They  therefore  demanded  the  "free  and  un 
limited  coinage  of  silver  ...  at  the  present  legal  ratio 
of  16  : 1  without  waiting  for  the  aid  or  consent  of  any  other 
nation" ;  but  in  an  earlier  resolution  they  declared  that 
"the  burning  issue  of  imperialism"  was  the  paramount 
one  of  the  campaign. 

On  the  first  ballot  Bryan  was  unanimously  nominated 
for  President  and  at  Indianapolis  on  August  8  accepted 
the  nomination  in  what  he  regarded  "as  one  of  the  most 
if  not  the  most  important  of  his  political  speeches."  The 
speech  in  the  authorized  volume  "revised  and  arranged 
by  himself"  is  entitled  "Imperialism"  and  is  mainly 
devoted  to  the  Republican  management  of  the  Philip 
pines. 

The  Philippine  Islands  were  acquired  as  the  result  of 
the  Treaty  with  Spain  and  it  was  a  well-known  fact  that 
the  Treaty  could  not  have  been  ratified  without  Demo 
cratic  votes.  This  is  tersely  stated  by  Senator  Hoar  in 
his  Autobiography.  "Seventeen  of  the  followers  of  Mr. 


Pp.  753,  758. 


CH.  VI.]  WILLIAM   J.  BRYAN  137 

Bryan  voted  for  the  Treaty.1  The  Treaty  would  have 
been  defeated,  not  only  lacking  the  needful  two-thirds 
but  by  a  majority  of  the  Senate  but  for  the  votes  of  Dem 
ocrats  and  Populists.  Mr.  Bryan  in  the  height  of  the 
contest  came  to  Washington  for  the  express  purpose  of 
urging  upon  his  followers  that  it  was  best  to  support  the 
Treaty,  end  the  war,  and  let  the  question  of  what  should 
be  done  with  our  conquest  be  settled  in  the  coming  cam 
paign."  2  In  his  speech  on  "  Imperialism,"  Bryan  ac 
knowledged  the  truth  of  this  statement,  defended  his 
position  in  a  careful  argument,  and  then  addressed  him 
self  to  the  question,  What  should  we  do  with  the  Philip 
pines  ?  He  and  the  Democratic  party  say,  treat  the  Fili 
pinos  as  we  have  promised  to  treat  the  Cubans.  Why 
ought  not  the  Filipinos  "of  right  to  be  free  and  indepen 
dent"  as  well  as  the  Cubans?  Admiral  Dewey  reported 
that  the  Filipinos  were  more  capable  of  self-government 
than  the  Cubans,  and  Bryan  stated  plainly  his  purpose. 
"If  elected,"  he  said,  "I  will  convene  Congress  in  ex 
traordinary  session  as  soon  as  inaugurated  and  recommend 
an  immediate  declaration  of  the  nation's  purpose,  first, 
to  establish  a  stable  form  of  government  in  the  Philippine 
Islands,  just  as  we  are  now  establishing  a  stable  form  of 
government  in  Cuba;  second,  to  give  independence  to 
the  Filipinos  as  we  have  promised  to  give  independence 
to  the  Cubans ;  third,  to  protect  the  Filipinos  from  out 
side  interference  while  they  work  out  their  destiny  just 
as  we  have  protected  the  republics  of  Central  and  South 
America,  and  are,  by  the  Monroe  Doctrine  pledged  to 


Ten  of  these  were  Democrats. 

ii.  322.     This  has  been  briefly  stated  in  chap.  v. 


138  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1900 

protect  Cuba/' 1      Bryan  enforced  his  argument  by  a 
poetical  citation : 

"  Would  we  tread  in  the  paths  of  tyranny, 
Nor  reckon  the  tyrant's  cost? 
Who  taketh  another's  liberty 
His  freedom  is  also  lost. 
Would  we  win  as  the  strong  have  ever  won, 
Make  ready  to  pay  the  debt, 
For  the  God  who  reigned  over  Babylon 
Is  the  God  who  is  reigning  yet." 2 

The  important  printed  contributions  to  the  campaign 
are  this  speech  of  Bryan's  and  McKinley's  letter  of  ac 
ceptance  of  September  8 ;  of  this  two-thirds  are  devoted 
to  the  Philippines  and  a  defence  of  his  management.  The 
letter  is  in  effect  a  reply  to  the  speech  and  on  the  whole 
may  be  deemed  an  effective  answer.  The  majority  of 
voters  probably  thought  so,  although  the  quotable  por 
tions  of  McKinley's  speech  of  July  12  may  have  had  the 
greater  influence.  We  have  fulfilled  the  pledges  we  made 
in  1896,  he  declared,  "We  have  prosperity  at  home  and 
prestige  abroad,"  yet  by  the  action  of  the  Democratic 
party,  "the  menace  of  16:1  still  hangs  over  us.  The 
Philippines  are  ours  and  American  authority  must  be 
supreme  throughout  the  archipelago.  .  .  .  There  must  be 
no  scuttle  policy."  "No  blow  has  been  struck  except  for 
liberty  and  humanity  and  none  will  be."  The  Republi 
can  party  "broke  the  shackles  of  4,000,000  slaves "  and  now 
it  has  liberated  10,000,000  "from  the  yoke  of  imperial 
ism."  3  Kipling's  words  represent  McKinley's  action : 


Speeches,  ii.  46. 

2  In  a  courteous  letter  to  D.  M.  Matteson,  William  J.  Bryan  says  the 
citation  was  from  a  poem  written  by  James  A.  Edgerton. 

3  Official  Proceedings,  pp.  148,  149,  150. 


CH.  VI.]  THE  CONTEST  OF   1900  139 

"Take  up  the  White  Man's  burden  .  .  . 


By  open  speech  and  simple 
An  hundred  times  made  plain, 
To  seek  another's  profit, 
And  work  another's  gain." 

The  decisive  jury  was  the  thirteen  and  a  half  million 
voters.  The  logical  result  of  Democratic  policy  was  to 
turn  over  the  Philippines  to  Aguinaldo  and  his  associates, 
and  there  were  many  who  thought  as  did  Senator  Lodge, 
the  permanent  chairman  of  the  Republican  convention, 
that  Aguinaldo  was  "a  self-seeking  adventurer  and 
usurper."  While  the  bloody  suppression  of  the  Philip 
pine  rebellion  militated  against  Republican  success,  there 
seemed  no  other  way  out.  Even  if  we  had  an  undesir 
able  acquisition,  it  was  ours  and  our  authority  must  be 
preserved. 

McKinley  and  Hay,  who  took  an  eager  though  imper 
sonal  1  view  of  the  contest,  were  solicitous  that  Hanna 
should  continue  as  chairman  of  the  Republican  National 
Committee  and,  when  he  decided  to  do  so,  the  President 
wrote  to  him:  "I  am  delighted  that  you  have  accepted 
the  chairmanship  of  the  National  Committee.  It  is  a 
great  task  and  will  be  to  you  a  great  sacrifice."  2  As  we 
see  it  now,  the  election  of  McKinley  appeared  a  foregone 
conclusion,  but  during  the  canvass  there  was  anxiety 
among  the  knowing  ones.  On  September  25  Hay  wrote 
to  Henry  Adams :  "  Hanna  has  been  crying  wolf  all  sum 
mer,  and  he  has  been  much  derided  for  his  fears,  but  now 
everybody  shares  them.  Bryan  comes  out  a  frank  an 
archist  again  in  his  letter  of  acceptance ;  and  Mitchell 


1  See  letter  to  Samuel  Mather,  Life  by  Thayer,  ii.  254.         J  Croly,  319. 


140  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1900 

with  his  coal  strike  has  thrown  at  least  a  hundred  thou 
sand  votes  to  him."  l  The  anthracite  coal  strike  dis 
turbed  Hanna  and  he  used  his  influence  with  the  coal 
operators  to  get  it  settled  before  election.2 

Hanna  was  unquestionably  the  chief  man  on  the  Re 
publican  side.  All  of  his  executive  ability  and  his  knack 
at  raising  money  were  exercised  in  behalf  of  his  candi 
date  and  party.  So  far,  it  was  1896  over  again,  but  he 
had  learned  to  make  effective  speeches  on  the  stump  and, 
as  he  was  much  in  demand  from  the  several  committees, 
he  appeared  before  many  audiences  throughout  the  coun 
try.  The  burden  of  his  talk  was  that  Republican  suc 
cess  and  administration  had  given  prosperity  to  the  man 
ufacturer,  merchant  and  financier,  and  the  full  dinner 
pail  to  the  laborer.  His  more  effective  work  was  through 
his  personality.  Westerners  beyond  Ohio  had  the  idea 
that  he  was  a  "  bloated  millionaire, "  and  when  they  came 
to  see  a  man  of  easy  bearing,  of  democratic  ways,  placing 
himself  on  a  par  with  the  common  man  and  hear  his  rough 
speech  adapted  to  their  easy  comprehension,  they  were 
converted  to  the  Hanna  cult.  "This  trip,"  wrote  Croly 
with  singular  penetration,  "helped  to  make  Mr.  Hanna 
personally  popular  throughout  the  West,  just  as  his  first 
stumping  tour  in  Ohio  had  made  him  personally  popular 
in  his  own  State.  As  soon  as  he  became  known,  the  vir 
ulence  and  malignity  with  which  he  had  been  abused 
reacted  in  his  favor.  When  he  appeared  on  the  platform, 
the  crowd,  instead  of  seeing  a  monster,  found  him  to  be 
just  the  kind  of  man  whom  Americans  best  understand 


1  Letters  Privately  Printed,  iii.  196. 

1  Croly,  328;   The  Nation,  Nov.  1,  1900,  342. 


CH.  VI.]  MARK  HANNA  141 

and  most  heartily  like.  He  was  not  separated  from  them 
by  differences  of  standards  and  tastes  or  by  any  intellec 
tual  or  professional  sophistication.  The  roughness  of 
much  of  his  public  speaking  and  its  lack  of  form  which 
makes  it  comparatively  poor  reading,  were  an  essential 
part  of  its  actual  success.  He  stamped  himself  on  his 
speeches  just  as  he  had  stamped  himself  upon  his  busi 
ness.  His  audiences  had  to  pass  judgment  on  the  man 
more  than  on  the  message  and  the  man  could  not  but 
look  good  to  them.'7  1 

"I  have  never  wondered,"  said  Senator  Dolliver  of  Iowa, 
"as  so  many  have,  that  Hanna  suddenly  developed  into  a 
great  orator.  ...  I  was  present  in  1900  at  the  stock  yards 
in  Chicago  when  I  had  a  glimpse  of  the  colossal  personal 
ity  of  this  man  which  made  a  very  profound  impression 
on  my  mind.  We  took  him  down  there  to  speak  to  the 
working  people  of  Chicago,  and  curiously  enough  —  a 
very  strange  anomaly  under  institutions  like  ours  —  a 
large  part  of  the  audience  had  assembled  there,  not  to 
listen  to  him  but  to  prevent  him  from  speaking ;  and 
with  noise,  riot,  tumult,  disturbance,  and  breach  of  peace 
.  .  .  that  surging  multitude  for  one  hour  and  thirty 
minutes  fought  an  unequal  battle  with  the  genius  of  a 
single  man ;  and  at  10  o'clock,  the  audience  calmed,  con 
trolled,  fascinated,  he  began  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
political  speeches  it  was  ever  my  good  fortune  to  hear."  2 

Next  in  importance  was  Roosevelt's  stumping.  If  we 
may  judge  his  speeches  by  his  letter  of  acceptance,  he 
defended  Republican  policy  and  administration.  He  in 
sisted  that  the  remonetization  of  silver  meant  disaster, 


1  P.  340.  2  Address,  April  7,  1904. 


142  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1900 

and  that  our  acquisition  of  new  provinces  was  in  the  line 
of  national  development;  it  meant  expansion  and  not 
" imperialism  or  militarism."  1  He  added  strength  to  the 
ticket  and  his  appearance  and  manner  increased  his  strong 
personal  popularity.  "His  attitude  as  speaker,"  wrote 
Thayer,  "his  gestures,  the  way  in  which  his  pent-up 
thoughts  seemed  almost  to  strangle  him  before  he  could 
utter  them,  his  smile  showing  the  white  rows  of  teeth, 
his  fist  clenched  as  if  to  strike  an  invisible  adversary, 
the  sudden  dropping  of  his  voice,  and  levelling  of  his  fore 
finger  as  he  became  almost  conversational  in  tone,  and 
seemed  to  address  special  individuals  in  the  crowd  before 
him,  the  strokes  of  sarcasm,  stern  and  cutting,  and  the 
swift  flashes  of  humor  which  set  the  great  multitude  in 
a  roar,  became  in  that  summer  and  autumn  familiar  to 
millions  of  his  countrymen;  and  the  cartoonists  made 
his  features  and  gestures  familiar  to  many  other  millions."  2 
As  was  the  case  four  years  previously,  Bryan  was  in 
defatigable  on  the  stump.  By  his  and  the  Democratic 
criticism  of  the  Republican  management  of  the  Philip 
pines,  he  gained  the  support  of  the  anti-Imperialists,  at 
the  head  of  whom  was  Carl  Schurz,  but  as  The  Nation 
remarked  on  another  occasion,  "Those  who  sup  with  the 
devil,  even  with  a  long  spoon,  are  sure  to  have  to  swallow 
a  nauseous  portion  at  the  end."  3  Bryan  had  the  cordial 
support  of  Tammany  Hall  and  showed  his  appreciation 
of  it  when  he  came  to  New  York,  declaring  "Great  is 
Tammany !  And  Croker  is  its  prophet."  This  disgusted 
Carl  Schurz,  who  wrote,  "Bah !  Wasn't  it  awful !"  4 


1  Official  Proceedings,  180. 

2  Roosevelt,  151.  l  June  28,  1900. 
4  Reminiscences,  iii.  447. 


CH.  VI.]  THE  ELECTION  OF   1900  143 

Despite  the  strength  of  the  cause  and  the  candidates, 
there  will  be  hours  of  depression  among  those  destined 
to  victory.  While  1900  must  be  put  down  as  a  year  of 
prosperity,  there  were  weeks  when  business  halted  owing 
partly  to  a  reaction  from  the  flush  times  of  1899,  partly 
to  the  depression  usual  in  a  presidential  year  and  partly 
to  a  real  alarm  by  financiers  at  the  prospect  of  Bryan's 
success.  His  policy  was  distrusted  and  his  administra 
tive  power  feared.  This  feeling  is  well  reflected  in  John 
Hay's  private  letter  of  October  31 :  "This  last  week  of 
the  campaign  is  getting  on  everybody's  nerves.  There 
is  a  vague  uneasiness  among  Republicans,  which  there 
is  nothing  in  the  elaborate  canvasses  of  the  Committee 
to  account  for.  I  do  not  believe  defeat  to  be  possible, 
though  it  is  evident  that  this  last  month  of  Bryan,  roar 
ing  out  his  desperate  appeals  to  hate  and  envy,  is  having 
its  effect  on  the  dangerous  classes. >M  Also  Hay  wrote  to 
Henry  Adams  on  the  same  day,  "Our  folks  are  curiously 
nervous  about  next  Tuesday.  The  canvass  is  all  right  - 
the  betting  also.  But  nobody  knows  what  Jack  Cade 
may  do."  2 

Forty-five  States  voted  on  November  6,  giving  McKinley 
292  electoral  votes  to  Bryan's  155,  and  a  plurality 
in  the  popular  vote  of  849,000,  —  the  greatest  Republi 
can  victory  since  1872.3  Bryan  carried  only  four  North 
ern  States,  Colorado,  Idaho,  Montana  and  Nevada; 
as  compared  with  1896  he  lost  his  own  State  of  Nebraska, 
Kansas,  Utah,  Washington,  South  Dakota  and  Wyoming. 


1  To  Samuel  Mather,  Life  of  Hay,  Thayer,  ii.  256. 
1  Letters  Privately  Printed,  iii.  201. 

1  Grant  in  1872  had  a  greater  percentage  of  the  popular  vote.     In  1896 
Kentucky  gave  McKinley  12  of  her  13  votes.     All  went  to  Bryan  in  1900. 


144  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1900 

Hanna  and  Roosevelt  undoubtedly  contributed  to  the 
result  west  of  the  Missouri  River. 

By  McKinley's  reelection  in  1900,  wrote  Croly,  "The 
Republicans  had  received  a  clear  mandate  to  govern  the 
country  in  the  interest  of  business  expansion. "  r  J.  Pier- 
pont  Morgan,  with  his  great  reputation  of  railroad  re- 
organizer  as  well  as  banker,  now  turned  his  attention  to 
the  iron  and  steel  business,  where  it  was  thought  his  facul 
ties  would  have  full  play.  Under  the  regime  of  competi 
tion,  men  bid  against  one  another  for  trade.  Pig  iron 
manufacturers  were  eager  for  the  custom  of  the  steel 
mills,  who  in  turn  sought  to  sell  to  the  railroads.  Con 
fining  our  attention  to  the  period  from  the  close  of  the 
Civil  War  to  1900,  fluctuations  had  been  great.  A  glut 
of  pig  iron  naturally  induced  low  prices,  a  large  capacity 
for  the  manufacture  of  steel  resulted  in  the  enterprising 
managers  bidding  against  one  another  for  whatever  trade 
was  in  sight.  Fostered  by  the  "hard  times"  following 
the  panic  of  1873,  long-headed  men  developed  the  manu 
facture  of  /'  special  ties"  in  steel,  but  every  pound  so  made 
took  the  place  of  the  same  quantity  of  iron  with  the  re 
sult  that  mills  devoted  exclusively  to  iron  could  not  in 
dull  periods  make  the  two  ends  meet.  Failures  came 
and  the  list  of  bankruptcies  in  the  iron  trade  was  appall 
ing.  It  was  always  a  "feast  or  a  famine"  was  a  common 
expression  and  the  hard  years  were  followed  by  the  "Ben- 
ner  boom"  of  1879  when  prices  went  beyond  all  reason. 
This,  with  less  violent  fluctuations  after  1881,  was  the 
history  of  the  iron  trade  to  the  panic  of  1893.  Requiring 
large  capital  and  managing  ability,  the  number  of  steel 


1  Life  of  Hanna,  341. 


CH.  VI]  MORGAN  —  CARNEGIE  145 

mills  was  not  large,  but  the  feeling  among  them  was  not 
harmonious  unless  the  common  dislike  of  all  the  others 
for  Andrew  Carnegie  and  his  methods  might  draw  them 
together  in  sympathy.  Between  1893  and  1900  a  pro 
cess  of  consolidation  had  been  going  on  so  that  a  large 
part  of  the  steel  business  of  the  country  had  become  cen 
tred  in  seven  concerns  outside  of  the  Carnegie  Steel 
Company.  The  consolidation  was  effected  by  promoters 
and  " water"  was  a  component  part  of  all  of  the  common 
and  preferred  stocks  which  made  up  the  capitalization. 
The  rebound  from  the  panic  of  1893  made  easy  the 
flotation  of  these  securities  and  in  some  of  the  concerns 
Morgan  had  an  interest.  The  question  arose  after  the 
election  outcome  of  1900,  Could  not  these  seven  be  united 
into  one  concern?  and  with  one  accord  it  seemed  to  be 
agreed  that  Morgan  was  the  man  to  finance  the  enter 
prise.  Attracted  to  it,  he  went  to  work  and  soon  had 
under  way  the  combination  of  the  seven,  which  would 
have  been  a  huge  concern  with  the  Carnegie  Steel  Com 
pany  its  chief  opponent.1 

Andrew  Carnegie  came  from  Scotland  to  America  as 
a  poor  boy  and  got  a  job  in  a  cotton  mill  in  Allegheny 
City  at  the  wage  of  $1.20  per  week.  He  told  of  his  ex 
perience  :  "For  a  lad  of  twelve  to  rise  and  breakfast  every 
morning,  except  the  blessed  Sunday  morning,  and  go  into 
the  streets  and  find  his  way  to  the  factory  and  begin  to 
work  while  it  was  still  dark  outside  and  not  be  released  un 
til  after  darkness  came  again  in  the  evening,  forty  minutes 

1  A  convenient  list  of  these  seven  plus  the  Carnegie  Steel  Co.,  the  Ameri 
can  Bridge  Co.,  and  the  Lake  Superior  Consolidated  Iron  Mines  is  given 
by  Cotter,  22.  See  likewise  Berglund,  102.  "The  American  Bridge  Co., 
and  the  Lake  Superior  Consolidated  Iron  Mines  entered  the  Steel  Cor 
poration  soon  after  its  organization." 


146  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1900 

only  being  allowed  at  noon,  was  a  terrible  task."  *  At 
fourteen  he  became  a  messenger  boy  in  a  telegraph  office, 
attracted  the  attention  of  Thomas  A.  Scott  who  asked 
him  to  be  his  "  clerk  and  operator/'  Scott  took  a  fancy 
to  Carnegie  and  suggested  investments,  so  that  he  de 
veloped  into  what  his  boy  friends  termed  a  "  capitalist." 
When  Scott  became  Vice-President  of  the  Pennsylvania 
Railroad,  Carnegie  became  superintendent  of  the  Pitts- 
burg  division  and  remained  for  a  number  of  years  in  the 
service  of  this  great  company.  Prospering  in  his  invest 
ments  he  organized  the  Keystone  Bridge  Works,  which 
was  among  the  first,  if  not  the  first,  to  construct  success 
ful  iron  bridges.2  Thus,  becoming  a  business  man,  work 
ing  on  his  own  account,  he  resigned  his  position  on  the 
Pennsylvania  Railroad,  and  devoted  his  attention  first 
to  the  making  of  pig  iron  and  then  by  a  natural  develop 
ment  to  the  manufacture  of  steel.  Financial  vicissitudes, 
differences  with  partners,  manufacturing  difficulties  had 
to  be  overcome,  but  in  1900  he  was  the  greatest  steel 
maker  in  the  world  and  could  produce  steel  rails  cheaper 
than  anywhere  else  on  earth.  His  history  has  been  told 
in  an  unsympathetic  yet  truthful  way  by  J.  H.  Bridge, 
who  had  been  private  secretary  of  Herbert  Spencer  and 
literary  assistant  to  Carnegie  himself ;  yet  from  a  careful 
reading  of  this  book  one  cannot  be  otherwise  than  con 
vinced  that,  in  this  day  of  material  progress,  Carnegie 
was  a  great  man. 

Carnegie's  faults  were  those  of  many  self-made  men 
and  lay  on  the  surface.     He  was  egotistical  and  con- 


1  The  Gospel  of  Wealth,  x.     "The  hours  hung  heavily  upon  me  and  in 
the  work  itself  I  took  no  pleasure."  —  Carnegie's  Autobiography,  34. 
8  See  Carnegie's  Autobiography,  115,  122. 


CH.  VI.]  ANDREW   CARNEGIE  147 

ceited  and  had  an  opinion  dogmatically  expressed  on 
many  subjects  on  which  confessed  ignorance  would  have 
been  better.  Apparently  without  reverence  for  those 
who  had  made  study  the  pursuit  of  a  lifetime,  he  took 
issue  with  Greek  scholars  on  the  desirability  of  a  study 
of  Greek;  and  there  was  scarcely  a  subject  in  English 
or  American  politics  as  to  which  he  had  not  a  positive 
opinion.  Dispensing  a  generous  hospitality  from  his 
Scotch  retreat  of  Skibo  Castle  he  was  much  run  after 
for  contributions  to  all  sort  of  enterprises.  This  phase 
of  his  life  is  well  represented  in  a  contemporary  cartoon.1 
Was  it  not  humiliating,  said  an  observer,  "to  see  people 
in  a  London  drawing-room  cringing  before  him  in  order 
to  get  a  cheque?"  But  it  was  no  better  in  the  United 
States,  where  he  was  besieged  by  all  sorts  of  men 
for  money  contributions  to  their  favorite  enterprises. 
"With  sincerity,"  said  Confucius,  "unite  a  desire  for 
self -culture."  Carnegie  was  sincere.  "The  man  who 
dies  rich,  dies  disgraced,"  he  wrote  in  1899.2  He  was  not 
then  rolling  in  superabundant  wealth,  but  when  he  pos 
sessed  it  after  the  event  I  am  about  to  relate  he  carried 
out  his  dictum  of  years  before.  That  he  had  a  desire 
for  self-culture  is  evident  from  his  reading  of  books  which 
he  displayed  in  his  writings  and  from  his  benefactions. 
When  he  was  a  working-boy  in  Pittsburg  he  had  con 
stant  recourse  to  a  free  library,  and  he  told  of  his  "in 
tense  longing"  for  a  new  book.  "I  resolved,"  he  wrote, 
"that  if  ever  wealth  came  to  me,  it  should  be  used  to 
establish  free  libraries."  3  The  Anglo-Saxon  world  knows 
how  well  this  resolution  was  carried  out. 


1  Cleveland  Plain  Dealer;    Cosmopolitan  Mag.,  Sept.  1901. 

2  The  Gospel  of  Wealth,  19.  » Ibid.,  28. 


148  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  (1900 

Such  was  Andrew  Carnegie,  the  poor  boy,  the  great 
manufacturer  of  steel  and  after  1901  the  possessor  of  two 
hundred  and  fifty  millions.  Of  course  he  was  helped  by 
the  high  tariff  and  he  took  advantage  of  all  the  condi 
tions  in  the  country  that  he  had  made  his  own. 
d  Men  may  poke  fun  at  him  because  he  wrote,  "I  sym 
pathize  with  the  rich  man's  boy  and  congratulate  the 
poor  man's  boy/'  for  most  of  the  " immortals"  have  been 
born  to  "the  precious  heritage  of  poverty,"  l  but  it 
was  the  sincere  observation  of  a  poor  boy,  who  during 
his  life  had  amassed  millions. 

We  now  return  to  the  organization  of  the  United  States 
Steel  Corporation  in  which  were  displayed  some  of  Mor 
gan's  best  and  doubtful  qualities.  He  was  keen  enough 
to  see  that  the  Carnegie  Steel  Company  must  be  in  the 
combination  and  while  Carnegie  was  desirous  of  selling, 
the  Scotchman  was  determined  to  get  a  good  price.  His 
policy  of  threat  was  effectually  used.  According  to  Bridge, 
he  wrought  through  a  "press  agent"  and  by  newspaper 
interviews.  It  was  given  out  that  owing  to  a  dis 
agreement  with  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  he  would 
give  all  possible  business  to  the  railroad  running  from 
Pittsburg  to  Conneaut,  the  Lake  Erie  terminus,  and 
would  also  take  advantage  of  the  cheap  water  transporta 
tion.  Striking  thus  directly  at  the  Pennsylvania  Rail 
road,  he  also  threatened  to  build  at  Conneaut  the  largest 


1  The  Gospel  of  Wealth,  xii.  In  his  Autobiography,  31,  Carnegie  gave 
a  charming  picture  of  the  life  of  his  family  after  they  had  left  Scotland 
and  settled  in  Allegheny  City  and  then  wrote:  "The  children  of  honest 
poverty  have  the  most  precious  of  all  advantages  over  those  of  wealth. 
The  mother,  nurse,  cook,  governess,  teacher,  saint,  all  in  one ;  the  father, 
exemplar,  guide,  counsellor  and  friend !  Thus  were  my  brother  and  I 
brought  up.  What  has  the  child  of  millionaire  or  nobleman  that  counts 
compared  to  such  a  heritage?" 


CH.  VI.]  ANDREW  CARNEGIE  149 

and  best  equipped  tube  works  in  the  country,  giving  a 
direct  blow  to  Morgan  who  was  largely  interested  in  the 
National  Tube  Company,  one  of  the  combining  concerns. 
It  was  likewise  well  known  that  the  Carnegie  Steel  Com 
pany  could  make  steel  cheaper  than  any  other  company 
in  the  world.  Carnegie  had  his  price  which  Morgan,  with 
apparently  little  hesitation,  paid.  It  was  said  at  the  time 
that  the  canny  Scotchman  had  outwitted  the  New  Eng 
land  Yankee.  Thus  the  so-called  " billion  dollar  trust" 
was  launched.  It  consisted  of  550  million  common  stock, 
550  million  preferred,  and  304  million l  5  per  cent  bonds ; 
all  of  the  bonds  went  to  the  Carnegie  Steel  Company 
of  which  Andrew  Carnegie  got  the  lion's  share.  The 
Carnegie  Steel  Company  also  received  $98,277,120  in 
preferred  stock  and  $90,279,040  in  common  stock  at  par. 
Reckoning  the  bonds  of  $303,450,000  worth  one  hundred 
cents  on  the  dollar,  the  preferred  stock  at  82  and  the 
common  stock  at  38,  the  Carnegie  Steel  Company  re 
ceived  $418,343,273  for  their  property.  It  was  no  won 
der  then  that  Andrew  Carnegie  was  counted  worth  $250,- 
000,000. 

The  other  combining  companies  2  took  stock.  Of  the 
1,100,000,000  stock  all  of  the  common  and  some  of  the 
preferred  was  " water" ;  but  as  there  was  an  abundance 
of  " water"  in  the  combining  companies,  the  increase 
of  stock  and  the  increase  of  " water"  do  not  seem  to  have 
been  objected  to.  For  their  services  the  Morgan  syndi 
cate  received  649,897  shares  of  the  common  stock  of  the 


1  Probably  $303,450,000.     There  were  also  about  56  million  of  bonds 
owned  by  the  combining  companies  which  the  U.  S.  Steel  Corporation 
assumed.     Berglund,  71. 

2  See  again  Cotter,  22 ;  Berglund,  102. 


150  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1901 

United  States  Steel  Corporation  and  an  equal  number 
of  the  preferred.  At  $38  a  share  for  the  common 
and  $82  a  share  for  the  preferred,  this  amounted  to 
$77,987,640.  This  was  all  effected  on  a  cash  capital  of 
25  millions,  which  the  syndicate  received  back,  plus  200 
per  cent  in  dividends.1  Although  J.  P.  Morgan  himself 
never  speculated  in  the  way  of  buying  or  selling  stocks 
on  a  margin,  he  comprehended  the  stock  market  well 
and  engaged  a  celebrated  manipulator  to  market  the 
shares,  which  were  put  upon  the  market  as  paying  div 
idends  of  four  per  cent  on  the  common  and  seven  per 
cent  on  the  preferred.  Starting  on  the  curb  at  38  for 
"steel  common"  and  82|  for  "steel  preferred,"  these 
stocks  were  soon  admitted  on  the  Stock  Exchange  and 
within  a  month  advanced  to  55  and  1011  respectively, 
although  perhaps  considerable  of  this  advance  was  due 
merely  to  "matching  of  orders."  2 

It  was  popularly  supposed  that  the  United  States  Steel 
Corporation  possessed  about  two-thirds  of  the  Lake  Su 
perior  iron  ore  and  Connellsville  coal  of  the  country,  al 
though  the  actual  figures  of  production  do  not  substan 
tiate  the  popular  belief.  In  the  four  years,  1902-1905 
inclusive,  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation  shipped 
56  per  cent  of  the  Lake  Superior  ore,  produced  36  per 
cent  of  the  Connellsville  coke,  70  per  cent  of  Bessemer 
steel  ingots,  60  per  cent  of  Bessemer  steel  rails  and  51  per 
cent  of  open  hearth  steel  ingots  and  castings.  There  was 
naturally  some  efficiency  in  operation  by  bringing  so  many 
plants  under  one  head  and  management,  and  there  was 


1  American  Finance,  Noyes,  300 ;  Life  of  Morgan,  Hovey,  216. 
'Noyes,  300. 


CH.  VI.]          THE  UNITED  STATES  STEEL  CORPORATION  151 

a  praiseworthy  effort  to  get  workingmen,  superintend 
ents  and  other  employe's  interested  in  the  Company  by 
selling  them  shares  at  lucrative  rates.  The  United  States 
Steel  Corporation  constantly  stabilized  prices.  After  its 
formation  there  was  no  violent  enhancement  of  values 
during  a  time  of  "boom, "  no  "  runaway  market"  in  steel. 
On  the  other  hand,  during  times  of  depression,  prices 
never  went  below  what  would  give  a  fair  profit. 

The  distribution  of  interests  by  Jupiter  does  not  work 
in  our  common  world  and  did  not  under  Morgan.  In 
short,  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation  was  too  big 
for  effective  work.  As  Morgan  discovered,  it  is  exceed 
ingly  difficult  to  find  a  man  of  sufficient  ability  and  char 
acter  to  head  so  large  a  concern.  His  first  efforts  were 
failures  and  while  the  present l  "chief  executive  officer," 
Judge  Elbert  H.  Gary,  is  a  decided  success,  it  is  doubtful 
whether  his  successor  will  possess  his  eminent  qualities. 
But  at  no  time  has  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation 
made  steel  absolutely  or  comparatively  as  cheap  as  did 
the  Carnegie  Steel  Company  just  before  the  combination 
was  made.  Carnegie  said  that  "his  partners  knew  noth 
ing  about  making  stocks  and  bonds  but  only  the  mak 
ing  of  steel."  The  difference  lies  in  the  combination  of 
companies  and  the  adjustment  of  interests  with  a  sharp 
ened  pencil  on  a  writing  pad  in  a  Wall  Street  office  and 
presence  at  the  works  among  the  men  where  steel  is 
turned  out.  Charles  M.  Schwab,  the  first  President 
of  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation,  in  New  York 


*  1920. 

2  Trusts  of  To-Day,  Montague,  37.  "America  is  soon  to  change 
from  being  the  dearest  steel  manufacturing  country  to  the  cheapest."  — 
Written  before  the  sale  to  J.  P.  Morgan.  Autobiography  of  Andrew 
Carnegie,  227. 


152  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1901 

City  and  Europe,  was  a  different  Schwab  from  him 
who,  in  the  grime  and  dirt  of  Pittsburg,  administered 
the  affairs  of  the  Carnegie  Steel  Company.  "  Schwab 
had  graduated  at  Braddock  under  Captain  Jones 
and,  displaying  exceptional  ability  as  a  manager  of  men, 
had  quickly  won  his  way  from  one  of  the  lowest  posi 
tions  in  the  yards  to  the  highest  in  the  office.  His 
cheery  friendliness  made  him  especially  popular  among 
the  workmen."  L  Anyone  who  knew  personally  William 
R.  Jones,  or  as  he  was  familiarly  called,  Captain  Bill 
Jones,  and  what  he  stood  for,  may  well  join  in  this 
tribute  which  Bridge  paid  him:  " Greater  than  all  of 
Jones's  inventions  was  his  progressive  policy.  .  .  .  The 
young  men  whom  he  trained  ably  seconded  him.  .  .  . 
The  famous  scrap  heap  for  outgrown,  not  outworn, 
machinery  was  instituted  by  Jones,  who  never  hesi 
tated  to  throw  away  a  tool  that  had  cost  half  a  mil 
lion  if  a  better  one  became  available.  And  as  his  own 
inventions  saved  the  company  a  fortune  every  year,  he 
was  given  a  free  hand.  Under  this  greatest  of  all  the 
captains  of  the  American  steel  industry  [Jones]  a  group 
of  younger  men  grew  up,  trained  in  his  broad  views  and 
habituated  to  his  progressive  methods ;  so  that  when  in 
1889  he  was  killed  in  a  horribly  tragic  way  by  the  ex 
plosion  of  one  of  his  furnaces,  there  were  men  ready  trained 
to  take  up  his  work  and  continue  it."  2  Carnegie  said 
that  he  owed  his  success  to  Jones  and  to  Schwab ; 3  and 


1  Bridge,  245.  Schwab  wrote,  July  24,  1919,  on  his  photograph  which 
is  reproduced  in  Carnegie's  Autobiography  opposite  256:  "To  my  dear 
est  friend  and  '  Master '  with  the  sincere  love  of  '  His  Boy.'  " 

*  Bridge,  105. 

3  Cotter,  89.  "  Jones,"  so  wrote  Andrew  Carnegie  in  his  Autobiogra 
phy,  "bore  traces  of  his  Welsh  descent.  .  .  .  He  came  to  us  a  two-dollar- 


CH.  VI.]  ANDREW  CARNEGIE  153 

he  once  suggested  for  his  epitaph,  "Here  lies  the  man 
who  knew  how  to  get  around  him  men  who  were  cleverer 
than  himself."  l  He  said,  "The  nation  that  makes  the 
cheapest  steel  has  the  other  nations  at  its  feet."  Hen- 
drick  also  affirmed  that  Carnegie  did  not  like  "this  Wall 
Street  coterie."  3  What  a  pity  that,  with  his  desire  to 
get  out  of  business,  such  inducements  were  offered  that 
he  must  perforce  go  in  with  them !  For  the  United  States 
Steel  Corporation  has  never  been  the  asset  for  the  coun 
try  that  the  Carnegie  Steel  Company  was  or  might  have 
been.  Carnegie  in  the  United  States  was  greater  than 
Krupp  in  Germany.  The  one  made  the  implements  of 
peace ;  the  other  was  skilful  in  the  production  of  neces 
saries  of  war.  Carnegie  had  a  fit  successor  in  Henry 
Clay  Frick  to  carry  on  his  work  while  he  might  have  de 
voted  himself  to  his  noble  benefactions.  Unfortunately 
however,  the  two  had  quarrelled. 

While  the  Carnegie  foibles  are  apparent,  he  was  ahead 
of  his  age  in  his  devotion  to  "gentle  Peace."  How  much 
he  thought  of  it,  why  the  world  ought  to  have  it,  why 


a-day  mechanic  from  the  neighboring  works  at  Johnstown.  .  .  .  He 
had  volunteered  as  a  private  during  The  Civil  War  and  carried  himself 
so  finely  that  he  became  captain  of  a  company  which  was  never  known 
to  flinch.  Much  of  the  success  of  the  Edgar  Thomson  Works  belongs  to 
this  man."  In  later  years,  Carnegie  offered  him  an  interest  which  would 
have  made  him  a  millionaire  without  entailing  any  financial  responsi 
bility.  This  Jones  declined  saying,  "No,  I  don't  want  to  have  my 
thoughts  running  on  business.  I  have  enough  trouble  looking  after  these 
works.  Just  give  me  a  big  salary  if  you  think  I  am  worth  it."  "All  right, 
Captain,  the  salary  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  is  yours." 
"  That's  the  talk,"  rejoined  Jones.  P.  203. 

"Captain  Jones  described  me  as  having  been  born  with  two  rows  of 
teeth  and  holes  punched  for  more,  so  insatiable  was  my  appetite  for  new 
works  and  increased  production."  -—  Ibid.,  112. 

1  The  Age  of  Big  Business,  B.  J.  Hendrick,  68. 

8  The  Age  of  Big  Business,  Hendrick,  60.  3  P.  81. 


154  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1901 

war  was  the  worst  of  evils,  are  amply  testified  to  in  his 
writings,  private  letters,  expressed  desires  and  by  his 
benefactions.  No  wonder  then  that  the  great  war  of 
1914  broke  his  heart.1 

Different  from  Carnegie,  J.  P.  Morgan  had  inherited 
wealth  and  a  good  education ;  he  possessed  the  confidence 
of  the  investing  public.  It  was  thought  in  1901  and  1902 
that  he  could  accomplish  anything.  Ex-Mayor  Grace's 
experience  was  that  of  many.  One  morning  he  received 
a  brief  letter  by  post  saying  that  he  had  been  awarded 
a  hundred  thousand  dollar  share  in  the  Underwriting 
syndicate  of  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation.  Hav 
ing  had  no  conversation  with  Morgan  on  the  subject, 
knowing  only  by  hearsay  of  the  organization  of  the  ''bil 
lion  dollar"  trust,  he  sent  his  cheque  for  what  was  asked 
for,  being  $8000,  from  his  entire  confidence  in  the  banker. 
Although  liable  up  to  the  amount  of  $100,000  he  never 
got  a  further  call  for  more  but  in  due  time  received  back 
the  money  he  had  sent  and  his  share  of  the  enormous 
profits  of  the  Underwriting.  "I  never  made  money  as 
easy  as  that,"  he  said.2 

The  organization  of  the  "billion  dollar  steel  trust," 
as  the  Steel  Corporation  was  called,  the  impetus  of 
McKinley's  second  election,  the  rebound  from  the  panic  of 
1893,  the  war  of  1898  and  the  stock  depression  of  1899 
turned  men's  heads  in  1901.  Stocks  went  up,  money  was 
easily  made,  thoughts  ran  in  hundred  millions,  men  and 
women  were  extravagant,  champagne  corks  popped,  the 
assertion  was  made  that  the  day  of  panics  had  passed 


1  Preface  to  Carnegie's  Autobiography  by  Mrs.  Carnegie,  v. 
a  Life  of  Morgan,  Hovey,  216. 


CH.  VI.]  THE    STOCK   PANIC  OF  1901  155 

and  all  went  as  merry  as  a  marriage  bell.  "The  out 
burst  of  speculation  during  April  1901,"  wrote  Noyes, 
"was  something  rarely  paralleled  in  the  history  of  specu 
lative  manias."  Men  who  were  made  millionaires  by 
their  sales  of  United  States  Steel  Corporation  shares  be 
came  speculators  in  Wall  Street.  "The  'outside  public' 
meantime  seemed  to  lose  all  restraint.  A  stream  of  ex 
cited  customers  of  every  description  brought  their  money 
to  New  York  and  spent  their  days  in  offices  near  the  Stock 
Exchange.  .  .  .  The  newspapers  were  full  of  stories  of 
hotel  waiters,  clerks  in  business  offices,  even  doorkeepers 
and  dressmakers,  who  had  won  considerable  fortunes  in 
their  speculations."  l  Happily  this  booming  condition 
was  for  a  time  brought  to  an  end  by  a  quarrel  between 
Edward  H.  Harriman  on  one  side  and  Morgan  and  James 
J.  Hill  on  the  other.  Both  parties  desired  control  of  the 
Northern  Pacific  Railroad  and  began  bidding  against 
one  another  for  its  possession.  The  stock  ran  up  from 
160  to  1000  but  "all  other  stocks  broke  violently"  and 
a  good  part  of  Wall  Street  was  for  two  hours  on  that  day 
of  May  9,  1901,  "technically  insolvent."2  Those  who 
term  this  a  real  panic  and  are  fond  of  historical  parallels 
may  refer  to  1881  and  point  to  the  facts  that  the  Indian 
corn  crop  in  1901  was  with  two  exceptions  3  the  smallest 
in  twenty  years  and  that  a  President  was  also  assassi 
nated.  The  strife  for  the  Northern  Pacific  was  a  battle 
of  financial  giants  but  all  this  turmoil  would  have  been 
avoided  had  they  composed  their  differences  before  in 
stead  of  after  this  Wall  Street  shock. 

1  Noyes,    301. 

[1900  the   crop  was  2,105,000,000 

s  Noyes,  306.     3 1881,  1894.     In { 1901  the  crop  was  1,522,000,000 

[1902  the  crop  was  2,523,000,000 


156  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1901 

Elated  with  his  success  in  the  Steel  combination  Morgan 
attempted  a  similar  enterprise  in  connection  with  trans 
port  across  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  He  got  hold  of  the  Do 
minion  Line,  the  American  and  Red  Star,  the  Atlantic 
Transport  Company,  the  White  Star  Line  and  the 
Leyland,  paying  for  the  ships  more  than  they  were  worth. 
The  chairman  of  the  Leyland  Company  told  the  share 
holders  that  Morgan's  offer  was  so  high  "that  no  man 
agement  had  a  right  to  refuse  it."  1  Morgan  attempted 
to  get  hold  of  the  German  lines  and  the  Cunard  Company 
but  these  for  similar  reasons  would  not  sell  their  ships. 

As  I  have  previously  written,  the  whole  amount  of 
cash  in  the  flotation  of  the  United  States  Steel  Corpora 
tion  was  twenty-five  millions ;  the  rest  was  faith  in  Mor 
gan.  It  may  be  readily  conceded  that  he  alone  in  the 
country  could  effect  such  an  organization  but,  was  it  worth 
while  to  abuse  that  faith  and  put  upon  the  market  at  a 
supposedly  valuable  price  more  than  550  millions  of 
"water"?  True,  Morgan's  friends  argued  that  the  cap 
italization  was  based  upon  earnings  and  not  upon  the 
value  of  the  property;  but  what  consolation  was  that 
to  "widows  and  orphans"  who  had  invested  in  Steel  Com 
mon  at  from  38  to  55  because  it  paid  four  per  cent,  when 
the  Corporation  suspended  dividends  on  the  Common 
and  the  stock  went  below  10  as  it  did  in  1903?  The  de 
cline  in  the  market  was  from  101  for  the  Preferred  down 
to  49,  and  from  55  for  the  Common  to  10.  No  wonder 
that  Morgan  was  depressed  coming  as  it  did  with  the 
utter  failure  of  his  ship  combine.  Morgan  has  "fallen 
down"  in  his  steamship  combination,  was  a  usual  remark. 

This  depression  in  1903  was  called  "  the  rich  men's 

1Noyes,    303. 


CH.  VI.]  JOHN   D.   ROCKEFELLER  157 

panic.'7  After  what  is  known  as  the  Northern  Pacific 
Railroad  corner,  speculation  again  grew  rampant  as  the 
" bumper  wheat  crop"  in  1901  made  up  for  the  shortage 
of  corn,  but  early  in  1903  it  became  apparent  that  the  old 
rules  of  business  and  finance  remained  in  force  and  the 
" little  panic"  between  two  economic  crises  occurred.  As 
Morgan  said  in  a  newspaper  interview  it  was  a  case  of 
"  undigested  securities."  1 

The  Boston  Herald  of  January  10,  1920,  commented  on 
"The  Greatest  Epic  in  the  History  of  Big  Business"  by 
which  it  meant  the  Standard  Oil  Company,  that  is  typi 
fied  by  John  D.  Rockefeller.  In  the  constituent  com 
panies  which  made  up  the  United  States  Steel  Corpora 
tion  one  finds  the  "Lake  Superior  Consolidated  Iron 
Mines,"  which  is  put  down  as  the  "Rockefeller  interests" 
and  which  was  necessary  to  the  Corporation  as  owning 
a  large  quantity  of  Lake  Superior  iron  ore.  Lake  Su 
perior  ore  had  become  the  basis  of  the  steel  industry  from 
its  quantity  and,  while  the  Bessemer  process  ruled,  from 
so  much  of  it  being  low  in  phosphorus.  Ores  high  in 
phosphorus  were  inadmissible  as  that  element  was  at 
enmity  with  steel.  The  "Rockefeller  interests"  were 
not  absorbed  until  after  the  Carnegie  Steel  Company. 
The  transaction  is  simply  related  by  Rockefeller.  "After 
some  negotiation,"  he  wrote,  "Morgan  made  an  offer 
which  we  accepted  whereby  the  whole  plant  —  mines, 
ships,  railways,  etc.  —  should  become  a  part  of  the  United 


1  Noyes,  308.  Besides  works  already  referred  to,  I  have  used  in  this 
account,  Trusts  of  To-Day,  G.  H.  Montague ;  Commercial  and  Financial 
Chronicle,  1900,  1901 ;  The  Nation,  1900,  1901 ;  Articles  of  Gleed,  Mac- 
chen,  Ely,  Cosmopolitan  Mag.,  1901 ;  article  of  R.  S.  Baker,  McClure's 
Mag.,  Nov.  1901;  Peck;  Life  of  Hill,  Pyle,  ii. 


158  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1901 

States  Steel  Corporation.  The  price  paid  was,  we  felt, 
very  moderate  considering  the  present  and  prospective 
value  of  the  property."  l 

John  D.  Rockefeller  was  one  of  the  directors  of  the 
huge  corporation  and  he  is  comprehensible  to  us  from  a 
study  of  Napoleon  I  and  from  a  remark  made  by  Her 
bert  Spencer  in  1882  when  he  was  considered  a  great  phi 
losopher,  "  Practically  business  has  been  substituted  for 
war  as  the  purpose  of  existence."  2  From  a  bookkeeper 
Rockefeller  had  become  a  partner  in  a  small  commission 
house  on  the  Cuyahoga  River  in  Cleveland,  when  the  dis 
covery  of  petroleum  in  Western  Pennsylvania  started 
many  men  in  Cleveland,  bent  on  making  their  fortunes, 
in  that  direction.  Nothing  like  the  excitement  had  been 
known  since  the  discovery  of  gold  in  California.3  Sam 
uel  Andrews  had  invented  an  easy  and  cheap  process  of 
cleansing  the  crude  oil  with  sulphuric  acid  and  oil  refin 
eries  went  up  in  Cleveland  as  if  by  magic.  Rockefeller, 
like  Cassius,  was  not  fat  and  thought  much  and  he  made 
up  his  mind  that  for  him  success  lay  in  oil ;  he  embarked 
on  its  manufacture,  made  a  copartnership  with  Andrews 
and  H.  M.  Flagler  and  the  three  went  into  the  business 
as  did  many  others.  For  a  while  the  demand  for  "the 
light  of  the  world"  could  not  be  supplied  but  eventually 
the  supply  became  greater  than  the  demand  and  Cleve 
land  manufacturers  were  confronted  with  the  fact  that 
the  refining  of  oil  in  Cleveland  for  the  whole  trade  of  the 


1  Random  Reminiscences,  131. 

"After-dinner  speech  in  New  York,  Nov.  9,  1882.     Essays,  iii.  484. 

1  An  animated  account  of  the  discovery  of  oil  and  the  excitement  en 
suing  is  given  by  Oberholtzer  in  his  History  of  the  United  States,  i.  250 
et  seq. 


CH.  VI.]  THE  STANDARD  OIL  COMPANY  159 

world  was  a  geographical  absurdity,  as  the  bulk  of  the 
trade  lay  east  of  the  oil  regions.  The  Cleveland  re 
finers  were  engaged  in  a  cutthroat  policy ;  they  bid 
against  one  another  in  the  purchase  of  the  crude  oil  from 
Pennsylvania,  and  in  the  other  direction  were  intense 
competitors  for  the  sale  of  the  refined.  In  1870  the  Stand 
ard  Oil  Company  was  formed  with  Rockefeller  as  the 
directing  agent,  who  conceived  the  idea  of  uniting  all 
under  one  head  by  the  purchase  of  all  of  the  Cleveland 
refineries.  This  he  did,  paying  a  fair  price  and  giving 
the  owners  the  choice  of  Standard  stock  or  cash  for  their 
works.  Those  who  took  cash  thought  that  they  were 
getting  a  bargain ;  those  who  took  stock  became  rich. 

Rockefeller  had  difficulty  in  raising  money  to  meet 
his  desires  as  the  financial  " bigwigs"  of  Cleveland,  with 
two  exceptions,  were  opposed  to  his  scheme  and  thought 
that  he  was  taking  too  many  and  too  great  chances.  At 
this  time  he  would  have  preferred  to  pay  for  the  refineries 
that  he  was  buying  in  stock  rather  than  in  money,  as  the 
one  commodity  was  more  plenty  than  the  other.  "We 
invariably,"  he  wrote,  "offered  those  who  wanted  to  sell 
the  option  of  taking  cash  or  stock  in  the  company.  We 
very  much  preferred  to  have  them  take  the  stock  because 
a  dollar  in  those  days  looked  as  large  as  a  cart-wheel,  but 
as  a  matter  of  business  policy  we  found  it  desirable  to 
offer  them  the  option  and,  in  most  cases,  they  were  even 
precipitate  in  their  choice  of  the  cash.  They  knew  what 
a  dollar  would  buy  but  they  were  very  skeptical  in  regard 
to  the  possibilities  of  resurrecting  the  oil  business  and 
giving  any  permanent  value  to  these  shares."  l  The  tale 


1  Random  Reminiscences,  95. 


160  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1901 

of  Rockefeller's  financial  anxieties  seems  strange  to  the 
younger  generation  which  associates  him  with  unlimited 
amounts  of  money,  but  those  whose  memory  goes  back 
to  the  time  know  how  true  is  his  account  and  that  he  does 
not  exaggerate  in  any  way  his  difficulties.  "We  had 
our  troubles  and  setbacks,"  he  wrote,  "we  suffered  from 
severe  fires;  and  the  supply  of  crude  oil  was  most  un 
certain.  ...  At  best  it  was  a  speculative  trade  and  I 
wonder  that  we  managed  to  pull  through  so  often."  l 

The  Standard  Oil  Company  was  thus  launched.2  If 
Rockefeller  did  not  say  it,  he  thought  that,  "The  coal 
oil  business  belongs  to  us."3  Keeping  in  mind  the  simi 
larity  and  the  difference  between  war  and  trade  how  like 
Napoleon's  expression  in  1811,  "Three  years  more  and 
I  am  lord  of  the  universe!"4  With  great  method  and 
untiring  zeal  Rockefeller  wrought  for  the  control  of  the 
manufacture  and  business  of  refined  oil.  He  acted  in 
accordance  with  the  conditions  of  his  time.  After  the 
panic  of  1873  railroad  business  became  poor  and  the  rail 
roads  were  "cutting  one  another's  throats"  for  whatever 
business  was  in  sight.  Rockefeller  took  in  the  situation 
and,  by  his  control  of  a  large  amount  of  desirable  freight, 
compelled  rebates  not  only  on  his  own  shipments  but  on 
those  of  his  competitors. 

William  H.  Vanderbilt,  who  succeeded  his  father  in 
the  control  of  the  New  York  Central  and  Lake  Shore 
Railways,  important  lines  of  communication  for  the  oil 


1  Random  Reminiscences,  83. 

2 1  do  not  digress  into  a  history  of  the  South  Improvement  Company, 
believing  that  it  died  in  embryo.  See  Wealth  against  Commonwealth, 
Henry  D.  Lloyd,  59. 

8  History  of  the  Standard  Oil  Company,  Tarbell,  ii.  34. 

4  Sloane's  Napoleon,  ii.  235. 


CH.  VI.]  VANDERBILT— ROCKEFELLER  161 

business,  was  then  supposed  to  be  the  richest  man  in  the 
country,  worth  $200,000,000.  Only  one  man  in  the 
world,  the  Duke  of  Westminster,  had  an  equal  amount, 
but  his  return  from  this  capital  was  not  as  great  as  Van- 
derbilt's.  His  appreciation  of  the  ability  shown  in  the 
management  of  this  enterprise  is  therefore  important. 
Vanderbilt  testified  in  1879:  "  These  men  [the  Standard 
Oil  Company  managers]  are  smarter  than  I  am  a  great 
deal.  They  are  very  enterprising  and  smart  men.  I 
never  came  in  contact  with  any  class  of  men  so  smart 
and  able  as  they  are  in  their  business."  1 

Rockefeller's  handling  of  the  railroads  placed  him  in 
a  commanding  position.  Herbert  Spencer  said  in  the 
speech  already  quoted,  "I  hear  that  a  great  trader  among 
you  deliberately  endeavored  to  crush  out  everyone  whose 
business  competed  with  his  own."  2  This  was  unques 
tionably  Rockefeller's  method  but  he  was  absolutely 
fair  to  all  of  his  stockholders  and  gentle  to  competing 
refineries  who  would  work  with  him  on  his  own  terms, 
which  in  every  case  turned  out  advantageously  for  those 
manufacturers.  The  crude  oil  producers  looked  upon 
him  "with  superstitious  awe,"  so  Miss  Tarbell  wrote. 
"  Their  notion  of  him  was  very  like  that  which  the  English 
common  people  had  for  Napoleon  in  the  first  part  of  the 
nineteenth  century ...  a  dread  power,  cruel,  omniscient, 
always  ready  to  spring."3  He  undoubtedly  squeezed 
the  crude  oil  producers  as  he  did  recalcitrant  partners  of 
friends  whom  he  started  in  outside  operations.  It  was 
owing  to  these  tactics  that  the  man  who  from  nothing 


1  Tarbell,  The  History  of  the  Standard  Oil  Company,  ii.  252. 

2  Essays,  iii.  484. 

3  Tarbell,  The  History  of  the  Standard  Oil  Company,  ii.  63. 


162  McKINLEY'S    ADMINISTRATION  [1901 

had  made  a  billion,  had  to  be  guarded  by  detectives.  He 
could  have  no  such  funeral  as  Peter  Cooper  had,  of  which 
a  journalist  at  the  time  said  Jay  Gould,  a  rich  man  of 
the  day,  with  all  of  his  money,  could  not  buy  such  a 
funeral. 

Rockefeller  accepted  the  conditions  of  the  game  and 
played  it  accordingly.  The  management  of  the  Standard 
was  one  of  efficiency  in  every  direction.  "It  seemed 
absolutely  necessary,"  Rockefeller  wrote,  "to  extend  the 
market  for  oil  by  exporting  to  foreign  countries  which 
required  a  long  and  most  difficult  development."  l  This 
was  in  exact  keeping  with  the  ideas  of  the  day  and  ex 
pressed  a  thought  in  many  minds.  Rockefeller  put  the 
idea  in  active  operation,  and,  while  making  money  for 
the  Standard  made  it  an  important  factor  in  the  country's 
foreign  trade.2  When  the  "spellbinders"  declaimed  that 
the  tariff  was  the  mother  of  all  trusts,  the  Standard 
Oil  Company  must  be  excepted,  as  its  operations  were 
not  dependent  on  the  tariff  legislation  of  Congress. 

In  line  with  efficiency,  every  bit  of  waste  was  carefully 
looked  after.  His  scientific  men  were  encouraged  in  the 
development  of  by-products  which  were  sold  cheaply, 
brought  comfort  to  many  households  and  swelled  the 
foreign  exports.  Rockefeller  himself  was  a  remarkable 
judge  of  men  and  gathered  around  him  a  number  of  able 
lieutenants  who  wrought  loyally  under  his  direction. 
While  he  himself  was  a  puritan  in  life  he  never  made  his 
personal  system  of  morality  a  guide  in  the  choice  of  those 


1  Random  Reminiscences,  82. 

8  Exports  fiscal  years  1870-71  to  1899-1900  in  value,  Corn  $1,073,333,- 
598,  Wheat  $2,495,182,543,  Wheat  Flour  $1,382,075,300,  Cotton  $6,409,- 
112,711,  Refined  Mineral  Oil  $1,294,953,816. 


CH.  VI.]  JOHN  D.  ROCKEFELLER  163 

under  him.  Was  the  man  equal  to  his  job?  seemed  to 
be  the  sole  test.  For  efficient  cooperation  the  United 
States  never  saw  the  equal  of  the  Standard. 

Rockefeller  was  the  first  to  develop  on  a  large  scale 
the  sale  of  a  natural  product  direct  from  the  producer 
to  the  consumer.  He  suppressed  the  middleman  and 
of  course  made  enemies.  A  man  who  had  a  small  broker 
age  business  dependent  upon  the  Standard,  on  which 
he  supported  in  economic  ease  a  small  family,  could 
not  refrain  from  exclaiming,  when  deprived  of  his  means 
of  living,  as  he  thought  of  the  work  of  this  powerful  rich 
man,  "He  has  taken  from  me  my  one  ewe  lamb."  To 
such  considerations  Rockefeller  was  callous.  Mercy  in 
business  never  entered  into  his  calculations.  Not  unlikely 
he  ascribed  talk,  critical  of  his  work,  to  envy,  which  he 
illustrated  in  his  Reminiscences  with  the  action  of  an 
Irish  neighbor  who  built  an  extremely  ugly  house,  the 
bright  colors  of  which  were  offensive,  as  he  looked  out 
from  his  windows ;  therefore  he  moved  some  large  trees 
to  shut  out  the  house  from  his  view.  Why  are  those 
large  trees  moved?  the  Irishman  was  asked,  to  which 
came  the  quick  reply,  "It's  invy,  they  can't  stand  looking 
at  the  evidence  of  me  prosperity."  l 

Rockefeller  quoted  the  expression  of  an  old  and  ex 
perienced  Boston  merchant,  "I  am  opposed  on  principle 
to  the  whole  system  of  rebates  and  drawbacks  —  unless 
I  am  in  it." 2  This  was  undoubtedly  the  opinion 
of  business  men  until  this  practice  was  forbidden  by  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Law  of  1887.  But  before  1887  the 
Standard  had  developed  its  system  and,  as  it  increased 


1  Random  Reminiscences,  72.  *  Ibid.,  112. 


164  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1901 

in  power  and  wealth,  dictated  to  those  high  in  command 
of  the  railroads,  getting  low  rates  which  enabled  it  to 
crush  competitors,  or  when  that  was  unnecessary,  to 
amass  hitherto  unheard  of  wealth. 

As  Rockefeller's  operations  were  successful  he  had  no 
difficulty  in  obtaining  all  of  the  money  that  he  desired, 
so  that  we  see  in  the  Standard  a  corporation  efficiently 
directed  with  a  real  genius  at  its  head  and  an  ever  ready 
supply  of  cash.  To  develop  the  foreign  trade  and  to 
supply  the  East  it  was  soon  seen  that  the  crude  oil  must 
be  refined  at  the  seaboard,  hence  refineries  were  estab 
lished  at  Brooklyn,  Bayonne  in  New  Jersey,  Philadelphia 
and  Baltimore.  Having  made  dictatorial  arrangements 
with  the  railroads,  organized  trade  with  Europe,  Asia, 
Africa,  the  East  and  West  of  his  own  country,  a  common 
man  would  have  rested  on  his  oars  satisfied  with  his  great 
accomplishments.  Not  so  Rockefeller  who  was  ever  on 
the  watch.  Pipe-lines  had  early  been  in  operation  to 
gather  the  oil  from  the  wells  to  the  railroads,  of  which 
the  Standard  had  its  share,  but  in  1879  it  was  demon 
strated  by  an  opposition  company  that  crude  oil  could 
be  pumped  over  the  mountains  and  so  reach  the  seaboard. 
Pipe-line  transportation  was  much  cheaper  than  railroad 
even  if  the  railroads  cut  down  their  carrying  charges  to 
cost.  Under  this  new  competition  all  of  Rockefeller's 
carefully  made  contracts  with  the  railroads',  so  far  as  the 
carrying  of  crude  oil  was  concerned,  were  for  naught, 
but  he  was  equal  to  the  emergency.  Within  five  years 
he  owned  all  of  the  pipe-lines  to  the  seaboard  or  had  them 
under  his  control.  With  great  effect  he  wrote  in  his  book : 
"The  entire  oil  business  is  dependent  upon  the  pipe-line. 
Without  it  every  well  would  be  less  valuable  and  every 


CH.  VI.  1  THE  STANDARD  OIL  COMPANY  165 

market  at  home  and  abroad  would  be  more  difficult  to 
serve  or  retain."  1 

Constantly  in  litigation  the  Standard  employed  the 
best  lawyers  to  fight  its  cases.  Its  policy  ever  to  get 
hold  of  the  ablest  was  in  this  particular  exemplified  with 
good  results. 

Did  the  Standard  make  the  light  of  the  world  cheaper? 
An  affirmative  answer  is  at  once  given  by  its  apologists, 
a  negative  by  its  critics.  For  ourselves  we  shall  do  well 
to  accept  the  judgment  of  the  intelligent  historian  of 
the  Standard  Oil  Company,  Gilbert  H.  Montague,  who 
with  the  energy  of  youth  investigated  fully  the  matter. 
"The  vexed  question,"  he  wrote,  "of  the  effect  of  the 
Standard  Oil  combination  on  the  price  of  refined  oil  will 
probably  never  be  settled." 2  It  certainly  stabilized 
prices.  Under  Cleveland  competition,  as  it  existed  be 
fore  1871,  there  would  have  been  an  era  of  low  prices 
succeeded  by  one  of  high,  in  entire  accordance  with  the 
law  of  supply  and  demand.  Under  Standard  manage 
ment  the  price  could  not  have  been  excessive  or  it  would 
have  lacked  candid  defenders.  On  the  other  hand  there 
were  the  large  dividends  and  the  fact  that  everyone  con 
nected  with  the  Standard  grew  rich. 

Henry  D.  Lloyd  in  "Wealth  against  Commonwealth" 
makes  a  sharp  criticism  of  the  Standard  Oil  Company, 
and  his  remedy  for  the  evils  it  and  other  trusts  caused 
is  State  Socialism.  This  discussion  will  go  on  as  long  as 
socialists  and  individualists  exist.  But  the  student  of 
men  and  affairs  cannot  overlook  that  "government  is 


1  Random  Reminiscences,  84. 

2  The  Rise  and  Progress  of  the  Standard  Oil  Company,  136. 


166  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1901 

some  of  us,  and  those  not  the  best  of  us,  put  over  the  rest 
of  us."  1  After  a  careful  reading  of  this  book  of  Lloyd's 
one  inclined  to  individualism  cannot  fail  to  approve  the 
statement  of  the  reviewer  of  The  Nation,  "Were  we  not 
satisfied  from  evidence  aliunde,"  it  said,  "that  the  man 
agers  of  the  Standard  Oil  Company  had  violated  both 
law  and  justice  in  their  attempts  to  suppress  competition, 
we  should  be  inclined  to  acquit  them  after  reading  this 
screed.  It  is  quite  beyond  belief  that  these  men  should 
be  capable  of  the  height  and  depth  of  wickedness  attrib 
uted  to  them,  even  if  they  possessed  the  superhuman  pow 
ers  with  which  they  are  credited.  It  is  plain  upon  Mr. 
Lloyd's  showing  that  their  competitors  would  be  no  bet 
ter  than  they  if  they  had  similar  opportunities  and  it 
is  impossible  to  arouse  sympathy  for  men  whose  com 
plaint  is  that  they  were  not  allowed  to  make  enormous 
profits,  for  it  appears  to  have  been  the  policy  of  the  Stand 
ard  Company  to  buy  out  its  rivals  at  reasonable  rates."  2 
Miss  Tarbell,  from  a  number  of  articles  in  McClure's 
Magazine,  devoted  to  muckraking,  has  written  two  vol 
umes  entitled  "The  History  of  the  Standard  Oil  Com 
pany  "  in  which  her  industrious  research  can  do  no  other 
than  compel  admiration  from  anyone  who  seeks  historic 
truth.  Her  examination  of  documents  that  bear  upon 
the  subject  seems  thorough  and  no  one  can  attempt  a  con 
sideration  of  the  Standard  without  recourse  to  the  many 
facts  that  she  has  uncovered.  All  the  same,  the  feeling 
grows  that  she  had  determined  on  her  thesis  and  in  her 
book  had  sought  facts  which  should  support  her  precon 
ceived  impressions.  Again  must  one  have  recourse  to  The 


1  Cited  from  memory  but  the  remark  was,  I  think,  made  by  Professor 
W.  G.  Sumner.  '  The  Nation,  Nov.  8,  1894,  348. 


CH.  VI.]  JOHN  D.  ROCKEFELLER  167 

Nation.  "The  writer"  [i.e.  Miss  Tarbell],  it  said,  "has 
either  a  vague  conception  of  the  nature  of  proof  or  she 
is  willing  to  blacken  the  character  of  John  D.  Rockefeller 
by  insinuation  and  detraction."  But  he  "has  been 
caught  in  no  worse  crimes  than  underselling  his  competi 
tors  and  getting  rebates  from  railroads.  ...  It  is  mat 
ter  of  public  notoriety  that  Mr.  Rockefeller  is  offensively 
reticent.  ...  In  impassioned  .  .  .  language  a  desperate 
struggle  is  described  between  the  powers  of  evil  incarnate 
in  the  Standard  Oil  Company  and  the  powers  of  goodness 
appearing  in  a  metaphysical  entity  called  the  'Oil  Region/ 
This  being,  it  appears,  loved  virtue  for  its  own  sake ;  it 
believed  in  independence  and  fair  play ;  it  hated  the  re 
bates  and  secret  rates;  it  hated,  but  it  also  feared,  its 
adversary.  .  .  .  The  'Oil  Region '  means  a  number  of 
men  engaged  in  the  wildest  kind  of  speculation,  many 
of  whom  proved  themselves  willing  to  engage  in  every 
kind  of  wickedness  of  which  the  Standard  Oil  Company 
was  accused."  It  "might  say  like  the  French  deputy  to 
his  constituents,  '  So  intense  was  the  corruption  that  even 
I  did  not  altogether  escape.' "  l 

A  careful  consideration  of  the  subject,  with  a  thorough 
reading  of  Lloyd's  and  Miss  Tarbell' s  books  cannot  fail 
to  impress  an  inquirer  with  the  great  ability  shown  by 
Rockefeller,  who  was  to  business  what  Napoleon  was  to 
war  and  to  civic  society.  In  Rockefeller  may  be  seen  a 
ripe  development  of  the  application  of  energy  to  resources. 
This  quiet,  reticent  man,  thinking  and  listening, 
as  he  stropped  his  penknife  over  the  heel  of  his  boot, 
like  the  traditional  Yankee  whittling  a  stick,  made  com 
binations  which  startled  the  world.  Always  given  to 

1  The  Nation,  Jan.  5,  1905,  15. 


168  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1901 

reflection  when  not  taking  needed  physical  exercise,  read 
ing  no  book  but  "Ben  Hur,"  1  he  moved  men  upon  his 
chess-board  like  pawns  in  the  game.  Sincerely  religious, 
it  must  have  been  a  surprise  to  him  that  his  methods 
were  questioned  when  he  simply  played  the  game  as  he 
found  its  conditions,  and  supposed  that  he  never  violated 
the  tenets  of  the  Christian  religion  as  commonly  under 
stood.  Outside  of  religion  and  physical  exercise  he  pur 
sued  one  single  idea  and  was  eminently  successful  from 
the  grasp  of  his  mind. 

The  question  must  arise,  Is  it  well  for  the  State  to  have 
such  huge  fortunes  as  those  of  Rockefeller  and  Carnegie 
accumulated  in  a  lifetime?  It  must  be  said  in  their 
defence  that  they  accomplished  the  difficult  art  of  giving, 
that  their  benefactions  were  noble  and  that  they  set  a 
pattern  for  other  rich  men,  whose  gifts  and  bequests  have 
been  on  the  side  of  civilization.  In  the  amassing  of  such 
wealth  it  is  well  that  they  or  their  descendants  did  not 
spend  it  in  luxurious  or  riotous  living ;  that  they  them 
selves  obeyed  the  call  of  duty  and  were  as  systematic 
and  wise  in  their  dispensations  as  in  their  acquirements. 
That  their  gifts  made  for  the  good  of  civilization,  however, 
will  fail  to  convince  the  mass  of  voters,  who  cannot  see 
that  fine  pictures,  well-collected  libraries,  endowed  uni 
versities,  cure  of  disease  and  prophylactic  treatment  com 
pensate  them  for  a  deprivation  of  their  share  of  the  cake 
in  favor  of  Rockefeller,  Carnegie  and  others.2 


1  Up  to  1918.     The  Bible  of  course  excepted. 

9  For  authorities  not  specifically  referred  to  I  have  consulted  Indus 
trial  Commission  Reports,  vol.  i.  19.  House  docs.,  1899-1900,  vol.  93; 
1901-1902,  vol.  82 ;  Trusts  of  To-Day,  Montague ;  Noyes,  Forty  Years 
of  American  Finance ;  Burton  J.  Hendrick,  Age  of  Big  Business ;  Peck ; 
The  Nation,  1900,  1901. 


CH  .VI.]  McKINLEY  169 

McKinley's  second  inaugural  address  (March  4,  1901) 
was  a  pa?an  to  the  successful  accomplishment  of  the  past 
four  years.  Then  there  was  a  deficit,  now  a  surplus ; 
then  depression,  now  activity.  "The  national  verdict 
of  1896,"  he  declared,  "has  for  the  most  part  been  exe 
cuted."  His  personal  bearing,  action  and  amiability  had 
contributed  much  to  the  achievement  of  what  he  stated 
in  fitting  words  :  "  Sectionalism  has  disappeared.  Division 
on  public  questions  can  no  longer  be  traced  by  the  war 
maps  of  1861."  1  "I  can  no  longer  be  called  the  Presi 
dent  of  a  party,"  he  said  to  his  Secretary ;  "I  am  now  the 
President  of  the  whole  people." 

Between  the  second  inauguration  and  his  death 
McKinley  enjoyed  his  office]  and  the  hold  which  he  had 
on  the  people ;  his  content  was  marred  by  the  alarming 
illness  of  his  wife  during  a  trip  to  the  Pacific  coast.  On 
his  return  to  Washington,  he  was  obliged,  because  of  her 
condition,  to  decline  an  invitation  to  the  Commence 
ment  of  Harvard  University  and  receive  the  honorary 
degree  of  Doctor  of  Laws.  In  answer  to  repeated  public 
requests  that  he  should  again  be  a  candidate  for  the  pres 
idency,  he  made  an  open  statement  that  under  no  cir 
cumstances  would  he  accept  a  nomination  for  a  third 
term. 

He  had  promised  to  visit  the  Buffalo  fair,  believing, 
as  he  there  said,  "Expositions  are  the  timekeepers  of 
progress.  They  record  the  world's  advancement."  "  The 
crowning  and  original  feature  of  this  Exposition/' 
wrote  Robert  Grant,  was  the  illumination  by  the  electric 


1  Messages  and  Papers,  Supplement,  163. 
8  Life  of  McKinley,  Olcott,  ii.  296. 


170  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  (1901 

lights;  the  power  for  the  electricity  was  furnished  by 
Niagara  Falls.  "The  time  fixed  for  the  ceremony  of 
illumination/'  continued  Grant,  "is  half-past  eight,  just 
as  the  summer  twilight  is  deepening  into  darkness.  .  .  . 
There  is  a  deep  silence  and  all  eyes  are  riveted  on  the 
electric  tower.  Suddenly  ...  we  have  a  veritable  fairy 
land  ;  the  triumph  not  of  Aladdin's  lamp  but  of  the  mas 
ters  of  modern  science  over  the  nature-god,  Electricity."  J 
Dooley  likewise  visited  the  fair.  "They  tell  me,"  he 
wrote,  "that  at  th'  Pan-American  show  in  th'  city  iv 
Buffalo  th'  ilicthric  light  is  made  be  Niag'ra  Falls.  .  .  . 
Hogan  seen  it,  an'  he  says  it  makes  th'  moon  look  like 
a  dark  lanthern.  They  speak  iv  th'  sun  in  Buffalo  th' 
way  a  motorman  on  a  trolley  line  wud  shpeak  iv  a  horse 
car.  '  Th'  sun  is  settin'  earlier,'  says  he  to  Conners,  th' 
thruckman  that  wus  to  win'  him.  'Since  th'  fair  begun,' 
says  Conners,  'it  hasn't  showed  after  eight  o'clock.  We 
'  seldom  hear  iv  it  nowadays.  We  set  our  clocks  be  th' 
risin'  an'  settin'  iv  th'  lights.'"  2 

The  President's  visit  to  the  Buffalo  fair  was  delayed 
until  September  when,  during  a  crowded  reception,  he 
was  shot  by  an  anarchist  (September  6)  who,  in  the  line 
of  approaching  people,  pretending  to  have  an  injured 
hand,  concealed,  in  the  handkerchief  wrapped  around  it, 
a  revolver  from  which  two  shots  dealt  the  death-blow 
to  the  President.  The  fatal  shot  was  fired  on  a  Friday 
afternoon.  McKinley  lingered  for  over  a  week  and  at 
times  strong  hopes  were  entertained  for  his  recovery,  but 
these  were  vain,  and  early  on  Saturday  morning,  Septem 
ber  14,  he  passed  away. 

1  Cosmopolitan  Magazine,  Sept.   1901,  453. 
8  Cosmopolitan  Magazine,  Sept.  1901,  478. 


CH.  VI. ]  ASSASSINATION  OF  McKINLEY  171 

The  crowd,  amazed  at  the  attempt  on  the  life  of  their 
beloved  President,  threatened  to  lynch  the  assassin  but 
McKinley,  stricken  to  death,  showed  his  respect  for  the 
law  in  his  words,  " Don't  let  them  hurt  him."  l  Then 
his  thoughts  dwelt  upon  his  wife,  who,  accompanying 
him  to  Buffalo,  was  at  a  neighboring  house.  "My  wife 
—  be  careful,  Cortelyou,  how  you  tell  her  —  oh,  be  care 
ful  !"  A  week  later  when  he  and  all  of  his  friends  knew 
that  the  end  was  near,  he  said,  "It  is  God's  way.  His 
will,  not  ours,  be  done  "  ;  then  he  repeated  some  lines 
of  his  favorite  hymn,  "Nearer,  my  God,  to  Thee."  2  In 
voluntarily  came  to  many  lips,  "See  how  a  Christian 
can  die."  The  journalist  who  had  sneered  at  "the  pious 
McKinley"  could  not,  from  his  skeptical  view,  appreciate 
the  depth  and  sincerity  of  McKinley's  religious  nature. 

Roosevelt,  on  hearing  of  the  assassination,  hurried  to 
Buffalo  but,  on  the  assurance  that  the  President  would 
recover,  left  for  the  Adirondacks  whence  he  was  hastily 
summoned  again.  Before  his  arrival  McKinley  had 
passed  away  and,  when  reaching  Buffalo,  Roosevelt  was 
met  by  a  request  from  Secretary  Elihu  Root,  the  ranking 
member  of  the  Cabinet  who  was  there,  that  he  "take 
the  constitutional  oath  of  President  of  the  United  States." 
To  this  he  replied :  "I  shall  take  the  oath  at  once  in  ac 
cordance  with  your  request,  and  in  this  hour  of  deep  and 
terrible  national  bereavement  I  wish  to  state  that  it  shall 
be  my  aim  to  continue  absolutely  unbroken  the  policy 
of  President  McKinley  for  the  peace  and  prosperity  and 
honor  of  our  beloved  country."  3 

1  For  the  trial  and  execution  of  McKinley's   assassin,   see  my  vol  viii 
151. 

3  Life  of  McKinley,  Olcott,  ch.  xxxiv. 
*  Messages  and  Papers,  Supplement,  298. 


172  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1901 

Elihu  Root,  McKinley's  Secretary  of  War,  said:  "I 
have  talked  with  him  [McKinley]  again  and  again  before 
a  Cabinet  meeting  and  found  that  his  ideas  were  fixed 
and  his  mind  firmly  made  up.  He  would  then  present 
the  subject  to  the  Cabinet  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  express 
his  own  decision,  but  yet  bring  about  an  agreement  ex 
actly  along  the  lines  of  his  own  original  ideas,  while  the 
members  often  thought  the  ideas  were  theirs.  ...  He 
cared  nothing  about  the  credit  but  McKinley  always  had 
his  way.  ...  He  had  vast  influence  with  Congress.  He 
led  them  by  the  power  of  affectionate  esteem  not  by  fear. 
He  never  bullied  Congress."  *  Shelby  M.  Cullom,  Sena 
tor  from  Illinois  for  thirty  years,  wrote :  "  We  have  never 
had  a  President  who  had  more  influence  with  Congress 
than  McKinley.  ...  I  have  never  heard  of  even  the 
slightest  friction  between  him  and  the  party  leaders  in 
Senate  and  House.  ...  He  looked  and  acted  the  ideal 
President.  He  was  always  thoroughly  self-poised  and 
deliberate ;  nothing  ever  seemed  to  excite  him  and  he 
always  maintained  a  proper  dignity.'7  2  President  Roose 
velt  said  in  his  first  Message  to  Congress :  "  At  the  time 
of  President  McKinley's  death  he  was  the  most  widely 
loved  man  in  all  the  United  States ;  while  we  have  never 
had  any  public  man  of  his  position  who  has  been  so  wholly 
free  from  the  bitter  animosities  incident  to  public  life.  .  .  . 
To  a  standard  of  lofty  integrity  in  public  life  he  united 
the  tender  affections  and  home  virtues  which  are  all- 
important  in  the  make-up  of  national  character."  3 

From  my  point  of  view  it  will  ever  be  a  regret  that  the 


»Olcott,  ii.  346.  2  Fifty  Years,  275. 

3  Messages  and  Papers,  Supplement,  315. 


CH.  VI.]  McKINLEY  173 

long-standing  distrust  of  and  enmity  to  Spain  should  have 
come  to  a  head  during  McKinley's  administration.  For 
he  was  essentially  a  peace  minister.  Coming  before  the 
public,  the  high-priest  of  protection,  he  had,  through  the 
exercise  of  executive  authority,  modified  his  views.  He 
was  diligent  in  the  enforcement  of  the  reciprocity  pro 
vision  of  the  Dingley  Act  and  named  John  A.  Kasson  to 
negotiate  in  accordance  therewith  reciprocity  agreements. 
It  was  not  necessary  that  these  agreements  should  be 
ratified  by  the  Senate  but  some  Senators,  who  were  more 
strongly  high  tariff  than  McKinley  himself,  thought  that 
France  had  gotten  the  better  of  Kasson  in  the  bargain.1 
Nor  was  McKinley 's  recommendation  of  free  trade  with 
Puerto  Rico  immediately  adopted.  In  his  message  of 
December,  1899,  he  said,  "Our  plain  duty  is  to  abolish 
all  customs  tariffs  between  the  United  States  and  Puerto 
Rico  and  give  her  products  free  access  to  our  markets." 
It  took  him  a  little  over  a  year  and  a  half  to  accomplish 
this  but  he  had  the  satisfaction  before  his  death  of  seeing 
complete  free  trade  with  the  island.2  In  the  speech  that 
he  made  in  Buffalo  the  day  before  his  assassination,  he 
showed  how  far  behind  him  he  had  left  the  doctrines  of 
ultra-protection.  "A  system,"  he  said,  " which  provides 
a  mutual  exchange  of  commodities,  is  manifestly  essential 
to  the  continued  and  healthful  growth  of  our  export  trade. 


1  Kasson  made  the  agreement  with  France  on  May  28,  1898 ;    it  was 
proclaimed  on  May  30.     He  made  an  agreement  with  Italy  on  Feb.  8, 
1900 ;    it  was  proclaimed  on  July  18,  1900 ;    another  with  Portugal  on 
May  22,  1899 ;  it  was  proclaimed  on  July  12,  1900. 

There  were  later  made  the  following  agreements,  but  not  by  Kasson  : 
Germany,  proclaimed  July  13,  1900.  Switzerland,  proclaimed  Jan.  1. 1906. 
Spain,  signed  Aug.  1,  1906.  Bulgaria,  proclaimed  Sept.  15,  1906.  Great 
Britain,  proclaimed  Dec.  5,  1907.  Netherlands,  proclaimed  Aug.  12,  1908. 

2  Willoughby,  Territories  and  Dependencies,  113. 


174  McKINLEY'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1901 

We  must  not  repose  in  fancied  security  that  we  can  for 
ever  sell  everything  and  buy  little  or  nothing.  If  such  a 
thing  were  possible,  it  would  not  be  best  for  us  or  for  those 
with  whom  we  deal.  We  should  take  from  our  customers 
such  of  their  products  as  we  can  use  without  harm  to  our 
industries  and  labor.  .  .  .  The  period  of  exclusiveness  is 
past.  The  expansion  of  our  trade  and  commerce  is  the 
pressing  problem.  Commercial  wars  are  unprofitable. 
A  policy  of  good  will  and  friendly  trade  relations  will 
prevent  reprisals.  Reciprocity  treaties  are  in  harmony 
with  the  spirit  of  the  times,  measures  of  retaliation  are 
not."  "We  find  our  long-time  principles  echoed,"  de 
clared  The  Nation,  "to  our  unfeigned  satisfaction."  1 

McKinley,  however,  did  not  live  up  to  the  expectations 
of  the  Civil  Service  reformers,  inferred  from  his  expres 
sions  and  attitude  when  a  member  of  the  House.  The 
testimony  of  William  D.  Foulke  of  Indiana  is  of  high 
value.  Singularly  in  favor  of  Civil  Service  reform,  on 
excellent  terms  with  Eaton,  Curtis,  Schurz,  Dana  and 
others  who  labored  in  the  vineyard,  he  supported  by 
speech  and  action  McKinley  in  1896  and  1900  and  was  a 
level-headed  man  who  could  look  on  both  sides  of  any 
question.  By  his  order  of  July  27,  1897,  asserted  Foulke, 
McKinley  "greatly  strengthened  the  competitive  ser 
vice"  ;  it  provided  that  no  removal  should  be  made  "ex 
cept  for  just  cause."  In  his  Annual  Message  of  Decem 
ber,  1897,  he  said  that  the  merit  system  "has  the  approval 
of  the  people  and  it  will  be  my  endeavor  to  uphold  and 
extend  it,"  and  in  the  ensuing  session  of  Congress  "he 
opposed  all  efforts  to  repeal  or  change  the  law.  But  in 


Sept.  12,  1901,  197. 


CH.  VI.]  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM  175 

the  administration  of  it,"  continued  Foulke,  "the  execu 
tive  department  showed  great  weakness. "  An  antici 
pated  and  forecasted  order  was  promulgated  on  May 
29,  1899,  which  marked  "the  first  considerable  reduction 
in  the  area  of  the  merit  system  since  the  Civil  Service  law 
was  enacted  in  1883."  As  a  quasi-atonement  he  extended 
the  merit  system  to  the  Philippine  Islands  "by  his  in 
structions  to  the  Philippine  Commission  in  April,  1900." 
"As  the  campaign  of  1900  drew  near,"  Foulke  went  on 
to  say,  "the  opinions  of  Civil  Service  reformers  were  di 
vided."  The  anti-imperialists,  among  whom  was  Carl 
Schurz,  "felt  a  deep  resentment  at  the  backslidings  of 
McKinley  and  could  see  nothing  of  his  extension  of  the 
competitive  system  to  the  Philippines  which  could  atone 
for  breaking  his  promises  regarding  that  system  in  the 
United  States."  1 

McKinley's  action  in  regard  to  Civil  Service  reform 
was  tortuous.  He  seemed  swayed  by  opposing  forces. 
Undoubtedly  the  one  opposed  to  Civil  Service  reform 
was  represented  by  Mark  Hanna  who  sincerely  believed 
that,  for  the  good  of  the  country  and  the  party,  he  him 
self,  the  heads  of  the  departments,  the  senators  and 
representatives  could  make  better  appointments  than 
could  be  secured  by  any  system  of  competitive  exam 
ination.2 


*W.  D.  Foulke,  Fighting  the  Spoilsman,  119,  122,  123,  125.  See 
Richard  H.  Dana's  review,  Amer.  Polit.  Science  Rev.,  Feb.  1920. 

a  Authorities  not  specifically  mentioned.  Proceedings  of  National 
Civil  Service  Reform  League,  1900,  1901 ;  Carl  Schurz,  Speeches,  Cor 
respondence,  etc.,  vi. ;  Foraker,  Notes  of  a  Busy  Life,  ii. ;  The  Nation, 
passim. 


CHAPTER  VII 

WITH  our  new  colonies  it  has  been  impossible  to  pre 
serve  a  chronological  unity  of  narrative.  It  is  now  nec 
essary  to  enter  upon  an  account  of  Puerto  Rico,  Cuba 
and  the  Philippines,  going  back  to  a  point  beyond  which 
the  narrative  has  already  taken  us  and  terminating  ahead 
of  the  time  to  which  the  history  of  our  domestic  trans 
actions  will  be  carried. 

Puerto  Rico  may  be  easily  disposed  of.  In  the  words 
of  Archibald  C.  Coolidge,  its  annexation,  "  being  a  natural 
consequence  of  the  Spanish  War,  met  with  little  opposi 
tion  from  any  quarter."  Writing  in  1908  he  sums  up 
with,  "All  told,  the  record  of  American  rule  has  been 
satisfactory  and  creditable."  1  This  is  supported  by  the 
words  of  a  competent  and  intelligent  English  authority, 
Eustace  Percy,  who  wrote  about  1919,  "In  Porto  Rico 
the  United  States  has  pursued  a  most  liberal  and  pro 
gressive  policy."  2  To  Joseph  B.  Foraker,  chairman  of 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Puerto  Rico,  fell  the  -duty  of 
drafting  the  organic  act  which  determined  our  relations 
with  Puerto  Rico.  This  became  a  law  in  1900,  is  known 
as  the  Foraker  Act,  was  upheld  somewhat  over  a  year 
later  as  constitutional  by  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court,  and  is  thus  referred  to  with  commendable  pride 
by  the  author,  "The  mere  fact  that  this  law  has  continued 
in  force,  practically  without  change,  ever  since  it  was 


1  The  United  States  as  a  World  Power,  143,  145. 

2  The  Responsibilities  of  the  League,  87. 

176 


CH.  VII. I  PUERTO  RICO— CUBA  177 

enacted,  now  full  fifteen  years  ago,  is  enough  to  indicate 
that  it  proved  satisfactory  when  put  into  practical  op 
eration."  l  "This  Act,"  wrote  William  F.  Willoughby, 
"is  in  every  respect  an  important  document.  It  may  be 
said  to  stand  to  our  new  insular  possessions  in  much  the 
same  relation  as  the  Northwest  Ordinance  did  to  our 
dependent  territory  on  the  mainland."  Willoughby  was 
Treasurer  of  Puerto  Rico  from  1901  to  1907  and,  while  in 
that  office,  wrote  a  book  in  which  he  gave  an  excellent 
account  and  analysis  of  the  Foraker  Act  summing  up 
with,  "The  problem  that  Congress  had  to  meet  when  it 
framed  the  organic  act  —  that  of  providing  a  system  of 
government  that  should  at  once  grant  a  maximum  of 
local  autonomy  and  at  the  same  time  make  provision  for 
sufficient  central  control  —  was  an  exceedingly  difficult 
one.  If  it  has  erred,  it  has  been  in  immediately  granting 
too  much  rather  than  too  little." 

"Whatever  may  be  the  fate  of  Cuba  in  the  future," 
wrote  Archibald  C.  Coolidge,  "the  treatment  she  has 
received  at  the  hands  of  the  United  States  in  the  decade 
since  she  was  made  free  will  remain  something  to  be  proud 
of."  3  The  pledge  contained  in  the  Teller  Amendment 
was  faithfully  kept.  After  the  Treaty  of  Paris  the  gov 
ernment  of  Cuba  was  for  a  while  under  the  direction  of 
the  American  Army.  Elihu  Root  had  become  Secretary 
of  War  and  he  was  insistent  that  Cubans  be  prepared 
for  a  civil  government  to  be  administered  by  themselves. 


1  Notes  of  a  Busy  Life,  Foraker,  ii.  82.     This  was  published  in  February, 
1916.    The  statute  is  printed  in  U.  S.  Statutes  at  large,  56th  Cong.,  vol.  31, 
p.  77. 

2  Territories  and  Dependencies  of  the  United  States,  83,  117. 

3  The  United  States  as  a  World  Power,  130. 


178  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1901 

But  before  the  American  Army  left,  a  great  work  was 
accomplished  in  sanitation  —  "the  marvel  of  the  age," 
Latan6  terms  it.1  "Read  the  story  of  yellow  fever  in 
Havana  and  Brazil,"  wrote  Dr.  William  Osier,  "if  you 
wish  to  get  an  idea  of  the  powers  of  experimental  medi 
cine  ;  there  is  nothing  to  match  it  in  the  history  of  human 
achievement."  2  The  work  in  Cuba  is  well  stated  by 
Secretary  Root  in  his  report  of  November  27, 1901.  "The 
eastern  part  of  the  island,"  he  wrote,  "is  entirely  free 
from  yellow  fever.  The  western  part  is  practically  free 
there  being  but  a  few  cases  in  or  about  Habana.  This 
dreaded  disease  has  passed  from  one  of  the  leading  causes  of 
death  to  one  of  the  least  frequent.  The  reduction  of  death 
rate  in  Habana  alone,  as  compared  with  the  former  death 
rate,  shows  an  average  of  approximately  3700  lives  per  year 
saved,  and  Habana  has  changed  its  position  from  one  of 
the  most  unhealthy  cities  to  one  of  the  most  healthy. 
The  control  of  yellow  fever,  acting  upon  the  results  of 
investigation  as  to  its  causes,  prosecuted  under  the  direc 
tion  of  the  military  government,  appears  to  be  now  prac 
tically  absolute."  3 

The  chief  credit  is  of  course  due  to  General  Wood  without 
whose  command  nothing  could  be  done,  but  associated 
with  him  in  this  "extraordinary  service  in  ridding  the 
island  of  yellow  fever"  were  Major  Walter  Reed  and  Ma 
jor  William  C.  Gorgas.  "The  name  of  Dr.  Jesse  W. 
Lazear,  contract  surgeon,"  continued  Secretary  Root, 
"who  voluntarily  permitted  himself  to  be  inoculated 
with  the  yellow  fever  germ,  in  order  to  furnish  a  necessary 


1  The  United  States  as  a  World  Power,  182. 

•" Man's  Redemption  of  Man,"  in  American  Mag.,  Dec.,  1910,   251. 

8  Report,  House  Docs.,  57th  Cong.  1st  Sess.,  39. 


CH.  VII.]  CUBA  179 

experimental  test  in  the  course  of  the  investigation,  and 
who  died  of  the  disease,  should  be  written  in  the  list  of 
the  martyrs  who  have  died  in  the  cause  of  humanity."  l 

A  census  was  taken  showing  a  population  of  1,572,797, 
of  whom  34  per  cent  were  able  to  read  and  write,  while 
66  per  cent  were  illiterate.  The  desire  and  need  of  popu 
lar  education  were  great  and  both  private  and  public 
efforts  were  made  in  this  direction.  The  wise  President 
of  Harvard  University,  Charles  W.  Eliot,  was  to  the  fore, 
raised  a  fund  for  the  purpose  and  invited  a  number  of 
Cuban  teachers  to  the  summer  school  in  Cambridge  where 
they  could  learn  from  masters  of  the  art  how  to  instruct 
others  eager  for  education  but  ignorant  of  the  way  to  get 
it.  These  teachers,  1281  in  number,  spent  the  summer 
in  attending  the  school  and  in  a  study  of  neighboring 
institutions  of  art  and  practical  manufacture,  and,  before 
they  went  home,  were  given  a  free  visit  to  New  York 
City  and  Washington. 2 

All  the  while,  progress  was  making  toward  the  training 
of  the  people  of  Cuba  for  self-government.  A  basis  of 
suffrage  was  agreed  upon  3  and  on  June  16,  1900,  munici 
pal  officers  throughout  the  entire  island  were  elected.  As 
soon  as  the  new  municipal  governments  were  fairly  in 
stalled,  a  call  for  a  constitutional  convention  was  made, 
and  thirty-one  delegates  to  it  were  orderly  chosen.  The 
convention  met  in  Havana  on  November  5,  1900,  and  was 
opened  by  General  Wood.  But  before  Cuba  could  be 
let  go,  the  relations  between  the  island  and  the  United 
States  must  be  defined.  This  was  done  in  the  Platt 


1  Report  of  Dec.  1,  1902.     House  Docs.  57,  Cong.  2d  Sess.,  10. 

8  Military  and  Colonial  Policy,  Root,  198. 

3  For  restrictions  on  universal  suffrage,  ibid.,  194. 


180  McKINLEY'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1901 

Amendment  to  the  Army  Appropriation  Bill  which  be 
came  a  law  on  March  2,  1901.  The  author  of  this  was 
Orville  H.  Platt  of  Connecticut  who  is  fitly  described  by 
his  biographer,  Louis  A.  Coolidge,  as  "an  old-fashioned 
senator/'  and  the  biography  is  said  to  be  "the  story  of  a 
life  unselfishly  devoted  to  the  public  service."  He  feared 
that  he  could  not  pass  the  measure  independently  through 
the  Senate  at  the  short  session  and  so  had  recourse  to  a 
rider  to  an  appropriation  bill. 

The  Platt  Amendment  provided  that : 

I.  The  independence  of  Cuba  should  not  in  any  way 
be  impaired  by  any  compact  with  a  foreign  power. 

II.  A  proper  limitation  was  made  as  to  the  amount  of 
any  public  debt  that  Cuba  should  contract. 

III.  Cuba  consented  to  tl\e  intervention  of  the  United 
States  "for  the  preservation  of  Cuban  independence,  the 
maintenance  of  a  government  adequate  for  the  protection 
of  life,  property  and  individual  liberty  and  for  discharg 
ing  the  obligations  imposed  by  the  Treaty  of  Paris  on  the 
United  States." 

IV.  The  acts  of  the  United  States  during  the  military 
occupancy  should  be  validated. 

V.  Cuba  would  maintain  "and  as  far  as  necessary" 
extend  the  work  of  sanitation. 

VI.  The  Isle  of  Pines  should  be  omitted  "from  the 
proposed  constitutional  boundaries  of  Cuba." 

VII.  Cuba  was  to  furnish  the  United  States  "lands 
necessary  for  coaling  or  naval  stations."  l 

Article  III  caused  the  greatest  amount  of  opposition 
in  the  Cuban  constitutional  convention  and  this  was 


1See  America  as  a  World  Power,   Latane",   Hart's  American  Nation 
Series,  189. 


CH.  VII. J  THE  PLATT  AMENDMENT  181 

finally  quieted  by  a  statement  of  Senator  Platt  and  an 
official  communication  to  a  committee  of  the  convention 
by  the  Secretary  of  War.1  Then  the  provisions  of  the  Platt 
Amendment  were  appended  to  the  Cuban  Constitution. 

Like  many  important  documents  the  authorship  of 
these  wise  provisions  has  been  in  dispute.  The  editors 
of  the  series  of  the  Root  publications  have  maintained 
that  it  was  drafted  by  Secretary  Root  and  this  claim  was 
made  indeed  during  the  lifetime  of  Senator  Platt.  The 
true  genesis  of  the  Platt  Amendment,  however,  is  truth 
fully  and  effectively  told  by  Senator  Platt  in  a  private 
letter  of  January  1,  1904:  "The  original  draft  was  my 
own.  ...  It  was  changed  from  time  to  time,  somewhat 
in  language  but  not  in  spirit,  in  consultation  both  with 
Republicans  of  the  Committee,  President  McKinley  and 
Secretary  Root.  A  final  consultation  between  myself 
and  Senator  Spooner  put  the  document  in  its  complete 
form."  Root's  titles  to  greatness  were  so  many  that 
he  would  be  the  last  man  to  claim  aught  that  was  not 
fully  his  own,  while  Senator  Platt's  admiration  at  an 
early  day  for  Root  was  unbounded.  He,  said  the  Sena 
tor,  is  discharging  the  duties  of  Secretary  of  War  better 
than  any  other  man  could.  But  he  could  fill  any  position 
in  the  Cabinet  and  indeed  he  might  serve  as  President 
with  capacity  and  wisdom. 

"At  any  rate,"  wrote  the  Senator  in  a  private  letter, 
"the  United  States  will  always,  under  the  so-called  Platt 
Amendment,  be  in  a  position  to  straighten  out  things  if 
they  get  seriously  bad."  3 


1  Life  of  Platt,  Coolidge,  344 ;   Military  and  Colonial  Policy,  Root,  214. 

2  Life  of    Platt,  Coolidge,  351,  et  ante;    Military  and  Colonial  Policy, 
Root,  viii.  3  Life  of  Platt,  Coolidge,  349. 


182  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1901 

Elections  were  held  in  Cuba  under  the  Constitution  on 
the  last  day  of  December,  1901,  when  governors  of  prov 
inces,  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  and 
presidential  and  senatorial  electors  were  chosen ;  these 
electors  met  during  the  following  February  and  elected  a 
President,  Vice-President  and  senators.  The  civil  govern 
ment  of  Cuba  was  duly  inaugurated  and  the  American 
troops  withdrawn  on  May  20,  1902.  With  pardonable 
pride  Elihu  Root  wrote  as  Secretary  of  War  in  his 
report  of  1902 :  "I  know  of  no  chapter  in  American  his 
tory  more  satisfactory  than  that  which  will  record  the 
conduct  of  the  military  government  of  Cuba.  The  credit 
for  it  is  due,  first  of  all,  to  General  Leonard  Wood."  In 
his  order  of  July  4,  1902,  Root  said  that  the  officers  and 
enlisted  men  "have  with  sincere  kindness  helped  the 
Cuban  people  to  take  all  the  successive  steps  necessary  to 
the  establishment  of  their  own  constitutional  government ; 
.  .  .  they  have  governed  Cuba  wisely,  regarding  justice  and 
respecting  individual  liberty;  have  honestly  collected 
and  expended  for  the  best  interests  of  the  Cuban  people 
the  revenues"  of  the  island.1 

The  peace,  the  health,  the  independence  of  Cuba  are 
necessary  to  the  United  States.  A  commercial  arrange 
ment  should  be  made  with  her  under  which  she  can  live, 
said  Root  in  his  report  of  November  27,  1901. 2  This 
meant  that  in  a  reciprocal  arrangement  the  duties  on 
her  sugar  and  tobacco  should  be  reduced.  This  proved 
to  be  a  long  and  tedious  process  owing  to  the  opposition 
of  some  selfishly  protected  interests,  but  the  arrangement 
was  finally  submitted  to  both  Houses  of  Congress. 


Report  of  Dec.  1,  1902,  9,  14.  2  P.  53. 


CH.  VII.]  THE  TREATY  WITH  CUBA  183 

Through  the  influence  of  President  Roosevelt  and  the 
work  of  Senator  Orville  H.  Platt  (to  mention  some  of  the 
agencies  working  to  this  end)  a  treaty  of  reciprocity  be 
tween  Cuba  and  the  United  States  was  ratified  late  in 
1903.  During  the  contest  Senator  Platt  wrote  in  a  pri 
vate  letter:  "The  reduction  on  Cuban  imports  will  not 
hurt  the  sugar  or  tobacco  industry  one  particle.  Neither 
the  sugar  trust  nor  the  tobacco  trust  will  derive  the  slight 
est  benefit  from  it.  The  talk  about  it  has  been  the  great 
est  exhibition  of  expansive  bosh  that  I  have  ever 
known."  1 

By  the  Platt  Amendment  it  was  provided  that  a  treaty 
between  the  two  countries  should  embody  its  provisions. 
This  was  made.  Our  course  towards  Cuba  is  well 
summed  up  by  Theodore  Roosevelt:  "We  made  the 
promise  to  give  Cuba  independence;  and  we  kept  the 
promise.  .  .  .  We  also  by  treaty  gave  the  Cubans  sub 
stantial  advantages  in  our  markets.  Then  we  left  the 
island,  turning  the  government  over  to  its  own 
people." 

The  Philippines  is  a  knotty  question.  It  has  been  a 
political  issue  and  the  course  of  the  administration  has 
aroused  sentimental  objection.  The  literature  on  the 
subject  is  enormous  and  observers,  who  have  remained 
long  and  have  written  candid  accounts,  have  arrived  at 
opposite  conclusions.3  It  is  best,  therefore,  in  the  maze 


1  Life  of  Platt,  Coolidge,  381. 

2  Autobiography,  545.     In  this  study  of  Cuba  I  have  been  much  helped 
by  Latane's  "America  as  a  World  Power."     See  the  Chapter  in  Life  of 
Platt  on  "Cuban  Scandals  and  Allowances." 

3  Charles  B.   Elliott  wrote:    "Many  writers,   American  and  English, 
who  have  favored  the  public  with  their  views  on  the  Philippines  .  .  .  sug- 


184  McKINLEY  AND  THE  PHILIPPINES  [1898 

of  contradictions  to  rely  on  the  man,  who,  more  than  any 
other  one,  is  responsible  for  our  policy  —  Elihu  Root. 
It  will  be  told  later  how  he  came  into  administrative 
office.  For  the  moment  it  suffices  to  say  that  he  regarded 
the  United  States  as  the  greatest  of  his  clients,  and  that 
an  ambassador  of  the  Russian  Czar  said  that  having  met 
most  of  the  public  men  of  Europe,  he  knew  no  one  who 
was  as  able  as  Elihu  Root. 

Before  he  called  Root  to  his  aid  President  McKinley 
had  inaugurated  the  government  of  the  Philippines.  His 
message  to  Otis,  who  was  the  military  commander  in  the 
islands,  stated  the  mission  of  the  United  States  but  in 
it  he  said  that  we  had  succeeded  to  the  "  sovereignty  of 
Spain "  and  that  our  aim  was  "  benevolent  assimilation. " 
Now  McKinley  was  entirely  sincere  and  the  anti-Impe 
rialists,  who  afterwards  played  upon  those  words,  failed 
to  comprehend  the  depth  of  his  religious  nature.  The 
overpowering  feeling  which  swayed  him  was  religious 
and  this  cannot  be  better  stated  than  in  the  private  letter 
to  him  of  Senator  Orville  H.  Platt  of  August  15,  1898. 
"I  feel  that  I  ought  to  say,"  he  wrote,  "that  during  the 
past  week  I  have  been  well  over  the  State  of  Connecticut 
and  I  am  satisfied  that  nine-tenths  of  the  people  of  the 
State  have  an  intense  feeling  that  we  should  insist  upon 
the  cession  of  all  the  Philippine  Islands.  These  who  be- 


gest  Kipling's  famous  'Pagett  M.  P.'  who  visited  India  in  winter  and 
'spoke  of  the  heat  of  India  as  the  Asia  solar  myth.'  "  As  his  entertainer 
returned  homeward  he  wrote  : 

"And  I  laughed  as  I  drove  from  the  station  but 

the  mirth  died  out  on  my  lips 
As  I  thought  of  the  fools  like  Pagett  who  write 
of  their  Eastern  Trips." 

The  Philippines  to  the  End  of  the  Commission  Government,  376. 


CH.  VII.]  THE  PHILIPPINES  185 

lieve  in  Providence  see,  or  think  they  see,  that  God  has 
placed  upon  this  government  the  solemn  duty  of  provid 
ing  for  the  people  of  these  islands,  a  government  based 
upon  the  principle  of  liberty,  no  matter  how  many  diffi 
culties  the  problem  may  present.  They  feel  that  it  is 
our  duty  to  attempt  its  solution.  Among  Christian 
thoughtful  people  the  sentiment  is  akin  to  that  which 
has  maintained  the  missionary  work  of  the  last  century 
in  foreign  lands.  I  assure  you  that  it  is  difficult  to  over 
estimate  the  strength  and  intensity  of  this  sentiment. 
If,  in  the  negotiations  for  peace,  Spain  is  permitted  to 
retain  any  portion  of  the  Philippines  it  will  be  regarded 
as  a  failure  on  the  part  of  this  nation  to  discharge  the 
greatest  moral  obligation  which  could  be  conceived."  L 

Connecticut  is  a  small  State  but  it  has  great  influence 
especially  in  the  Western  States  through  which  President 
McKinley  made  his  "famous  Western  journey"  and  had 
his  own  opinion  confirmed.  The  attempt  of  many  anti- 
Imperialists  to  hint  that  love  of  gain  was  the  prime  cause 
of  our  taking  the  Philippines  is  not  borne  out  by  the 
record. 

The  first  interference  by  Congress  with  the  Commis 
sion  government  was  by  the  Spooner  Amendment  to  the 
Army  Appropriation  Bill,  which  was  approved  on  March 
2,  1901  ;  this  was  decidedly  opposed  to  any  attempt  to 
exploit  the  islands.2  The  Philippine  Commission,  in  their 
report  to  the  Secretary  of  War  of  November  1,  1902,  spoke 
of  "the  burdensome  restrictions  upon  the  investment  of 


of  Platt,  Coolidge,  287. 
2  The  Spooner  Amendment  is  printed  in  Root,   Milit.   and   Colonial 
Policy,  255.     See  speech  of  Senator  Lodge  on  an  earlier  bill.     Speeches 
and  Addresses,  317. 


186  NO  LAND-GRABBING  GAME  [1901 

capital  in  lands  and  mines  in  these  islands.  .  .  .  The  re 
quirements,"  they  continued,  "that  no  corporation  shall 
own  more  than  2500  acres,  stops  absolutely  the  invest 
ment  of  new  capital  in  the  sugar  industry  and  in  the  to 
bacco  industry.  It  takes  away  any  hope  of  bringing 
prosperity  to  these  islands  by  the  extending  of  the  acreage 
in  the  cultivation  of  these  two  important  products  of  the 
archipelago.  It  very  much  interferes  with  the  invest 
ment  of  capital  in  railroad  enterprises,  because  they  are 
naturally  connected  with  the  possibilities  of  transporta 
tion  of  sugar  and  tobacco  from  the  interior  to  the  sea 
ports."  1  In  their  report  of  December  23,  1903,  they  re 
turned  to  the  subject  and  recommended  that  "the  limi 
tation  ought  either  to  be  removed  entirely  or  be  increased 
so  as  to  allow  the  acquisition  of  at  least  25,000  acres  of 
land."  2 

The  charge  that  our  acquisition  was  "a  greedy  land- 
grabbing  game"  may  have  come  from  the  open  plans  of 
promoters  of  new  enterprises.  So  far  as  I  have  been  able 
to  discover  there  were  no  extravagant  profits  except  those 
made  out  of  the  70,000  American  soldiers  by  some  half 
dozen  "American  trading  companies,"  who  acquired 
"quick  and  large  profits"  referred  to  by  Civil  Governor 
William  H.  Taft  in  his  report  of  November  15,  1903.3 
It  was  the  old  story  of  Pistol, 

"I  shall  sutler  be 
Unto  the  Camp  and  profits  will  accrue."  4 

While  on  this  subject  the  idea  may  at  once  be  dismissed 
that  the  United  States  made  any  money  out  of  the  Phil 
ippines.  Archibald  C.  Coolidge,  whose  authority  can- 

1  Report,  7.  2  Report,  9. 

1  P.  49.  4  King  Henry  V.,  act  ii.,  scene  1. 


CH.  VII.]  THE  PHILIPPINES  187 

not  be  gainsaid,  wrote  in  1908:  "  American  capital  has 
not  come  in  in  the  way  that  was  expected,  partly  on 
account  of  the  legislation  passed  to  protect  the  natives 
against  exploitation,  but  more  particularly  because  people 
have  found  it  safer  and  more  profitable  to  invest  their 
money  nearer  home."  l  It  is  true  that  the  manipulation 
of  the  tariff,  although  a  concession  was  made  to  the  prod 
ucts  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  was  not  enlightened  pol 
icy.  Governor  Taft  desired  absolute  free  trade  with  the 
islands  but  it  took  a  number  of  years,  and  then  under  his 
own  presidency  (1909),  to  effect  this  consummation. 

President  McKinley  was  a  conscientious  Methodist, 
and  he  fully  believed  that  in  the  Philippines  the  white 
man's  burden  was  laid  upon  the  United  States.  As  men 
act  from  mingled  motives,  the  idea  of  personal  fame 
doubtless  was  bound  up  in  his  action.  He  was  a  student 
of  American  history  and  knew  it  well  for  the  years  that 
came  within  his  personal  remembrance.  Every  American 
President  since  1865  has  emulated  the  fame  of  Lincoln, 
as  did  McKinley,  when  in  his  speech  accepting  the  nomi 
nation  in  1900,  he  declared  :  "The  Republican  Party  .  .  . 
broke  the  shackles  of  4,000,000  slaves  and  made  them  free, 
and  to  the  party  of  Lincoln  has  come  another  supreme 
opportunity  which  it  has  bravely  met  in  the  liberation 
of  10,000,000  of  the  human  family  from  the  yoke  of  im 
perialism."  2  He  likewise  believed  that  the  possession  of 
the  Philippines  would  be  an  assistance  to  our  growing 
trade  in  the  Orient. 

No  one  can  write  on  this  subject  without  devoting  a 
large  amount  of  study  to  the  arguments  of  the  anti- 

1  The  United  States  as  a  World  Power,  170. 

2  Life  of  McKinley,  Olcott-  ii.  287.     This  was  then  stated 


188  STOREY  —  SCHURZ  [1901 

Imperialists  with  whose  statements,  so  far  as  they  can  be 
tortured  into  reasoning  that  we  had  no  business  trying  to 
govern  people  7000  miles  away,  I  am  in  entire  sympathy. 
Moorfield  Storey's  acute  logic  and  large  present 
intelligence  would  make  one  almost  feel  that  Charles 
Sumner  was  on  earth  again  interpreting  the  Constitution 
and  the  acts  of  the  President  by  the  truths  of  the  Declara 
tion  of  Independence.  His  opposition  to  our  work  in 
the  Philippines  was  sincere  and  was  urged  by  a  sacrifice 
of  present  ease  and  earthly  honors.  For  he  was  of  the 
stuff  of  which  martyrs  are  made  and,  in  earlier  days,  would 
have  suffered  for  his  opinions  at  the  stake.  Carl  Schurz, 
according  to  a  personal  friend,  was  a  revolutionist  and 
thus  he  showed  himself  in  his  opposition  to  the  Philippine 
policy.  His  speeches  were  those  of  an  orator  and  his 
well-rounded  periods  put  his  position  with  great  force. 
His  argument,  which  was  generally  concurred  in  by  the 
anti-Imperialists  that  we  should  treat  the  Philippines  as 
we  had  treated  Cuba,  was  well  put,  attested  as  it  was  by 
the  despatch  of  Admiral  Dewey  that  the  Filipinos  "are 
far  superior  in  their  intelligence  and  more  capable  of  self- 
government  than  the  natives  of  Cuba,  and  I  am  familiar 
with  both  races."1  But  Schurz's  plan  in  giving  self- 
government  to  the  Philippines  was  "to  make  the  Philip 
pine  Islands  neutral  territory  as  Belgium  and  Switzerland 
are  in  Europe."  2  Schurz  fortunately  did  not  live  to  see 
the  guarantee  of  Belgium's  neutrality  treated  as  a  mere 
"scrap  of  paper,"  nor  did  he  become  disabused  of  his 
profound  admiration  for  the  German  Emperor,  Wilhelm 


1  Despatch  of  Dewey  to  Sec.  of  Navy,  June  27,  1898. 

2  Speech  of  Oct.  17,  1899.    Speeches,  etc.,  vi.  108. 


CH.  VII.]  THE  EMPEROR  OF  GERMANY  189 

II.  "  Whether  the  Emperor  of  Germany  did  not  at  one 
time  wish  to  acquire  the  Philippines,  I  do  not  know," 
he  said.  "But  if  we  offered  him  the  Philippines  to-day 
with  our  compliments,  he  would  doubtless  ask,  'How 
large  an  army  do  you  have  to  employ  to  subjugate  the 
country?'  The  answer  would  be,  'At  present  60,000 
men ;  we  may  need  100,000. '  The  Emperor  would  smil 
ingly  reply,  'Thank  you.  Offer  this  job  to  someone  who 
is  as  foolish  as  you  have  been.'  He  would  probably  be 
too  polite  to  say  so,  but  he  would  doubtless  think  so."  1 
At  this  time  a  majority  of  the  best  informed  people  in 
the  United  States  and  England  believed  that  Germany 
would  take  these  islands  if  she  could  get  them  and  apply, 
if  need  be,  the  ruthless  methods  which  the  Emperor  told 
his  troops  to  employ  in  China.  "Spare  nobody,"  he 
said,  "make  no  prisoners,  use  your  weapons  in  a  manner 
to  make  every  Chinaman  for  a  thousand  years  to  come 
forego  the  wish  to  as  much  as  look  askance  at  a  Ger 
man."  2 

The  opposition  of  Senator  George  F.  Hoar  was  pathetic. 
A  true  Republican,  he  loved  McKinley,  who,  late  in  1898, 
was  committed  to  taking  the  Philippines.  When  he  saw 
the  President  during  December  of  that  year  and  was 
taken  by  the  hand  with  the  question,  "How  are  you  feel 
ing  this  winter,  Mr.  Senator?"  "Pretty  pugnacious,  I 
confess,  Mr.  President,"  "The  tears  came  into  his  eyes 
and  McKinley  said,  grasping  my  hand  again,  'I  shall 
always  love  you  whatever  you  do.'"3  Hoar  planted 


1  Speech  of  Sept.  28,  1900,  ibid.,  248. 

2  July  2,  1900.     The  Kaiser's   Speeches,  Wolf  von   Schierbrand,  260 
(1903). 

3  Autobiography,  ii.  315. 


190  GEORGE  F.  HOAR  [1899 

himself  on  the  Declaration  of  Independence  that  "  gov 
ernments  derive  their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of 
the  governed. "  He  was  a  true  disciple  of  Charles  Sum- 
ner  "to  whom,"  he  said,  "the  Declaration  of  Independ 
ence  was  another  gospel."  l  We  ought  to  have  treated 
the  Philippines  as  we  did  Cuba,  he  affirmed,  and  had  we 
done  so,  a  government  under  Aguinaldo  and  his  associates 
would  have  been  formed  as  stable  as  the  governments 
from  the  United  States  to  Cape  Horn.  A  democracy,  he 
declared,  "cannot  rule  over  vassal  states  as  subject  people 
without  bringing  in  the  elements  of  death  into  its  own 
constitution."  2  This  idea  was  extensively  elaborated 
by  Carl  Schurz,  but  it  had  great  force  coming  from  a  true 
American  and  a  loyal  Republican  like  Senator  Hoar. 

In  truth  there  is  something  admirable  in  these  three 
men  pleading  for  the  rights  of  eight  million  brown  people 
as  they  had  hitherto  for  four  million  blacks.  It  is  the 
old  story  of  the  superior  taking  the  part  of  the  inferior, 
and  it  involves  the  subjugation  of  race  pride  and  putting 
one's  self  in  the  place  of  the  brown  or  black  man. 

McKinley  had  aspirations  after  culture  and  was  es 
pecially  fond  of  college  men.  He  decided  to  send  a  Com 
mission  to  the  Philippines,  at  whose  head  should  be  Jacob 
G.  Schurman,  President  of  Cornell  University.  During 
January,  1899,  Schurman  was  summoned  to  Washington 
and  such  an  invitation  was  extended  to  him.  He  de 
murred  first  because  he  feared  that  he  could  not  leave 
the  University  and  then  he  said,  "To  be  plain,  Mr.  Pres 
ident,  I  am  opposed  to  your  Philippine  policy ;  I  never 


1  Speech  in  the  Senate,  Jan.  9,  1899 ;    see  Senator  Lodge's  argument 
on  "consent  of  the  governed."     Speeches  and  Addresses,  326. 

2  Senate  speech. 


CH.  VII.]  THE  SCHURMAN  COMMISSION  191 

wanted  the  Philippine  Islands."  "Oh,"  was  the  reply, 
"that  need  not  trouble  you ;  I  didn't  want  the  Philippine 
Islands  either;  and  in  the  protocol  to  the  treaty  I  felt 
myself  free  not  to  take  them,  but  in  the  end  there  was 
no  alternative."  The  American  people  certainly  would 
not  consent  to  leave  the  Philippines  to  Spain,  the  Presi 
dent  argued,  and,  as  that  was  no  longer  a  question,  if 
"American  sovereignty  were  not  set  up,  the  peace  of  the 
world  would  be  endangered."  We,  so  he  implied,  cer 
tainly  owed  responsibilities  to  the  world  at  large.  The 
President  desired  this  Commission  to  act  as  an  advisory 
Cabinet  and  he  especially  wished  to  know  what  sort  of 
political  relations  it  was  wise  to  establish  between  the 
United  States  and  eight  million  l  brown  men  of  Asia. 
He  desired  aid  in  shaping  such  a  policy  and  at  the  same 
time  a  tactful  cooperation  with  the  naval  and  military 
authorities  at  Manila.2  Schurman  accepted  the  Presi 
dency  of  the  Commission  and  McKinley  named  as  his 
associates  Admiral  Dewey,  General  Otis  (who  was  the  mil 
itary  commander  in  the  Philippines),  Charles  Denby  and 
Dean  C.  Worcester  of  the  University  of  Michigan. 

When  Schurman  arrived  in  Manila  he  found  a  war  in 
progress  which  was  an  interruption  to  his  peaceful  errand. 
The  American  and  Philippine  armies  had  faced  each  other 
near  Manila  for  a  number  of  weeks  in  hostile  array.  The 
Americans  had  bought  the  sovereignty  of  the  islands 
from  Spain  but  the  Filipinos  supposed  that  in  the  event 


1  The  first  Commission  adopted  that  figure  (15).     The  Census  of  1903 
made  the  population  somewhat  less.     Enc.  Brit. ;  Blount,  Amer.  Occupa 
tion  of  the  Philippines,  567.     Williams  wrote  that  the  population  to  the 
square  mile  was  about  66,   to  350  in  Java,   290  in  Japan,   200  in  In 
dia.     Odyssey  of  the  P.  Com.,  306. 

2  Schurman,     A  Retrospect  and  Outlook,  2. 


192  THE  REVOLT  OF  THE  FILIPINOS  U899 

of  American  success  they  were  to  be  granted  their  inde 
pendence.  The  fight  which  broke  out  on  February  4, 
1899,  was  therefore  one  between  sovereignty  and  inde 
pendence.  The  feeling  which  became  pretty  general 
among  the  Filipinos  may  be  stated  thus:  "If  the  Amer 
icans  are  going  to  look  on  us  and  treat  us  as  the  Spaniards 
have  done  for  three  hundred  years  we  do  not  want  them 
here."  1  Aguinaldo  was  the  head  of  the  Filipinos  and  he 
was  a  Malay  of  marked  ability.  A  born  leader  he  knew 
how  to  consolidate  the  different  factions  in  the  islands. 
While  he  was  far  from  being  the  "  George  Washington 
of  the  Orient,"  as  some  of  the  anti-Imperialists  in  Amer 
ica  called  him,  he  probably  conducted  as  well  as  possible 
the  war  for  independence.  But  it  is  a  question  whether 
he  and  most  of  his  followers  would  have  opposed  the 
Americans  had  they  known  that  they  came  there  not  to 
exploit  the  islands  but  to  assist  them  in  their  progress 
toward  civilization.  The  Filipinos,  however,  had  been 
fed  with  promises  until  they  had  come  to  distrust  the 
white  man ;  and  the  minute  blood  was  shed  the  sympa 
thy  of  the  mass  ran  with  their  brown  brothers.  The 
Filipino  soldiers  were,  however,  no  match  for  the  Amer 
icans,  and  while  they  had  modern  rifles  they  did  not  know 
how  to  use  them,  so  that  casualties  on  their  side  were 
large  and  entirely  out  of  proportion  to  the  losses  of  the 
Americans.  By  the  end  of  1899  organized  resistance  to 
the  United  States  Government  came  to  an  end,  and  there 
after  the  insurrection  took  the  form  of  guerilla  warfare 
which,  in  many  cases,  degenerated  into  brigandage.  In 
November  of  this  year  Aguinaldo  disappeared  into  the 


Unofficial  Letters  of  an  Official's  Wife,  Edith  Moses  (1908),  74. 


CH.  VII.  1  THE  SCHURMAN  COMMISSION  193 

wilderness  and  apparently  played  little  or  no  part  in  the 
guerilla  warfare. 

The  Schurman  Commission  became  one  of  investiga 
tion  and  in  their  report  of  January  31,  1900,  maintained 
that  the  Philippine  Islands  could  not  stand  alone.  To 
become  "  self-governing  and  independent "  they  needed 
the  "tutelage  and  protection  of  the  United  States."  But 
the  "goal  of  the  intelligent  Filipinos"  was  ultimate  in 
dependence —  "independence  after  an  undefined  period 
of  American  training."  1  "Should  our  power  by  any 
fatality  be  withdrawn,"  it  said,  "the  Commission  be 
lieve  that  the  government  of  the  Philippines  would  speed 
ily  lapse  into  anarchy,  which  would  excuse,  if  it  did  not 
necessitate,  the  intervention  of  other  powers  and  the 
eventual  division  of  the  islands  among  them."  2 

About  ten  per  cent  of  the  Filipinos  were  educated  men, 
of  high  intelligence.  They  knew  Spanish,  the  civilization 
and  the  literature  of  Spain,  but  naturally  they  were  not 
all  saints.  A  goodly  proportion  of  them  were  office- 
seekers  of  the  type  we  know  in  the  United  States,  and 
they  desired  independence  in  order  to  hold  the  purse 
strings  of  the  nation,  while  if  they  were  under  an  Ameri 
can  protectorate  they  would  be  protected  from  other 
Asiatic  and  European  countries  by  the  American  Navy, 
in  the  event  that  they  should  misconduct  themselves  in 
foreign  affairs.  The  radicals,  whose  true  leader  was  Agui- 
naldo,  influenced  a  majority  of  this  ten  per  cent  and  they 
swayed  the  mass.  All  but  less  than  a  million  were  Ro- 


1  Report,  83. 

2  Senate  hearings  on  affairs  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  2983.     Henry 
Cabot  Lodge  was  the  efficient  chairman  of  the  committee  before  whom 
the  hearings  were  had. 


194  THE  FILIPINOS  [1900 

man  Catholic  Christians  and  this  religion  was  imposed 
upon  them  by  the  Spanish  conquest  three  hundred  years 
before,  and  the  Spaniards  brought  to  them  also  Spanish 
civilization  which  proved  to  be  an  element  of  great  prog 
ress.  In  one  respect  at  least  the  Filipinos  stood  high  in 
comparison  with  other  Orientals  and  even  Europeans  — 
in  their  regard  for  women.  Antedating  the  Spanish  con 
quest  there  was  an  equal  inheritance  law.  Never  were 
soldiers  and  officers  of  the  American  Army  more  mis 
taken  than  when  they  called  the  Filipinos  " niggers,"  as 
in  all  essentials  the  Filipinos  stood  far  in  advance  of  the 
American  negro.1  Really  the  Filipinos  and  Americans 
should  have  stood  shoulder  to  shoulder  instead  of  appeal 
ing  to  force  for  their  varying  immediate  aims.  But  as 
Carl  Schurz  sagely  remarked,  "The  best  government 
will  always  be  unpopular  if  it  is  foreign  government."  2 
When  Storey,  Hoar  and  Schurz  opposed  the  Philippine 
policy  of  the  administration  on  the  ground  that  "govern 
ments  derive  their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed"  they  were  entirely  logical,  for  the  course  of 
events  makes  it  evident  that  the  Filipinos  did  not  desire 
American  rule ;  but  it  was  no  more  flagrant  a  case  than 
the  war  of  the  North  on  the  Confederate  States,  as  the 
Southern  people  desired  a  government  of  their  own  with 
slavery  amply  protected.  Lincoln  conducted  the  war  on 
the  ground  that  a  majority  of  the  Southern  people  were 
not  of  the  same  mind  as  their  leaders,  and  McKinley, 
Root  and  Taft  made  war  on  the  Philippine  insurgents 
with  a  similar  view. 


1  As  to  this  see  Blount,  American  Occupation  of  the  Philippines,  365. 

2  Schurz,  Speeches,  vi.  175. 


CH.  VII.]  ROOT  SECRETARY  OF  WAR  195 

McKinley  was  a  rare  judge  of  men.  When  he  forced 
the  resignation  of  Russell  A.  Alger  as  Secretary  of  War,  he 
appointed  to  the  position  Elihu  Root  of  New  York.  The 
appointment  was  made  during  July,  1899,  and  Root  thus 
told  the  story:  " Having  just  finished  the  labors  of  the 
year  and  gone  to  my  country  home,  I  was  called  to  the 
telephone  and  told  by  one  speaking  for  President 
McKinley,  *  the  President  directs  me  to  say  to  you  that 
he  wishes  you  to  take  the  position  of  Secretary  of  War.' 
I  answered,  i  Thank  the  President  for  me,  but  say  that  it 
is  quite  absurd.  I  know  nothing  about  war.  I  know 
nothing  about  the  army.'  I  was  told  to  hold  the  wire, 
and  in  a  moment  there  came  back  the  reply,  'President 
McKinley  directs  me  to  say  that  he  is  not  looking  for 
anyone  who  knows  anything  about  the  army ;  he  has  got 
to  have  a  lawyer  to  direct  the  government  of  those  Span 
ish  islands  and  you  are  the  lawyer  he  wants/  Of  course," 
proceeded  Root,  "I  had  then,  on  the  instant,  to  deter 
mine  what  kind  of  a  lawyer  I  wished  to  be,  and  there  was 
but  one  answer  to  make,  and  so  I  went  to  perform  a  law 
yer's  duty  upon  the  call  of  the  greatest  of  all  our  clients, 
the  government  of  our  country." 

Root  described  his  labor :  "It  was  a  fascinating  work. 
It  was  the  work  of  applying  to  some  ten  millions  of  people 
in  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippines,  the  prin 
ciples  of  American  liberty.  They  were  living  under  laws 
founded  upon  the  customs  of  their  lives,  customs  drawn 
from  old  Spain  and  developed  in  social  and  industrial 
activity  quite  unlike  that  of  the  United  States ;  and  the 
problem  was  to  apply  those  principles  which  are  declared 
in  our  constitutions,  which  embodied  the  formative  idea 
of  the  Declaration  of  Independence  that  all  men  are  en- 


196  ROOT  AND  McKINLEY  [1001 

dowed  with  inalienable  rights,  among  which  are  life  and 
liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness,  to  the  customs  and 
the  laws  of  people  which  had  come  down  from  the  Spain 
of  Philip  the  Second  and  the  Inquisition."  l 

Root's  opinion  of  McKinley  after  more  than  two  years 
of  official  and  personal  intercourse  may  well  be  cited : 
"How  wise  and  skilful  he  was!  how  modest  and  self- 
effacing  !  how  deep  his  insight  into  the  human  heart !  how 
swift  the  intuitions  of  his  sympathy!  how  compelling 
the  charm  of  his  gracious  presence !  He  was  so  unselfish, 
so  thoughtful  of  the  happiness  of  others,  so  genuine  a 
lover  of  his  country  and  kind.  And  he  was  the  kindest 
and  tenderest  friend  who  ever  grasped  another's  hand. 
Alas  that  his  virtues  did  plead  in  vain  against  cruel 
fate!"2 

As  President  McKinley  was  unable  to  secure  the  re 
turn  to  the  Philippines  of  his  first  Commission,  he  ap 
pointed  a  new  one :  William  H.  Taft,  Professor  Dean  C. 
Worcester  of  the  University  of  Michigan,  Luke  E.  Wright 
of  Tennessee,  Henry  C.  Ide  of  Vermont  and  Professor 
Bernard  Moses  of  the  University  of  California.  It  must 
be  premised  that  Taft  was  Judge  of  the  United  States 
Circuit  Court  and  the  height  of  his  ambition  was  a  seat 
on  the  United  States  Supreme  bench.  He  was  desig 
nated  as  President  of  the  Board  and  has  thus  told  the 
story  of  his  appointment:  "It  was  in  February,  1900, 
that  in  the  court  house  in  Cincinnati  I  received  from  Mr. 
McKinley  a  telegram  which  read  like  this,  'If  you  have 
no  other  engagement,  you  will  do  me  a  great  favor  by 
calling  on  me  in  Washington  some  time  next  week/  I 


1  Military  and  Colonial  Policy,  Root,  xiv,  xv.  2  Ibid.,  112. 


CH.  VII]  THE  TAFT  COMMISSION  197 

did  not  know  of  any  vacancy  existing  on  the  Supreme 
Court  bench  but  I  went  to  Washington  just  the  same. 
Arriving  at  the  White  House  I  was  ushered  into  the  Cab 
inet  room  and  there  I  met  the  President.  '  Judge/  he 
said,  'I'd  like  to  have  you  go  to  the  Philippines.'  I  said, 
'  Mr.  President,  what  do  you  mean  by  going  to  the  Philip 
pines?'  He  replied,  'We  must  establish  a  government 
there  and  I  would  like  you  to  help.'  '  But,  Mr.  Presi 
dent,'  I  said,  'I  am  sorry  we  have  got  the  Philippines. 
I  don't  want  them  and  I  think  you  ought  to  have  some 
man  who  is  more  in  sympathy  with  the  situation/  '  You 
don't  want  them  any  less  than  I  do/  replied  the  President, 
'but  we  have  got  them  and  in  dealing  with  them  I  think 
I  can  trust  the  man  who  didn't  want  them  better  than 
I  can  the  man  who  did.'  You  can  readily  understand/' 
continued  Taft,  "the  feelings  of  a  man  whose  only  ob 
ject  in  going  to  Washington  was  the  hope  of  finding  a 
vacant  cushion  on  the  Supreme  Court  bench  to  be  asked 
to  go  10,000  miles  from  home.  But  after  I  had  talked 
with  Mr.  McKinley  and  with  Secretary  Root  I  decided 
I  would  go  and  in  a  hurry.  I  went  under  the  influence 
of  Mr.  McKinley's  personality,  the  influence  he  had  of 
making  people  do  what  they  ought  to  do  in  the  interest 
of  the  public  service.  Mr.  McKinley  said  he  would  stand 
by  me  in  the  Philippines  and  he  did."  1 

The  instructions  to  this  Commission  of  April  7,  1900, 
addressed  to  the  Secretary  of  War  are  properly  called 
the  magna  carta  of  the  Philippines.  It  is  asserted  by 
the  editors  of  the  Root  volumes  2  that  this  paper  was 


1  Speech  of  President-elect  Taft,  New  York  City,  Dec.  13,  1908,  Bos 
ton  Herald. 

2  Robert   Bacon  and  James  Brown  Scott. 


198  ROOT'S  INSTRUCTIONS  (1900 

drafted  by  Root  and  with  "trifling  verbal  changes  "  signed 
by  the  President.1  This  is  asserted  by  other  writers  and 
so  far  as  I  know  not  contradicted,  so  it  may  be  recorded 
as  a  fact.  As  the  military  government  was  now  supreme 
and  it  was  desirable  to  avoid  any  conflict  with  the  Civil 
Commission,  both  the  general  in  command  and  the  Com 
mission  were  directed  to  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 
The  Commission  should  at  first  "  devote  their  attention 
to  the  establishment  of  municipal  government,  in  which 
the  natives  of  the  islands,  both  in  the  cities  and  in  the 
rural  communities,  shall  be  afforded  the  opportunity  to 
manage  their  own  local  affairs  to  the  fullest  extent  of 
which  they  are  capable,  and  subject  to  the  least  degree 
of  supervision  and  control,  which  a  careful  study  of  their 
capacities  and  observation  of  the  workings  of  native  con 
trol  show  to  be  consistent  with  the  maintenance  of  law, 
order,  and  loyalty."  Next  should  be  the  organization  of 
government  in  the  large  administrative  divisions,  the 
intent  being  to  substitute  civil  for  military  control.  On 
September  1,  1900,  the  legislative  authority  which  had 
been  exercised  by  the  military  governor  should  be  trans 
ferred  to  the  Civil  Commission.  "Exercise  of  this  legis 
lative  authority,"  the  instructions  continued,  "will  in 
clude  the  making  of  rules  and  orders,  having  the  effect 
of  law,  for  the  raising  of  revenue  by  taxes,  custom  duties 
and  imports ;  the  appropriation  and  expenditure  of  pub 
lic  funds  of  the  islands ;  the  establishment  of  an  educa 
tional  system  throughout  the  islands ;  the  establishment 
of  a  system  to  secure  an  efficient  civil  service  ;  the  organiza 
tion  and  establishment  of  courts ;  the  organization  and 


Military  and  Colonial  Policy,  225. 


CH.  VII.]  ROOT'S  INSTRUCTIONS  199 

establishment  of  municipal  and  departmental  govern 
ments,  and  all  other  matters  of  a  civil  nature.  .  .  .  Wher 
ever  civil  governments  are  constituted  under  the  directions 
of  the  Commission,  such  military  posts,  garrisons  and  forces 
will  be  continued  for  the  suppression  of  insurrection  and 
brigandage  and  the  maintenance  of  law  and  order  as  the 
Military  Commander  shall  deem  requisite,  and  the  military 
forces  shall  be  at  all  times  subject,  under  his  orders,  to  the 
call  of  the  civil  authorities  for  the  maintenance  of  law 
and  order  and  the  enforcement  of  their  authority." 

Natives  of  the  islands  should  be  preferred  for  the  offices 
but  they  must  be  absolutely  and  unconditionally  loyal 
to  the  United  States.  The  government  established  is 
"not  for  our  satisfaction  or  for  the  expression  of  our  theo 
retical  views,  but  for  the  happiness,  peace  and  prosperity 
of  the  people  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  and  the  measures 
adopted  should  be  made  to  conform  to  their  customs, 
their  habits,  and  even  their  prejudices  to  the  fullest  extent 
consistent  with  the  accomplishment  of  the  indispensable 
requisites  of  just  and  effective  government." 

Then  followed,  substantially,  the  Bill  of  Rights  of  the 
American  Constitution ;  but  the  right  to  bear  arms  and 
trial  by  jury  were  not  included  in  the  enumeration  of  the 
safeguards  of  liberty.  Education  should  be  promoted 
and  extended.  This  was  an  easy  matter  as  the  desire 
for  education  was  almost  universal  and  the  wish  to  learn 
English  eager.  With  wisdom  the  direction  to  the  Com 
mission  was:  "Instruction  should  be  given  in  the  first 
instance  in  every  part  of  the  islands  in  the  language  of 
the  people.  In  view  of  the  great  number  of  languages 
spoken  by  the  different  tribes,  it  is  especially  important 
to  the  prosperity  of  the  islands  that  a  common  medium 


200  ROOT'S  INSTRUCTIONS  [1900 

of  communication  may  be  established,  and  it  is  obviously 
desirable  that  this  medium  should  be  the  English  lan 
guage.  Especial  attention  should  be  at  once  given  to 
affording  full  opportunity  to  all  of  the  islands  to 
acquire  the  use  of  the  English  language."  The  compre 
hensive  instructions  ended  with:  A  "high  and  sacred 
obligation  rests  upon  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  to  give  protection  for  property  and  life,  civil  and 
religious  freedom  and  wise,  firm  and  unselfish  guidance 
in  the  paths  of  peace  and  prosperity  to  all  the  people  of 
the  Philippine  Islands.  I,"  said  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  "charge  this  Commission  to  labor  for  the 
full  performance  of  this  obligation,  which  concerns  the 
honor  and  conscience  of  their  country,  in  the  firm  hope 
that  through  their  labors  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  Phil 
ippine  Islands  may  come  to  look  back  with  gratitude  to 
the  day  when  God  gave  victory  to  American  arms  at 
Manila  and  set  their  land  under  the  sovereignty  and  the 
protection  of  the  people  of  the  United  States."  1 

The  way  was  paved  by  the  introduction  of  a  bill  from 
the  Committee  on  the  Philippines  which,  although  not 
enacted,  offered  a  statement  from  Senator  Henry  Cabot 
Lodge,  who  was  in  full  sympathy  with  our  possession  of 
the  Philippines.  On  March  7, 1900,  he  said :  The  "Presi 
dent,  under  the  military  power,  which  still  controls  and 
must  for  some  time  control  the  islands,  could  do  all  that 
this  bill  provides.  .  .  .  We  follow  the  well-settled  pre 
cedents  of  Jefferson  and  Monroe.  .  .  .  We  may  safely 
tread  in  the  footsteps  of  the  author  of  the  Declara 
tion  of  Independence.  He  saw  no  contradiction  be- 


\Messages  and  Papers  of  the  President,  Supplement,  139. 


CH.  VII.]  ROOT'S  INSTRUCTIONS  201 

tween  that  great  instrument  and  the  treaty  with 
Napoleon."  L 

These  instructions  were  approved  by  the  Spooner 
Amendment  (March  2,  1901)  and  by  the  Philippine  Gov 
ernment  Act  of  July  1,  1902.  Upon  this  magna  carta 
was  built  the  government  of  the  Philippines.  The  Com 
mission  had  full  power  to  rule  the  islands.  Root  was  the 
creator  and  Taft  the  practical  instrument;  both  were 
backed  loyally  by  Presidents  McKinley  and  Roosevelt, 
and  all  wrought  together  in  perfect  harmony,  furnishing 
an  example  of  the  wise  administration  of  colonial  pos 
sessions  on  a  new  and  original  plan.  Certainly  no  gov 
ernment  was  better  served. 

The  Commission  had  a  guerilla  warfare  to  reckon  with. 
During  1900  this  was  kept  alive  by  the  hope  of  Demo 
cratic  success  in  the  presidential  election,  as  the  leaders 
assured  the  masses  that,  in  the  event  of  Bryan's  triumph, 
their  independence  would  be  secured.2 

During  March,  1901,  Aguinaldo,  who  was  termed  "the 
incarnation  of  the  insurrection,"  was  captured,  as  the 
result  of  a  " desperate  enterprise"  by  General  Funston 
with  four  American  officers,  assisted  by  about  eighty  Mac- 
cabebes,  who,  though  Filipinos,  had  a  long-standing 
feud  with  their  brothers,  had  been  loyal  to  the  Spanish 
authorities  and  transferred  that  loyalty  to  us.  "I  take 
pride,"  wrote  Theodore  Roosevelt  to  General  Funston,  "in 
this  crowning  exploit  of  a  career  filled  with  cool  courage, 
iron  endurance  and  gallant  daring,  because  you  have  added 


1  Speeches  and  Addresses,  317  et  seq.;  letter  from  Senator  Lodge,  Nov. 
15,  1920. 

8  The  Americans  in  the  Philippines,  Le  Roy,  ii.  135  n. 


202  AGUINALDO  [1901 

your  name  to  the  honor  roll  of  American  worthies." 1 
On  April  19  Aguinaldo  took  the  oath  of  allegiance  to 
the  American  Government  and  has  faithfully  kept  this 
oath.2  He  also  issued  a  proclamation  in  which  he  said : 
"The  cause  of  peace  .  .  .  has  been  joyfully  embraced  by 
a  majority  of  our  fellow  countrymen  who  are  already 
united  around  the  glorious  and  sovereign  banner  of  the 
United  States.  In  this  banner  they  repose  their  trust, 
in  the  belief  that  under  its  protection  our  people  will  at 
tain  all  the  promised  liberties  which  they  are  even  now 
beginning  to  enjoy.  The  country  has  declared  unmis 
takably  in  favor  of  peace ;  so  be  it.  Enough  of  blood ; 
enough  of  tears  and  desolation.  ...  By  acknowledging 
and  accepting  the  sovereignty  of  the  United  States 
throughout  the  entire  archipelago,  as  I  now  do,  without 
any  reservation  whatever,  I  believe  that  I  am  serving 
thee,  my  beloved  Country.  May  happiness  be  thine."  8 
On  September  1,  1900,  the  Taft  Commission  entered 
upon  their  legislative  work ;  on  July  4,  1901,  Taft  was 
appointed  Civil  Governor  of  the  islands.  By  July  4,  1902, 
the  guerilla  warfare  was  at  an  end  and  Root  issued  this 
address  to  the  soldiers:  "The  President  thanks  the  offi 
cers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  army  in  the  Philippines, 
both  regulars  and  volunteers,  for  the  courage  and  forti 
tude,  the  indomitable  spirit  and  loyal  devotion  with  which 
they  have  put  down  and  ended  the  great  insurrection 
which  has  raged  throughout  the  archipelago  against  the 
lawful  sovereignty  and  just  authority  of  the  United 
States."  When  the  organized  resistance  "had  been  over- 


1  Theodore  Roosevelt  and  His  Time,  Bishop,  i.  108. 

2  Blount,  American  Occupation  of  the  Philippines,  352. 

3  The  Philippines,  Military  Regime,  Elliott,  526. 


CH.  VII.  1  THE  PRESIDENT  THANKS  THE  ARMY  203 

come,  they  were  required  to  crush  out  a  general  system 
of  guerilla  warfare  conducted  among  a  people  speaking 
unknown  tongues,  from  whom  it  was  almost  impossible 
to  obtain  the  information  necessary  for  successful  pur 
suit  or  to  guard  against  surprise  and  ambush."  They 
"had  to  do  with  a  ^population  among  whom  it  was  im 
possible  to  distinguish  friend  from  foe,  and  who  in  count 
less  instances  used  a  false  appearance  of  friendship  for 
ambush  and  assassination.  They  were  obliged  to  deal 
with  problems  of  communication  and  transportation  in 
a  country  without  roads  and  frequently  made  impassable 
by  torrential  rains.  They  were  weakened  by  tropical 
heat  and  tropical  disease.  .  .  .  Under  all  these  adverse 
circumstances  the  army  of  the  Philippines  has  accom 
plished  its  task  rapidly  and  completely.  .  .  .  Utilizing 
the  lessons  of  the  Indian  wars  it  has  relentlessly  followed 
the  guerilla  bands  to  their  fastnesses  in  mountain  and 
jungle  and  crushed  them.  ...  Its  officers  have  shown 
high  qualities  of  command  and  its  men  have  shown  de 
votion  and  discipline."  l 

So  far  as  I  know  the  charges  that  were  made  as  to  the 
use  of  torture  by  American  soldiers  consisted  in  the  ap 
plication  of  the  " Water-cure"  to  elicit  information  as  to 
the  whereabouts  of  hostile  bands.  A  bamboo  reed  was 
placed  in  the  victim's  mouth  and  water  was  poured  down 
through  it  to  the  disturbance  of  all  the  digestive  organs. 
When  the  victim  was  permitted  to  void  the  water,  the 
desired  intelligence  was  frequently  procured  by  the  threat 
of  a  renewed  application.  While  very  painful  this  tor 
ture  was  seldom  fatal  nor  permanently  damaging.2  The 

1  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  Supplement,  396. 

2  Blount,  The  American  Occupation  of  the  Philippines,  202. 


204  ROOSEVELT  —  ROOT  [1902 

American  soldiers  despised  the  Filipinos  and  were  ready 
to  practise  the  principle  of  "an  eye  for  an  eye;  a  tooth 
for  a  tooth,"  but  in  most  instances  they  were  restrained 
by  their  officers.1 

Theodore  Roosevelt,  who  as  President  was  thoroughly 
informed,  who  had  a  high  regard  for  humanity,  who  ap 
preciated  fully  the  harm  of  torture  both  to  the  tortured 
and  to  him  who  inflicts  the  torture,  has  written  the  truth  on 
this  subject  in  a  few  words.  "Under  the  strain  of  well  nigh 
intolerable  provocation  there  were  shameful  instances, 
as  must  happen  in  all  wars,  where  the  soldiers  forgot 
themselves  and  retaliated  evil  for  evil.  There  were  one 
hundred  thousand  of  our  men  in  the  Philippines,  a  hun 
dred  thousand  hired  for  a  small  sum  a  month  apiece,  put 
there  under  conditions  that  strained  their  nerves  to  the 
breaking  point,  and  some  of  the  hundred  thousand  did 
what  they  ought  not  to  have  done."  2 

Root  fully  appreciated  the  burden  which  he  had  as 
sumed.  "It  concerned  the  credit  and  honor  of  our  coun 
try  that  we  should  succeed  in  the  Philippines,"  he  de 
clared.  But  he  admitted  during  September,  1902,  that 
there  were  moments  of  despair.  "There  come  always," 
he  said,  "in  every  great  and  difficult  undertaking,  times 
when  failure  seems  possible;  times  when  discourage- 


1  The  army  song  signifies  the  feeling  : 

"Damn,  damn,  damn  the  Filipino 
Pock-marked  Khakiac  ladrone :   [Copper-colored  thief] 
Underneath  the  starry  flag 
Civilize  him  with  a  Krag. 
And  return  us  to  our  own  beloved  home," 

sung  to  the  tune  of  "Tramp,  tramp,  tramp,"  Blount,  270. 

'The  Philippines,  Mrs.  C.  Dauncey  (1910),  5;  see  T.  Roosevelt  and 
His  Time,  Bishop,  i.  191 ;  also  T.  R.'s  letter  to  Bishop  Lawrence  and  ad 
dress  in  Arlington  Cemetery,  ibid. ;  My  Historical  Essays,  238. 


Cn.  VII.]  CIVIL  GOVERNMENT  SUBSTITUTED  205 

ments  and  difficulties  and  doubts  beset  the  pathway  of 
endeavor. " 

"As  armed  resistance  ceased,"  wrote  Root,  in  "island 
by  island,  province  by  province,  town  by  town,  civil  gov 
ernment  was  substituted  for  military  government ;  the 
bill  of  rights  extended  its  protection  over  the  people ; 
the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  became  the  guaranty  of  their 
liberty;  elections  were  held  at  which  the  people  chose 
the  officers  of  their  own  towns  and  provinces;  a  native 
constabulary  was  organized  and  proved  faithful  and  effec 
tive  for  the  protection  of  life  and  property ;  the  people 
resumed  their  customary  vocations  under  the  protection 
of  law.  .  .  .  The  personnel  of  civil  government  has  been 
brought  together  under  an  advanced  and  comprehen 
sive  civil  service  law  which  has  been  rigidly  enforced. 
.  .  .  The  Philippine  people  will  follow  in  the  footsteps 
of  the  people  of  Cuba ;  more  slowly  indeed  because  they 
are  not  so  advanced  yet  as  surely,  they  will  grow  in  ca 
pacity  for  self-government,  and  receiving  power  as  they 
grow  in  capacity,  will  come  to  bear  substantially  such  rela 
tions  to  the  people  of  the  United  States  as  do  now  the  people 
of  Cuba,  differing  in  details  as  conditions  and  needs  differ, 
but  the  same  in  principle  and  the  same  in  beneficent 
results."  1 

In  those  days  German  opinion  in  reference  to  admin 
istration  was  highly  regarded.  The  circular  of  the  Ger 
man  government  for  1901,  said,  "that  the  American  ad 
ministration  of  the  affairs  of  the  Philippines  has,  as  far 
as  the  economic  betterment  of  the  country  is  concerned, 
already  achieved  extraordinary  success."  2 

1  Milit.  and  Colonial  Policy,  Root,  77,  80,  101,  103;    1902,  1904. 

2  Ibid.,  78. 


206  ROOT  AND  TAFT  [1902 

The  opponents  of  the  policy  of  the  administration 
maintained  that  "the  Constitution  followed  the  flag," 
but  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  validated  the  pro 
cedure  of  the  President  and  of  Congress  who  were  sus 
tained  by  public  opinion  that  denied  the  inhabitants  of 
the  Philippines  "equal  rights  under  the  Constitution." 
John  H.  Latan6  has  written  an  intelligent  chapter  analyz 
ing  the  different  decisions  in  cases  relating  to  Puerto  Rico 
and  the  Philippines,1  in  which  their  burden  was  this  sub 
ject,  and  at  its  close  he  intimated  what  has  been  humor 
ously  put  by  Dooley,  "No  matter  whether  the  Consti 
tution  follows  the  flag  or  not  th;  Supreme  Court  follows 
th;  illiction  returns."  2 

As  Root  was  the  creator  of  the  Philippine  policy  so 
was  William  H.  Taft  its  administrator.  It  was  he  who 
by  suave  and  persistent  negotiation  settled  the  difficult 
question  of  the  friars'  lands.  The  friars  were  Domini 
cans,  Augustinians,  Franciscans  and  Recolectos,  held 
sway  in  the  country  and  represented  the  most  tyrannical 
aspect  of  the  Spanish  dominion.3  Making  themselves 
obnoxious  to  the  Philippine  people  who  were,  neverthe 
less,  good  Catholics,  they  and  their  lands  must  in  some 
way  be  disposed  of,  were  success  to  attend  the  American 
occupation.  To  an  arrangement  which,  while  maintain 
ing  the  right  of  private  property,  should  take  away  the 
undoubted  grievance  of  friar  ownership,  Taft,  under  au 
thority  of  an  Act  of  Congress,  addressed  himself  with 
eminent  success.  During  the  progress  of  the  negotiation 


1  Chap.  viii.     America  as  a  World  Power. 
1  The  Philippines,  Military  Regime,  Elliott,  496  n. 
*  "The  people  hated  the  Friars  worse  than  they  did  the  locusts." 
Odyssey  of  the  P.  Com.,  Williams,  188. 


CH.  VII.]  GOVERNOR  TAFT  207 

he  made  a  visit  to  Rome  and  in  the  end  brought  the  own 
ers  of  the  lands  practically  to  his  terms,  finally  closing 
"the  purchase  of  upward  of  410,000  acres  at  a  price  of 
$7,239,000  gold."  He  then  proposed  to  dispose  of  the 
lands  "to  the  tenants  on  contracts  of  sale  with  easy  pay 
ments  for  a  number  of  years."  This  was  done.  We 
did  not  purchase  these  lands,  he  wrote  "with  a  view  to  a 
profitable  investment  .  .  .  but  merely  for  the  purpose  of 
ridding  the  administration  of  the  government  in  the  is 
lands  of  an  issue  dangerous  to  the  peace  and  prosperity 
of  the  people."  x  The  account  which  he  gave  of  these 
negotiations  in  his  report  of  November  15,  1903,  sub 
stantiated  as  it  is  by  other  sources,  stamps  him  as  an  un 
usual  colonial  administrator.  In  fact  all  the  glimpses 
one  gets  of  his  work  in  the  islands  are  much  to  his  credit. 
His  unabated  energy,  his  determination  to  commend 
himself  to  the  Filipinos,  his  smile  and  hearty  handshake,2 
his  tactful  speeches,  his  attendance  at  dinners  and  balls, 
his  excellent  dancing  thereat 3  —  all  show  his  resolution 
to  make  his  mission  successful.  At  a  meeting  in  the  sec 
ond  city  of  the  islands,  an  observer  wrote,  "Taft  pre 
sided  with  that  cordial  good-natured  expression  which  is 
one  of  his  greatest  charms  and  which  cannot  but  inspire 
confidence  and  good- will."  In  another  province  the 
observer  was  impressed  with  Taft's  master  talk.  "It 
was  in  detail,  yet  succinct  and  clear,  fitted  to  the  com 
prehension  of  the  people."  4 

Personally,  he  told  a  Senate  Committee  in  Washington 
during  February,  1902,  "I  did  not  favor  going  into  the 


1  Report,  Nov.  15,  1903,  44. 

2  Blount,  286.        3  Odyssey  of  the  P.  Com.,  Williams,  310. 
4  Ibid.,   179,   182. 


208  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  (1902 

Philippine  Islands.  I  was  sorry  at  the  time  that  we  got 
into  it.  But  we  are  there.  ...  I  have  been  called  an 
optimist ;  I  think  the  Mark  Tapley  of  this  business.  It 
is  true  I  am  an  optimist.  If  I  did  not  believe  in  the  suc 
cess  of  what  we  are  attempting  to  do  out  there,  I  would 
resign  and  come  home.  Certainly  no  man  ever  succeeded 
who  did  not  believe  in  the  success  of  what  he  was  doing. 
We  think  we  can  help  these  people;  we  think  we  can 
elevate  them  to  an  appreciation  of  popular  government ; 
and  we  think  that  because  the  experiment  has  not  really 
ever  been  tried  before  is  not  reason  for  saying  that  the 
trial  of  the  experiment  may  not  be  a  success  in  this  in 
stance."  1 

In  truth  he  had  an  opportunity  to  go  home.  Presi 
dent  Roosevelt  cabled  to  him  late  in  1902  :  "On  January 
first  there  will  be  a  vacancy  on  the  Supreme  Court  to 
which  I  earnestly  desire  to  appoint  you.  ...  I  feel  that 
your  duty  is  on  the  Court  unless  you  have  decided  not 
to  adopt  a  judicial  career.  I  greatly  hope  you  will  ac 
cept."  To  this  Taft  replied:  "Great  honor  deeply  ap 
preciated  but  must  decline.  Situation  here  most  critical 
from  economic  standpoint.  .  .  .  Nothing  would  satisfy 
individual  taste  more  than  acceptance.  Look  forward 
to  the  time  when  I  can  accept  such  an  offer  but  even  if 
it  is  certain  that  it  can  never  be  repeated  I  must  now 
decline."  At  the  same  time  he  cabled  to  Secretary  Root : 
"Chance  has  thrown  every  obstacle  in  the  way  of  our 
success  but  we  shall  win.  I  long  for  a  judicial  career  but 
if  it  must  turn  on  my  present  decision  I  am  willing  to 
lose  it."  Late  in  November  Taft  received  this  letter 


1  Senate  Hearings  on  Affairs  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  Part  i.  346.- 


CH.  VII.  J  ROOSEVELT  AND  TAFT  209 

from  President  Roosevelt:  "Dear  Will,  I  am  disap 
pointed,  of  course,  that  the  situation  is  such  as  to  make 
you  feel  it  unwise  to  leave,  because,  exactly  as  no  man 
can  quite  do  your  work  in  the  islands,  so  no  man  can 
quite  take  your  place  as  the  new  member  of  the  Court. 
But,  if  possible,  your  refusal  on  the  ground  you  give 
makes  me  admire  you  and  believe  in  you  more  than  ever." 
But  about  one  month  later  President  Roosevelt  wrote 
to  Taft,  the  letter  being  received  January  6,  1903  :  "Dear 
Will,  I  am  awfully  sorry,  old  man,  but  after  faithful  effort 
for  a  month  to  try  to  arrange  matters  on  the  basis  you 
wanted,  I  find  that  I  shall  have  to  bring  you  home  and 
put  you  on  the  Supreme  Court.  I  am  very  sorry.  I 
have  the  greatest  confidence  in  your  judgment,  but  after 
all,  old  fellow,  if  you  will  permit  me  to  say  so,  I  am  Presi 
dent  and  see  the  whole  field.  .  . .  After  the  most  careful 
thought,  after  the  most  earnest  effort  as  to  what  you 
desired  and  thought  best,  I  have  come,  irrevocably,  to  the 
decision  that  I  shall  appoint  you  to  the  Supreme  Court 
in  the  vacancy  caused  by  Judge  Shims'  resignation.  .  .  . 
I  am  very  sorry  if  what  I  am  doing  displeases  you,  but 
as  I  said,  old  man,  this  is  one  of  the  cases  where  the  Pres 
ident,  if  he  is  fit  for  his  position,  must  take  the  respon 
sibility.  " 

In  answer  to  this  letter  Taft  sent  this  cable  to  the  Pres 
ident :  "Recognize  soldier's  duty  to  obey  orders."  But 
"I  presume  on  our  personal  friendship,  even  in  the  face 
of  your  letter,  to  make  one  more  appeal,  in  which  I  lay 
aside  wholly  my  strong  personal  disinclination  to  leave 
work  of  intense  interest  half-done."  These  people  are 
convinced  "that  I  am  their  friend  and  stand  for  a  policy 
of  confidence  in  them  and  belief  in  their  future  and  for 


210  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1902 

extension  of  self-government  as  they  show  themselves 
worthy.  .  .  .  Announcement  of  withdrawal  pending 
settlement  of  church  question,  economic  crisis,  and 
formative  political  period  when  opinions  of  all  parties 
are  being  slowly  moulded  for  the  better,  will,  I  fear,  give 
impression  that  change  of  policy  is  intended  because 
other  reasons  for  action  will  not  be  understood.  ...  I 
feel  it  is  my  duty  to  say  this.  If  your  judgment  is  un 
shaken  I  bow  to  it."  To  this  came  a  cable  from  Presi 
dent  Roosevelt,  "All  right,  stay  where  you  are.  I  shall 
appoint  someone  else  to  the  Court."  1 

One  of  the  most  interesting  matters  in  American  his 
tory  during  the  first  two  decades  of  the  twentieth  cen 
tury  is  the  relation  between  Roosevelt  and  Taft;  to 
end  the  Supreme  Court  incident  a  violation  of  chronology 
in  the  narrative  is  needed.  We  therefore  go  on  to  1906 
when  Taft  was  Secretary  of  War  in  President  Roosevelt's 
Cabinet.  He  was  again  offered  a  position  on  the  Supreme 
Court  bench  but  in  a  personal  interview  showed  unwill 
ingness  to  accept  it.  Shortly  afterwards,  on  March  15, 
1906,  Roosevelt  wrote  to  Taft  a  letter  in  which  he  said : 
"My  dear  Will,  it  is  preeminently  a  matter  in  which  no 
other  man  can  take  the  responsibility  of  deciding  for  you 
what  is  best  for  you  to  do.  .  .  .  But  I  appreciate,  as  every 
thoughtful  man  must,  the  importance  of  the  part  to  be 
played  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  next  twenty-five 
years.  .  .  .  There  are  strong  arguments  against  your  tak 
ing  this  justiceship.  In  the  first  place,  my  belief  is  that, 
of  all  the  men  who  have  appeared  so  far,  you  are  the  man, 
who  is  most  likely  to  receive  the  Republican  nomination, 


JMrs.  W.  H.  Taft,  Recollections,  262  et  seq. 


CH.  VII.]  ROOSEVELT  AND  TAFT  211 

and  who  is,  I  think,  the  best  man  to  receive  it.  It  is  not 
a  light  thing  to  cast  aside  the  chance  of  the  Presidency, 
even  though,  of  course,  it  is  a  chance,  however,  a  good 
one."  Taft  considered  the  offer  over  four  months  and 
then  wrote  to  the  President  (July  30,  1906)  from  Murray 
Bay,  Canada,  where  he  was  taking  his  summer  vacation, 
declining  the  offer,  saying:  "I  would  much  prefer  to  go 
on  the  Supreme  Bench  for  life  than  to  run  for  the  Presi 
dency.  .  .  .  But  circumstances  seem  to  me  to  have  im 
posed  something  in  the  nature  of  a  trust  to  me  personally 
that  I  should  not  discharge  by  now  succeeding  Justice 
Brown.  In  the  nature  of  things  the  trust  must  end  with 
this  administration  and  one  or  two  years  is  short  to  do 
much.  Yet  the  next  session  of  Congress  may  result  in 
much  for  the  benefit  of  the  Filipino  and,  it  seems  to  me, 
it  is  my  duty  to  be  in  the  fight."  1 

While  still  in  the  Philippines  Taft  twice  put  aside  the 
coveted  place  and  remained  in  the  islands,  the  climate 
of  which  was  unsuitable.  Before  he  appeared  before  the 
Senate  Committee  in  Washington,  on  leave  for  the  state 
of  his  health,  and  before  these  first  two  offers  were  made 
to  him  of  a  supreme  judgeship,  he  had  submitted  to  two 
surgical  operations  and  was  in  bed  for  a  number  of  weeks, 
but  maintained  "his  usual  cheerful  frame  of  mind."  2 
His  wife,  too,  was  debilitated  and  needed  a  change  to 
America.  Finally,  at  the  end  of  1903,  he  left  for  Wash 
ington  to  accept  the  position  of  Secretary  of  War.  He 
was  popular  with  the  native  inhabitants;  they  loved 
him  and  their  anxiety  when  he  was  ill  knew  no  bounds. 


1  J.  B.  Bishop,  Roosevelt  and  His  Time,  ii.  99  et  seq. 
1  Mrs.  W.  H.  Taft,  Recollections,  229;  Unofficial  Letters,  Edith  Moses, 
187. 


212  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1902 

At  the  time  when  President  Roosevelt  insisted  on  his 
acceptance  of  the  second  offer  of  supreme  judgeship  and 
it  leaked  out  that  Taft  was  going  to  leave  the  Philippines, 
there  was  a  sincere  demonstration  in  his  favor  in  the  city 
of  Manila  which  was  placarded  with  the  sentiment  in 
various  languages,  "We  want  Taft."1  In  his  farewell 
speech  he  declared  that  the  Philippines  were  for  the  Fili 
pinos.  It  need  not  occasion  surprise  that  President  Roose 
velt  in  a  review  of  this  colonial  administration  said  that 
Taft's  work  in  the  Philippines  is  as  great  as  Lord  Cro- 
mer's  in  Egypt. 

The  cost  of  the  Philippines  by  the  end  of  1907  is  esti 
mated  at  $300,000,000  ;  besides,  the  cost  per  annum  of 
the  native  scouts  and  the  12,000  American  troops  was 
about  14  millions.2  The  government  of  the  islands  is 
self-supporting,  wrote  Governor  Forbes,  and  this,  accord 
ing  to  Blount,  is  true  except  for  the  expense  of  the  scouts 
and  the  American  soldiers.  In  February,  1902,  Taft  told 
a  Senate  committee:  "I  think  the  intervention  of  the 
United  States  in  the  Philippine  Islands  is  the  best  possible 
thing  that  could  >have  happened  to  the  Filipino  people 
but  ...  for  the  people  of  the  United  States  it  probably 


1  Mrs.  W.  H.  Taft,  Recollections,  267. 

2  The   American   Occupation   of   the   Philippines,     Blount,    600.     In 
his  report  of  Dec.  1, 1902,  Root  wrote  :  "Since  the  ending  of  the  insurrec 
tion  and  the  complete  establishment  of  civil  government  in  the  Philip 
pines,  it  has  been  possible  to  make  a  farther  reduction  of  the  Army  and  on 
October  24,  1902,  an  order  was  made  reducing  the  enlisted  strength  to 
59,866.  .  .  .     The  effect  of  carrying  out  this  order  will  be  to  bring  the 
American  troops  stationed  in  the  Philippines  down  to  an  enlisted  strength 
of  13,480."     In  his  report  of  Dec.  7,  1903,  he  said,  "The  American  troops, 
in  the  Philippines  consisted  of  843  officers  and  14,667  enlisted  men.  .  .  . 
The  number  can  still  further  be  reduced."     I  have  assumed  that  the  num 
ber  was  reduced  to  12,000  as  Blount  was  very  unfriendly  to  the  American 
administration. 


CH.  VII.]  CAMERON  FORBES'S  OPINION  213 

would  be  better  that  chance  had  not  thrown  the  Filipino 
people  under  our  guidance  and  protection."  l  And  dur 
ing  May,  1907,  in  a  speech  at  St.  Louis,  he  admitted  that 
the  islands  had  been  a  financial  drain.2 

W.  Cameron  Forbes,  when  Vice-Governor,  wrote  in 
the  Atlantic  Monthly  for  February,  1909:  "We  have 
completed  the  separation  of  Church  and  State,  buying 
out  from  the  religious  orders  their  large  agricultural  prop 
erties,  which  are  now  administered  by  the  government 
for  the  benefit  of  the  tenants.  We  have  put  the  finances 
on  a  sound  and  sensible  basis.  .  .  .  We  have  established 
schools  throughout  the  archipelago,  teaching  upward  of 
half  a  million  children."  And  Forbes  affirmed  that  with 
some  natural  exceptions  it  was  "safe  to  travel  everywhere 
throughout  the  islands  without  carrying  a  weapon. 
We,"  he  continued,  "have  given  the  Filipinos  almost 
complete  autonomy  in  their  municipalities.  .  .  .  The 
record  of  the  Americans  in  the  Philippines  is  one  of  which 
no  American  need  be  ashamed.  .  .  .  We  are  casting  off 
the  shackles  which  held  down  the  laboring  classes  of  the 
Philippines  and,  with  the  laboring  classes  raised,  we  are 
raising  all  the  people  to  a  higher  and  nobler  plane.  We 
may  not  as  yet  have  given  independence  to  the  Philip 
pines  but  we  are  certainly  giving  independence  to  the 
Filipinos."  3 

All  the  money  raised  by  internal  taxation  was  spent 
on  the  islands.  There  was  absolutely  no  exploitation. 
"As  I  look  back,"  wrote  Elihu  Root  in  1916  in  a  preface 


1  Hearings  on  Affairs  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  Part  1,  406. 

'Blount,  357. 

3  Article  entitled  "A  Decade  of  American  Rule  in  the  Philippines  " 
The  citations  down  to  "weapon,"  are  made  by  Blount  in  his  American 
Occupation  of  the  Philippines. 


214  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1902 

to  Charles  B.  Elliott's  book,  "over  our  American  admin 
istration  in  the  Philippines  ....  down  to  the  close  of 
the  Taft  Administration  in  the  spring  of  1913,  I  think 
the  American  people  are  entitled  to  say  to  themselves 
that  their  work  was  well  done.  We  maintained  in  the 
islands  a  very  able  and  honest  government  which  con 
stantly  and  effectively  kept  in  view  the  very  high  stand 
ard  of  purpose  with  which  we  began.  By  limiting  this 
statement  to  the  end  of  the  Taft  Administration  I  do  not 
mean  to  imply  that  1  think  any  differently  of  our  adminis 
tration  since  that  time.  I  simply  do  not  know  enough 
about  it  since  then  to  make  an  assertion  one  way  or  the 
other.  The  time  during  which  I  knew  about  the  Phil 
ippine  government  covers  the  first  fourteen  years,  and 
as  to  that  time  I  say  that  the  people  of  the  United  States 
ought  to  be  proud  of  their  government  in  the  Philippines 
and  grateful  to  the  men  and  women  who  reflected  credit 
on  their  country  by  giving  their  strength  and  lives  to 
that  public  service."  l 

Root  was  a  broad-minded  man  as  well  as  a  great  law 
yer.  His  allusion  to  "my  friend  Mr.  Schurz"2  at  the 
time  that  Carl  Schurz  was  assailing  the  Philippine  policy 
with  all  the  force  of  his  periodic  eloquence,  shows  an  ab 
sence  of  partisan  spirit.  Like  Webster,  Root  earned 
the  title  of  "Defender  of  Peace";  in  December,  1913, 
he  was  awarded  the  Nobel  Peace  Prize.  When  Secretary 
of  State,3  and  James  Bryce  was  Ambassador  from  Great 
Britain,  the  two  by  wise  diplomacy  settled  all  matters 


1  Prefatory  note  The  Philippines,  To  the  End  of  the  Military  Regime. 

2  Military  and  Colonial  Policy,  Root,  43. 

3  Root  was  Secretary  of  War  from  1899-1904,  Secretary  of  State  from 
1905  to  Jan.  25,  1909. 


CH.  VII.]  COOLIDGE'S  OPINION  215 

of  dispute  between  the  two  countries.  I  may  parallel 
what  1  wrote  of  Webster  :  The  social  intercourse  between 
Root  and  Bryce  while  they  were  at  work  on  these  treaties 
is  one  of  those  international  amenities  that  grace  the 
history  of  diplomacy.1 

It  is  well  now  to  hear  from  Archibald  C.  Coolidge,  an 
academic  man,  yet  a  man  of  the  world,  a  traveller,  an 
observer,  a  thinker,  who  comprehends  thoroughly  the 
Orient.  "  Criticize  as  we  may  the  details  of  the  present 
policy"  [in  the  Philippines],  he  wrote  in  1908,  "no  im 
partial  observer  will  deny  that  since  1898  the  Americans 
have  accomplished  a  great  deal  in  their  task  of  transform 
ing  the  islands.  Improved  means  of  communication, 
public  works  of  all  kinds,  modern  sanitation,  justice, 
public  security,  honest  and  efficient  government,  popular 
participation  in  the  government  and  a  system  of  general 
education  form  a  record  to  be  proud  of.  In  all  this,  good 
fortune  has  counted  for  but  little."  2 


1  See  my  vol.  i.  139,  140.     Bryce  said  in  London,  July  28,  1920,  on  the 
occasion  of  unveiling  a  copy  of  the  Saint-Gaudens  statue  of  Lincoln:  "If 
I  may  venture  to  express  what  I  believe  to  be  the  general  feeling  in  Amer 
ica,  America  looks  upon  Elihu  Root  as  the  greatest  Secretary  of  State 
it  has  had  since  Daniel  Webster.     It  was  my  good  fortune  to  have  to  nego 
tiate  with  him  in  Washington  not  a  few  treaties  between  our  two  coun 
tries,  and  I  have  never  known  in  either  hemisphere  anyone  with  a  wider 
range  of  vision  or  with  a  mind  more  fair  and  just  in  handling  diplomatic 
questions.     He  always  showed  the  sincerest  wish  for  perfect  concord  and 
friendly  cooperation  between  our  two  great  countries.     With  such  a  man 
it  was  a  pleasure  to  negotiate,  and  to  listen  to  such  a  man  is  a  privilege." 
London  Daily  Telegraph,  July  29,  1920 ;    private  letter  from  Elihu  Root 
Dec.  24,  1920. 

2  The  United  States  as  a  World  Power,  170.     The  Taft  Com.  reported 
on  Nov.  1,  1902:  "By  the  war  and  by  the  rinderpest,  chiefly  the  latter, 
the  carabaos  or  water  buffalos  have  been  reduced  to  10  per  cent  of  their 
former  number.     The  chief  food  of  the  common  people  of  these  islands 
is  rice  and  the  carabao  is  the  indispensable  instrument  of  the  people  in 
the  cultivation  of  rice,  as  they  cultivate  it,  as  it  is  also  the  chief  means  of 
transportation  of  the  tobacco,  hemp  and  other  crops.     The  loss  of  the 


216  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1902 

James  A.  Robertson  -wrote  in  1917 :  The  American 
policy  may  have  resulted  in  a  "loss  of  efficiency  in  gov 
ernment.  There  has  been  extremely  little  of  'Woe 
to  the  conquered '  spirit  from  Americans,  and  the  slogan 
'The  Philippines  for  the  Filipinos ' has  been  real.  ...  On 
the  whole  the  result  has  been  better  than  the  most  ardent 
advocates  .  .  .  had  hoped."  The  American  experiment 
"has  attained  valuable  results  which,  notwithstanding 
the  political  and  anti-imperialistic  diatribes  against  the 
sincerity  of  Americans,  has  been  conducted  not  without 
honor."  l  Theodore  Roosevelt  wrote  truly:  "The  Eng 
lish  and  Dutch  administrators  of  Malaysia  have  done 
admirable  work ;  but  the  profit  to  the  Europeans  in  those 
States  has  always  been  one  of  the  chief  elements  con 
sidered;  whereas  in  the  Philippines  our  whole  attention 
was  concentrated  upon  the  welfare  of  the  Filipinos  them 
selves,  if  anything  to  the  neglect  of  our  own  interests."  2 

What  shall  we  do  with  the  Philippines,  as  a  large  ma 
jority  of  the  American  people  desire  to  be  rid  of  them 
if  the  riddance  can  be  safely  and  honorably  done  ?  Theo 
dore  Roosevelt,  who,  as  President  for  over  seven  years, 
gave  the  subject  grave  thought,  made  an  answer  sound 
and  complete.  Thus  he  wrote  in  1913  :  "We  are  govern 
ing  and  have  been  governing  the  islands  in  the  interests 
of  the  Filipinos  themselves.  If,  after  due  time,  the  Fili- 


carabao  has  reduced  the  production  of  rice  in  the  islands  75  per  cent  and 
the  25  per  cent  remaining  is  in  imminent  danger  from  the  locusts."  Gov. 
Taft  wrote  in  his  report  of  Nov.  15,  1903  :  "From  the  first  of  January 
until  late  in  August  there  was  a  drought  in  the  islands  of  unusual  length 
which  interfered  with  the  successful  reaping  of  many  of  the  crops,  and 
with  the  drought  a  pest  of  locusts  came  that  bade  fair  to  consume  every 
part  of  the  food  supply  that  grew  above  the  ground." 

1  American  Historical  Review,  July,  1917,  817,  830. 

2  Autobiography,  544. 


CH.  VII.]  THE  PHILIPPINES  217 

pinos  themselves  decide  that  they  do  not  wish  to  be  thus 
governed,  then  I  trust  that  we  will  leave ;  but  when  we 
do  leave  it  must  be  distinctly  understood  that  we  retain 
no  protectorate  —  and  above  all  that  we  take  part  in  no 
joint  protectorate  —  over  the  islands  and  give  them  no 
guarantee  of  neutrality  or  otherwise;  that,  in  short,  we 
are  absolutely  quit  of  responsibility  for  them  of  every 
kind  and  description."  l 


Autobiography,  515.  Authorities:  Dewey's  Autobiography;  Rich 
ardson,  x. ;  McKinley's  Messages  of  Dec.  1899  and  1900 ;  Roosevelt's 
Message,  Dec.  1901,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  Supplement, 
1889-1902;  Moorfield  Storey,  Letter  to  a  Friend,  Oct.  21,  1899,  Sec 
retary  Root's  Record  in  the  Philippine  Warfare  (1902),  What  Shall  We 
Do  with  Our  Dependencies  (1903),  Before  the  House  Committee  on  In 
sular  Affairs  (190G),  Political  Pamphlets  in  Boston  Athenaeum;  George 
F.  Hoar,  Speech  in  U.  S.  Senate,  Jan.  9,  1899,  Letter,  Our  Duty  to  the 
Philippines,  Jan.  11,  1900,  Autobiography,  ii.,  309;  Carl  Schurz,  Writ 
ings,  etc.,  iii.,  Speeches,  etc.,  vi. ;  Schurman,  Report  of  Philippine  Com 
mission,  1899,  A  Retrospect  and  Outlook,  Address,  1902;  Senate  Hear 
ings  on  Affairs  in  Philippine  Islands,  Parts  1,  2,  3,  Senate  Docs.  23,  24, 
25;  Reports  of  Secretary  of  War,  1900,  1901,  1902,  1903;  Reports  of 
Philippine  Commission,  1900,  1901,  1902,  1903,  House  Docs.;  Coolidge, 
The  U.  S.  as  a  World  Power;  Elihu  Root,  Milit.  and  Colonial  Policy; 
Charles  B.  Elliott,  The  Philippines  to  the  End  of  the  Military  Regime; 
ibid.,  To  the  End  of  the  Commission  Government;  James  A.  Le  Roy, 
The  Americans  in  the  Philippines,  i.  &  ii. ;  Worcester,  The  Philippines 
Past  and  Present,  i.  &  ii. ;  Blount,  The  American  Occupation  of  the 
Philippines;  Williams,  The  Odyssey  of  the  Philippine  Commission; 
Edith  Moses,  Unofficial  Letters  of  an  Official's  Wife ;  The  Philippines, 
Mrs.  Campbell  Dauncy,  Introduction  by  Theodore  Roosevelt;  Theodore 
Roosevelt,  Autobiography;  Mrs.  W.  H.  Taft,  Recollections;  Latane", 
America  as  a  World  Power;  Olcott,  Life  of  McKinley;  Willoughby, 
Territories  and  Dependencies ;  Scribner's  Magazine,  June,  1920. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

ON  taking  the  oath  of  office  at  the  time  of  McKinley's 
death  Theodore  Roosevelt  was  entirely  sincere  when  he 
said  that  "in  this  hour  of  deep  and  terrible  bereavement 
...  it  shall  be  my  aim  to  continue  absolutely  unbroken 
the  policy  of  President  McKinley."  [September  14.] 
The  student  of  Roosevelt's  seven  and  one-half  years  in  the 
White  House  will  fail  in  their  comprehension  if  he  does 
not  believe  thoroughly  in  Roosevelt's  sincerity  and  cour 
age.  On  the  train  carrying  the  late  President's  body  be 
tween  Buffalo  and  Washington,  Senator  Mark  Hanna, 
who  must  be  regarded  as  the  inherited  representative  of 
McKinley 's  policy,  said,  "Theodore,  do  not  think  any 
thing  about  a  second  term."  That  no  thought  of  the 
sort  at  this  time  entered  Roosevelt's  head  is  apparent 
from  the  remark  he  made  to  Joseph  B.  Bishop  on  his 
first  day  in  the  White  House:  "I  don't  know  anything 
about  seven  years.  But  this  I  do  know  —  I  am  going  to 
be  President  for  three  years  and  I  am  going  to  do  my  ut 
most  to  give  the  country  a  good  President  during  that 
period.  ...  I  am  no  second  Grover  Cleveland.  I  ad 
mire  certain  of  his  qualities,  but  I  have  no  intention  of 
doing  with  the  Republican  party  what  he  did  with  the 
Democratic  party.  I  intend  to  work  with  my  party  and 
to  make  it  strong  by  making  it  worthy  of  popular  sup 
port."  * 

1  Theodore  Roosevelt  and  His  Time,  Bishop,  i.  150.  When  here 
after  I  cite  this  admirable  work  I  shall  refer  to  it  as  Bishop. 

218 


Copyright  by  UtMerwood  &  Underwood. 


CH.  VIII.  J  ROOSEVELT  AS  PRESIDENT  219 

"Wise  legislation,"  declared  Roosevelt  in  seconding 
McKinley's  nomination  at  the  Republican  convention 
in  Philadelphia  during  June,  1900,  "is  vitally  important, 
but  honest  administration  is  even  more  important."  l 
The  importance  which  he  gave  to  administration  is  ap 
parent  from  his  action  during  the  time  that  he  was  Presi 
dent.  Believing  that  a  bad  colonel  makes  a  bad  regi 
ment,  he  was  particular  in  getting  efficiency  at  the  head 
of  departments  and  in  other  places  where  the  master 
gave  the  cue  to  his  subordinates.  He  knew  McKinley  to 
be  a  good  judge  of  men  and  Roosevelt  was  not  of  the  sort 
who  believed  so  thoroughly  in  his  own  selections  that  he 
could  not  accept  those  of  others.  He  would  take  a  good 
man  wherever  he  found  "him.  Root,  Hay,  Knox  and  Gov 
ernor  Taft  were  all  chosen  by  McKinley,  yet  they  be 
came  trusted  counsellors  of  Roosevelt.  On  September 
17  he  asked  all  of  the  members  of  the  Cabinet  to  remain 
in  office,  which  they  consented  to  do.2 

"It  is  a  dreadful  thing,"  he  wrote  to  his  friend  Sena 
tor  Lodge,  "to  come  into  the  Presidency  in  this  way; 
but  it  would  be  a  far  worse  thing  to  be  morbid  about  it. 
Here  is  the  task  and  I  have  got  to  do  it  to  the  best  of 
my  ability,  and  that  is  all  there  is  about  it."  3 

Continuing  "absolutely  unbroken  the  policy  of  Presi 
dent  McKinley"  was  not  the  same  as  continuing  the 
heads  of  the  departments.  That  Roosevelt  meant  ex 
actly  what  he  said  when  he  took  the  oath  of  office  is  un 
doubted,  but  what  he  promised  was  entirely  impossible. 


Official  Proceedings,  118. 

2  The  reasons  for  the  retirement  of  Gage,  Smith  and  Long  are  given  by 
Leupp,  The  Man  Roosevelt,  73  et  seq. 
8  Bishop,  i.  151. 


220  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1901 

I  am,  he  said,  temperamentally  more  like  Cleveland  than 
like  McKinley.  The  legacy  which  McKinley  left  to  his 
countrymen  in  his  Buffalo  speech  was  to  revise  the  tariff 
in  the  direction  of  lower  duties  by  means  of  reciprocity 
treaties.  And  there  is  no  doubt  that  Roosevelt  balanced 
the  policy  of  attacking  the  tariff  first  instead  of  attack 
ing  the  trusts.  Not  that  he  believed  that  the  tariff  was 
the  mother  of  all  trusts  but  he  wrote,  "As  regards  politi 
cal  economy  I  was  of  course  while  in  college  taught  the 
laissez-faire  doctrines  —  one  of  them  being  free  trade  — 
then  accepted  as  canonical."  1  By  extreme  tariff  men 
he  was  not  regarded  as  sound  on  account  of  this  educa 
tion,  as  Harvard  College  was  looked  upon  as  devoted  to 
the  doctrine  of  free  trade.  Although  he  felt  that  he  could 
carry  a  reduction  of  duties  through  Congress  such  a 
course  would  divide  his  party,  while  in  an  attack  on  the 
Trusts  he  could  carry  his  party  in  Congress  with  him. 
Therefore  during  his  administration  there  was  no  revi 
sion  of  the  tariff 2  but  his  fight  against  Big  Business  was 
one  of  his  keynotes. 

Roosevelt  endeavored  to  carry  out  faithfully  what  he 
had  said  on  the  day  that  he  took  the  oath  of  office.  He 
wrote  a  cordial  letter  to  Senator  Hanna  requesting  an 
early  conference  and  received  this  reply:  " There  are 
many  important  matters  to  be  considered  from  a  politi 
cal  standpoint  and  I  am  sure  we  will  agree  upon  a  proper 
course  to  pursue.  Meantime  'go  slow.'  You  will  be  be- 


1  Charles  G.  Washburn,  Theodore  Roosevelt,  112.     Autobiography,  30. 

2  Charles  G.  Washburn,     Theodore  Roosevelt,   114;    see  Roosevelt's 
ideas  on  The  Tariff  and  Trusts.     Speech  in  Cincinnati,  Sept.  20,  1902. 
Roosevelt,  His  Life  Meaning  and  Messages,  The  Current  Lit.  Pub.  Co., 
1919,  82. 


CH.  VIII.]  THE  NORTHERN  SECURITIES  CASE  221 

sieged  from  all  sides  and  I  fear  in  some  cases  will  get  the 
wrong  impression.  Hear  them  all  patiently  but  reserve 
your  decision."  1 

McKinley's  inheritors  did  not  like  the  position  which 
Roosevelt  took  towards  the  large  financial  interests  of  the 
country.  He  touched  upon  the  subject  in  his  first  An 
nual  Message  and  submitted  what  he  said  to  Senator 
Hanna,  receiving  the  advice  not  to  give  it  so  much  promi 
nence,  but  this  suggestion  he  disregarded.2  His  action 
ought  not  to  have  been  a  surprise  to  those  who  had  fol 
lowed  his  course  while  Governor  of  New  York  and  had 
rated  correctly  his  many  public  utterances.  Neverthe 
less  the  announcement  of  it  in  the  merger  of  two  com 
peting  railroads  into  the  Northern  Securities  Company 
caused  a  shock  to  the  financial  world. 

The  Northern  Pacific  and  Great  Northern  railroads 
ran  from  Lake  Superior  to  Puget  Sound  on  the  Pacific 
coast,  and  on  through  traffic  were  competing  lines ;  but 
for  a  number  of  years  their  relations  had  been  altogether 
friendly.  Both  desired  a  terminal  in  Chicago  which 
should  connect  with  their  St.  Paul-Minneapolis  lines, 
and  after  much  discussion  and  negotiation  acquired  the 
Chicago,  Burlington  and  Quincy.  James  J.  Hill,  as  hon 
est  a  man  as  ever  lived,  whose  career  from  early  poverty 
to  superfluous  wealth  was  noted  for  the  confidence  other 
men  reposed  in  him,  may  be  said  to  be  the  hero  of  the 
merger  of  the  three  railroads.  He  formed  a  company 


1  Oct.  12,  1901.     Bishop,  i.  154.     One  cannot  fail  to  be  reminded  of 
Polonius's  advice  to  Laertes  : 

"  Give  every  man  thy  ear,  but  few  thy  voice : 

Take  each  man's  censure,  but  reserve  thy  judgment."  Hamlet,  Act  i.,  Sc.  1. 

2  Bishop,  i.  159. 


222  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1902 

called  the  Northern  Securities  which  was  to  own  theC., 
B.  and  Q.  property  as  well  as  that  of  the  other  two.  This 
was  a  holding  company  whose  officers  should  manage  the 
three  railroads  and  divide  the  dividends  among  the  stock 
holders  of  the  Northern  Pacific  and  Great  Northern ;  the 
Chicago,  Burlington  and  Quincy  stockholders  were  paid 
by  joint  bonds  of  the  two  purchasing  railroads.  Hill's 
idea  in  making  the  merger  was  for  the  sake  of  nc  vulgar 
profit  but  to  render  the  stock  of  the  Northern  Securities 
Company  an  investment  to  men  and  their  heirs  who 
would  have  a  greater  protection  in  the  event  of  the  death 
of  those  now  in  control.  Hill  and  his  attorneys  studied 
the  precedents,  laws  and  regulations  and  especially  the 
decision  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  in  the 
Knight  case,  arriving  at  the  conclusion  that  the  Anti- 
Trust  Act  of  1890  did  not  apply  to  such  a  merger ;  they 
went  forward  therefore  with  their  plans.  And  if  James 
J.  Hill  could  have  left  men  who  would  carry  on  business 
as  he  had  carried  it  on,  the  merger  could  not  be  said  to 
interfere  with  the  public  good. 

But  he  had  to  reckon  with  Theodore  Roosevelt,  who 
was  antagonistic  to  the  operations  of  large  financiers  and 
believed  that  it  was  incumbent  on  him  as  President  to 
protect  the  public  against  their  operations.  While 
Roosevelt  liked  Hill,  he  did  not  consider  J.  Pierpont 
Morgan,  who  was  an  active  coadjutor  with  Hill  in  this 
enterprise,  a  good  financial  adviser.  When  Morgan 
heard  of  the  President's  opposition  to  the  merger  he  went 
to  Washington  and  said  to  him,  "If  we  have  done  any 
thing  wrong  send  your  man  (meaning  Attorney-General 
Knox)  to  my  man  (naming  one  of  his  lawyers)  and  they 
can  fix  it  up."  "That  can't  be  done,"  said  the  President. 


CH.  VIIL]  MORGAN  —  HILL  —  ROOSEVELT  223 

"We  don't  want  to  fix  it  up,"  added  Knox  who  assisted 
at  this  interview,  "we  want  to  stop  it."  Morgan  in 
quired,  "Are  you  going  to  attack  my  other  interests,  the 
Steel  Trust  and  the  others?"  "Certainly  not,"  replied 
the  President,  "unless  we  find  out  that  in  any  case  they 
have  done  something  that  we  regard  as  wrong."  When 
Morgan  went  away  Roosevelt  expressed  his  opinion, 
saying  to  Knox:  "That  is  a  most  illuminating  illustra 
tion  of  the  Wall  Street  point  of  view.  Mr.  Morgan  could 
not  help  regarding  me  as  a  big  rival  operator,  who  either 
intended  to  ruin  all  his  interests  or  else  could  be  induced 
to  come  to  an  agreement  to  ruin  none."  l  Roosevelt  con 
sidered  Hill  a  good  financial  adviser  but  said  that  he  had 
to  be  on  the  watch  that  Hill,  in  giving  him  counsel,  had 
not  an  eye  to  his  own  interest.  Still  Roosevelt  appreci 
ated  a  man  who  from  nothing  had  amassed  a  fortune  of 
sixty  millions,  although  he  did  not  rate  as  the  highest 
ability  the  acquiring  of  wealth  in  this  country  of  enor 
mous  resources.  His  heroes  were  drawn  from  another  class. 
It  is  interesting  to  note  the  conflict  between  these  two 
honest  men.  Roosevelt  requested  an  opinion  from 
Attorney-General  Knox,  who  on  February  19, 1902,  author 
ized  the  publication  of  the  following  statement :  "Some 
time  ago  the  President  requested  an  opinion  as  to  the  le 
gality  of  this  merger,  and  I  have  recently  given  him  one 
to  the  effect  that,  in  my  judgment,  it  violates  the  provi 
sions  of  the  Sherman  Act  of  1890  (the  Anti-Trust  Act), 
whereupon  he  directed  that  suitable  action  should  be 
taken  to  have  the  question  judicially  determined." 2 


1  Bishop,  i.   185. 

2  Meyer,  History  of  the  Northern  Securities  Case.     Bulletin   of   the 
University  of  Wisconsin,  No.  142,  258. 


224  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1904 

This  was  a  bomb  shell  in  Wall  Street  and  the  beginning  of 
the  active  hostility  of  the  large  financial  interests  to  Theo 
dore  Roosevelt,  who'directed  the  course  of  his  Attorney- 
General.  Knox  knew  the  ground  well,  as  before  McKin- 
ley  had  drawn  him  from  the  active  practice  of  his  profes 
sion,  he  was  a  corporation  lawyer.  He  began  suit  in  the 
United  States  Circuit  Court  in  St.  Paul  on  March  10, 
1902 ;  and  on  April  9,  1903,  a  decision  was  rendered  by 
four  Circuit  judges  sitting  in  St.  Louis.  This  tribunal 
"  decreed  that,  as  the  combination  known  as  the  North 
ern  Securities  Company  violated  the  Anti-Trust  Act  of 
1890,  that  Company  is  enjoined  from  attempting  to  ac 
quire  further  stock  of  the  Northern  Pacific  or  Great 
Northern  Railways ;  it  is  further  enjoined  from  voting 
the  stock  already  acquired  or  attempting  to  exercise  any 
control  whatsoever.  The  Northern  Pacific  and  Great 
Northern  are  enjoined  from  permitting  any  such  action 
on  the  part  of  the  Securities  Company  and  from  paying 
to  that  Company  any  dividends  on  stock  which  it  now 
claims  to  own."  1 

The  case  went  to  the  United  States  Supreme  Court, 
the  majority  opinion  of  which  was  written  by  Justice 
Harlan  (March  14,  1904)  which  took  the  ground  that  the 
merger  was  opposed  to  the  Anti-Trust  Act  of  1890  and 
therefore  illegal ;  the  decree  of  the  lower  Court  was  af 
firmed.2  It  was  given  out  that  the  Court  had  decided  in 
favor  of  the  Government  by  5 :  4  but  Justice  Brewer,  in 
stating  his  agreement  in  the  main  with  the  four  others, 
differed  in  some  degree,  so  that  it  was  jocularly  said  that 


1 193  U.  S.  Reports,  255. 

2  This  opinion  was  concurred  in  by  Justices  Brown,  McKenna  and  Day. 
193  U.  S.  Reports,  198,  317. 


CH.  VIII.]  THE  NORTHERN  SECURITIES  CASE  225 

the  Government  had  won  by  4|  to  4|.  Many  were  vi 
tally  interested  in  the  decision  and  the  gossip  of  the  day 
put  Justice  Holmes,  who  was  appointed  by  Roosevelt,  on 
the  side  of  the  Government.  It  was  a  great  surprise 
therefore  that  when  the  decision  was  known,  he  should 
be  found  on  the  other  side,  giving  the  grounds  of  his  judg 
ment.1  Gossip  of  the  day  was  also  concerned  with  two 
other  judges  who  were  counted  against  the  Government, 
but  as  matter  of  fact  concurred  with  Harlan  in  his  opin 
ion.  This  gossip  redounded  to  the  majesty  of  the  Court. 

Hill's  opinion  soon  after  Knox's  announcement  was 
given  in  a  private  letter.  "It  really  seems  hard,"  he 
wrote,  "when  we  look  back  on  what  we  have  done  and 
know  that  we  have  led  all  Western  companies  in  opening 
the  country  and  carrying  at  the  lowest  rates,  that  we 
should  be  compelled  to  fight  for  our  lives  against  the  po 
litical  adventurers  who  have  never  done  anything  but 
pose  and  draw  a  salary."  But  when  the  Supreme 
Court  decision,  which  he  thought  would  be  favorable  to 
his  enterprise,  was  rendered,  he  said,  "We  must  all  bow 
to  the  law  of  the  land,"  3  and  steps  were  taken  to  undo 
the  work  of  combination.  Through  the  decisions  of  the 
Courts,  no  property  was  sacrificed,  but  shares,  which  had 
been  transferred  to  the  Securities  Company,  were  returned 
to  their  original  owners ;  but  any  such  holding  company 
as  the  Northern  Securities  was  forbidden. 

No  one  who  has  read  carefully  the  life  of  Hill  can  do 
otherwise  than  feel  sympathy  with  the  man  when  one  of 

1  Both  Justices  Holmes  and  White  delivered  dissenting  opinions ;  with 
them  concurred  Chief  Justice  Fuller  and  Justice  Peckham.     193   U.   S. 
Reports,  364,  400. 

2  March,  1902.     Life  of  Hill,  Pyle,  ii.  171. 
«  Ibid.,  175. 


226  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1904 

his  darling  projects  was  defeated,  but  as  we  look  at  it 
now,  President  Roosevelt  was  right  and  the  decision  of 
the  Court  was  sound.  While  this  combination  as  directed 
by  Hill  may  not  have  been  against  the  public  good,  the 
mischief  lay  in  the  precedent,  for,  were  this  merger  ap 
proved,  a  few  men  by  successive  steps  might  have  con 
trolled  the  railroad  system  of  the  country.  Hill,  Mor 
gan  and  a  few  of  their  associates  holding  the  majority  of 
stock  or  representing  it  in  the  Northern  Securities  Com 
pany,  would  have  controlled  the  business  of  the  Northern 
Pacific,  the  Great  Northern  and  the  Chicago,  Burlington 
and  Quincy  Railroads ;  and  by  the  same  token  a  few  men 
might  have  controlled  the  railroad  system  of  the  country. 
Roosevelt's  idea  of  the  Knight  case,  which  had  been  de 
cided  by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  in  January, 
1895,  with  but  one  dissenting  voice,1  was  that  such  a 
merger  as  that  involved  in  the  Northern  Securities  case 
could  be  reached  only  by  the  action  of  the  States  them 
selves  ;  but  by  the  decision  of  the  same  court  in  the  ac 
tual  (i.  e.  the  Northern  Securities)  case  the  nation  might 
act  and  for  this  Roosevelt  contended.  He  thus  wrote : 
"By  a  vote  of  five  to  four  the  Supreme  Court  reversed 
its  decision  in  the  Knight  case,  and  in  the  Northern  Se 
curities  case  sustained  the  Government.  The  power  to 
deal  with  industrial  monopoly  and  suppress  it  and  to  con 
trol  and  regulate  combinations,  of  which  the  Knight  case 
had  deprived  the  Federal  Government,  was  thus  restored 
to  it  by  the  Northern  Securities  case."  2 


1  Chief  Justice  Fuller  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court.     Justice  Har- 
lan  dissented.     156  U.  S.  Reports,  1.     The  decision  was  on  the  21st. 

2  Autobiography,  469.     I  have  been  much  indebted  to  Meyer's  ac 
count,  ante. 


CH.  VIII.]  BOOKER   WASHINGTON  227 

From  the  day  of  Knox's  statement,  the  line  was  drawn 
between  Roosevelt  and  the  large  financial  interests  of  the 
country.  A  goodly  part  of  the  history  of  his  adminis 
tration  is  due  to  that  conflict,  and  as  Roosevelt  was  ef 
fective  as  a  fighter,  he  was  ready  to  throw  down  the 
gauntlet. 

"The  Northern  Securities  Suit/7  he  wrote  during  Au 
gust,  1904,  "  is  one  of  the  great  achievements  of  my  ad 
ministration.  I  look  back  upon  it  with  great  pride  for 
through  it  we  emphasized  in  signal  fashion,  as  in  no  other 
way  could  be  emphasized,  the  fact  that  the  most  power 
ful  men  in  this  country  were  held  to  accountability  be 
fore  the  law."  1 

Roosevelt  had  been  in  the  White  House  only  a  little 
over  a  month  when  he  set  tongues  to  wagging  both  South 
and  North,  among  negroes  and  whites,  by  having  Booker 
Washington  to  dinner.  His  own  account  of  the  incident, 
written  in  a  private  letter  of  November  8,  1901,  is  an  ac 
curate  relation:  "When  I  asked  Booker  T.  Washington 
to  dinner  I  did  not  devote  very  much  thought  to  the  mat 
ter  one  way  or  the  other.  I  respect  him  greatly  and  be 
lieve  in  the  work  he  has  done.  I  have  consulted  so  much 
with  him  it  seemed  to  me  that  it  was  natural  to  ask  him 
to  dinner  to  talk  over  the  work,  and  the  very  fact  that  I 
felt  a  moment's  qualm  on  inviting  him  because  of  his 
color  made  me  ashamed  of  myself  and  made  me  hasten 
to  send  the  invitation.  I  did  not  think  of  its  bearing  one 
way  or  the  other,  either  on  my  own  future  or  on  anything 
else."  Roosevelt  was  exceedingly  hospitable  and  it  was 
entirely  natural  for  him  to  invite  a  man  with  whom  he 


1  Bishop,  i.  325.  2  Bishop,  i.  166. 


228  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1901 

had  business  to  break  bread  and  eat  salt.  Washington  in 
deed  from  his  clear  comprehension  and  unselfish  advo 
cacy  made  you  forget  his  color.  A  North  Carolinian, 
then  editor  of  the  Atlantic  Monthly,  had  a  similar  ex 
perience.  Not  having  completed  his  business  when  lunch 
eon  time  came,  he  naturally  asked  Washington  to  go 
along  with  him  and  was  only  reminded  of  the  fact  that 
his  guest  was  a  man  of  color  from  the  attitude  of  the 
waiters  and  the  gaze  of  other  patrons  in  the  public  res 
taurant. 

Washington  was  thoroughly  tactful,  and  did  his  best  to 
avoid  having  any  public  mention  of  the  honor  which  was 
paid  to  him,  and  in  fact  throughout  the  whole  affair, 
with  one  exception,  acted  the  part  which  his  well-wishers 
might  have  desired.  The  dinner  incident  was  on  Octo 
ber  18.  Five  days  afterwards  Roosevelt  and  Washing 
ton,  attending  the  Bi-Centennial  of  Yale  University,  met 
in  the  Hyperion  theatre  at  New  Haven,  the  President  on 
the  platform  where  he  was  to  receive  the  degree  of  Doc 
tor  of  Laws  and  Washington  in  the  body  of  the  theatre  as 
delegate  from  the  Tuskegee  Institute.  Justice  Brewer, 
an  old  Yale  graduate,  delivered  the  oration  and  during  it 
said,  "  Thank  God,  there  have  always  been  in  this  coun 
try  college  men  able  to  recognize  a  true  Washington 
whether  his  first  name  was  George  or  Booker."  1  Booker 
was  immensely  popular  in  the  North.  Andrew  Carnegie 
expressed  a  dominant  opinion  when  he  wrote,  "  We  should 
all  take  our  hats  off  to  the  man  who  not  only  raised  him 
self  from  slavery  but  helped  raise  millions  [?]  of  his  race 
to  a  higher  stage  of  civilization." 2  Echoing  Justice 


Yale  Alumni  Weekly.  2  Autobiography,  276. 


CH.  VIII.]         THE  BOOKER  WASHINGTON  INCIDENT  229 

Brewer's  statement  the  theatre  resounded  with  applause 
and  Booker  Washington  got  up  and  bowed.  This  of 
course  was  a  jarring  incident  amid  the  best  of  behavior, 
but  he  may  have  been  urged  to  this  recognition  by  some 
one  at  his  side. 

The  mischief  of  Roosevelt's  action  lay  first,  in  his  being 
looked  upon  by  the  negroes  as  a  saviour.  President  Lin 
coln  had  given  them  political  freedom  and  now  President 
Roosevelt  was  to  raise  them  to  social  equality.  And  sec 
ond,  in  its  effect  on  the  white  people  at  the  South.  Their 
attitude  is  well  expressed  by  the  words  of  a  Southerner 
living  in  Tuskegee  who  was  full  of  praise  for  Washington's 
work,  "Now  when  I  meet  the  man  who  has  done  all  this 
I  can't  call  him  Booker  like  I  would  an  ordinary  nigger, 
but  thunder !  I  can't  call  a  nigger  Mister,  so  I  just  say, 
Professor."  A  young  Southerner  said  to  Leupp  :  "I  love 
that  man  [Theodore  Roosevelt] ;  I  would  do  anything  in 
the  world  for  him,  follow  him  anywhere.  But  the  one 
thing  in  his  career  which  I  shall  never  get  over  is  the 
Booker  Washington  incident.  Understand  me  :  I  do  not 
disparage  Washington's  work  —  I  appreciate  it  as  much 
as  you  do.  I  admit  all  that  you  say  of  his  personal 
worth.  He  has  been  in  my  mother's  parlor  and  invited 
to  sit  down  there.  I  don't  know  that  I  should  have  had 
any  feeling  about  the  President  asking  him  to  lunch  or 
dinner  by  themselves.  But  to  invite  him  to  the  table 
with  ladies  —  that  is  what  no  Southerner  can  brook!"  l 

At  the  end  of  the  letter  already  cited,  Roosevelt  on 
November  8, wrote,  "As  things  have  turned  out  I  am  very 


1  The  Man  Roosevelt,  230.     This  book  has  been  of  much  use  to  me  in 
writing  of  the  Booker  Washington  incident. 


230  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1902 

glad  that  I  asked  him  [Booker  Washington],  for  the  clamor 
aroused  by  the  act  makes  me  feel  as  if  the  act  was  neces 
sary."  1  This  was  a  note  of  defiance  but  his  mature  opin 
ion  afterwards  was  different.  He  said  to  me  that  he  had 
made  a  mistake  in  asking  Booker  Washington  to  dinner ; 
that  among  the  Southerners  there  was  prejudice  against 
such  action  and,  while  he  could  not  comprehend  their 
feeling,  it  was  there  and  had  to  be  reckoned  with.  He 
began  his  administration  with  great  consideration  for  the 
South  in  the  matter  of  Federal  appointments  and  while, 
after  the  Booker  Washington  incident  there  was  criti 
cism  in  regard  to  some  of  them,  on  the  whole  he  stood 
pretty  well  at  the  South.  "Half  my  blood  is  Southern," 
he  wrote.2  It  was  understood  that  he  did  not  approve  of 
the  policy  of  forcing  negro  suffrage  upon  the  Southern 
States  involved  in  the  Reconstruction  Acts  of  Congress 
and  the  XV  Amendment  and  he  never  repeated  the  Booker 
Washington  incident.3  In  his  Autobiography  written 
in  1913  he  made  no  mention  of  it.  But  his  action  did  not 
injure  him  permanently  in  the  South.  When  he  came 
before  the  people  for  election  in  1904  he  carried  Missouri 
by  a  handsome  majority,  the  first  time  in  her  history 
since  1868  when  she  had  voted  for  the  Republican  can 
didates.  The  result  in  Maryland  was  so  close  that  he 
was  adjudged  one  electoral  vote.4 

"The  year  1902,"  wrote  Bishop,  "was  one  of  incessant 
activity  for  Roosevelt."  5  How  could  it  be  otherwise 
with  a  man  of  his  capacious  brain,  equal  in  action  and 
study  to  that  of  three  men !  Henry  Adams,  who  was  on 


1  Bishop,  i.  166.  2  Bishop,  i.  154. 

3  William  R.  Thayer's  Roosevelt,  284. 

4  A  History  of  the  Presidency  (1916),Stanwood,  ii.  137.         6  P.  188. 


CH.  VIII.]  THE  CHARLESTON  EXPOSITION  231 

terms  of  social  intimacy,  wrote:  " Power  when  wielded  by 
abnormal  energy  is  the  most  serious  of  facts  and  all  Roose 
velt's  friends  know  that  his  restless  and  combative  energy 
was  more  than  abnormal.  Roosevelt  .  .  .  was  pure  act." 
He  might  wield  "  unmeasured  power  with  immeasur 
able  energy  in  the  White  House."  1  When  he  opened  the 
South  Carolina  Interstate  and  West  Indian  Exposition  in 
December,  1901,  at  Charleston  it  was  an  expansionist 
President  who  hoped  "that  it  may  prove  of  great  and 
lasting  benefit  to  our  industries  and  to  our  commerce  with 
the  West  Indies."  2 

"Of  the  making  of  expositions  there  is  seemingly  no 
end,"  wrote  James  B.  Townsend.  "  The  Pan-American 
at  Buffalo  had  hardly  closed  its  gates  in  November  [1901] 
when  the  .  .  .  Charleston  Exposition  threw  open  its 
doors.  ...  It  is  a  far  cry  from  Buffalo  to  Charleston  - 
over  a  thousand  prosaic  miles  in  actual  figures  but  in 
midwinter  seemingly  half  the  globe  in  climate  and  sur 
roundings.  The  traveler  who  turned  his  back  upon  the 
deserted  halls  of  the  Pan-American,  swept  by  the  wintry 
blasts  from  the  North  and  found  himself  thirty-six  hours 
later  in  Charleston,  her  feet  bathed  in  the  almost  tideless 
summer  seas,  her  quaint  old  buildings  recalling  the  far 
past,  a  warm  sun  making  the  city  beautiful,  and  the  Cher 
okee  roses  blooming  in  its  old  gardens,  felt  himself  in 
deed  the  pleased  victim  of  a  transformation  carried  by 
magic  'from  lands  of  snow  to  lands  of  sun/  "  3  The  Ex 
position  opened  on  December  1,  1901,  and  continued 
until  June  1,  1902,  and  on  April  9,  President  Roosevelt 


Bishop,  152;    Education,  417. 

2  Appleton's  Annual  Cyclopaedia,  1902,  644. 

3  Cosmopolitan  Magazine,  March,  1902,  523. 


232  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1902 

was  in  Charleston  and  addressed  the  "Men  and  women 
of  the  South,  my  fellow-citizens  of  the  Union."  "  Charles 
ton/*  he  said,  "is  a  typical  Southern  city.  .  .  .  All  of 
us,  North  and  South,  can  glory  alike  in  the  valor  of  the 
men  who  wore  the  blue  and  of  the  men  who  wore  the  gray. 
Those  were  iron  times  and  only  iron  men  could  fight  to 
its  terrible  finish  the  great  struggle  between  the  hosts  of 
Grant  and  Lee."  I  nominated  as  Vice-Governor  of  the 
Philippines,  he  said,  an  "ex-Confederate,  General  Luke 
Wright  of  Tennessee,  who  in  the  Civil  War  fought  with 
distinction  in  a  uniform  of  Confederate  gray.  ...  Of 
course,"  he  declared  in  conclusion,  "we  are  proud  of  the 
South.  ...  I  am  proud  of  your  great  deeds,  for  you 
are  my  people."  l 

June,  1902,  found  the  President  attending  the  Com 
mencement  Exercises  of  Harvard  University  when  his 
Alma  Mater  conferred  upon  him  the  degree  of  Doctor 
of  Laws.  President  Eliot,  in  one  of  his  famous  charac 
terizations,  spoke  of  him  as  "a  true  type  of  the  sturdy 
gentleman  and  the  high-minded  public  servant  of  a  dem 
ocracy."  2  After  Roosevelt's  speech  at  the  Alumni  din 
ner,  Eliot  said  of  him,  in  the  hearing  of  John  Hay,  who 
was  the  recipient  of  the  same  honor,  "What  a  man! 
Genius,  force  and  courage  and  such  evident  honesty."  3 
In  this  speech  Roosevelt  complimented  John  D .  Long 
and  Senator  Hoar,  and  referred  to  Henry  Cabot  Lodge 
as  his  "closest,  stanchest  and  most  loyal  personal  friend." 
He  spoke  highly  of  Hay,  Root,  Taft  and  Leonard  Wood, 


1  Roosevelt's    Presidential   Addresses,    etc.    The    Review    of    Reviews 
Co.  (1910),  i.  18  et  seq. 
* Washburn,  65. 
«  Life  of  Hay,  Thayer,  ii.  348;  Washburn,  65. 


CH.  VIII.]  THEODORE  ROOSEVELT  233 

and  the  talk  merited  the  words  which  Hay,  with  becom 
ing  modesty,  wrote,  "It  was  the  speech  of  a  great  ruler 
and  a  great  gentleman."  l  It  is  an  admirable  trait  in 
Roosevelt's  character  that,  having  accepted  his  assist 
ants  from  his  predecessor,  he  stood  by  them  and  gave 
them  due  credit.  He  never  had  any  envy  of  his  helpers 
from  which  some  great  men  are  not  free. 

"  I  could  do  more  to  do  Antonius  good, 
But  'twould  offend  him," 2 

declared  one  of  Mark  Antony's  officers. 

During  the  last  of  August  and  early  in  September 
Roosevelt  made  a  number  of  speeches  in  the  New  Eng 
land  cities,  the  burden  of  which  was  that  the  general 
government  must  be  given  the  power  to  regulate  "  great 
corporations  which  we  rather  loosely  designate  as  trusts."  3 
It  must  be  remembered  that  we  are  now,  in  the  year  1902, 
before  the  decision  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court 
in  the  Northern  Securities  case  which  was  not  rendered 
until  March,  1904,  and  that  neither  Roosevelt  nor  the 
crowds  that  flocked  to  hear  him  were  aware  what  the  de 
cision  would  be,  but  he  was  insistent  that  the  general 
government  should  be  given  this  power  through  legisla 
tion  by  Congress.  "At  present,"  he  declared  in  Boston, 
"we  have  really  no  efficient  control  over  a  big  corpora 
tion  which  does  business  in  more  than  one  State."  4 
"We  must  get  power  first,  then  use  that  power  fearlessly 
but  with  moderation,  with  sanity,  with  self-restraint."  5 
"So  far  from  being  against  property,"  he  said  during  his 


1  Life  of  Hay,  Thayer,  ii.  349.     The  speech  is  printed  in  the  Review 
of  Reviews,  Pub.  78. 

2  Antony  and  Cleopatra,  iii.  1. 
J  Current  Lit.  Pub.,  i.  40. 

4  Current  Lit.  Pub.,  i.  45.  6  Fitchburg,  ibid.,  55. 


234  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1902 

speech  in  Boston,  "when  I  ask  that  the  question  of  trusts 
be  taken  up,  I  am  acting  in  the  most  conservative  sense 
in  property's  interest.  When  a  great  corporation  is  sued 
for  violating  the  Anti-Trust  Law,  it  is  not  a  move  against 
property,  it  is  a  move  in  favor  of  property,  because  when 
we  make  it  evident  that  all  men,  great  and  small  alike, 
have  to  obey  the  law,  we  put  the  safeguard  of  the  law 
around  all  men.  ...  I  am  advocating  action  to  pre 
vent  anything  revolutionary.  .  .  .  The  first  thing  we 
want  is  publicity.  .  .  .  The  publicity  itself  would  cure 
many  evils."  l 

During  his  tour  he  enunciated  truths  which  showed 
that  in  his  pursuit  of  the  so-called  trusts  he  would  be  ac 
tuated  by  sound  principles.  "We  are  passing  through  a 
period  of  great  commercial  prosperity,"  he  said  in  Provi 
dence,  "and  such  a  period  is  as  sure  as  adversity  itself  to 
bring  mutterings  of  discontent.  .  .  .  The  spirit  of  envy 
and  jealousy  springs  up  in  the  breasts  of  those  who, 
though  they  may  be  doing  fairly  well  themselves,  see  oth 
ers  no  more  deserving  who  do  better.  Wise  laws  and 
fearless  and  upright  administration  of  the  laws  can  give 
the  opportunity  for  such  prosperity  as  we  see  about  us. 
But  that  is  all  that  they  can  do.  ...  It  is  not  true  that 
the  poor  have  grown  poorer  but  some  of  the  rich  have 
grown  very  much  richer."  No  State  government  and  town 
can  "by  some  queer  patent  device  supply  the  lack  of 
individual  thrift,  energy,  enterprise,  resolution."  "The 
best  laws  that  the  wit  of  man  can  devise  would  not  make 
a  community  of  thriftless  and  idle  men  prosperous."  2 


1  Current  Lit.  Pub.,  i.  43,  47,  48. 

2  Current  Lit.  Pub.,  i.  31,  33,  57,  91.     The  last  two  citations  are  from 
speeches  in  Dalton,  Mass.,  and  in  Logansport,  Indiana. 


CH.  VIII. ]  THEODORE  ROOSEVELT  235 

While  at  Pittsfield,  Mass.,  he  suffered  a  severe  accident. 
A  trolley  car,  going  at  a  high  rate  of  speed,  ran  into  a 
carriage,  in  which  he  was  riding;  a  secret  service  man 
who  sat  on  the  box  with  the  driver  was  instantly  killed ; 
the  President  was  thrown  forty  feet  and  fell  upon  his 
right  cheek  which  with  his  right  leg  was  badly  bruised. 
The  accident  took  place  on  September  3,  but  nothing 
daunted  he  started  on  the  day  following  from  Oyster 
Bay  on  a  speech-making  tour  through  the  South  and 
West.1 

The  most  notable  speech  was  made  in  Chattanooga  on 
September  8  to  the  Brotherhood  of  Locomotive  Firemen. 
"I  believe  emphatically  in  organized  labor,"  he  declared ; 
and  then  he  preached  the  gospel  of  work  in  words  to  fit 
the  occasion:  "Your  work  is  hard.  Do  you  suppose  I 
mention  that  because  I  pity  you  ?  No ;  not  a  bit.  I 
don't  pity  any  man  who  does  hard  work  worth  doing. 
I  admire  him.  I  pity  the  creature  who  doesn't  work  at 
whichever  end  of  the  social  scale  he  may  regard  himself 
as  being.  The  law  of  Jworthy  work  well  done  is  the  law  of 
successful  American  life.  I  believe  in  play  too  —  play 
and  play  hard  while  you  play ;  but  don't  make  the  mis 
take  of  thinking  that  that  is  the  main  thing.  The  work 
is  what  counts."  2 

An  abscess  developing  on  the  injured  leg,  forced  him  to 
abandon  his  trip  and  return  to  Washington. 


1  Bishop,   i.    196. 

8  Current  Lit.  Pub.,  i.  69,  70. 


CHAPTER   IX 

IN  1902  President  Roosevelt  was  confronted  with  a 
strike  in  the  anthracite  coal  regions,  which  until  then 
was  the  greatest  coal  strike  in  American  history.  After 
many  and  futile  negotiations  the  strike  was  declared  on 
May  15,  and  this  brought  out  all  of  the  miners  of  anthra 
cite  coal.  Three  men  of  various  education  and  walks 
in  life  were  earnestly  in  favor  of  settling  the  strike,  but 
their  efforts,  both  before  and  after  the  declaration,  were 
for  a  while  unavailing.  John  Mitchell,  the  President  of  the 
miners'  union,1  was  one  of  the  three,  and  he  wrote  in  his 
book  published  in  1903:  "The  average  wage  earner  has 
made  up  his  mind  that  he  must  remain  a  wage  earner. 
He  has  given  up  the  hope  of  a  kingdom  to  come  where 
he  himself  will  be  a  capitalist  and  he  asks  that  the  reward 
for  his  work  be  given  to  him  as  a  workingman.  Singly, 
he  has  been  too  weak  to  enforce  his  just  demands  and  he 
has  sought  strength  in  union  and  has  associated  himself 
into  labor  organizations.  .  .  .  There  is  no  necessary  hos 
tility  between  labor  and  capital.  Neither  can  do  without 
the  other;  each  has  evolved  from  the  other.  Capital 
is  labor  saved  and  materialized ;  the  power  to  labor  is 
in  itself  a  form  of  capital.  There  is  not  even  a  necessary 
fundamental  antagonism  between  the  laborer  and  the 
capitalist.  Both  are  men  with  the  virtues  and  vices  of 
men  and  each  wishes  at  times  more  than  his  fair  share."  2 


1  The  official  title  was  United  Mine  Workers  of  America. 

2  Organized  Labor,  Mitchell,  ix. 

236 


CH.  IX.]  MARK  HANNA  237 

Mark  Hanna  was  another.  As  owner  of  bituminous 
coal  mines,  he  had  had  a  large  experience  with  striking 
miners.  He  had  tried  the  old-fashioned  lock-out,  nego 
tiation  with  the  miners'  union  and  the  substitution  of 
green  men  for  the  old  miners,  with  the  purpose  of  breaking 
up  a  strike  or  ending  a  lock-out.  He  had  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  of  all  of  them,  negotiation  with  the  min 
ers'  union  was  on  the  whole  the  best  plan.  His  business 
experience  was  now  joined  to  his  political  standing  and 
he  gave  the  benefit  of  both  to  the  public. 

Then  there  was  President  Roosevelt.  With  a  practi 
cal  agreement  between  the  three  it  might  have  seemed  as 
if  a  resolution  were  easy ;  and  they  had  to  deal  with  only 
six  organizations  as  through  mining  and  railroad  com 
binations,  the  whole  business  of  mining  anthracite  coal 
may  have  been  said  to  be  centered  in  these  six,  chief  of 
whom  was  George  F.  Baer,  President  of  the  Philadelphia 
and  Reading  Coal  and  Iron  Company  as  well  as  of  the 
Railroad  Company.  Baer,  a  self-made  man,  a  lawyer 
by  profession,  seems  to  have  dominated  all  the  rest  and 
even  for  a  time  to  have  prevailed  over  J.  P.  Morgan  who 
had  great  influence  with  all  of  the  coal  operators. 

The  bituminous  coal  miners  in  session  at  Indianapolis 
during  July,  1902,  decided  against  a  sympathetic  strike, 
for  the  reason  that  they  had  a  contract  with  the  pro 
ducers  not  expiring  until  the  following  April ;  but  al 
though  living  up  to  their  contract,  they  arranged  to  give 
to  their  brothers  in  the  anthracite  region  the  largest 
amount  possible  of  material  assistance  which  enabled 
them  to  prolong  the  strike.  Thus  affairs  continued  dur 
ing  the  summer  of  1902.  There  was  a  dead-lock  between 
the  miners  and  producers.  When  September  came, 


238  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1902 

the  public  in  eastern  Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey,  New 
York  and  New  England  began  to  be  alarmed  regarding 
their  supply  of  anthracite  coal,  as  on  that  depended  prac 
tically  their  domestic  use.  Much  pressure  was  brought 
to  bear  that  in  some  way  the  matter  be  settled  so  that 
the  public  should  have  their  usual  supply.  Of  this  pres 
sure  the  greatest  amount  was  on  the  President,  who  appre 
ciated  thoroughly  the  gravity  of  the  situation,  and  on 
September  27  wrote  to  Senator  Hanna:  "What  gives 
me  the  greatest  concern  at  the  moment  is  the  coal  famine. 
Of  course  we  have  nothing  to  do  whatever  with  this  coal 
strike  and  no  earthly  responsibility  for  it.  But  the  pub 
lic  at  large  will  tend  to  visit  on  our  heads  responsibility 
for  the  shortage  in  coal.  .  .  .  But  I  do  most  earnestly 
feel  that  from  every  consideration  of  public  policy  and 
good  morals,  the  operators  should  make  some  slight  con 
cession."  l 

No  one  after  the  President  bore  so  important  a  part 
in  this  matter  as  did  Mark  Hanna.  He  had  temporarily 
settled  the  anthracite  coal  strike  of  1900,  had  now  be 
come  chairman  of  the  Industrial  Department  of  the  Civic 
Federation,2  whose  object  was  to  prevent  strikes  and  lock 
outs  through  trade  agreements  by  means  of  collective 
bargaining.  This  position  gave  him  an  added  influence 
with  the  men.  He  shared  the  President's  "  anxiety  in 
regard  to  the  coal  situation."  Visiting  him  at  Oyster 
Bay  he  went  thence  to  New  York  City  where  he  saw 
Mitchell  and  Morgan.  He  obtained  from  Morgan  a 
proposition  of  settlement  which  Mitchell,  on  behalf  of 


1  Life  of  Hanna,  Croly,  397. 

2  As  to  Hanna's  connection  with  the  Civic  Federation  see  Croly,  390 
etseq. 


CH.  IX.]  ROOSEVELT  —  HANNA  239 

the  miners,  agreed  to  accept.  "I  really  felt  encouraged/' 
he  wrote  to  the  President,  "to  think  that  I  was  about  to 
accomplish  a  settlement.  I  went  to  Philadelphia  and 
saw  Mr.  Baer  and  to  my  surprise  he  absolutely  refused 
to  entertain  it."  1 

Apparently  at  this  time  Baer  was  the  master  of  the 
situation.  He  maintained  that  the  operators  must  con 
trol  their  own  business  and  not  allow  any  dictation  from  a 
miners'  union.  To  the  demand  for  arbitration  their 
reply  was,  "We  have  nothing  to  arbitrate."  Hanna 
felt  that  the  operators  were  determined  on  starving  the 
miners  to  submission  which  seemed  to  him  difficult  as 
they  were  "getting  abundant  supplies  from  their  fellow- 
workmen  all  over  the  country."  2 

Roosevelt  appreciated  every  point  in  the  situation. 
On  the  same  day  that  he  wrote  to  Hanna,  he  wrote  to 
Senator  Lodge.  The  operators  "have  said  that  they 
are  never  going  to  submit  again  to  having  their  labor 
ers  given  a  triumph  over  them  for  political  purposes, 
as  Senator  Hanna  secured  the  triumph  in  1900.  They 
are  now  repeating  with  great  bitterness  that  they  do 
not  intend  to  allow  Quay  to  bully  them  into  making 
any  concession  for  his  political  ends  any  more  than  they 
would  allow  Hanna  to  do  it  for  his."  3 

Roosevelt,  however,  made  up  his  mind  to  leave  nothing 
undone.  He  invited  representatives  of  the  operators 
and  miners  to  meet  him  in  Washington  on  October  3,  and 
on  their  assembling,  he  made  them  a  brief  address,  telling 
them  that  he  was  impelled  to  his  action  by  "the  urgency 
and  the  terrible  nature  of  the  catastrophe  impending 


1  Raima's  letter  of  Sept.  29,  Croly,  398. 

2  Banna's  letter  of  Sept.  29,  Croly,  398.          3  Bishop,  i.  200. 


240  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1902 

over  a  large  portion  of  our  people  in  the  shape  of  a  winter 
fuel  famine.77  l  The  story  of  the  Conference  is  told  by 
the  President  in  a  letter  of  October  3  to  Hanna.  "  Well ! 
I  have  tried  and  failed,"  he  wrote.  "I  feel  downhearted 
over  the  result  both  because  of  the  great  misery  ensuing 
for  the  mass  of  our  people  and  because  the  attitude  of 
the  operators  will  beyond  a  doubt  double  the  burden  on 
us  who  stand  between  them  and  socialistic  action.  .  .  . 
At  the  meeting  to-day  the  operators  assumed  a  fairly  hope 
less  attitude.  None  of  them  appeared  to  such  advan 
tage  as  Mitchell,  whom  most  of  them  denounced  with 
such  violence  and  rancor  that  I  felt  he  did  very  well  to 
keep  his  temper.  Between  times  they  insulted  me  for 
not  preserving  order."  Mitchell  proposed  "that  all 
matters  in  dispute  be  submitted  to  the  arbitration  of  a 
tribunal  selected  by  the  President."  2  The  President 
continued  in  his  letter  to  Hanna,  "If  the  operators  had 
acceded  to  Mitchell's  proposition,  1  intended  to  put  you 
on  the  commission  or  board  of  arbitration.  But  the 
operators  declined  to  accede  to  the  proposition.  ...  A 
coal  famine  in  the  winter  is  an  ugly  thing  and  I  fear  we 
shall  see  terrible  suffering  and  grave  disaster."  3 

Now  entered  upon  the  scene  Grover  Cleveland.  He 
read  in  the  newspaper  of  October  4  the  account  of  the 
Conference  of  the  preceding  day  and  in  a  private  letter 
to  the  President  expressed  himself  as  "especially  dis 
turbed  and  vexed  by  the  tone  and  substance  of  the  oper 
ators7  deliverances."  He  suggested  that  for  the  moment 
the  proprietors  and  miners  sink  their  present  controversy, 
produce  coal  sufficient  "to  serve  the  necessities  of  con- 

1  Bishop,  i.  203.  2  Organized  Labor,  Mitchell,  387. 

3  Croly,  398. 


CH.  IX.]  THEODORE  ROOSEVELT  241 

sumers"  and  afterwards  "take  up  the  fight  again  where 
they  left  off  'without  prejudice."  Roosevelt  was  glad 
to  receive  such  a  letter;  he  had  been  studying  Cleve 
land's  and  Olney's  action  in  the  Pullman  car  strike  1  and 
he  expected  to  act  with  the  same  firmness  that  they  had 
shown.  Now  he  told  Cleveland  that  the  operators  "  re 
fused  point  blank"  to  consider  Mitchell's  proposition 
of  arbitration,  and  he  had  substantially  adopted  the  sug 
gestion  of  the  letter.  On  October  6  the  President  pro 
posed  that  if  the  men  would  go  to  work,  he  would  appoint 
a  commission  to  determine  matters  in  dispute  promising 
to  do  all  in  his  power  to  have  what  legislation  they  pro 
posed  enacted.  This  offer  was  refused  by  Mitchell  for 
what  he  deemed  good  and  sufficient  reasons.2 

The  President  was  not  especially  pleased  that  his  plan 
to  settle  the  trouble  was  thus  rejected  by  Mitchell  but 
this  feeling  was  soon  overcome  by  his  irritation  at  the 
standpoint  of  the  operators ;  he  now  proposed  to  ask 
Carroll  D.  Wright,  United  States  Commissioner  of  Labor, 
and  two  eminent  men  to  make  a  thorough  investigation 
and  to  say  how  the  dispute  should  be  settled.  He  ear 
nestly  begged  Cleveland  to  be  one  of  the  three.  Re 
ceiving  the  Ex-President's  assent  on  October  13,  he  "  im 
mediately  wrote  to  a  certain  Federal  judge  asking  him 
to  be  the  third  member  of  the  Commission. "  As  the 
investigation  would  consume  considerable  time,  the  Pres 
ident  determined  that  operations  should  begin  at  once, 
so  he  arranged  with  Senator  Quay  to  have  the  governor 
of  Pennsylvania  notify  him  that  he  could  not  keep  order 
in  the  coal  regions  without  Federal  interference.  Then 


'See  viii.  424.  2  Organized  Labor,  388. 


242  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1902 

Roosevelt  decided  to  send  thither  Lieutenant-General 
John  M.  Schofield,  who  was  on  the  retired  list  of  the  army, 
with  a  sufficient  number  of  regular  troops ;  he  should 
act  as  receiver,  put  down  all  violence,  take  full  charge 
of  the  mines  and  operate  them  to  supply  the  present  de 
mand.  Secretaries  Root  and  Knox,  both  being  excellent 
lawyers,  would  not  have  advised  this  straining  of  the  Con 
stitution  ;  nevertheless  they  supported  the  President 
loyally.1 

There  was  considerable  violence  in  the  coal  regions 
but  where  the  fault  lay  it  was  bootless  to  inquire.  Cer 
tainly  Mitchell's  advice  was  against  anything  of  the  sort 
and  the  President  who  knew  all  of  the  facts  in  the  case, 
stated  in  a  private  letter  to  Bishop  on  October  13,  the 
matter  fairly :  "I  have  been  told,  on  excellent  authority, 
that  the  disorder  has  been  very  great  and  of  very  evil 
kind.  On  equally  good  authority  I  am  told  the  exact 
contrary.  ...  I  stand  against  socialism,  against  anarchic 
disorder. "  2  Soon  after  the  conference  of  October  3, 
all  of  the  national  guard  of  Pennsylvania  was  sent  to  the 
coal  regions  to  act  toward  the  preservation  of  peace. 
It  was  frequently  stated  by  the  operators  that,  if  men 
were  properly  protected,  enough  could  be  secured  to  man 
the  mines,  but  this  did  not  prove  to  be  the  case.3 

The  President  saw  accurately  the  probable  course  of 
things,  writing  thus  to  Robert  Bacon:  "The  situation 
is  bad,  especially  because  it  is  possible  it  may  grow  in- 


1  On  Aug.  6,  1908,  Roosevelt  wrote  a  letter  to  the  Outlook  in  which  he 
gave  a  large  part  of  the  Cleveland  correspondence.     The  Outlook,  Aug. 
22,  1908,  881.     It  is  also  printed  by  Bishop,  i.  204  et  seq.     For  the  Scho 
field  incident,  Bishop,  i.  211.     T.   Roosevelt,   An  Autobiography,  514; 
Private  Conversation  with  the  President,  Nov.  16,  1905. 

2  Bishop,  i.  208.  3  See  Mitchell,  Organized  Labor,  389. 


CH.  IX.]  ELIHU  ROOT  243 

finitely  worse.  If  when  the  severe  weather  comes  on 
there  is  a  coal  famine  I  dread  to  think  of  the  suffering, 
in  parts  of  our  great  cities  especially,  and  I  fear  there  will 
be  fuel  riots  of  as  bad  a  type  as  any  bread  riots  we  have 
ever  seen.  Of  course,  once  the  rioting  has  begun,  once 
there  is  a  resort  to  mob  violence,  the  only  thing  to  do  is 
to  maintain  order."  1 

Before  adopting  the  drastic  plan  of  making  General 
Schofield  a  receiver  of  the  mining  companies,  the  Presi 
dent  again  tried  persuasion.  By  this  time  the  operators, 
for  some  reason  not  disclosed,  had  become  more  placa 
ble.  Roosevelt  requested  Secretary  Root  to  go  to  New 
York  to  see  if  he  could  not  get  Morgan  to  agree  upon 
some  plan  of  arbitration.  Root  spent  the  better  part  of 
a  day  with  J.  P.  Morgan  on  his  yacht  Corsair  and  during 
this  interview,  so  Root  wrote  to  the  President,  "we 
drafted  an  agreement  of  arbitration  for  a  commission 
to  be  appointed  by  you.  Mr.  Morgan  got  the  signatures 
of  the  operators  to  this  paper  with  a  single  modification. 
The  modification  required  that  the  arbitrators  appointed 
by  you  should  belong  to  certain  specified  classes  —  an 
army  engineer,  a  business  man  familiar  with  the  coal  busi 
ness,  a  judge  of  the  locality,  a  sociologist,  etc.  When 
this  paper  was  presented  to  the  miners,  they  in  turn  wished 
for  some  modification  of  the  proposal  and  it  appeared 
they  would  be  satisfied  to  enter  into  the  agreement  if 
Bishop  Spalding  [the  Roman  Catholic  bishop  of  Peoria, 
Illinois]  could  be  added  to  the  list  of  arbitrators  and  Mr. 
Clark  could  be  appointed  to  the  place  which  called  for 
a  sociologist."  The  President  was  in  constant  consulta- 

1  Oct.  5,  Bishop,  i.  208. 

2  Letter  of  Root  to  the  President,  June  23,  1903,  Bishop,  i.  212. 


244  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1902 

tion  with  Hanna  and  learned  from  him  that  he  had  sent  a 
telegram  to  Mitchell  assuring  him  that  the  miners  "  could 
depend  on  absolute  fairness"  at  Roosevelt's  hands.1 

To  clinch  the  business  so  that  there  could  be  no  mis 
understanding,  Root  desired  that  a  member  of  Morgan's 
firm  should  come  to  Washington  and  confer  with  the 
President.  Thereupon,  two  of  the  prominent  partners 
came.  The  interview,  which  took  place  on  October  15, 
is  best  described  in  a  private  letter  of  the  President  to 
Senator  Lodge:  "The  operators  had  limited  me  down 
by  a  full  proviso  to  five  different  types  of  men,  including 
an  '  eminent  sociologist/  .  .  .  The  miners,  on  the  other 
hand,  wanted  me  to  appoint  at  least  two  extra  members 
myself,  or  in  some  fashion  to  get  Bishop  Spalding  (whom 
I  myself,  wanted)  and  the  labor  union  man  on  the  com 
mission.  .  .  .  The  operators  refused  point  blank  to  have 
another  man  added.  .  .  .  Finally  it  developed  that  what 
they  meant  was  that  no  extra  man  should  be  added  if 
he  was  a  representative  of  organized  labor.  ...  It  took 
me  about  two  hours  before  I  at  last  grasped  the  fact  that 
the  mighty  brains  of  these  captains  of  industry  had  for 
mulated  the  theory  that  they  would  rather  have  anarchy 
than  tweedledum,  but  if  I  would  use  the  word  tweedledee 
they  would  hail  it  as  meaning  peace.  In  other  words, 
that  they  had  not  the  slightest  objection  to  my  appointing 
a  labor  man  as  an  ' eminent  sociologist'  and  adding  Bishop 
Spalding  on  my  own  account,  but  they  preferred  to  see 
the  Red  Commune  come  rather  than  to  have  me  make 
Bishop  Spalding  or  anyone  else  'the  eminent  sociolo 
gist/  and  add  the  labor  man.  I  instantly  told  them  that 


1  Life  of  Hanna,  Croly,  399. 


CH.  IX.]  ROOSEVELT  —  HANNA  245 

I  had  not  the  slightest  objection  whatever  to  doing  an 
absurd  thing  when  it  was  necessary  to  meet  the  objection 
of  an  absurd  mind  on  some  vital  point,  and  that  I  would 
cheerfully  appoint  my  labor  man  as  the  '  eminent  sociolo 
gist.'  It  was  almost  impossible  for  me  to  appreciate 
the  instant  and  tremendous  relief  this  gave  them.  They 
saw  nothing  offensive  in  my  language  and  nothing  ridicu 
lous  in  the  proposition,  and  Pierpont  Morgan  and  Baer, 
when  called  up  by  telephone,  eagerly  ratified  the  absurd 
ity;  and  accordingly  at  this  utterly  unimportant  price 
we  bid  fair  to  come  out  of  as  dangerous  a  situation  as 
I  ever  dealt  with."  l 

Roosevelt  desired  to  appoint  Grover  Cleveland  on  the 
Commission  in  lieu  of  the  army  engineer,  but  to  this  the 
operators  would  not  agree.  In  1915  Roosevelt  wrote 
to  Charles  Washburn,  "I  think  the  settlement  of  the  coal 
strike  was  much  the  most  important  thing  I  did  about 
labor  from  every  standpoint."  The  President  wrote 
to  Senator  Ilanna:  "Last  night  when  it  became  evident 
that  we  were  going  to  get  a  Commission  which  would  be 
accepted  by  both  sides,  I  remarked,  'Well,  Uncle  Mark's 
work  has  borne  fruit/  and  everybody  said  'yes.'  The 
solution  came  because  so  many  of  us  have  for  so  long 
hammered  at  the  matter  until  at  last  things  got  into  shape 
which  made  the  present  outcome  possible."  3  In  effect 
ing  such  a  compromise  the  personality  of  men  counted 
for  much  and  Roosevelt  and  Hanna  seemed  the  men  of 
all  men  to  bring  about  such  a  result. 


Bishop,  i.  214;    Private  Conversation  with  the  President,  Nov.  16, 
1905. 

2  Roosevelt,  Thayer,  246 ;   Charles  G.  Washburn,  82. 
*  Oct.  16,  Life  of  Hanna,  Croly,  400. 


246  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1902 

The  Commission  was :  Brigadier-General  John  M. 
Wilson,  retired,  formerly  Chief  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A. ; 
E.  W.  Parker,  expert  mining  engineer,  chief  statistician 
of  the  coal  division  of  the  U.  S.  Geological  Survey  and 
editor  of  the  Engineering  and  Mining  Journal;  George 
Gray,  Judge  of  the  United  States  Circuit  Court,  Dela 
ware  ;  E.  E.  Clark,  Chief  of  the  Order  of  Railway  Con 
ductors,  sociologist;  Thomas  H.  Watkins,  practically 
connected  with  the  mining  and  selling  of  coal;  Bishop 
John  L.  Spalding  of  Illinois;  Carroll  D.  Wright,  U.  S. 
Commissioner  of  Labor,  Recorder  of  the  Commission.1 
"Most  of  the  miners  were  Roman  Catholics"  and  " Mit 
chell  and  the  other  leaders  of  the  miners  had  urged  me 
to  appoint  some  high  Catholic  ecclesiastic."  Bishop 
Spalding  was  "one  of  the  very  best  men  to  be  found  in 
the  entire  country."  2  Judge  Gray  was  chosen  chairman 
of  the  Commission. 

The  miners  at  once  went  to  work.  The  relief  felt  in 
the  eastern  part  of  the  country  was  very  great.  The 
well-to-do  were  spared  much  hardship,  the  poor,  freezing. 
Coal,  of  which  there  was  still  a  small  stock,  had  advanced 
to  fabulous  prices.  Now  normal  conditions  obtained. 
Many  homes  accustomed  to  genial  warmth  blessed  Roose 
velt  because  he  had  used  the  high  office  of  President  to 
give  them  comfort. 

In  five  months  the  Commission  made  their  report  to 
the  President,  with  their  different  awards.  They  ad 
judged  that  the  miners  should  have  an  increase  of  ten 
per  cent  in  their  wages;  that  there  should  be  no  dis 
crimination  against  union  or  non-union  laborers;  a  slid- 

1  Bishop,  i.  217. 

2  Roosevelt,  Autobiography,  507,  509. 


CH.  IX.]  SETTLEMENT  OF  THE  STRIKE  247 

ing  scale  of  wages  was  fixed  which  should  increase  the 
pay  of  the  miners  with  any  advance  in  the  price  of  coal ; 
the  award  should  continue  for  three  years.  The  Com 
mission  further  adjudged  that  any  differences  of  opinion 
should  be  referred  to  a  permanent  joint  committee  to 
be  called  a  Board  of  Conciliation,  to  consist  of  six  persons, 
three  of  whom  should  be  named  by  the  mine  workers 
and  three  by  the  operators.  In  the  event  that  the  six 
could  not  agree,  the  umpire  should  be  "one  of  the  circuit 
judges  of  the  third  judicial  circuit  of  the  United  States, 
whose  decision  shall  be  final  and  binding  in  the  premises." l 
John  Mitchell  maintained  that  the  Commission  indirectly 
acknowledged  the  miners'  union,  writing,  "  While  dis 
claiming  the  wish  to  compel  the  recognition  of  the  United 
Mine  Workers  of  America,  the  Commission  in  actual 
practice  made  that  recognition  inevitable  and  imme 
diate."  2 

"Time,"  wrote  Joseph  B.  Bishop  in  1920,  "has  com 
pletely  justified  the  President's  course.  Not  only  did 
the  findings  of  the  Commission  secure  peace  in  the  anthra 
cite  mines  during  the  three  stipulated  years,  but  perma 
nently,  for  since  1902  there  has  been  no  strike  there  and 
no  serious  labor  trouble."  3 

Germans  living  in  Venezuela  had  claims  against  her 
which  were  assumed  by  the  German  Government ;  there 
were  also  British  and  Italian  claims  which  had  been 
assumed  respectively  by  Great  Britain  and  Italy  so  that 
the  question  of  indemnity  became  one  between  govern 
ments.  For  our  purpose,  Italy  may  be  left  out  of  con- 


1  Report  of  Anthracite  Coal  Commission,  80  et  seq. 

2  Organized  Labor,  394.  3  Vol.  i.  219. 


248  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1902 

sideration  and  our  attention  directed  to  Germany  and 
Great  Britain,  between  which  the  printed  records  of  For 
eign  Relations  show  a  community  of  interest  and  feeling. 
In  1901  these  two  powers  offered  a  number  of  times  to 
submit  the  dispute  to  arbitration  and  especially  by  the 
note  of  the  German  Government  of  July  16,  1901, l  but 
Venezuela  refused  such  an  offer.  In  1902  Germany  and 
Great  Britain  had  a  squadron  of  war-vessels  off  the  Vene 
zuelan  coast  for  the  purpose  of  collecting  what  was  due 
their  citizens.  The  story  would  be  no  other  than  one 
of  shiftiness  on  the  part  of  a  South  American  power  in 
her  diplomacy  and  action  were  it  not  that  the  proceeding 
of  the  German  Government  in  1902  gave  the  occasion 
of  a  bout  between  the  President  and  the  Kaiser.  In 
December,  1902,  Venezuela  desired  arbitration,  which 
now  Germany  did  not  want,  and  the  suspicion  of  Roose 
velt  became  aroused  that  she  "  intended  to  seize  some 
Venezuelan  harbor  and  turn  it  into  a  strongly  fortified 
place  of  arms  on  the  model  of  Kiauchau  [Kiaochow] 2 
with  a  view  to  exercising  some  degree  of  control  over  the 
future  Isthmian  Canal,  and  over  South  American  affairs 
generally." 

England  and  Germany  at  this  time  threatened  a  block 
ade  and  on  December  9,  1902,  captured  all  of  the  Venezue 
lan  war-vessels  in  the  port  of  Caracas,  her  capital ;  and 
four  days  later,  the  united  fleets  bombarded  the  forts 


1  Foreign  Relations,  1904,  507. 

2  Kiaochow  Bay,  a  large  inlet  in  China,  "was  seized  in  November,  1897, 
by  the  German  fleet.  .  .  .     The  bay  and  land  on  both  sides  of  the  en 
trance  were  leased  to  Germany  for  99  years.     During  the  continuance  of 
the  lease  Germany  exercises  all  the  rights  to  territorial  sovereignty,  in 
cluding  the  right  to  erect  fortifications."     Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  xv. 
783. 


CH.  IX.]  THE  GERMAN   MENACE  249 

of  the  town  of  Puerto  Cabello,  the  cause  being  an  alleged 
insult  to  the  British  flag  on  a  British  merchant  vessel.1 
Germany  favored  a  " pacific  blockade"  while  Great  Brit 
ain  did  not  believe  there  could  be  such  a  thing.  "Has 
war  been  declared?"  the  Prime  Minister,  Mr.  Balfour, 
was  asked  in  the  House  of  Commons,  and  he  replied, 
"Does  the  honorable  and  learned  gentleman  suppose 
that  without  a  state  of  war  you  can  take  the  ships  of  an 
other  power  and  blockade  its  ports?"  2 

In  October,  1915,  William  Roscoe  Thayer  writing  a 
chapter,  "The  German  Menace  Looms  Up,"  in  his  "Life 
of  John  Hay,"  gave  the  inside  of  Germany's  ulterior  pur 
pose  ;  this  history  aroused  great  interest.  Roosevelt 
on  August  21,  1916,  wrote  a  letter  to  Thayer  in  which 
he  told  the  whole  story,3  confirming  what  Thayer  had 
already  written  and  elaborating  the  incident.  In  his 
Message  to  Congress  of  December,  1901,  the  President 
had  said,  "The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  declaration  that 
there  must  be  no  territorial  aggrandizement  by  any 
non-American  power  at  the  expense  of  any  American 
power  on  American  soil."  To  Roosevelt  it  seemed  that 
the  result  of  Germany's  action  would  be  a  violation 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and,  if  she  refused  to  arbitrate 
the  whole  question,  she  would  wage  war  against  Venezuela 
and  take  possession  of  a  seaport.  "Germany,"  he  wrote, 
"declined  to  agree  to  arbitrate  the  question  at  issue  be 
tween  her  and  Venezuela  and  declined  to  say  that  she 
would  not  take  possession  of  Venezuelan  territory,  merely 
saying  that  such  possession  would  be  'temporary.'  " 


1  Foreign  Relations,  1903,  790,  797. 

2  Dec.  17,  1902,  Foreign  Relations,  1903,  455. 

3  Thayer  printed  this  letter  as  an  appendix  to  his  second  edition. 


250  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1902 

The  attitude  of  England  was  different.  Henry  White 
heard  on  December  16  Lord  Lansdowne,  the  Foreign 
Minister,  say  in  the  House  of  Lords,  "It  is  not  intended 
to  land  a  British  force  and  still  less  to  occupy  Venezuelan 
territory."  l  The  correspondence  with  Great  Britain  was 
conducted  by  Henry  White,  the  first  Secretary  of  Le 
gation,  who,  seeing  his  own  country's  side  with  persist 
ency  could  present  it  to  a  foreign  power  with  the  courtesy 
that  obtains  in  diplomatic  transactions  —  "the  most 
useful  man  in  the  entire  diplomatic  service  during  my 
presidency,  and  for  many  years  before  was  Henry 
White,"2  said  Roosevelt.  "I  speedily  became  con 
vinced,"  wrote  Roosevelt,  "that  Germany  was  the  leader 
and  the  really  formidable  party  in  the  transaction  and 
that  England  was  merely  following  Germany's  lead  in 
rather  half-hearted  fashion." 

"I  saw  the  Ambassador"  [Holleben,  of  Germany]  re 
lated  Roosevelt,  "and  explained  that  in  view  of  the  Ger 
man  squadron  on  the  Venezuelan  coast  I  could  not 
permit  longer  delay  in  answering  my  request  for  an  arbi 
tration  and  that  I  could  not  acquiesce  in  any  seizure  of 
Venezuelan  territory.  The  Ambassador  responded  that 
his  government  could  not  agree  to  arbitrate  and  that 
there  was  no  intention  to  take  ' permanent'  possession 
of  Venezuelan  territory.  I  answered  that  Kiauchau 
was  not  a  permanent  possession  of  Germany  —  that  I 
understood  it  was  merely  held  by  a  99  years'  lease  and 
that  I  did  not  intend  to  have  another  Kiauchau,  held 
by  similar  tenure,  on  the  approach  to  the  Isthmian  Ca- 


1  Foreign  Relations,  1903,  453. 

1  Theodore  Roosevelt,  Autobiography,  388. 


CH.  IX.]  THE  GERMAN   MENACE  251 

nal."  The  President  further  said  that  if  he  did  not  re 
ceive  a  favorable  reply  within  ten  days,  he  should  order 
Dewey  and  his  fleet  thither  to  resist  any  attempt  of  the 
Germans  to  take  possession  of  Venezuelan  territory. 

Roosevelt  was  aware  that  he  could  back  up  the  threat. 
Paying  much  attention  to  naval  matters  he  knew  that 
our  Navy  was  in  efficient  condition.  Dewey  was  at  Cu- 
lebra,  Puerto  Rico,  "in  command  of  a  fleet  consisting  of 
over  fifty  ships,  including  every  battle-ship  and  every 
torpedo  boat  that  we  had,  with  orders  from  Washington  to 
hold  the  fleet  in  hand  and  be  ready  to  move  at  a  moment's 
notice." 

A  few  days  afterwards  Holleben  came  to  see  the  Presi 
dent  but  said  nothing  in  reference  to  Venezuela,  and  when 
he  To.se  to  go  he  was  asked  if  he  had  heard  anything  from 
his  government  regarding  the  matter  in  dispute.  The 
answer  was  no,  whereupon  the  President  said  he  would 
advance  the  time  he  had  proposed  and  order  Dewey  to 
sail  twenty-four  hours  previous  to  the  expiration  of  the 
ten  days.  But  before  the  President  found  it  necessary 
to  cable  to  Dewey,  Holleben  informed  him  that  the  German 
Emperor  would  consent  to  an  arbitration  and  desired 
that  Roosevelt  should  be  arbitrator.  This,  after  due 
consideration,  was  declined  and  the  case  went  to  the 
Hague  Tribunal.1 

This  account  is  confirmed  by  a  letter  of  President 
Roosevelt  to  Henry  White  dated  August  14,  1906:  "At 
the  time  of  the  Venezuela  business  I  saw  the  German 
Ambassador  privately  myself ;  told  him  to  tell  the  Kaiser 
that  I  had  put  Dewey  in  charge  of  our  fleet  to  maneuver 


1  Thayer,  Life  of  Hay,  ii.  Appendix. 


252  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1902 

in  West  Indian  waters;  that  the  world  at  large  should 
know  this  merely  as  a  maneuver  and  we  should  strive 
in  every  way  to  appear  simply  as  cooperating  with  the 
Germans ;  but  that  I  regretted  to  say  that  the  popular  feel 
ing  was  such  that  1  should  be  obliged  to  interfere,  by  force 
if  necessary,  if  the  Germans  took  any  action  which  looked 
like  the  acquisition  of  territory  there  or  elsewhere  along  the 
Caribbean ;  that  this  was  not  in  any  way  intended  as  a 
threat,  but  as  the  position  on  the  part  of  the  Government 
which  the  American  people  would  demand,  and  that  I 
wanted  him  to  understand  it  before  the  two  nations 
drifted  into  such  a  position  that  trouble  might  come. 
I  do  not  know  whether  it  was  a  case  of  post  hoc  or  propter 
hoc,  but  immediately  afterward  the  Kaiser  made  to  me  the 
proposition  that  I  should  arbitrate  myself,  which  I  finally 
got  him  to  modify  so  that  it  was  sent  to  The  Hague." 

My  authority  for  this  bout  between  the  President  and 
the  Kaiser  is  Thayer's  account  and  Roosevelt's  letters  of 
August,  1906  and  1916.  There  seems  to  be  no  opposition 
between  them  and  the  printed  diplomatic  correspondence, 
Roosevelt's  speech  of  April  2, 1903,  cited  by  John  Bassett 
Moore  in  his  Review  of  Thayer's  Life  of  Hay,1  and  the 
President's  Message  to  Congress  of  December,  1903.  It 
is  well  known  that  much  diplomatic  work  is  not  set  down 
in  the  printed  Foreign  Relations.  Charles  Francis  Adams, 
who  had  occasion  to  investigate  some  phases  of  English 
diplomacy,  was  insistent  on  the  part  that  private  letters 
played  in  certain  negotiations;  and  in  our  own  country 
the  daily  talk  and  telephone  communications  must  be 
considered.  Therefore  Roosevelt's  recollection  of  this 


Political  Science  Quarterly,  March,  1917,  119. 


CH.  IX.]  GERMANY  ARBITRATES  253 

episode,  although  not  given  to  the  world  until  1915  and 
1916,  seems  to  me  good  historical  evidence.  In  no  way 
does  the  printed  record  contravene  it.  In  fact,  in  a  study 
of  the  correspondence  with  Germany  one  may  well  be 
convinced  that  the  whole  story  is  not  therein  told,  as  many 
of  the  despatches  are  simply  given  in  "  paraphrase."  The 
differences  regarding  arbitration  between  Great  Britain  and 
Germany  may  be  detected  and  it  is  easy  to  believe  that  Ger 
many  was  forced  in  1902  to  an  arbitration  of  the  dispute. 
After  the  controversy  with  the  Kaiser  had  ended  with 
his  submission,  affairs  proceeded  smoothly.  Both  Great 
Britain  and  Germany  made  certain  reservations  that 
should  not  be  submitted  to  the  Tribunal.  Both  coun 
tries  blockaded  the  Venezuela  ports  from  December  20, 
1902,  to  February  16, 1903,  during  which  time  negotiations 
went  on  which  resulted  in  the  arbitration.  Both  of  these 
circumstances  were  apparently  with  the  consent  of  Pres 
ident  Roosevelt.  The  Hague  Tribunal  made  its  award 
on  February  22,  1904.1 

President  Roosevelt's  action  toward  another  European 
power  demands  attention.  "I  feel,"  he  wrote  to  Finley 
Peter  Dunne  [Dooley]  "a  sincere  friendliness  for  Eng 
land  ;  but  you  may  notice  that  I  do  not  slop  over  about 
it,  and  that  I  do  not  in  the  least  misunderstand  England's 
attitude."  2  "I  think  more  of  England  than  of  any  other 
foreign  country,"  the  President  said  a  year  later.  "She 
is  more  sincerely  our  friend.  I  detest  the  Anglophobists. 
Sometimes  when  discussing  matters  with  the  Irish  I  am 
tempted  to  become  an  Anglomaniac."  3  For  an  om- 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1904,  506.         2  November  1904,  Bishop,   i.  348. 
3  Conversation  with  President  Roosevelt,  November  17,  1905. 


254  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1903 

nivorous  reader,  as  was  Roosevelt,  no  other  feeling  was 
possible.  The  majority  of  the  many  books  that  he  read 
were  by  English  writers.  He  thoroughly  believed  in 
the  high  civilization  expressed  in  her  literature.  To  him 
that  the  two  nations  possessed  the  common  language  of 
Shakespeare  and  Milton  was  no  unmeaning  talk ;  it  was 
indeed  ingrained  in  the  fibre  of  his  being  and  he  was  al 
ways  ready  to  acknowledge  England  as  the  predominant 
partner.  One  may  see  into  his  very  thought  in  reading 
his  letter  to  John  Morley  [Jan.  17,  1904]  wherein  he  says, 
"  Personally  I  feel  that  with  all  their  faults  Gibbon  and 
Macaulay  are  the  two  great  English  historians.7'1  This 
feeling  toward  England  must  therefore  be  taken  into 
account  in  considering  the  Alaska  boundary  dispute. 

Every  British  map  until  1884  shows  the  disputed  Alaskan 
territory  belonging  either  to  Russia  or  to  the  United 
States  according  to  which  had  dominion,  and  no  claim 
was  made  by  Canada  to  this  territory  until  1898  when  Lord 
Herschell,  at  the  head  of  the  Joint  High  Commission,  ap 
pointed  to  consider  twelve  subjects  of  difference  between 
Canada  and  the  United  States,  asserted  it,  eliciting  this 
comment  from  John  Hay,  then  Secretary  of  State.  On  Jan 
uary  3,  1899,  he  thus  wrote  to  Henry  White  :  "In  the  case 
of  Alaska  it  is  hard  to  treat  with  patience  the  claim  set  up 
by  Lord  Herschell,  that  virtually  the  whole  coast  belongs 
to  England,  leaving  us  only  a  few  jutting  promontories 
without  communication  with  each  other.  Without  going 
into  the  historical  or  legal  argument,  as  a  mere  matter 
of  common  sense  it  is  impossible  that  any  nation  should 
ever  have  conceded,  or  any  other  nation  have  accepted, 


1  Bishop,  i.  269. 


CH.  IX.]  ALASKA  255 

the  cession  of  such  a  ridiculous  and  preposterous  boun 
dary  line.  We  are  absolutely  driven  to  the  conclusion  that 
Lord  Herschell  put  forward  a  claim  that  he  had  no  be 
lief  or  confidence  in,  for  the  mere  purpose  of  trading  it 
off  for  something  substantial.  And  yet  the  slightest 
suggestion  that  his  claim  is  unfounded  throws  him  into 
a  fury."  1 

It  was  not  only,  indeed  I  think  not  chiefly,  due  to  the 
belief  that  the  contested  region  might  be  gold-bearing,  but 
rather  to  the  desire  to  get  ports  contiguous  to  the  Klondike. 
This  was  especially  true  of  Skagway  at  the  head  of  the 
Lynn  Canal.  It  was  the  chief  port  for  the  Klondike  and 
under  the  Canadian  claim  would  be  British  territory. 

The  reason  of  this  claim  is  not  far  to  seek.  In  1896 
gold  was  discovered  in  the  Klondike.  British  Columbia 
and  Alaska  went  wild  over  the  discovery.  Gold  might 
exist  in  this  disputed  territory  so  that  it  might  be  of  value 
to  either  country.  Herschell  and  the  British  members 
of  the  Commission  would  settle  no  other  question  unless 
the  Alaska  boundary  was  first  determined,  and  as  the 
Joint  High  Commission  could  not  agree  on  that,  they 
adjourned  without  arriving  at  any  conclusion.  It  was 
therefore  one  of  the  foreign  matters  bequeathed  to  the 
Roosevelt  administration. 

Then  came  the  South  African  War  [1899-1902]  and  out 
of  friendship  to  England,  the  President  did  not  want 
to  press  the  matter ;  he  was  indeed  in  no  hurry  but,  if 
gold  were  discovered,  he  intended  to  occupy  the  territory. 
The  English  proposed  arbitration.  Our  Ambassador 
favored  that  disposition  of  the  matter  and  possibly  so 


1  Life  of  Hay,  Thayer,  ii.  205. 


256  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1903 

did  our  Secretary  of  State.  But  the  President  said,  no. 
It  is  no  question  for  arbitration.  Roosevelt  indeed  dis 
trusted  the  opinion  of  our  Ambassadors  to  England; 
they  were  prone  to  see  the  English  side  of  any  question.1 
James  Bryce  wrote  in  1888 :  "Even  in  these  days  of  vig 
ilant  and  exacting  constituencies  one  sees  many  members 
of  the  House  of  Commons,  the  democratic  robustness 
or  provincial  crudity  of  whose  ideas  melts  like  wax  under 
the  influence  of  fashionable  dinner-parties  and  club  smok 
ing  rooms."  2  Educated  men  know  the  charm  of  English 
society  and  can  appreciate  how  our  official  representa 
tives,  recipients  as  they  are  of  manifold  attentions,  fall 
victims  to  that  charm. 

The  President  was  firm.  The  result  was  the  Conven 
tion  of  January  24,  1903,  which  constituted  a  Tribunal 
of  "six  important  jurists  of  repute,"  to  determine  the 
boundary  line  between  Alaska  and  British  Columbia. 
Three  members  were  to  be  appointed  by  the  President; 
three  by  his  Britannic  Majesty.  A  majority  should 
determine  the  award.3  The  President  named  Henry 
Cabot  Lodge,  Senator  from  Massachusetts,  Elihu  Root, 
Secretary  of  War,  and  George  Turner,  ex-Senator  from 
Washington.  Before  these  were  definitely  appointed  the 
President  endeavored  to  get  a  Justice  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  but  he  declined  on  the  ground  that  the  post  was 
not  in  line  with  his  duties.  Another  Justice  was  ap 
proached  with  a  like  result.4  The  selections  of  the  Presi- 


1  Conversation  with  the  President,  Nov.  17,  1905 ;  Life  of  Hay,  Thayer, 
ii.  207,  208;  Life  of  Roosevelt,  Thayer,  174.  But  see  Life  of  Choate, 
Martin,  ii.  228,  235,  237,  238. 

*  American  Commonwealth,  ii.  230. 

3  Foreign  Relations,  1903,  488. 

4  Diplomatic  Memoirs,  John  W.  Foster,  ii.  199. 


CH.  IX.]  THE  ALASKA  BOUNDARY  257 

dent  were  criticised,  both  in  Canada  and  the  United  States, 
as  not  being  according  to  the  Treaty  which  called  for 
" impartial  jurists  of  repute. "  The  editor  of  Hall's  In 
ternational  Law  (ed.  1904)  spoke  of  the  choice  of  the 
American  members  as  a  "  serious  blot  on  the  proceed 
ings.  "  But  the  British  government  did  not  officially 
make  any  complaint.  They  named  as  members,  Baron 
Alverstone,  Lord  Chief  Justice  of  England,  Louis  A.  Jette*, 
Lieutenant-Go vernor  of  Quebec,  and  A.  B.  Aylesworth 
of  the  Toronto  bar.1  London  was  selected  as  the  place 
for  the  sitting  of  the  Tribunal. 

After  the  appointment  of  the  Tribunal  and  before  its 
decision,  the  President  wrote  to  Justice  Holmes  a  letter 
[July  25,  1903],  which  he  might  show  "privately  and  un 
officially"  to  Joseph  Chamberlain,  the  Colonial  Secre 
tary.  He  also  wrote  one  of  similar  import  to  Henry 
White  which  as  desired  was  shown  to  Arthur  Balfour, 
Prime  Minister.  In  the  letter  to  Justice  Holmes  the 
President  said:  "Nothing  but  my  very  earnest  desire 
to  get  on  well  with  England  and  my  reluctance  to  a  break 
made  me  consent  to  this  appointment  of  a  Joint  Com 
mission  [officially  a  Tribunal]  in  this  case ;  for  I  regard 
the  attitude  of  Canada  which  England  has  backed,  as 
having  the  scantest  possible  warrant  in  justice.  How 
ever,  there  were  but  two  alternatives.  Either  1  could 
appoint  a  commission  and  give  a  chance  for  agreement ; 
or  I  could  do  as  I  shall  of  course  do  in  case  this  Commis 
sion  fails  and  request  Congress  to  make  an  appropriation 
which  will  enable  me  to  run  the  boundary  on  my  own 
hook.  .  .  .  The  claim  of  the  Canadians  for  access  to  deep 


1  Diplomatic  Memoirs,  J.   W.   Foster,   ii.   198. 


258  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1903 

water  along  any  part  of  the  Canadian  [Alaskan]  coast 
is  just  exactly  as  indefensible  as  if  they  should  now  sud 
denly  claim  the  island  of  Nantucket.  There  is  not  a 
man  fit  to  go  on  the  Commission  in  all  the  United  States, 
who  would  treat  this  claim  any  more  respectfully 
than  he  would  treat  a  claim  to  Nantucket.  .  .  .  But  there 
are  points  which  the  Commission  can  genuinely  consider. 
There  is  room  for  argument  about  the  islands  in  the 
mouth  of  the  Portland  Channel.  .  .  .  The  objection 
raised  by  certain  Canadian  authorities  to  Lodge,  Root 
and  Turner,  and  especially  to  Lodge  and  Root,  was  that 
they  had  committed  themselves  on  the  general  propo 
sition.  No  man  in  public  life  in  any  position  of  promi 
nence  could  have  possibly  avoided  committing  himself 
on  the  proposition.  .  .  .  Let  me  add  that  I  earnestly 
hope  that  the  English  understand  my  purpose.  I 
wish  to  make  one  last  effort  to  bring  about  an 
agreement  through  the  Commission  which  will  enable  the 
people  of  both  countries  to  say  that  the  result  represents 
the  feeling  of  the  representatives  of  both  countries.  But 
if  there  is  a  disagreement  I  wish  it  distinctly  understood, 
not  only  that  there  will  be  no  arbitration  of  the  matter, 
but  that  in  my  Message  to  Congress  I  shall  take  a  position 
which  will  prevent  any  possibility  of  arbitration  here 
after  ;  a  position,  I  am  inclined  to  believe,  which  will 
render  it  necessary  for  Congress  to  give  me  the  author 
ity  to  run  the  line  as  we  claim  it,  by  our  own  people  with 
out  any  further  regard  to  the  attitude  of  England  and 
Canada."  1  And  Hay  wrote  to  Foster  on  September  20, 
1903:  "I  hear  the  usual  pessimistic  forecasts  —  some 


1  Bishop,  i.  259 ;  Thayer,  Life  of  Roosevelt,  176. 


CH.  IX.]  ALASKAN  TRIBUNAL  259 

from  London  —  some  from  this  side.  But  I  shall  not 
believe,  until  I  am  forced  to,  that  Lord  Alverstone  can  so 
shut  his  eyes  to  law  and  evidence  as  to  give  a  verdict  against 
us,  especially  as  he  must  know  that  this  is  the  last  chance 
for  an  honorable  and  graceful  retreat  from  an  absolutely 
untenable  position.  I  am  sincerely  sorry  they  have  got 
themselves  into  such  a  fix ;  but  it  is  their  own  fault  and 
they  will  make  a  fatal  mistake  if  they  refuse  to  avail  them 
selves  of  the  opportunity  we  have  given  them  to  get  out."  1 
The  decision  of  the  Tribunal  was  made  October  20, 
1903,  and  fixed  the  land  boundary  well  back  of  all  the 
inlets,  as  was  the  chief  contention  of  the  United  States. 
This  was  done  by  a  vote  of  four  to  two,  Lord  Alverstone 
siding  with  the  Americans  and  the  two  Canadian  members 
dissenting.  The  Tribunal  was  unanimous  in  giving  to 
Canada  two  of  the  four  uninhabited  islands.2  The  two 
Canadian  members  not  only  did  not  sign  the  award  but 
gave  to  the  press  "a  carefully  prepared  interview  in  which 
they  declared  that  the  decision  was  not  judicial  in  its 
character."  John  W.  Foster,  who  criticised  the  appeal 
to  the  press  by  the  Canadian  members,  did  not  share 
the  censure  meted  out  to  them  for  their  failure  to  sign 
the  award.  He  wrote  with  the  impartiality  which  dis 
tinguishes  his  work :  "  A  similar  precedent  is  to  be  found 
in  the  Halifax  Fisheries  Arbitration  of  1877,  when  the 
American  member  not  only  refused  to  sign  the  award 
but  questioned  its  validity.  A  better  practice  was  ob 
served  in  the  Fur-Seal  Arbitration  at  Paris  in  1893.  The 
two  American  members,  Justice  Harlan  and  Senator 
Morgan,  were  outvoted  on  almost  every  one  of  the  six 

1  Diplomatic  Memoirs,  John  W.  Foster,  ii.  206. 

2  Foreign  Relations,  1903,  543 ;  Foster,  Diplomatic  Memoirs,  ii.  203. 


260  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1903 

points  submitted  to  the  Tribunal;  but,  without  with 
drawing  their  votes  they  cheerfully  united  with  their 
colleagues  in  signing  the  award."  Foster  went  on  to 
say,  "The  people  of  the  United  States  were  very  angry 
at  the  Halifax  award  and  were  by  no  means  pleased  with 
the  result  of  the  Fur-Seal  Arbitration  at  Paris."1 

On  June  8,  1911,  Roosevelt  wrote  to  Admiral  Mahan: 
"The  settlement  of  the  Alaskan  boundary  settled  the 
last  serious  trouble  between  the  British  Empire  and  our 
selves  as  everything  else  could  be  arbitrated.  ...  I  feel 
very  differently  towards  England  from  the  way  I  feel 
towards  Germany."  2 

Roosevelt,  shortly  before  his  death  [January  6,  1919], 
wrote  to  Mahan  a  letter  that  may  be  taken  as  his  legacy 
to  his  countrymen :  "I  regard  the  British  Navy  as  prob 
ably  the  most  potent  instrumentality  for  peace  in  the 
world.  I  do  not  believe  we  should  try  to  build  a  navy 
in  rivalry  to  it  but  I  do  believe  we  should  have  the  second 
navy  in  the  world.  Moreover  I  am  prepared  to  say  what 
five  years  ago  I  would  not  have  said,  I  think  the  time  has 
come  when  the  United  States  and  the  British  Empire 
can  agree  to  a  universal  arbitration  treaty.  In  other 
words  I  believe  the  time  has  come  when  we  should  say 
that  under  no  circumstances  shall  there  ever  be  a  resort 
to  war  between  the  United  States  and  the  British  Empire, 
and  that  no  question  can  arise  between  them  that  cannot 
be  settled  in  judicial  fashion."  3 


1  Diplomatic  Memoirs,  ii.  204.        2  Life  of  Mahan,  Taylor,  203. 

3  Life  of  Mahan,  Taylor,  224.  In  this  account  I  have  also  consulted 
J.  W.  Foster's  Article  on  the  Alaskan  Boundary,  National  Geographic 
Magazine,  Nov.  1899,  printed  as  Doc.  No.  2,  58th  Cong.,  Special  Session ; 
The  Case  of  the  U.  S. ;  The  Argument  of  the  U.  S.,  both  of  which 
are  printed  by  the  Gov't  Printing  Office. 


CHAPTER  X 

far  the  most  important  action  I  took  in  foreign 
affairs  during  the  time  I  was  President,"  wrote  Roose 
velt,  "relates  to  the  Panama  Canal."1  At  the  time  Hay 
became  Secretary  of  State  there  was  a  feeling  in  the  coun 
try  decidedly  in  favor  of  joining  the  two  oceans  by  a  ca 
nal.  Long  existent,  the  feeling  had  been  fostered  by  the 
events  of  the  Spanish- American  War~and  especially  by 
the  voyage  of  the  Oregon  around  Cape  Horn.  As  she 
was  desired  to  reinforce  the  Atlantic  fleet,  it  could  not 
be  ignored  how  much  sooner  she  would  have  made  the 
junction  had  there  been  a  canal  from  the  Pacific  to  the 
Atlantic.  The  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  with  England, 
made  in  1850,2  stood  in  the  way.  Hay  set  to  work  to 
supersede  this  and  negotiated  a  Treaty  which  was  signed 
by  him  and  Lord  Pauncefote,  the  British  Ambassador, 
on  February  5,  1900.  Roosevelt,  who  was  then  Governor 
of  New  York,  in  a  friendly  letter  to  Hay  criticised  severely 
two  points  in  the  Treaty :  the  first  was  the  prohibition 
of  fortifying  the  canal,  and  the  second  was  a  virtual  in 
vitation  to  foreign  powers  to  a  joint  guarantee  that  in 
his  view  would  tend  to  invalidate  the  Monroe  Doctrine.3 
Hay  was  irritated  that  the  Senate  did  not  ratify  the 
Treaty;  he  deemed  it  an  " irreparable  mistake  of  our 
Constitution"  which  put  it  into  "the  power  of  one- third 
+  1  of  the  Senate  to  meet  with  a  categorical  veto  any 
treaty  negotiated  by  the  President."  4  He  spoke  against 

1  Autobiography,  553.  2  Vol.  i.  199. 

3  Life  of  Hay,  Thayer,  ii.  339.  4  To  Choate,  ibid.,  219. 

261 


262  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1901 

the  Senate  "  almost  with  ferocity."1  His  sayings  re 
ported  by  tale  bearers  did  not  help  his  cause  with  the 
senators  and  he  was  never  popular  with  the  Senate.  Yet 
much  more  than  anything  of  the  sort,  the  ideas  which 
lay  at  the  bottom  of  Roosevelt's  friendly  criticism  affected 
the  Senate's  action  in  regard  to  the  Treaty  and  they  made 
amendments  to  it  which  embodied  tacitly  these  objec 
tions.  The  British  Government  did  not  accept  the 
amendments.  Hay  resigned  his  position  as  Secretary 
of  State  in  the  following  words :  "Dear  Mr.  President: 
The  action  of  the  Senate  indicates  views  so  widely  diver 
gent  from  mine  in  matters  affecting,  as  I  think,  the  na 
tional  welfare  and  honor,  that  I  fear  my  power  to  serve 
you  in  business  requiring  the  concurrence  of  that  body 
is  at  an  end.  I  cannot  help  fearing  also  that  the  news 
paper  attacks  upon  the  State  Department,  which  have 
so  strongly  influenced  the  Senate,  may  be  an  injury  to  you 
if  I  remain  in  the  Cabinet."  McKinley,  in  a  very  manly 
letter,  refused  to  accept  his  resignation.2 

Hay  did  not  let  his  irritation  prevent  his  going  ahead 
with  the  project,  and  he  took  steps  toward  the  negotia 
tion  of  a  new  Treaty.  Meanwhile  Roosevelt  had  become 
President  and  the  new  Treaty,  which  is  known  as  the  sec 
ond  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty,  was  signed  by  Hay  and 
Pauncefote  on  November  18,  1901,  was  ratified  by  the 
Senate  on  December  16  by  72  :  6  and  concurred  in  by  the 
British  Government.  Under  this  Treaty,  the  canal  was 
built.  It  provided  that  it  should  supersede  the  conven 
tion  of  1850  and  that  the  canal  might  be  constructed 


i  Life  of  Hay,  Thayer,  ii.  233. 
a  Ibid.,  ii.  226. 


CH.  X.]  THE  PANAMA  CANAL  263 

either  by  the  United  States  or  by  corporations  that  it 
might  aid.1  A  clear  statement  of  its  meaning  on  one 
disputed  point  is  given  by  Shelby  M.  Cullom,  who  was 
then  a  member  and  soon  to  become  chairman  of  the 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations.  "The  first  and  second 
Hay-Pauncefote  treaties  must  be  construed  together; 
the  first  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty  contained  a  prohibi 
tion  against  fortifications;  the  second  Hay-Pauncefote 
Treaty  neither  prohibited  nor  in  terms  agreed  to  fortifi 
cations,  but  was  silent  on  the  subject ;  therefore,  the  legal 
construction  would  be  that  Great  Britain  had  receded 
from  the  position  that  the  canal  should  not  be  fortified."  2 

The  canal  was  fortified.  James  Bryce  wrote:  "The 
visitor  who  sees  the  slopes  where  these  forts  and  batteries 
are  to  be  placed,  asks  who  are  the  enemies  whom  it  is 
desired  to  repel.  Where  is  the  great  naval  power  that 
has  any  motive  either  of  national  enmity  or  of  self- 
interest  sufficient  to  induce  it  to  face  the  risks  of  a  war  with 
a  country  so  populous,  so  wealthy  and  so  vigorous  as 
the  United  States?"3  The  peace-loving  American  who 
gazes  at  the  forts  on  the  cliffs  of  Gibraltar  might  put  pari 
passu  the  same  question. 

Public  sentiment  had  decided  that  there  should  be  an 
inter-oceanic  canal  and  that  it  should  be  constructed 
by  the  United  States.  The  question  was  should  it  go 
by  Nicaragua  or  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  ?  When 
Hay  wrote  on  January  15,  1900,  "The  canal  is  going  to 
be  built,  probably  by  the  Nicaragua  route," 4  he  expressed 

1  Digest  of  International  Law.     John   Bassett   Moore,   iii.  219.     The 
Treaty  is  printed  in  full  and  the  first  Hay-Pauncefote   Treaty  is  given 
on  p.  210. 

2  Fifty  Years  of  Public  Service,  381.  'South  America,  32. 
4  Life  of  Hay,  Thayer,  ii.  222. 


264  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1902 

the  popular  opinion.  The  Nicaragua  canal  "has  become 
a  sentiment,"  said  Senator  Hanna  in  his  great  speech 
advocating  the  Panama  route.  Three  commissions  had 
decided  in  favor  of  it.  "I  want  to  confess,"  declared 
Hanna,  "that  in  common  with  all  my  fellow  citizens  I 
shared  in  that  feeling  and  belief  and,  as  the  necessity 
seemed  to  grow  and  demand  an  isthmian  canal  [through 
Nicaragua],  I  would  have  been  prepared,  under  the  in 
fluences  which  then  existed,  to  give  my  hearty  support 
to  that  project." 

The  advantage  of  Panama  over  Nicaragua  was  well 
put  forward  by  Hanna  in  this  speech.  "The  Panama 
Canal  route,"  he  said,  "is  49  miles  long  as  against  183 
miles  of  the  Nicaraguan  route."  The  New  Panama 
Canal  Company  (French)  which  had  previously  offered 
to  sell  its  plant,  rights,  privileges,  franchises  and  con 
cessions  for  109  millions  had  now  come  down  to  40  mil 
lions.1  Included  in  this  offer  were  all  of  the  existing 
shares  of  the  Panama  railway  except  about  1100 ;  the 
total  was  70,000  shares.  The  last  Commission  had,  on 
receiving  the  new  offer  of  the  French  company,  made  a 
supplementary  report  (January  18,  1902)  recommend 
ing  the  Panama  route.  The  question  of  earthquakes, 
volcanic  eruptions,  of  the  cost  of  construction  and  opera 
tion  was  all  in  favor  of  the  canal  by  way  of  Panama.2 

This  was  Hanna's  greatest  effort  in  the  Senate.  Ac 
cording  to  Senator  George  F.  Hoar,  no  mean  judge,  he 
was  eloquent  as  he  discussed  the  question  in  all  of  its 


1  Jan.  9,  1902. 

2  Hanna's  speech  was  made  June  5  and  6,  1902,    is  reported  in  the 
Congressional  Record,  6317  et  seq.;   see  also  Life  of  Hanna,  Croly,  379 
et  seq. 


CH.  X.]  THE  PANAMA  CANAL  265 

bearings.  "He  changed  the  whole  attitude  of  the  Sen 
ate/'  wrote  Cullom,  "  concerning  the  route  for  an  inter- 
oceanic  canal.  We  all  generally  favored  the  Nicaraguan 
route.  Senator  Hanna  became  convinced  that  the  Pan 
ama  route  was  best  and  he  soon  carried  everything  be 
fore  him  to  the  end  that  the  Panama  route  was  selected."1 
A  bill  providing  for  the  construction  of  the  Nicaraguan 
canal  had  passed  the  House  almost  unanimously  and 
to  the  bill  as  it  came  to  the  Senate,  Spooner  had  added 
an  amendment  providing  for  the  purchase  of  the  rights, 
privileges,  franchises,  concessions,  right  of  way,  unfin 
ished  work,  plants  and  property  of  the  New  Panama 
Canal  Company  of  France  for  40  millions,  and  the  con 
struction  of  the  canal  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  but 
if  "the  President  be  unable  to  obtain  for  the  United  States 
a  satisfactory  title  to  the  property  of  the  New  Panama 
Canal  Company  and  the  control  of  the  necessary  terri 
tory  of  the  Republic  of  Colombia  within  a  reasonable 
time  and  upon  reasonable  terms, "  then  the  President 


1  Fifty  Years  of  Public  Service,  281.  "The  United  States  had  been 
committed  for  thirty  years  to  an  isthmian  canal  by  the  Nicaragua  route. 
It  came  to  be  considered  as  'the  American  line.'  The  resolution  in  its 
favor  had  passed  the  House.  Senator  Hanna  gave  to  the  study  of  the 
question,  which  was  purely  a  business  one,  a  mind  long  trained  in  con 
struction  contracts.  He  came  to  the  conclusion  that  we  should  build  on 
the  Panama  route.  ...  He  accomplished  that  rarest  of  triumphs,  the 
command  of  a  listening  Senate."  —  Senator  C.  M.  Depew.  Senator 
Charles  Dick  who  succeeded  Hanna  in  the  Senate  said:  "His  greatest 
achievement  in  this  body  was  in  converting  a  hostile  majority  to  favor 
the  route  for  an  isthmian  canal  which  his  judgment  declared  was  the  best. 
He  came  to  this  conclusion  only  after  most  thorough  investigation. 
When  he  entered  upon  this  contest  few  of  the  Members  of  Congress 
agreed  with  him.  ...  He  was  told  that  his  efforts  would  be  futile.  He 
entered  upon  the  contest  with  all  the  zeal  and  energy  of  his  strong  nature. 
By  personal  appeals,  by  labors  in  committee  and  on  this  floor  he  urged 
his  views."  Memorial  addresses,  104,  131. 


266  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1903 

" might  fall  back  to  the  Nicaragua  route."  l  This  passed 
the  Senate  by  42  to  34,2  was  accepted  by  the  House, 
signed  by  the  President  and  was  entirely  satisfactory 
to  public  opinion. 

On  the  basis  of  this  act  Hay  negotiated  what  is  known 
as  the  Hay-Herran  Treaty,  signed  January  22,  1903.  Dr. 
Herran  was  the  charge*  d'affaires  of  Colombia  in  Wash 
ington.  Colombia's  executive  officer  was  Marroquin,  a 
usurper  who  had  been  Vice-President  and  now  assumed 
to  be  acting  President.  He  was  called  a  dictator  by 
Roosevelt  and  those  who  supported  his  action,  but  his 
word  was  far  from  being  law.  At  first  really  in  favor  of 
the  Treaty,  he  succumbed  to  a  popular  sentiment,  which 
was  excited  by  the  Finance  Minister  and  the  press  of 
Bogota",  and  did  not  advocate  strongly  the  Treaty  before 
the  Colombia  Congress  as  Roosevelt  and  Hay  thought 
he  should  have  done.  The  Treaty  was  not  valid  unless 
approved  by  the  Colombia  Congress  and  the  popular 
feeling,  at  least  in  Bogota",  the  capital,  was  that  the  ten 
million  bonus  and  the  $250,000  per  year  after  nine  years, 
which  was  what  the  United  States  had  agreed  to  pay 
by  the  Hay-Herran  Treaty,  was  not  sufficient  compen 
sation  for  that  which  Colombia  was  conceding  to  the 
United  States.  It  was  thought  that  the  provision  of  the 
Spooner  Act  that,  unless  proper  arrangements  could  be 
made  with  the  Republic  of  Colombia  and  the  French 
Canal  Company,  the  United  States  was  empowered  to 
construct  the  Nicaraguan  Canal,  was  a  mere  bluff  to  make 
better  terms  with  Colombia  which  looked  upon  the  Isth- 

1  Acts  of  Congress  relating  to  the  Panama  Canal,  27.     This  included 
68,863  shares  of  the  Panama  Railroad  Company  out  of  a  total  of  70,000 
shares. 

2  Life  of  Hanna,  Croly,  384. 


CH.  X.]  THE  HAY-HERRAN  TREATY  267 

mus  of  Panama  "as  a  financial  cow  to  be  milked  for  the 
benefit  of  the  country  at  large."  l  Therefore  the  Senate 
of  Colombia  in  two  different  sessions,  as  a  response  to 
popular  sentiment  aroused  largely  by  the  press  of  Bo 
gota^,  rejected  the  Treaty  in  August  and  postponed  the 
consideration  of  it  indefinitely  in  October.2 

Unquestionably  the  Hay-Herran  Treaty  should  have 
been  ratified.  The  arguments  of  Roosevelt  and  Hay 
in  its  favor  are  unanswerable,  but  the  idea  of  the  Bogotd 
press  and  the  Colombia  Senate  was  that  more  money 
might  be  had.  General  Reyes,  who  was  really  a  friend 
to  a  fair  composition  between  the  two  countries,  thought 
that  ten  millions  from  the  French  Company  and  an  in 
crease  of  five  millions  from  the  United  States  would  in 
sure  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty.3  The  more  radical 
pretended  that  the  French  concession  expired  in  1904 
and,  if  ratification  were  postponed,  Colombia  might  re 
ceive  the  whole  forty  millions  which  the  United  States 
had  agreed  to  pay  to  the  French  Company.  But  this 
concession  to  the  French  Company  had  been  extended 
to  1910,  and  to  repudiate  such  a  plain  contract  would 
hardly  have  been  done  even  by  a  country  so  regardless 
of  plighted  faith  as  was  Colombia.  Take  it  all  in  all,  the 
action  of  Colombia  was  blackmail  and  aroused  all  the 
fighting  qualities  in  Roosevelt's  nature.  A  true  convert 
to  the  Panama  Canal,  he  determined  that  the  canal  should 
there  be  built. 

Events  now  moved  swiftly.  Hay  telegraphed  on  July 
13  to  Beaupre,  our  Minister  at  Bogota:  " Neither  of  the 


1  Life  of  Hay,  Thayer,  ii.  304. 

2  August  12,  October  30.     As  the  Senate  rejected  it  the  House  did  not 
pass  upon  it.  »  July  9,  Foreign  Relations,  1903,  163. 


268  ROOSEVELT'S    ADMINISTRATION  [1903 

proposed  amendments  mentioned  in  your  telegram 
[Reyes's  suggestion  ante]  received  to-day  would  stand 
any  chance  of  acceptance  by  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States,  while  any  amendment  whatever  or  unnecessary 
delay  in  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty  would  greatly  im 
peril  its  consummation."  l 

It  was  bruited  about  in  Bogota  that,  in  the  event  of 
non-ratification  of  the  Treaty,  Panama  would  secede 
from  Colombia,  get  the  ten  million  bonus  and  the  annual 
stipend  herself,  but  as  to  that  the  Colombia  Senate,  backed 
by  popular  sentiment,  was  willing  to  take  the  chance. 
Colombia  had  a  population  of  five  millions  divided  into 
nine  departments  of  which  Panama  was  one,  and  the 
number  of  its  inhabitants  was  about  250,000.  The  Co 
lombian  army  consisted  of  10,000. 2 

Now  appeared  upon  the  scene  Philippe  Bunau-Varilla, 
a  celebrated  French  engineer,  who  had  been  connected 
with  the  French  Canal  enterprise  and  was  now  much 
concerned  in  having  the  Panama  route  adopted  and  the 
French  Company  receiving  actually  the  forty  millions 
without  any  deduction  in  favor  of  the  "  corruptionists  " 
of  Bogota ;  he  therefore  fomented  with  great  skill  a  revolu 
tion  in  Panama.  It  was  practically  a  bloodless  3  revolution 
and  resulted  in  a  Treaty  between  the  Republic  of  Panama 
and  the  United  States,  providing  for  the  construction 
of  the  canal.  While  neither  President  Roosevelt  nor 
Secretary  Hay  connived  at  the  revolution,  they  sympa 
thized  with  it.  "No  one,"  declared  President  Roosevelt 


1  Foreign  Relations,  1903,  164. 

2  Reyes,  Foreign  Relations,  288. 

3  One  Chinaman  was  killed.     Despatch  of  Ehrman  to  Hay,  Nov.  4. 
Ehrman  was  Consul-General  in  Panama.    Foreign  Relations,  1903,  232. 


CH.  X.]  THE  PANAMA  REVOLUTION  269 

in  his  Message  of  January  4,  1904,  "connected  with  this 
Government  had  any  part  in  preparing,  inciting,  or  en 
couraging  the  late  revolution  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama, 
and  that,  save  from  the  reports  of  our  military  and  naval 
officers,  no  one  connected  with  this  Government  had  any 
previous  knowledge  of  the  revolution  except  such  as  was 
accessible  to  any  person  of  ordinary  intelligence  who 
read  the  newspapers  and  kept  up  a  current  acquaintance 
with  public  affairs."  l  In  August,  wrote  Roosevelt,  "it 
began  to  appear  probable  that  the  Colombian  legislature 
would  not  ratify  the  treaty.  .  .  .  Everyone  knew  that 
the  revolution  was  a  possibility  but  it  was  not  until  toward 
the  end  of  October  that  it  appeared  to  be  an  imminent 
probability.  Although  the  Administration,  of  course,  had 
special  means  of  knowledge,  no  such  means  were  nec 
essary  in  order  to  appreciate  the  possibility  and  toward 
the  end  the  likelihood,  of  such  a  revolutionary  outbreak 
and  of  its  success."2  As  Roosevelt  said  to  William  R. 
Thayer  many  years  later,  "The  other  fellows  in  Paris 
and  New  York  had  taken  all  the  risk  and  were  doing  all 
the  work.  Instead  of  trying  to  run  a  parallel  conspiracy 
I  had  only  to  sit  still  and  profit  by  their  plot  —  if  it  suc 
ceeded."  3 

The  President  ordered  naval  ships  to  Colon  (the  port 
of  Panama  on  the  Caribbean  Sea  which  was  an  arm  of 
the  Atlantic)  and  thus  prevented  the  landing  of  a  rein 
forcement  of  Colombian  troops  that  would  have  sup 
pressed  the  revolution.  How  much  the  revolutionists 


1  Foreign  Relations,  1903,  272.    Also  Hay,  ibid.,  295,  310;    T.  Roose 
velt,  Autobiography  (1913),  564. 

2  Message  of  January,  1904.     Foreign  Relations,  1903,  263,  264. 

3  Roosevelt,  190. 


270  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1903 

were  dependent  on  the  United  States  is  seen  by  a  citation 
from  Bunau-Varilla's  book.  "From  the  morning  of  the 
2d  November  (1903),"  he  wrote,  "all  the  inhabitants 
of  Colon  were  looking  towards  Kingston,  hoping  for  the 
appearance  of  the  ship  symbolizing  American  protection. 
As  the  hours  passed,  disappointment  gradually  invaded 
all  hearts.  Towards  nightfall  despair  was  general,  when 
suddenly  a  light  smoke  arose  in  the  direction  of  the  north 
east.  This  was  a  ray  of  hope !  If  it  were  the  liberator ! 
Little  by  little,  the  smoke  thickened,  the  ship  emerged 
above  the  horizon  and  soon  the  Star-Spangled  Banner 
dominated  the  Bay  of  Colon.  A  burst  of  delirious  en 
thusiasm  shook  the  whole  Isthmus.  It  was  really  true ! 
Bunau-Varilla  had  effectually  obtained  for  the  unfortu 
nate  country  the  protection  of  the  powerful  Republic ! 
At  this  moment,  without  one  word  having  been  uttered 
the  revolution  was  accomplished  in  the  hearts  of  all.  .  .  . 
In  the  morning  of  the  3d  of  November  General  Tovar 
(of  Colombia)  arrived  quietly  with  about  500  soldiers.  .  .  . 
If  these  troops  had  arrived  twenty-four  hours  earlier 
nobody  would  have  made  a  move.  .  .  .  The  Independent 
Republic  of  Panama  was  proclaimed.  The  revolution 
had  been  made  without  shedding  a  drop  of  blood."  1 
The  ship  which  arrived  so  opportunely  for  Bunau-Va- 
rilla's  scheme  was  the  Nashville.  It  may  therefore  be 
said  that  unless  President  Roosevelt  had  ordered  our 
vessels-of-war  to  Colon  the  Panama  revolution  would 


1  Panama,  Bunau-Varilla,  335.  The  incident  is  repeated  in  The 
Great  Adventure  of  Panama  (1920)  in  which  Bunau-Varilla  also  states, 
"All  is  saved  [by  the  arrival  of  the  Nashville],  .  .  .  Colombia  can  say 
to-day  that  the  Republic  of  Panama  was  born  owing  to  American  pro 
tection."  243,  247. 


CH.  X.]  THE  PANAMA  REVOLUTION  271 

have  been  suppressed.1  "I  simply  lifted  my  foot/'  af 
firmed  Roosevelt.  "Oh,  Mr.  President,"  said  Attorney- 
General  Knox  in  Cabinet  meeting,  "do  not  let  so  great 
an  achievement  suffer  from  any  taint  of  legality."  2 

It  is  probable  that  Roosevelt  had  better  have  exer 
cised  the  virtue  of  patience  as  he  was  so  advised  by  Sena 
tor  Hanna.3  Many  things  might  have  happened  with 
out  the  secession  of  Panama.  Popular  sentiment  in 
the  United  States  was  now  in  favor  of  the  Panama  route. 
Senator  John  T.  Morgan  of  Alabama,  who  although  a 
Democrat  had  been  made  chairman  of  the  Inter-Oceanic 
Canal  Committee  by  a  Republican  Senate,  on  account 
of  his  enthusiasm  for  an  Inter-Oceanic  Canal,  had  made 
the  Senate  majority  report  in  favor  of  the  Nicaragua 
route.  But  Hanna  was  the  "instigator  of  the  minority 
report  and  became  the  leader  in  the  Senate  of  the  pro- 
Panama  party,"  4  and  the  successor  of  Morgan  as  the 
chairman  of  the  committee.  He  was  as  enthusiastic 
for  Panama  as  was  Roosevelt,  and  could  probably  have 
influenced  the  Senate  in  its  favor,  despite  the  backing- 
down  of  Colombia.  The  eruption  of  Mont  Pel6e  in  Mar 
tinique  during  May,  1902,  costing  about  40,000  lives,  was 
a  powerful  argument  in  favor  of  Panama,  as  it  was  well 
understood  that  the  danger  from  volcanoes  and  earth 
quakes  was  greater  by  the  Nicaragua  route.  "Volcanoes 
and  earthquakes,"  said  Hanna  in  the  Senate,  "  seem  to 
be  a  burning  question  just  now  while  Mount  Pel6e  is 
discharging  its  fire,  and  they  have  led  to  a  more  careful 
consideration  of  that  matter."  5 

1  For  the  disposition  of  the  vessels  reinforcing  the  Nashville,  see  Roose 
velt  in  Foreign  Relations,  1903,  266. 

2  Impressions,  Abbott,  139,  140. 

3  Bishop,  i.  278.        4  Life  of  Hanna,  Croly,  380.         5  Record,  6319. 


272  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1903 

A  mischief  in  Roosevelt's  action  was  that  it  aggravated 
the  suspicions  of  the  Central  and  South  American  re 
publics  of  the  United  States  and  led  them  to  believe  that 
the  doctrine  of  might  makes  right  prevailed  in  Yankee- 
dom ;  so  that  if  exercising  the  virtue  of  patience  involved 
a  delay  of  only  twelve  months,  it  better  have  been  exer 
cised.  Moreover  it  may  have  been  wise  to  nurse  a  co 
terie  in  the  Republic  of  Colombia  in  the  hope  that  the 
violent  public  sentiment  of  Bogotd  might  pass  away. 
Marroquin,  unpopular  as  he  was  in  Bogota,  had  appointed 
as  governor  of  Panama  Senator  Obaldia.  "Obaldia's 
separatist  tendencies,"  wrote  our  Minister  Beaupre*  to 
Hay,  "are  well  known  and  he  is  reported  to  have  said 
that,  should  the  canal  treaty  not  pass,  the  department 
of  Panama  would  declare  its  independence  and  would 
be  right  in  doing  so.  That  these  are  his  opinions  there 
is  of  course  no  doubt."  *  Reyes,  the  probable  and  actual 
successor  of  Marroquin,  was  well  worth  cultivating  and 
his  dignified  correspondence  with  Secretary  Hay  during 
December,  1903,  and  January,  1904,  manifest  a  man  with 
whom  one  could  bargain. 

"Such  a  scheme"  [that  of  the  secession  of  Panama  and 
its  annexation  to  the  United  States],  wrote  Adce,  Assistant- 
Secretary  of  State  to  Hay,  "could,  of  course,  have  no 
countenance  from  us  —  our  policy  before  the  world  should 
stand  like  Mrs.  Caesar,  without  suspicion."  2  That  the 
policy  determined  on  was  not  above  suspicion  is  evident 
from  Moorfield  Storey's  address  at  the  Massachusetts 
Reform  Club  during  December,  1903;  from  Daniel  H. 
Chamberlain's  "Open  letter  to  John  Hay"  in  the  New 


1  Foreign  Relations,  1903,  193. 

2  Life  of  Hay,  Thayer,  ii.  313. 


CH.  X.]  THE  PANAMA   REVOLUTION  273 

York  Times  of  October  2,  1904 ;  from  James  C.  Carter's 
criticism ;  from  George  L.  Fox's  brochure  of  1904,  entitled 
"  President  Roosevelt's  Coup  d'Etat"  ;  from  Leander  T. 
Chamberlain's  article  entitled  "  A  Chapter  of  National  Dis 
honor,"  reprinted  from  the  North  American  Renew  of 
February,  1912,  as  a  Senate  document;  and  from  George 
L.  Fox's  letter  to  the  New  York  Nation  of  February  24, 
1916,  reprinting  the  protest  of  many  Yale  professors  of 
December  24,  1903,  against  the  treatment  of  Colombia.1 
Saddest  of  all  was  the  attitude  of  Senator  George  F. 
Hoar.  In  a  speech  in  the  Senate  on  December  17,  1903,  he 
said  :  "  No  man  in  this  country  desires  more  eagerly  than  I 
do  to  support  the  Administration  and  to  act  with  my 
Republican  associates  in  this  matter.  I  desire  the  build 
ing  of  the  canal.  It  is  one  of  the  great  landmarks,  rarely 
found  once  in  a  century,  in  the  progress  of  humanity, 
bringing  nations  together  and  making  the  whole  world 
kin.  I  hope  that  it  is  a  laudable  ambition  that  this  may 
be  accomplished  in  my  time  by  the  party  with  which  I 
have  acted  from  my  youth,  and  by  the  Administration 
of  my  choice.  Nothing  can  be  more  delightful  to  me  than 
that  it  shall  be  accomplished  by  the  President  of  whom 
I  have  supposed  I  had  the  right  to  speak  as  an  honored 
and  valued  personal  friend.  .  .  .  Before  the  revolution 
broke  out  our  Government  instructed  its  man-of-war  to 
prevent  the  Government  of  Colombia  from  doing  any 
thing  in  anticipation  of  the  revolution  to  prevent  it.  ... 
Colombia  was  a  friendly  nation.  ...  It  is  said  that  she 


1  The  address  of  Storey  and  article  of  D.  H.  Chamberlain  are  preserved 
as  pamphlets  in  the  Boston  Athenaeum.  The  article  of  L.  T.  Chamberlain 
is  in  a  bound  volume  of  "Tracts."  In  regard  to  James  C.  Carter  see  Life 
of  Hay,  Thayer,  ii.  324. 


274  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1904 

negotiated  a  treaty  with  us  by  her  Executive,  and  then 
that  her  Executive  took  no  steps  to  persuade  her  Con 
gress  to  ratify  it.  Indeed  she  did  exactly  what  we  did 
with  Denmark  thirty  years  ago  in  the  case  of  St.  Thomas, 
what  we  have  done  lately  with  several  commercial  treaties 
and  what  the  present  Administration  did  with  Great 
Britain  within  a  year  in  the  matter  of  the  Newfoundland 
fishery  treaty."1 

Senator  Shelby  M.  Cullom  was  present  at  an  interview 
between  President  Roosevelt  and  Senator  George  F.  Hoar 
and  has  thus  related  the  incident :  "  The  President  wanted 
the  Senator  to  read  a  Message  which  he  had  already  pre 
pared  in  reference  to  Colombia's  action  .  .  .  [probably 
the  Message  of  January  4,  1904].  The  President  was 
sitting  on  the  table,  first  at  one  side  of  Senator  Hoar 
and  then  on  the  other,  talking  in  his  usual  vigorous  fash 
ion,  trying  to  get  the  Senator's  attention  to  the  Message. 
Senator  Hoar  seemed  averse  to  reading  it  but  finally  sat 
down,  and  without  seeming  to  pay  any  particular  atten 
tion  to  what  he  was  perusing,  remained  for  a  minute 
or  two,  then  arose  and  said  'I  hope  I  may  never  live  to 
see  the  day  when  the  interests  of  my  country  are  placed 
above  its  honor.'  He  at  once  retired  from  the  room  with 
out  uttering  another  word."  2 

It  must  not  be  forgotten  however,  that  Roosevelt, 
Hay  and  Root  who  was  Secretary  of  War  at  the  time  of 
taking  Panama,  are  a  powerful  trio  to  combat.  Roose 
velt  and  Hay  represented  a  common-sense  view  while 
Root's  legal  analysis  is  very  strong.3  Their  action  was 


1  Record,  316  et  seq. 

*  Fifty  Years  of  Public  Service,  212. 

8  Bishop,  i.  301  et  seq. 


CH.  XJ  PANAMA  275 

in  no  way  for  self-aggrandizement  but  solely  in  the  in 
terest  of  the  country  that  they  represented.  "The  canal 
would  not  have  been  built  at  all  save  for  the  action  I 
took,"  declared  Roosevelt  in  1913. l  There  is  no  question 
that  he  believed  this  sincerely  to  the  day  of  his  death, 
but  for  the  moment  in  this  statement  he  indulged  in 
prophecy  forgetting  Hosea  Biglow's  remark,  "Don't  never 
prophesy  —  onless  ye  know." 

A  Junta  of  the  provisional  government  of  Panama 
appointed  Philippe  Bunau-Varilla  "Envoy  Extraordi 
nary  and  Minister  Plenipotentiary  near  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  with  full  powers  for  political  and 
financial  negotiations."  On  November  13  the  Republic 
of  Panama  was  recognized  by  the  United  States.  This 
action  was  followed  by  like  recognition  of  France,  Ger 
many,  Denmark,  Russia,  Sweden  and  Norway,  Nicara 
gua,  Peru,  China,  Cuba,  Great  Britain,  Italy,  Costa 
Rica,  Japan  and  Austria-Hungary.2  On  November  18 
Hay  and  Bunau-Varilla  signed  the  Treaty  which  goes 
under  their  names.  It  was  soon  ratified  by  Panama.3 
The  United  States  Senate  ratified  it  on  February  23,  1904, 
by  a  vote  of  66  : 14.  Under  it  the  canal  was  built. 

"We  were  able  to  make  with  Panama  a  much  more 
satisfactory  treaty  than  we  had  with  Colombia,"  wrote 
Cullom.4  The  United  States  guaranteed  the  indepen 
dence  of  Panama.  Panama  granted  to  the  United  States 
a  zone  of  land  ten  miles  wide  from  which  the  cities  of 
Panama  and  Colon  (the  Pacific  and  Caribbean  seaports) 


1  Autobiography,  569 ;  see  also  Fear  God  and  Take  Your  Own  Part, 
written  in  1916,  305. 

'Roosevelt,   January  4,   1904.     Foreign  Relations,   276. 
'Panama,  P.   Bunau-Varilla,  349,  364,  367,  372,  384. 
4  Fifty  Years  of  Public  Service,  383. 


276  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1904 

were  excepted,  but  the  United  States  was  given  full  power 
to  enforce  the  sanitation  and  public  order  of  those  two 
cities.  The  United  States  was  to  pay  to  Panama  ten 
millions  in  gold  coin  and,  beginning  nine  years  after  the 
ratification  of  the  treaty,  an  annual  payment  of  $250,000. 
Panama  granted  to  the  United  States  authority  to  fortify 
the  canal  and  "if  it  should  become  necessary  at  any 
time,"  to  employ  its  land  and  naval  forces  at  its  discre 
tion.1 

"After  paying  $40,000,000  to  J.  P.  Morgan  &  Co.  for 
their  subsequent  transfer ^  to  the  new  company/'  so 
wrote  Bunau-Varilla,  "the  American  Government  re 
sumed  on  the  4th  of  May  1904,  the  work  of  completion 
of  the  great  French  undertaking  after  fifteen  years,  four 
months  and  twenty  days  practical  suspension  of  activ 
ity."  2 

James  Bryce  wrote  about  the  canal  in  a  manner  to 
gratify  the  American  heart,  when  the  source  is  considered. 
"In  these  forty  miles  of  canal,"  he  said,  "(or  fifty  if  we 
reckon  from  deep  water  to  deep  water)  the  two  most 
remarkable  pieces  of  engineering  work  are  the  gigantic 
dam  (with  its  locks)  at  Gatun  and  the  gigantic  cutting 
at  Culebra,  each  the  hugest  of  its  kind  that  the  world 
has  to  shew.  .  .  .  Nothing  less  than  an  earthquake  will 


1  Treaties  relating  to  the  Panama  Canal,  13. 

2  Panama,  430.     I  have  used  Foreign  Relations,  1903,  more  than  the 
citations  to  them  seem  to  warrant.     All  the  despatches  of  our  competent 
minister   to    Colombia,    Beaupre",    are    well    worth    reading.     Theodore 
Roosevelt,   Autobiography;    Life  of  Hay,   Thayer,   ii. ;    do.    Roosevelt; 
Bishop;  Life  of  Hanna,  Croly;  Panama,  Bunau-Varilla;    do.  The  Great 
Adventure  of  Panama.     I  have  also  used  Roosevelt,  Fear  God  and  Take 
Your  Own  Part;    Life  of  Roosevelt,  Leupp;    do.  Lewis;    The  Panama 
Gateway,  Bishop ;   Life  of  Foraker,  ii. ;  Encyclopaedia  Britannica ;  Senate 
debate  on  Treaty  with  Columbia,  open  executive  session,  April,   1921, 
especially  speeches  of  Senators  Lodge,  Kellogg,  Knox,  Borah  and  Johnson. 


CH.  XJ  PANAMA  277 

affect  them  and  of  earthquakes  there  is  no  record  in  this 
region  though  they  are  frequent  in  Costa  Rica,  two  hun 
dred  miles  away.  .  .  .  There  is  something  in  the  magni 
tude  and  the  methods  of  this  enterprise  which  a  poet 
might  take  as  his  theme.  Never  before  on  our  planet 
has  so  much  labor,  so  much  scientific  knowledge,  and  so 
much  executive  skill  been  concentrated  on  a  work  de 
signed  to  bring  the  nations  nearer  to  one  another  and 
serve  the  interests  of  all  mankind.  .  .  .  The  chief  engi 
neer,  Colonel  Goethals,  is  the  head  not  only  of  the  whole 
scheme  of  construction  but  of  the  whole  administration, 
and  his  energy,  judgment  and  power  of  swift  decision 
are  recognized  to  have  been  a  prime  factor  in  the  progress 
of  the  work  and  the  excellence  of  the  administrative  de 
tails.  The  houses  erected  by  the  United  States  govern 
ment  are  each  of  them  surrounded  on  every  floor  by  a 
fine  wire  netting  which,  while  freely  admitting  the  air, 
excludes  winged  insects.  All  the  hospitals  have  been 
netted  so  carefully  that  no  insect  can  enter  to  carry  out 
infection  from  a  patient.  .  .  .  The  discovery,  made  while 
the  United  States  troops  were  occupying  Cuba  after  the 
war  of  1898,  that  yellow  fever  is  due  to  the  bite  of  the 
Stegomyia,  carrying  infection  from  a  patient  to  a  healthy 
person,  and  that  intermittent  fevers  are  due  to  the  bite 
of  the  Anopheles,  similarly  bearing  poison  from  the  sick 
to  the  sound,  made  it  possible  to  enter  on  a  campaign 
for  the  prevention  of  these  diseases  among  the  workers 
on  the  Isthmus.  .  .  .  One  may  be  for  days  and  nights 
on  the  Isthmus  and  neither  see  nor  hear  nor  feel  a  mos 
quito.  To  have  made  one  of  the  pest  houses  of  the  world 
...  as  healthy  as  Boston  or  London  is  an  achievement 
of  which  the  American  medical  staff  and  their  country 


278  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1904 

for  them,  may  well  be  proud ; l  and  the  name  of  Colonel 
Gorgas,  the  head  of  that  medical  staff  to  whose  unwea 
ried  zeal  and  care  this  achievement  is  largely  due,  deserves 
to  stand  on  the  roll  of  fame  beside  that  of  Colonel  Goe- 
thals,  the  chief  engineer  and  chairman  of  the  Commis 
sion,  who  has  directed  and  is  bringing  to  its  successful 
issue,  this  whole  great  enterprise.  ...  It  is  expected  that 
the  construction  of  the  canal  will  be  found,  when  it  is 
finished,  to  have  cost  nearly  $400,000,000."  2 

Bryce  in  1921  disposes  of  what  was  at  the  time  a 
mooted  question.  "  It  deserves  to  be  noted,"  writes 
Bryce,  "as  a  mark  of  Roosevelt's  good  sense  and  dis 
cernment  that  he  had,  at  an  early  stage  in  the  long  debates 
over  the  canal  project,  made  up  his  mind  that  a  sea  level 
canal  was  practically  out  of  the  question.  There  was 
a  grandiosity  about  the  idea  of  an  ocean  highway  with  no 
locks  which  might  have  been  expected  to  attract  him. 
But  his  gift  for  weighing  arguments  and  reaching  the 
correct  conclusion  made  him  grasp  and  hold  fast  to  the 
decision  [that  of  a  lock  canal]  which  experience  has  abun 
dantly  approved."  3 

1  For  a  striking  article  on  the  sanitation  of  the  Isthmus  see  Charles  F. 
Adams,  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  May  1911,  610. 

2  South   America,    23   et  seq.     The   cost    up    to    1916    according    to 
Theodore  Roosevelt  was  $375,000,000,  Fear  God  and  Take  Your  Own 
Part,  311. 

Up  to  June  30,  1920,  $467,431,257.41  had  been  appropriated  for  the 
canal.  Of  this  $379,840,741.92  was  appropriated  for  the  construction  of 
the  canal  and  its  immediate  adjuncts.  The  rest  went  to :  fortifications, 
$34,658,400.81 ;  nine  annual  payments  to  Panama,  $2,250,000 ;  for  opera 
tion  and  maintenance,  $50,511,914.68.  Up  to  the  same  date  $7,215,288.68 
had  been  repaid  on  the  cost  of  construction;  $33,303,581.67  had  been 
collected  in  tolls.  Other  receipts  besides  those  two  make  the  total  re 
ceipts  to  June  30,  1920,  $42,176,261.22.  —  Report  of  Governor  of  the  Pan 
ama  Canal,  1920,  155,  156. 

8  Review  of  J.  B.  Bishop's  Roosevelt.  The  Literary  Review,  N.  Y.  Eve. 
Post,  Feb.  19,  1921. 


CHAPTER  XI 

HENRY  WHITE  wrote  in  a  private  letter,  "  Roosevelt 
was  the  only  man  I  have  ever  met  who  combined  the 
qualities  of  an  able  politician  at  home  with  those  of  an 
equally  good  diplomatist  abroad."  We  have  seen  some 
thing  of  his  work  as  diplomatist  in  Chapter  IX  and  shall 
see  more  as  the  history  goes  on ;  he  was  now  to  measure 
himself  against  the  ablest  politician  in  the  United  States, 
unless  he  himself  were  entitled  to  that  designation,  Mark 
Hanna.  The  stake  was  the  Republican  nomination  for  the 
presidency  in  1904.  Hanna  did  not  approve  of  Roosevelt's 
action  toward  the  large  financial  interests  of  the  country, 
yet  feeling  that  Roosevelt  might  have  the  country  at  his 
back  did  not  act  openly  in  opposition.  On  the  contrary, 
to  a  certain  extent,  he  worked  with  him  and  the  President 
was  grateful  for  his  assistance.  Writing  to  Taft,  then 
Civil  Governor  of  the  Philippines,  under  date  of  March 
13,  1903,  he  said,  "With  both  Hanna  and  Aldrich  I  had 
to  have  a  regular  stand-up  fight  before  I  could  get  them 
to  accept  any  trust  legislation,  but  when  I  once  got  them 
to  say  they  would  give  in,  they  kept  their  promise  in 
good  faith  and  it  was  far  more  satisfactory  to  work  with 
them  than  to  try  to  work  with  the  alleged  radical  re 
formers."  l 

Under  this  seeming  harmony  there  was,  however,  a 
quiet  opposition.  Hanna  had  the  support  of  the  finan 
cial  and  business  interests  of  the  country  but  he  was 


1  Bishop,  i.  237. 
279 


280  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1903 

keen  enough  to  know  that  something  beside  the  backing 
of  Wall  Street  and  associated  interests  was  necessary  to 
the  man  who  had  political  aspirations.  He  secured  the 
support  of  the  Labor  Unions.  During  August,  1902,  he 
declared:  "The  natural  tendency  in  this  country,  ay, 
and  in  the  world  over,  has  been  the  selfish  appropriation 
of  the  larger  share  by  capital.  As  long  as  labor  was  in  a 
situation  which  forced  it  to  submit,  that  condition  would 
to  a  very  large  degree  continue.  If  labor  had  some  griev 
ance  and  each  laborer  in  his  individual  capacity  went 
to  his  employer  and  asked  for  consideration,  how  much 
would  be  shown  to  him?  Not  much.  Therefore  when 
they  banded  together  in  an  organization  for  their  own 
benefit  which  would  give  them  power,  if  necessary,  to 
demand  a  remedy,  I  say  organized  labor  was  justified.  .  .  . 
It  is  truly  astonishing  to  consider  what  trivial  disagree 
ments  have  occasioned  some  of  the  most  serious  strikes. 
I  have  seen  two  parties  stand  apart,  each  with  a  chip  on  his 
shoulder,  defying  his  opponent  to  knock  it  off.  .  .  .  While 
labor  unions  may  have  proved  a  curse  to  England,  I  be 
lieve  that  they  will  prove  a  boon  to  our  own  country.  .  .  . 
Two  factors  contributed  to  the  prosperity  of  our  nation  — 
the  man  who  works  with  his  hands  and  the  man  who  works 
with  his  head  —  partners  in  toil  who  ought  to  be  partners  in 
the  profit  of  that  toil."  And  again  in  May,  1903,  "I  be 
lieve  in  organized  labor  and  I  believe  in  organized  capital 
as  an  auxiliary."  1 

Collective  bargaining  was  Hanna's  remedy  for  labor 
troubles  and  this  doctrine  he  thoroughly  elaborated.  By 
his  famous  "stand  pat"  speech  at  Akron  during  Septem 
ber,  1902,2  he  won  the  support  of  manufacturers  and  busi- 

1  Croly,  405  et  seq.        2  See  Croly,  417,  for  a  full  account  of  it. 


CH.  XL]  ROOSEVELT  — HANN A  281 

ness  men  who  did  not  want  the  present  tariff  disturbed. 
That  Roosevelt  and  Hanna  seemed  to  be  drifting  apart 
troubled  a  supporter  of  Roosevelt  who  was  likewise  a 
thorough-going  Republican;  together,  he  said,  their 
power  among  Republicans  was  immense ;  should  they 
openly  differ  and  put  up  a  fight  they  could  smash  the 
party.  This  was  reported  to  Hanna  who  looked  grave 
but  said  nothing.  To  a  further  remark  that  he  seemed 
to  have  with  him  two  inconsistent  influences,  the  finan 
cial  interests  and  organized  labor,  he  said  simply,  I  have 
the  support  of  both.  Hanna  had  likewise  the  backing 
of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  and  of  the  Salvation 
Army,  so  that  he  was  not  an  opponent  to  be  despised  and 
he  was  not  in  any  respect  thought  slightingly  of  by  Roose 
velt. 

The  opposition  between  the  two  became  public  during 
May,  1903,  and  the  occasion  was  the  Republican  State 
Convention  of  Ohio  which  met  in  June.  Roosevelt  de 
sired  ardently  the  presidential  nomination  ;  he  was  popu 
lar  throughout  the  country  evidenced  by  many  official 
declarations  in  his  favor.  He  kept  himself  before  the 
public,  travelling  about  the  country,  speaking  constantly 
and  was  in  the  far  West  when  this  threatened  disturb 
ance  in  the  relations  between  Roosevelt  and  Hanna  be 
came  known.  Foraker,  who  was  senior  Senator  from 
Ohio,  belonged  to  a  different  section  of  the  party  from  the 
Hanna-McKinley  section  and  felt  that  he  had  not  re 
ceived  his  share  of  the  patronage  under  the  McKinley 
administration.  For  this  and  from  the  antagonism  that 
had  grown  up  between  him  and  Senator  Hanna,  he  was 
willing  to  widen  the  breach  between  the  President  and 
the  Senator.  Prompted  as  he  affirmed,  by  expressions 


282  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1903 

from  Raima's  henchmen,  he  gave  out  during  the  last  of 
May,  1903,  an  interview  in  which  he  declared :  "  Roose 
velt  has  made  a  good  President.  He  has  been  alert,  ag 
gressive  and  brilliant  and  with  it  all  he  has  been  success 
ful.  .  .  .  He  is  to-day  the  best  known  and  the  most  popu 
lar  man  in  the  United  States.  .  .  .  Many  States  indorsed 
and  declared  last  year  in  favor  of  him  as  our  candidate 
for  1904.  Nearly  all  the  Northern  States  will  make  sim 
ilar  declarations  this  year.  I  do  not  know  of  any  reason 
why  Ohio  should  not  also  declare  in  favor  of  him.  ...  I 
think  it  would  be  very  wise  for  the  Republicans  of  Ohio 
at  the  approaching  State  convention  not  only  to  indorse 
the  administration  of  President  Roosevelt,  but  also  to 
declare  their  intention  to  support  him  next  year  as 
our  candidate  for  the  Presidency."  1  On  May  24  Hanna 
replied  to  this  in  a  statement  which  was  given  to  the  press. 
"I  am  not,  and  will  not  be,  a  candidate  for  the  Presiden 
tial  nomination.  On  account  of  my  position  as  Chair 
man  of  the  Republican  National  Committee  and  the 
further  fact  that  this  year  I  am  supposed  to  have  a  vital 
interest  in  the  results  in  Ohio  as  bearing  upon  my  reelec 
tion  to  the  United  States  Senate,  it  would  be  presumed 
that  I  might  have  some  influence  as  to  the  policy  or  action 
of  the  State  convention  this  year  in  national  affairs.  In 
that  connection,  it  would  seem  apparent  that  whatever 
that  influence  might  be  it  had  been  exerted  in  a  direction 
which  would  cause  just  criticism  on  the  part  of  any  other 
person  who  might  aspire  to  be  a  candidate  for  the  Re 
publican  nomination  for  President  in  1904.  For  these 
reasons  I  am  opposed  to  the  adoption  of  such  a  resolu 
tion."  

1  Notes  of  a  Busy  Life,  Foraker,  ii.  110. 


CH.  XL]  ROOSEVELT  — HANN A  283 

On  the  same  day  Hanna  telegraphed  to  the  President 
who  was  at  Seattle,  Washington:  "The  issue  that  has 
been  forced  upon  me  in  the  matter  of  our  State  con 
vention  this  year  indorsing  you  for  Republican  nomina 
tion  next  year  has  come  in  a  way  which  makes  it  neces 
sary  for  me  to  oppose  such  a  resolution.  When  you  know 
all  the  facts  I  am  sure  that  you  will  approve  my  course. " 
Roosevelt  replied  on  the  same  day:  "Your  telegram 
received.  I  have  not  asked  any  man  for  his  support. 
I  have  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  raising  this  issue. 
Inasmuch  as  it  has  been  raised,  of  course,  those  who  favor 
my  administration  and  my  nomination  will  favor  in 
dorsing  both,  and  those  who  do  not  will  oppose."  This 
brought  from  Hanna  the  rejoinder  on  May  26:  "Your 
telegram  of  the  23d  received.  In  view  of  the  sentiment 
expressed  I  shall  not  oppose  the  indorsement  of  your 
administration  and  candidacy  by  our  State  convention. 
I  have  given  the  substance  of  this  to  the  Associated 
Press."  On  May  29  in  reply  to  a  letter  from  Hanna 
Roosevelt  wrote  from  Ogden,  Utah:  "Your  interview 
was  everywhere  accepted  as  the  first  open  attack  on  me, 
and  it  gave  heart,  curiously  enough,  not  only  to  my  oppo 
nents  but  to  all  the  men  who  lump  you  and  me  together 
as  improperly  friendly  to  organized  labor  and  to  the  work 
ing  men  generally.  .  .  .  The  general  belief  was  that  this 
was  not  your  move  save  indirectly ;  but  that  it  was  really 
an  attack  by  the  so-called  Wall  Street  forces  on  me,  to 
which  you  had  been  led  to  give  a  reluctant  acquiescence. 
.  .  .  After  thinking  the  matter  carefully  over  I  became 
sure  that  I  had  to  take  a  definite  stand  myself.  I  hated 
to  do  it,  because  you  have  shown  such  generosity  and 
'straightforwardness  in  all  your  dealings  with  me  that  it 


284  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1903 

was  peculiarly  painful  to  me  to  be  put,  even  temporarily, 
in  a  position  of  seeming  antagonism  to  you.  No  one  but 
a  really  big  man  —  a  man  above  all  petty  considerations 
—  could  have  treated  me  as  you  have  done  during  the 
year  and  a  half  since  President  McKinley's  death.  I 
have  consulted  you  and  relied  on  your  judgment  more 
than  I  have  done  with  any  other  man."  l  Two  days  pre 
viously  Roosevelt  wrote  confidentially  to  Senator  Lodge : 
"I  decided  that  the  time  had  come  to  stop  shilly-shally 
ing  and  let  Hanna  know  definitely  that  I  did  not  intend 
to  assume  the  position,  at  least  passively,  of  a  suppliant 
to  whom  he  might  give  the  nomination  as  a  boon.  ...  I 
rather  expected  Hanna  to  fight,  but  made  up  my  mind 
that  it  was  better  to  have  a  fight  in  the  open  at  once  than 
to  run  the  risk  of  being  knifed  secretly.  ...  I  am  pleased 
at  the  outcome  and  it  simplifies  things  all  round,  for  in 
my  judgment,  Hanna  was  my  only  formidable  opponent 
so  far  as  the  nomination  is  concerned."  2 

There  can  be  no  question  that  the  President  gained 
in  this  controversy.  The  adroit  cartoonist  of  the  New 
York  Herald  illustrated  this  in  a  picture  of  Hanna  shak 
ing  his  fist  at  Foraker  and  with  not  the  best  grace  in  the 
world,  handing  a  bouquet,  labelled  "  endorsement "  to 
Roosevelt  who  expressed  himself  as  "  delighted."  3  But 
no  change  in  their  personal  relations  followed.  On  June 
10  the  President  attended  the  marriage  of  Hanna's 
daughter  Ruth  to  Joseph  Medill  McCormick,  addressing 
in  his  hearty  manner  the  Senator  who  met  him  at  the 
railway  station  as  " Uncle  Mark."  The  Senator  made 


1  Croly,  424  et  soq. 

2  Bishop,  i.  245. 

3  A  Cartoon  History  of  Roosevelt's  Career,  Albert  Shaw,  95- 


CH.  XL]  ROOSEVELT  —  H  ANN  A  285 

the  wedding  a  festive  occasion  and  gathered  together  a 
number  of  personal  and  political  friends. 

Mark  Hanna's  eye  was  on  the  Ohio  political  campaign 
of  1903  when  the  issue  was  fairly  made.  Should  he  be 
reflected  to  the  senatorship  over  his  Democratic  oppo 
nent?  His  party  had  carried  Ohio  the  previous  year  by 
an  immense  majority  but  a  strict  personal  issue  was  ab 
sent.  It  may  be  said  that  he  now  [i.  e.,  in  1903]  dominated 
the  campaign,  carrying  the  State  by  over  100,000  for  the 
Republican  nominee  for  governor,  Myron  T.  Herrick, 
and  with  a  Republican  majority  on  the  joint  ballot  of 
91  in  the  legislature,  a  very  gratifying  result  which  put 
Mark  Hanna  to  the  fore  again  as  a  candidate  for  the 
presidential  nomination. 

In  the  meantime  the  President  had  lost  the  support 
of  a  part  at  least  of  organized  labor.  On  May  19,  the 
Public  Printer  discharged  William  A.  Miller;  the  real 
reason  was  his  expulsion  from  a  local  union.  Miller 
contested  his  dismissal  and  carried  the  case  to  the  Civil 
Service  Commission  that  reported  in  his  favor,  where 
upon  the  President  ordered  him  to  be  reinstated.  The 
American  Federation  of  Labor  took  up  the  case  and  de 
cided  the  action  of  the  President  unfriendly.  Roosevelt 
gave  their  Executive  Council,  at  the  head  of  which  was 
Samuel  Gompers,  their  President,  an  interview  in  which 
he  justified  his  action,  writing  in  a  private  letter  some 
what  before  his  talk  to  the  labor  representatives:  "It 
is  a  sheer  waste  of  time  for  those  people,  through  such 
resolutions  as  those  of  the  unions  you  quote,  to  threaten 
me  with  defeat  for  the  Presidency  next  year.  Nothing 
would  hire  me  even  to  accept  the  Presidency  if  I  had  to 
take  it  on  terms  which  would  mean  a  forfeiting  of  self- 


286  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1903 

respect.  ...  I  should  refuse  to  take  it  at  the  cost  of  un 
doing  what  I  did  in  the  matter  of  Miller  and  the  Labor 
Union.  The  labor  unions  and  the  trust  magnates  may 
perhaps  unite  against  me.  If  so,  I  shall  do  my  level  best 
to  make  the  fight  an  open  one  and  beat  them  —  and  I 
think  I  run  a  good  chance  of  winning ;  and  if  I  fail  I  shall 
not  regret  the  policy  I  have  pursued."  l  The  President 
thought  that  he  had  at  his  back  the  "  one-suspender  men/' 
otherwise  called  by  a  sturdy  democrat,  "the  dinner-pail 
men,"  the  small  shopkeepers  and  a  large  proportion  of 
the  farmers. 

The  Wall  Street  men  and  Hanna  are  working  together 
to  prevent  my  nomination  in  Chicago,  said  the  President. 
So  far  as  Wall  Street  was  concerned  he  was  right.  The 
financial  interests  were  opposed  to  Roosevelt  and  they 
believed  that  anything  to  beat  him  was  the  correct  policy. 
A  reasonable  amount  of  money  could  be  raised  to  secure 
for  Hanna  the  nomination  and  election,  and  they  and 
certain  politicians  were  at  one  in  the  conviction  that 
Roosevelt  if  nominated  could  not  be  elected.  But  Hanna 
would  give  them  no  countenance,  nor  would  he  declare 
for  Roosevelt.  The  breach  widened.  George  B.  Cortelyou, 
who  had  been  McKinley's  and  Roosevelt's  private  sec 
retary  and  was  now  Secretary  of  the  new  Department 
of  Commerce  and  Labor,  made  an  attempt  to  bring  the 
two  together.  He  went  to  see  the  Senator,  who  declared 
that  "he  was  not  a  candidate,  that  he  had  never  been 
nor  would  be  a  candidate."  So  he  had  assured  Roosevelt 
but  he  was  tired,  he  said,  "of  going  to  the  White  House 
every  day,  of  putting  his  hand  on  his  heart  and  being 

1  Bishop,  i.  251.  As  regards  the  Miller  case,  ibid.,  249  et  seq. ;  Roose 
velt,  Messages,  Current  Lit.  Pub.  Co.,  i.  159  et  seq. 


CH.  XL]  ROOSEVELT  —  HANNA  287 

sworn  in."  Somewhat  later  Cortelyou  went  to  see  the 
President  and  found  him  in  conference  with  three  friends, 
one  of  whom  was  a  member  of  the  Cabinet  and  another 
a  Senator.  The  President  said  in  his  emphatic  way, 
"Yes,  Mr.  Hanna  ought  to  make  an  unequivocal  public 
statement  of  his  position,"  when  Cortelyou  assured  the 
President  and  his  friends  that  "Mr.  Hanna  has  no  inten 
tion  of  being  a  candidate  for  President."  l 

Thus  affairs  continued  during  December,  1903,  and  Jan 
uary,  1904.  It  is  not  difficult  to  understand  Hanna's 
position.  He  did  not  believe  in  Roosevelt's  policy  toward 
the  financial  and  business  interests  of  the  country  and 
Hanna  knew  that  he  had  their  backing  and  also  that  of 
the  Labor  Unions;  had  he  been  ten  years  younger  and 
in  good  health  he  would  probably  have  made  a  fight 
against  Roosevelt  for  the  Republican  nomination.  But 
his  health  was  poor,  he  was  66,  he  knew  the  power  which 
the  national  administration  could  exert  for  the  nomina 
tion  and  he  hesitated  to  take  up  the  contest.  With  de 
sign  therefore,  he  let  the  golden  moment  slip  when  he 
was  present  at  Columbus,  making  a  brief  speech  of  thanks 
to  the  Ohio  legislature  for  the  senatorship  and  failing  to 
announce  his  candidacy  for  the  presidential  nomination. 
Late  that  month  Cornelius  N.  Bliss  said  that  Hanna  had 
wittingly  let  pass  the  nick  of  time ;  had  he  eighteen  days 
previously  declared  himself  a  candidate,  he  and  Roosevelt 
would  have  been  competitors  for  the  nomination.2 

Some  of  Hanna's  advocates  were  determined  to  force 


1  Croly,  437.  According  to  Croly,  James  R.  Garfield,  then  Commis 
sioner  of  Corporations,  and  Theodore  E.  Burton,  representative  from  the 
Cleveland  district,  were  effective  in  preventing  the  breach  from  widening. 
See  also  letter  of  O.  H.  Platt,  cited  by  Croly,  441. 

8  The  address  in  Columbus  was  Jan.  12,  1904 ;  the  talk  of  Bliss,  Jan.  30. 


288  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1904 

the  nomination  upon  him  and  argued  that,  as  the  call  of 
States  was  in  alphabetical  order,  Alabama  and  Arkansas 
would  first  be  called,  would  vote  for  Hanna  whence  there 
would  come  a  tidal  wave  that  would  result  in  his  nomina 
tion.  Charles  G.  Washburn,  a  friend  and  college  class 
mate  of  Roosevelt,  wrote  :  "I  was  a  delegate  to  the  Con 
vention  that  nominated  Roosevelt  for  President  in  1904. 
A  portrait,  of  heroic  size,  of  Mark  Hanna,  hung  over  the 
platform.  I  said  to  a  man  who  sat  next  to  me  'What 
would  happen  if  Hanna  were  living  ?'  He  said  in  reply, 
'He  would  be  nominated  here  to-day/"  l 

By  the  end  of  January,  1904,  Roosevelt  was  confident, 
writing  thus  to  Shaw :  "In  confidence  I  can  tell  you  that 
outside  all  the  Southern  States  I  am  now  as  certain  as 
I  well  can  be  that  if  Hanna  made  the  fight  (for  the  nomi 
nation)  and  with  all  the  money  of  Wall  Street  behind 
him,  he  would  get  the  majority  of  the  delegations  from 
no  State  excepting  Ohio;  and  from  the  South  I  should 
have  from  a  third  to  a  half  of  the  delegates,  and  most  of 
the  remainder  would  have  been  pledged  to  me  and  would 
have  to  be  purchased  outright  against  me.  I  believe 
that  the  best  advisers  among  my  opponents  themselves 
see  this  and  have  very  nearly  made  up  their  minds  to 
give  up  the  contest.  In  a  few  weeks  I  think  that  most 
of  the  Wall  Street  Republicans  will  have  concluded  that 
they  have  to,  however  grudgingly,  support  me.  .  .  .  My 
nomination  has  become  assured,  in  my  judgment,  be 
fore  they  give  up  the  contest."  2 

Hanna  was  capable  of  a  high  aspiration  and  this  took 
the  form  with  him  of  a  reconcilement  between  capital 


1  Roosevelt,  53.  *  Bishop,  i.  314. 


CH.  XL]  HANN A— ROOSEVELT  289 

and  labor  to  which  he  was  willing  to  devote  his  business 
experience  and  political  standing.  Unquestionably  he 
as  leading  Senator  and  Roosevelt  as  President  might  have 
accomplished  much ;  both  loved  their  country  and  would 
make  personal  sacrifices  for  it ;  both  had  personal  morals 
above  reproach ;  both  had  a  high  idea  of  service ;  but 
the  two  could  not  work  sympathetically  together. 
Shakespeare  told  why,  "An  two  men  ride  of  a  horse, 
one  must  ride  behind."  l 

Now  entered  upon  the  scene  the  King  of  Terrors. 
Hanna  died  on  February  15,  1904.  While  lying  upon 
his  death-bed  in  the  Arlington  Hotel,  the  President  called 
to  inquire  after  his  condition  and  on  February  5  received 
this  pencilled  note:  "My  dear  Mr.  President:  You 
touched  a  tender  spot,  old  man,  when  you  called  person 
ally  to  inquire  after  [me]  this  A.M.  I  may  be  worse, 
before  I  can  be  better,  but  all  the  same  such  '  drops  of 
kindness'  are  good  for  a  fellow."  To  this  Roosevelt 
replied:  "Dear  Senator:  Indeed  it  is  your  letter  from 
your  sick  bed  which  is  touching,  not  my  visit.  May  you 
soon  be  with  us  again,  old  fellow,  as  strong  in  body  and 
as  vigorous  in  your  leadership  as  ever."  2 

His  death  was  regarded  as  a  calamity  in  Cleveland ; 
and  in  his  State  of  Ohio,  it  seemed  as  if  a  prop  to  the  na 
tion  had  been  taken  away.  Roosevelt  wrote  to  Root  on 
the  next  day:  "No  man  had  larger  traits  than  Hanna. 
He  was  a  big  man  in  every  way  and  as  forceful  a  person 
ality  as  we  have  seen  in  public  life  in  our  generation."  3 
The  Chaplain  of  the  Senate,  Reverend  Edward  Everett 
Hale,  spoke  thus  over  his  dead  body :  "This  man  had  at 


1  Much  Ado,  iii.  5.  2  Croly,  453,  454. 

3  Bishop,  i.  315. 


290  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1904 

once  as  no  other  man  had,  the  confidence  of  capital  and 
labor.  He  could  mediate  between  the  men  who  provide 
the  tools  and  the  workmen  who  handle  them."  Later 
his  senatorial  associates  paid  him  high  tributes.  Foraker 
said  :  "He  was  one  of  the  really  great  men  of  his  day  and 
generation.  ...  He  had  before  him  seven  years  of  ser 
vice."  His  personal  friend,  Senator  Platt  of  Connecti 
cut,  declared,  "that  when  Marcus  A.  Hanna  died  all  the 
people  mourned  with  a  grief  that  was  deep  and  un 
feigned."  Senator  Fairbanks  said  truthfully,  "He  pos 
sessed  in  full  degree  the  power  of  great  initiative."  Sena 
tor  Beveridge  said  that,  "He  was  the  man  of  affairs  in 
statesmanship  .  .  . ;  he  was  the  personification  of  our 
commercial  age." 1  "  The  New  York  Evening  Post 
crowd,"  as  Roosevelt  called  them,  could  not  join  in  these 
tributes.  They  may  have  taken  their  cue  from  their 
great  progenitor  who  wrote,  "I  do  not  like  the  Western 
type  of  man."  2  In  that  they  differed  from  Roosevelt 
who  broke  out,  "I  do  like  these  Westerners." 

Between  these  eulogists  and  detractors  of  Hanna  it 
is  pleasant  to  hear  from  a  moderator,  Edward  D.  White, 
who  as  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  was  well  acquainted 
with  Hanna,  admired  and  loved  him,  who  one  night  in 
December,  1920,  long  after  he  had  been  Chief  Justice, 
could  talk  of  naught  else,  testifying  his  high  regard  for  the 
ability,  honor  and  unselfishness  of  Hanna. 

Hanna  was  now  out  of  the  way.  No  man  in  public 
life  took  his  place  in  partial  antagonism  to  Roosevelt. 
The  coast  was  clear.  He  was  nominated  by  acclamation 
at  the  Republican  National  Convention  that  assembled 

1  Memorial  Addresses,  pp.  15,  31,  49,  77,  110. 
•Life  of  Godkin,  Ogden,  ii. 


CH.  XL]  HANNA  291 

in  Chicago,  June  21,  1904.  Charles  G.  Washburn,  later 
Congressman  from  the  Worcester  district,  a  keen  judge 
of  men,  wrote  in  his  book  adding  to  what  I  have  already 
cited:  "Of  course  Hanna  would  not  have  been  nomi 
nated.  .  .  .  The  old  order  which  was  incarnated  in  Hanna 
had  not  then  passed  away  but  it  was  passing.  .  .  .  When 
McKinley  and  Hanna  died,  the  old  dynasty  fell."  l 


1  Roosevelt,  64. 


CHAPTER  XII 

IN  accepting  the  nomination  for  the  presidency  Roose 
velt  showed  that  he  was  a  true  partisan  Republican  as, 
in  his  speech  of  acceptance,  he  dilated  on  the  "  Record 
of  the  Republican  party/'  on  the  currency  and  the  tariff. 
"We  have  placed  the  finances  of  the  Nation  upon  a 
sound  gold  basis,"  he  said.  "We  have  enacted  a  tariff 
law  under  which  during  the  past  few  years  the  country 
has  attained  a  height  of  material  well-being  never  before 
reached."  In  his  letter  he  elaborated  his  position  on 
the  tariff  taking  the  ground  of  the  educated  man  who 
had  been  led  to  believe  in  the  virtue  of  protection.  "The 
question  of  what  tariff  is  best  for  our  people  is  primarily  one 
of  expediency,  to  be  determined  not  on  abstract  academic 
grounds  but  in  the  light  of  experience.  It  is  a  matter 
of  business " ;  and  he  repeated  the  Republican  stock 
argument  against  the  Democratic  tariff  of  1894. l 

The  Democrats  had  nominated  Alton  B.  Parker,  Chief 
Justice  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  the  State  of  New  York, 
who,  declining  to  run  on  a  platform  squinting  in  the  di 
rection  of  free  silver,  had  eliminated  from  the  contest 
the  money  question.  Nor  was  the  tariff  an  issue  to  be 
decided.  The  issue  of  the  campaign  was  Roosevelt. 
"Your  personality  has  been  the  Administration,"  wrote 
Elihu  Root.2  This  meant  largely  what  Roosevelt  had 
done  in  attacking  the  great  financial  interests  of  the  coun- 


1  The  speech  was  July  27;  the  letter,  September  12.     Current  Lit.  Pub. 
Co.,  198,  200,  213.  2  Bishop,  i.  323. 

292 


CH.  XII.]  ALTON  B.  PARKER  293 

try  which,  after  much  consideration,  had  selected  Parker 
as  their  candidate.  They  had  coquetted  with  Grover 
Cleveland.  "It  is  evident,"  wrote  Roosevelt  to  Senator 
Lodge  on  May  4,  1903,  "Cleveland  has  the  presidential 
bee  in  his  bonnet,  and  it  is  equally  evident  that  a  large 
number  of  people  are  desirous  of  running  him  again."  l 
Nevertheless  his  decision  not  to  accept  another  nomina 
tion  became  "unalterable." 

Toward  its  end  Parker  brought  personalities  into  the 
campaign  which  must  be  considered.  Roosevelt  had  se 
lected  as  chairman  of  the  Republican  National  Commit 
tee  George  B.  Cortelyou,  after  having  vainly  endeavored 
to  secure  Elihu  Rooc,  W.  Murray  Crane  and  Cornelius  N. 
Bliss.  Cortelyou  had  been  Cleveland's  executive  clerk, 
private  secretary  of  McKinley  and  Roosevelt,  and  was 
then  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor,  appointed 
by  Roosevelt.  A  fair  inference  from  Judge  Parker's 
speeches  was  that  President  Roosevelt  and  Cortelyou 
had  used  their  official  positions  to  induce  corporations  to 
contribute  funds.  Roosevelt,  having  a  high  regard  for  the 
dignity  of  his  office,  had  held  aloof  from  a  public  participa 
tion  in  the  campaign  but  these  speeches  of  Parker  gave  him 
a  long-sough  t-f  or  opportunity  of  taking  a  hand  in  the  contest 
as  a  fighter,  and  on  November  4  2  he  made  this  statement : 
"The  assertion  that  Mr.  Cortelyou  had  any  knowledge 
gained  while  in  an  official  position,  whereby  he  was  enabled 
to  secure  and  did  secure  any  contributions  from  any  cor 
poration  is  a  falsehood.  .  .  .  The  assertion  that  there 
has  been  made  in  my  behalf  and  by  rny  authority,  by 


1  Bishop,  i.  241. 

2  The  election  was  on  November  8.     Charles  W.  Fairbanks  of  Indiana 
was  chosen  Vice-President. 


294  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1904 

Mr.  Cortelyou  or  by  anyone  else,  any  pledge  or  promise, 
or  that  there  has  been  any  understanding  as  to  future 
immunities  or  benefits,  in  recognition  of  any  contribu 
tions  from  any  source,  is  a  wicked  falsehood.  ...  As 
Mr.  Cortelyou  has  said  to  me  more  than  once  during  the 
campaign,  if  elected  I  shall  go  into  the  Presidency  un 
hampered  by  any  pledge,  promise  or  understanding  of 
any  kind,  sort  or  description,  save  my  promise  made 
openly  to  the  American  people,  that  so  far  as  in  my  power 
lies  I  shall  see  to  it  that  every  man  has  a  square  deal,  no 
less  and  no  more."  1 

The  Nation,  which  was  an  enthusiastic  supporter  of 
Parker,  maintained  that  the  gravamen  of  Parker's  charges 
was  that  the  beneficiaries  of  the  tariff  policy  of  the  Re 
publican  party  were  to  be  recouped  for  their  contribu 
tions  in  the  event  of  Republican  success.  But  Roosevelt 
did  not  so  interpret  the  charges.  Indeed  The  Nation 
failed  to  iterate  with  its  accustomed  vigor  Parker's  charges 
against  Roosevelt  and  Cortelyou,  proposing  apparently 
to  shield  him  under  the  stock  Democratic  argument 
against  the  tariff  and  the  Republican  party.2 

Of  the  same  nature  was  the  Harriman  attack  which 
was  made  public  more  than  two  years  later  and  which 
was  to  the  effect  that  Roosevelt  had  requested  Harriman 
to  raise  $250,000  for  the  presidential  campaign.  Roose 
velt  denied  this  emphatically.  "I  never,"  he  said,  " re 
quested  Mr.  Harriman  to  raise  a  dollar  for  the  Presiden 
tial  campaign  of  1904.  On  the  contrary,  our  communi 
cations  as  regards  the  campaign  related  exclusively  to  the 
fight  being  made  against  Mr.  Higgins  for  Governor  of 


1  Current  Lit.  Pub.  Co.,  222  et  seq.     a  The  Nation,  1904,  24, 180,  250,  365. 


CH.  XII. J  ROOSEVELT  295 

New  York.  ...  He  was  concerned  only  in  getting  me 
to  tell  Mr.  Cortelyou  to  aid  Mr.  Higgins  so  far  as  he 
could,  which  I  gladly  did."  l  It  was  well  known  that  at 
Republican  headquarters,  New  York  State  was  consid 
ered  in  danger,  not  lest  its  electoral  vote  should  fail  Roose 
velt,  but  whether  the  Republican  candidate  for  governor 
should  be  elected. 

Roosevelt  was  triumphantly  chosen.  He  was  almost 
the  only  one  among  his  supporters  who  doubted  the  re 
sult2  that  went  far  ahead  of  his  anticipations.  "I  am 
stunned  by  the  overwhelming  victory  we  have  won," 
he  wrote  to  his  son.  "I  have  the  greatest  popular  ma 
jority  and  the  greatest  electoral  majority  ever  given  to 
a  candidate  for  President."  3  He  carried  the  border 
slave  States,  of  West  Virginia  and  Missouri ;  while  having 
a  popular  plurality  of  50  in  Maryland,  he  received  only  one 
of  her  electoral  votes.  As  a  result  of  this  election  when 
Congress  met  December  4, 1905,  there  were  in  the  Senate 
57  Republicans  to  32  Democrats ; 4  in  the  House,  249  Re 
publicans  to  137  Democrats. 

On  the  night  of  election  after  it  was  known  that  he 
was  triumphantly  chosen,  he  gave  out  from  the  White 
House  this  statement,  "The  wise  custom  which  limits 
the  President  to  two  terms  regards  the  substance  and 
not  the  form,  and  under  no  circumstances  will  I  be  a  can 
didate  for  or  accept  another  nomination."  5 


1  Current  Lit.  Pub.  Co.,  427. 

1  See  My  Brother  T.  Roosevelt,  Mrs.  Robinson,  217.     But  Roosevelt 
was  eager  to  be  elected  and  anxious  in  regard  to  the  result. 

3  Bishop,  i.  335 ;  see  also  letter  to  Henry  White,  316,  332,  and  to  Kip 
ling,  332. 

4  There  was  one  vacancy. 

5 Life  of  Roosevelt,  Lewis,  234.     Bishop  has  "A"  instead  of  "The," 
334. 


296  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1903 

Roosevelt  had  now  received  a  mandate  from  the  people 
with  the  House  and  Senate  largely  Republican.  Before 
proceeding  to  tell  what  he  accomplished  during  his  second 
administration  it  will  be  well  to  recount  what  he  had 
done  when  as  Vice-President  he  succeeded  to  the  presi 
dency,  that  in  the  course  of  the  narrative  has  not  been 
considered.  What  exasperated  the  large  financial  in 
terests  was  his  so-called  attack  on  them;  he  was  insist 
ent  on  Federal  regulation  and  did  not  believe  that  it 
could  properly  be  left  to  the  States.  "The  Sherman 
Anti-Trust  Law  [the  Act  of  1890.  For  Acts  of  1887  and 
1890  see  my  viii.  288,  358]  was  a  dead  letter/'  wrote 
Cullom,  "until  Roosevelt  instructed  the  Attorney  Gen 
eral  to  prosecute  its  violators,  both  great  and  small."1 
Roosevelt  said  with  truth,  "Publicity  and  not  secrecy, 
will  win  hereafter/' 2  He  had  a  Congress  fairly  obedient 
to  his  wish.  He  wrote  during  August,  1906:  "By  the 
enactment  of  the  Elkins  law  and  by  the  creation  of  the 
Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor  including  the  Bu 
reau  of  Corporations,  Congress  enabled  us  to  make  great 
strides  in  advance  along  the  path  of  thus  bringing  the 
use  of  wealth  in  business  under  the  supervision  and  regu 
lation  of  the  National  Government  —  for,  in  actual  prac 
tice  it  has  proved  a  sham  and  pretence  to  say  that  the 
several  States  can  thus  supervise  and  regulate  it."  3  The 
Elkins  law,  passed  February  19,  1903,  forbade  rebates. 
Congress  passed  on  February  14,  1903,  an  act  creating 
a  Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor  including  a  Bu 
reau  of  Corporations.  Such  action  was  due  to  the  warm 


1  Fifty  Years  of  Public  Service,  292.         2  Message  of  December,  1904. 
3  Letter  to  James  E.  Watson.     Current  Lit.  Pub.  Co.,  400. 


CH.  XII.]  THE  PENSION  ORDER  297 

recommendation  of  the  President,  who  appointed  as  its 
first  Secretary  George  B.  Cortelyou. 

During  March,  1904,  the  President  established  by  execu 
tive  order  "  a  service  pension  for  all  veterans  of  the  Civil 
War"  between  62  and  70.1  This  was  called  by  his  op 
ponents  an  unconstitutional  exercise  of  power  and  a  bid 
for  the  soldiers'  vote  as  represented  by  the  Grand  Army 
of  the  Republic.  But  supporters  of  Roosevelt  will  adopt 
a  defence  of  this  action  as  exhibited  in  his  private  letters. 
In  one  written  during  May  he  said  that  the  feeling  in 
Congress  "was  overwhelmingly  for  a  full  service  pension 
—  that  is  $12.00  a  month  beginning  at  the  age  of  62." 
Such  a  measure  would  have  cost  the  Government  about 
fifty  millions  annually,  while  his  order  would  carry 
only  about  five  millions.  "So  much,"  he  wrote,  "for 
the  technical  argument."  But  "I  hold  that  the  ruling 
was  absolutely  right  and  proper.  Most  of  our  friends 
who  live  softly  do  not  understand  that  the  great  majority 
of  people  who  live  by  hard  manual  labor  have  begun  to 


1  D.  M.  Matteson  has  prepared  the  following  note  :  The  order  which 
is  signed  by  the  Commissioner  of  Pensions  is  dated  March  15,  1904.  It 
is  based  on  the  Act  of  June  27,  1890,  which  declared  that  the  pension  should 
be  from  $6  to  $12  according  to  the  degree  of  inability  to  earn  a  support. 
The  order  said,  "old  age  is  an  infirmity  the  average  nature  and  extent  of 
which  the  experience  of  the  Pension  Bureau  has  established  with  reason 
able  certainty."  As  the  Act  of  1887  established  an  old  age  pension  for 
Mexican  War  veterans  39  years  after  that  war,  and  as  1904  is  39  years 
after  the  Civil  War,  therefore  it  is  ordered  that  all  veterans  of  the  Civil 
War  of  62  years  or  more  shall  be  considered  as  "disabled  one  half  in  ability 
to  perform  manual  labor"  and  entitled  to  $6  a  month;  after  65  years, 
to  $8;  after  68,  to  $10;  and  after  70, 'to  $12. 

President  Cleveland  had  issued  an  order  making  75  years  a  complete 
disability  and  President  McKinley  one  making  65  a  half  disability. 

Congress  on  Feb.  6,  1907,  established  a  regular  old  age  pension  for  Mex 
ican  veterans  of  a  minimum  of  60  days'  service  and  Civil  War  veterans 
of  a  minimum  of  90  days'  service,  giving  $12  a  month  at  62  as  the  minimum 
and  $20  at  75  as  the  maximum. 


298  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1904 

find  their  wage-earning  capacity  seriously  impaired  by  the 
time  they  are  sixty.  .  .  .  Now  the  average  wage  worker 
does  not  lay  by  enough  money  to  keep  him  in  his  old  age, 
and  when  he  has  fought  in  the  Civil  War  I  am  entirely 
willing  that  he  shall  be  cared  for  to  the  extent  indicated 
in  my  order."  l 

The  phrase  "our  friends  who  live  softly"  is  a  partial 
keynote  to  Roosevelt's  administrative  career.  Assuredly 
he  thought  more  highly  of  them  if  they  were  doing  what 
he  considered  good  work  than  of  men  devoted  to  the 
mere  amassing  of  wealth,  and  he  was  willing  to  award 
them  full  credit ;  but  other  letters  written  at  about  this 
time  show  that  he  did  not  look  to  them  for  his  main  sup 
port.  They  were  "the  gentle  folk,"  as  he  wrote  to  his 
friend  Owen  Wister  after  the  election  of  1904,  "the  people 
whom  you  and  I  meet  at  the  houses  of  our  friends  and 
at  our  clubs;  the  people  who  went  to  Harvard  as  we 
did."  But  I  owed  my  election  "above  all  to  Abraham 
Lincoln's  'plain  people,'  to  the  folk  who  worked  hard  on 
farm,  in  shop,  or  on  the  railroads,  or  owned  little  stores, 
little  businesses  which  they  managed  themselves."  2  In 
the  same  vein  he  wrote  to  Sir  George  Otto  Trevelyan 
soon  after  his  inauguration  in  1905:  "My  supporters 
are  to  be  found  in  the  overwhelming  majority  among 
those  whom  Abraham  Lincoln  called  the  plain  people. 
.  .  .  The  farmers,  lumbermen,  mechanics,  ranchmen, 
miners  of  the  North,  East  and  West  have  felt  that  I  was 
just  as  much  in  sympathy  with  them,  just  as  devoted 
to  their  interests,  and  as  proud  of  them  and  as  representative 
of  them  as  if  I  had  sprung  from  among  their  own  ranks."  s 

Bishop,  i.  318  et  seq. 

» Bishop,  i.  345.  8  Ibid.,  364. 


CH.  XII.  1  ROOSEVELT  299 

Yet  Roosevelt  was  far  from  being  a  demagogue.  He 
upheld  without  ceasing  the  right  of  private  property; 
he  was  bitterly  opposed  to  socialism  and  he  agreed  in 
the  main  with  those  who  held  to  individual  ideas;  he 
enjoyed  the  companionship  of  men  who  lived  softly  and 
he  liked  a  good  dinner  party.  To  those  who  appreciated 
the  innate  refinement  of  John  Hay,  his  words  come  with 
peculiar  force.  "It  is  a  comfort  to  work  for  a  President 
who.  .  .  happened  to  be  born  a  gentleman."1  Astheevent 
has  shown,  the  financial  interests  and  many  of  the  men 
who  lived  softly  —  perhaps  a  majority  —  committed  an 
error  when  they  did  not  at  this  time  hold  up  the  hands 
of  Theodore  Roosevelt.  Publicity  was  important  for 
the  investor,  which  he  had  through  the  Fourth  Estate ; 
the  prohibition  of  rebates  was  necessary  for  the  small 
business  men ;  the  watering  of  stock  was  a  menace  to 
the  sterling  interest  of  the  country;  the  wage  earners 
had  their  journals  which  kept  them  informed  of  the  do 
ings  of  Big  Business.  To  them  it  seemed  easy  work  to 
cut  off  coupons,  to  draw  dividends,  to  take  the  air  by 
riding  about  in  automobiles,  and  they  looked  upon  Roose 
velt  as  a  champion  who  was  going  to  insure  them  a  better 
time,  although  they  had  leaders  like  John  Mitchell  who 
interpreted  for  them  correctly  what  the  Roosevelt  good 
time  meant.  In  the  state  of  public  sentiment  succeed 
ing  the  Cleveland-McKinley  regime  the  financial  inter 
ests  should  have  looked  upon  Roosevelt  as  their  best 
friend.  It  was  true,  as  Elihu  Root  told  many  of  the  rep 
resentatives  of  Big  Business  at  the  Union  League  Club 
during  February,  1904:  "You  say  Roosevelt  is  an  un- 


Bishop,  i.  263 


300  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1904 

safe  man.  I  tell  you  he  is  a  great  conservator  of  property 
and  rights."  l 

The  year  1904  must  not  be  passed  by  without  a  men 
tion  of  the  St.  Louis  World  Fair  which  celebrated  the 
Louisiana  Purchase.  John  Hay  "  grumbled  when  the 
President  made  him  go  to  St.  Louis  to  address"  the  rep 
resentatives  of  the  press.  "  The  years  of  my  boyhood," 
he  said,  "were  passed  on  the  banks  of  the  Mississippi, 
and  the  great  river  was  the  scene  of  my  early  dreams."  2 
But  Henry  Adams  remarked,  "John  Hay  was  as  strange 
to  the  Mississippi  River  as  though  he  had  not  been  bred 
on  its  shores."  Adams  went  with  Hay  and  has  thus 
described  a  part  of  their  journey  from  Washington  to 
St.  Louis:  "In  this  great  region  from  Pittsburg  through 
Ohio  and  Indiana,  agriculture  had  made  way  for  steam ; 
tall  chimneys  reeked  smoke  on  every  horizon,  and  dirty 
suburbs  filled  with  scrap-iron,  scrap-paper  and  cinders 
formed  the  setting  of  every  town." 

Hay's  address  was  a  glorification  of  material  progress, 
of  the  advance  of  America,  of  the  great  significance  of 
the  Louisiana  Purchase,  but  the  comment  of  his  friend, 
Henry  Adams,  strikes  more  forcibly  the  student  of  affairs  : 
"The  St.  Louis  Exposition,"  he  wrote,  was  the  first  crea 
tion  of  the  new  American  "in  the  twentieth  century  and 
for  that  reason  acutely  interesting.  One  saw  here  a  third 
rate  town  of  half-a-million  people  without  history,  edu 
cation,  unity,  or  art  and  with  little  capital  .  .  .  doing 
what  London  or  New  York  would  have  shrunk  from 
attempting.  This  new  social  conglomerate,  with  no  tie 
but  its  steam  power  and  not  much  of  that,  threw  away 


1  Washburn's  Roosevelt,  67.  2  Addresses,  244. 


CM.  XII.]  THE  ST.  LOUIS  EXPOSITION  301 

thirty  or  forty  million  dollars  on  a  pageant  as  ephemeral 
as  a  stage  flat."  There  were  "long  lines  of  white  palaces 
exquisitely  lighted  by  thousands  on  thousands  of  elec 
tric  candles."  l 

But  the  correspondent  of  The  Nation  thought  that  in 
architectural  beauty  the  St.  Louis  Exposition  was  in 
ferior  to  that  in  Chicago  and  further  said  that  in  elec 
trical  display  it  had  not  the  mighty  Niagara  for  help.5 

A  feature  was  the  "Congress  of  Arts  and  Science,"  the 
main  purpose  of  which  "was  to  place  within  reach  of  the 
investigator  the  objective  thought  of  the  world,  so  classi 
fied  as  to  show  its  relations  to  all  similar  phases  of  human 
endeavor,  and  so  arranged  as  to  be  practically  available 
for  reference  and  study."  To  the  disinterested  and  valu 
able  advice  of  President  Nicholas  Murray  Butler  and 
President  William  R.  Harper  the  Congress  was  under 
heavy  obligations.  The  teaching  was  in  the  form  of 
lectures  and  the  reading  of  papers  and  more  than  a  hun 
dred  leading  scholars  of  Europe  assisted  the  American 
contributors  "under  conditions  where  academic  fellow 
ship  on  an  equal  footing  was  a  necessary  part  of  the  work. 
...  It  was  a  real  feast  of  international  scholarship."  3 


1  Henry  Adams,  Education,  466.         2  The  Nation,  1904. 
3  Congress  of  Arts  and  Science.     Universal  Exposition,  St.  Louis,  1904, 
i.  3,  133.     H.  J.  Rogers,  Hugo  Mtinsterberg. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

BEFORE  Roosevelt  was  inaugurated  and  before  he  began 
therefore  the  term  which  was  his  own,  he  showed  his 
power  as  diplomatist.  War  between  Russia  and  Japan 
began  on  February  10, 1904,  and  had  in  him  an  attentive 
observer.  In  his  own  words  he  tells  the  story.  "  During 
the  early  part  of  the  year  1905,"  he  wrote  in  his  Auto 
biography,  "the  strain  on  the  civilized  world  caused  by 
the  Russo-Japanese  War  became  serious.  The  losses  of 
life  and  of  treasure  were  frightful.  ...  If  the  war  went 
on  I  thought  it  on  the  whole  likely  that  Russia  would  be 
driven"  farther  west.  "  But  it  was  very  far  from  cer 
tain.  There  is  no  certainty  in  such  a  war.  Japan  might 
have  met  defeat  and  defeat  to  her  would  have  spelt  over 
whelming  disaster;  and  even  if  she  had  continued  to 
win,  what  she  thus  won  would  have  been  of  no  value  to 
her,  and  the  cost  in  blood  and  money  would  have  left 
her  drained  white.  I  believed  therefore  that  the  time 
had  come  when  it  was  greatly  to  the  interest  of  both  com 
batants  to  have  peace,  and  when  therefore  it  was  possible 
to  get  both  to  agree  to  peace."  1  During  January  he  " pri 
vately  and  unofficially  advised  the  Russian  Government, 
and  afterward  repeated  the  advice  indirectly  through  the 
French  Government,  to  make  peace."  "The  European 
powers  want  peace."  But  "it  looks  as  if  the  foreign 
powers  did  not  want  me  to  act  as  peacemaker,"  2  he 
wrote  to  Secretary  Hay,  who  was  in  Europe  on  account 
of  his  physical  condition. 

1  P.  583.  8  Bishop,  i.  376,  377. 

302 


CH.  XIII.]  GERMANY— ENGLAND  303 

In  the  two  chapters  which  Bishop  has  devoted  to  this 
subject  one  may  well  be  amazed,  from  the  confidential 
correspondence  there  disclosed,  at  Roosevelt's  knowledge 
of  European  conditions  and  at  his  various  characteriza 
tions  of  European  powers  and  their  rulers.     Talleyrand 
said  of  Alexander  Hamilton  that  he  had  divined  Europe. 
We  may  well  affirm  that  Theodore  Roosevelt  in  the  early 
part   of   the   twentieth   century    had   divined    Europe. 
"The  Kaiser,"  he  wrote,  "has  had  another  fit  and  is  now 
convinced  that  France  is  trying  to  engineer  a  congress 
of  the  nations  in  which  Germany  will  be  left  out.    What 
a  jumpy  creature  he  is  anyhow!"  l    He  is  a  "fuss-cat." 
He  desired  that  peace  should  be  made  between  the  two 
warring  powers  but  he  wanted  to  have  a  hand  in  it  and 
was  willing  to  accept  other  people's  ideas  if  he  could  call 
them  his  own.     The  Kaiser,  he  wrote  to  Hay  on  April 
2,  "sincerely  believes  that  the  English  are  planning  to 
attack  him  and  smash  his  fleet,  and  perhaps  join  with 
France  in  a  war  to  the  death  against  him.     As  a  matter 
of  fact  the  English  harbor  no  such  intentions,  but  are 
themselves  in  a  condition  of  panic  terror  lest  the  Kaiser 
secretly  intend  to  form  an  alliance  against  them  with 
France  or  Russia,  or  both,  to  destroy  their  fleet  and  blot 
out  the  British  Empire  from  the  map !     It  is  as  funny  a 
case  as  I  have  ever  seen  of  mutual  distrust  and  fear  bring 
ing  two  people  to  the  verge  of  war."     In  the  same  letter 
to  Hay  he  gave  his  opinion  of  the  Russian  Emperor. 
"Did  you  ever  know  anything  more  pitiable  than  the 
condition  of  the  Russian  despotism?    The  Czar  is  a  pre 
posterous    little  creature  as    the   absolute    autocrat    of 


1  Bishop,  i.  377. 


304  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1905 

150,000,000  people.  He  has  been  unable  to  make  war 
and  he  is  now  unable  to  make  peace."  l 

Roosevelt  told  the  Japanese,  "it  was  in  my  judgment 
wise  to  build  a  bridge  of  gold  for  the  beaten  enemy  " ; 
and  they  took  his  advice.  On  May  27  and  28,  1905,  the 
Japanese  annihilated  the  Russian  fleet  in  the  Sea  of  Ja 
pan.  Roosevelt,  who  was  an  excellent  judge  of  naval 
matters,  thus  characterized  the  engagement,  "Neither 
Trafalgar  nor  the  defeat  of  the  Spanish  Armada  was  as 
complete  —  as  overwhelming."  2  With  amazing  wisdom, 
directly  on  the  heels  of  this  great  naval  victory,  the  Jap 
anese  made  overtures  in  writing  for  peace.  Roosevelt 
saw  at  once  the  Russian  ambassador  and  "told  him  to 
say  to  the  Czar  that  I  believe  the  war  absolutely  hope 
less  for  Russia."  Now  he  had  the  help  of  the  Kaiser. 

Roosevelt  wrote  to  Senator  Lodge  on  June  16:  "The 
more  I  see  of  the  Czar,  the  Kaiser  and  the  Mikado,  the 
better  I  am  content  with  democracy,  even  if  we  have  to 
include  the  American  newspaper  as  one  of  its  assets  — 
liability  would  be  a  better  term.  Russia  is  so  corrupt, 
so  treacherous  and  shifty,  and  so  incompetent,  that  I 
am  utterly  unable  to  say  whether  or  not  it  will  make 
peace  or  break  off  the  negotiations  at  any  moment.  Ja 
pan  is,  of  course,  entirely  selfish,  though  with  a  veneer 
of  courtesy  and  with  infinitely  more  knowledge  of  what 
it  wants  and  capacity  to  get  it."  He  wrote  in  a  letter 
later  to  Senator  Lodge  soon  after  the  negotiations  had 
begun:  "The  Russians  are  utterly  insincere  and  treach 
erous  ;  they  have  no  conception  of  truth,  no  willingness 
to  look  facts  in  the  face,  no  regard  for  others  of  any  sort 


Bishop,  i.  378,  379.  2  Ibid.,  351,  352. 


CH.  XIII.]  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   WAR  305 

or  kind,  no  knowledge  of  their  own  strength  or  weakness ; 
and  they  are  helplessly  unable  to  meet  emergencies."  l 

As  related  by  Bishop  the  tactfulness  and  patience  of 
Roosevelt  were  unsurpassed.  With  the  main  point  set 
tled  many  questions  of  detail  arose.  There  was  natur 
ally  a  conflict  as  to  the  place  where  the  plenipotentiaries 
should  meet,  and  after  much  debate  Washington  was 
fixed  upon ;  then,  after  that  was  decided,  Russia  desired 
to  change  the  place  of  meeting  to  The  Hague.  She  now 
ran  up  against  a  stone  wall.  Roosevelt,  disgusted  with 
so  much  shilly-shallying,  sent  this  word  to  George  von 
L.  Meyer,  our  ambassador  in  Russia,  with  instructions 
to  impart  it  to  the  Foreign  Minister  and  if  necessary  to 
the  Czar  himself.  "I  notified  Japan  that  Washington 
would  be  the  appointed  place  and  so  informed"  the  Rus 
sian  ambassador.  "I  then  gave  the  same  announcement 
to  the  public.  It  is,  of  course,  out  of  the  question  for  me 
to  consider  any  reversal  of  this  action  and  I  regard  the 
incident  as  closed,  so  far  as  the  place  of  meeting  is  con 
cerned."  2  " Meyer,"  wrote  Roosevelt,  "who  was,  with 
the  exception  of  Henry  White,  the  most  useful  diplomat 
in  the  American  service,  rendered  literally  invaluable 
aid  by  insisting  on  his  seeing  the  Czar  at  critical  periods 
of  the  transaction  when  it  was  no  longer  possible  for  me 
to  act  successfully  through  the  representatives  of  the 
Czar,  who  were  often  at  cross  purposes  with  one  another." 3 
Roosevelt  said  in  a  private  letter  to  Senator  Nelson  of 
Minnesota,  "I  have  led  the  horses  to  water,  but  Heaven 


1  Bishop,  i.  394,  395. 

2  Bishop,  i.  391. 

3  Autobiography,  587;    Life  of  Meyer,  M.  A.  de  Wolfe  Howe,  196  et 
seq. 


306  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1905 

only  knows  whether  they  will  drink  or  start  kicking  one 
another  beside  the  trough.'7  l 

As  the  conference  was  to  function  during  the  summer,  it 
was  recognized  that  Washington  would  be  too  hot,  there 
fore  the  place  of  meeting  was  changed  to  the  Portsmouth 
Navy  Yard  2  near  Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire.  The 
plenipotentiaries  were  all  men  of  distinguished  capacity. 
Russia  was  represented  by  Witte,  Secretary  of  State, 
and  Baron  Rosen,  Russian  ambassador  to  the  United 
States;  Japan  by  Baron  Komura,  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  and  Takahira,  Japanese  minister  in  Washington. 
The  reception  of  the  envoys  by  Roosevelt  showed  him  a 
thorough  man  of  the  world  accustomed  to  do  the  proper 
thing  at  the  proper  time.  They  went  separately  on  two  war 
vessels  from  New  York  to  Oyster  Bay,  the  summer  resi 
dence  of  the  President,  and  were  there  received  by  him 
on  board  the  United  States  steamer  Mayflower.  Noth 
ing  occurred  to  mar  the  meeting  of  the  two  hostile  envoys. 
The  President  had  a  luncheon  prepared  but,  as  they  all 
moved  together  into  the  saloon  and  as  it  was  taken  stand 
ing,  no  question  of  preference  could  be  raised.  At  its 
end  the  President  proposed  this  toast:  UI  drink  to  the 
welfare  and  prosperity  of  the  sovereigns  and  peoples  of 
the  two  great  nations  whose  representatives  have  met 
one  another  on  this  ship.  It  is  my  most  earnest  hope 
and  prayer,  in  the  interest  of  not  only  these  two  great 
powers  but  of  all  mankind,  that  a  just  and  lasting  peace 
may  speedily  be  concluded  between  them."  3  The  en- 


1  Bishop,  i.  398. 

*  The  Portsmouth  Navy  Yard  was  really  in  Kittery,  Maine. 

s  Bishop,  i.  405. 


CH.  XIII.]  THE    RUSSO-JAPANESE    PEACE  307 

voys  then  went  to  Portsmouth  and  set  about  their  im 
portant  work. 

The  President  needed  all  of  his  tact  and  influence  to 
prevent  the  Conference  from  breaking  up.  By  despatches 
to  Japan  and  to  Russia  he  was,  as  Bishop  wrote,  its  "  guid 
ing  and  controlling  force/'  Late  in  August  the  crisis 
occurred  and  it  arose  from  the  Japanese  demand  for  an 
indemnity  and  the  cession  of  the  island  of  Saghalien. 
The  President  suggested,  sending  the  suggestion  at  the 
same  time  to  the  Kaiser  and  the  Mikado,  that  Russia 
should  pay  no  indemnity  whatever  and  should  receive 
back  the  north  half  of  Saghalien  "for  which  it  is  to  pay 
to  Japan  whatever  amount  a  mixed  commission  may 
determine."  This  suggestion  brought  about  the  terms 
of  peace.  Japan  with  paramount  wisdom  accepted  the 
suggestion.  "The  Emperor,"  so  came  the  word  to  Roose 
velt,  "after  presiding  at  a  Cabinet  Council,  decided  to 
withdraw  the  demand  of  money  payment  for  the  cost 
of  war  entirely,  if  Russia  recognize  the  occupation  of 
Saghalien  Island  by  Japan,  because  the  Emperor  regards 
humanity  and  civilization  far  more  than  his  nation's 
welfare."  x  "An  agreement  was  reached  on  August  29, 
1905,  on  the  terms  laid  down  by  the  President  and  on 
September  5,  1905,  a  treaty  of  peace  embodying  them 
was  signed."  2 

The  President  received  praise  from  all  sides.  Baron 
Kaneko  wrote  to  him:  "Your  advice  to  us  was  very 
powerful  and  convincing  by  which  the  peace  of  Asia  was 
secured.  Both  Russia  and  Japan  owe  to  you  this  happy 
conclusion."  The  Kaiser,  the  King  of  England,  the 


Bishop,  i.  412  et  ante.  2  Ibid.,  412. 


SOS  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1905 

Czar  and  the  Mikado  expressed  their  approval  grace 
fully.1  On  September  6  the  President  wrote  to  the  Mi 
kado  a  letter  in  which,  in  giving  him  high  praise,  he  re 
flected  also  his  own  ideas.  "I  express,"  he  wrote,  "as 
strongly  as  I  can,  my  sense  of  the  magnanimity,  and  above 
all  of  the  cool-headed,  far-sighted  wisdom,  you  have 
shown  in  making  peace  as  you  did.  .  .  .  During  the  last 
eighteen  months  your  generals  and  admirals,  your  sol 
diers  and  sailors,  have  won  imperishable  renown  for  Nip 
pon.  ,  .  .  You  have  crowned  triumphant  war  by  a  peace 
in  which  every  great  object  for  which  you  fought  is  se 
cured,  and  in  so  doing  you  have  given  to  the  world  a  sig 
nal  and  most  striking  example  of  how  it  is  possible  for  a 
victorious  nation  to  achieve  victory  over  others  without 
losing  command  over  itself.  ...  A  continuance  of  the 
war,  no  matter  how  damaging  to  Japan's  opponent,  would 
also  have  been  necessarily  of  damage  to  Japan  far  beyond 
what  could  have  been  offset'  by  any  resulting  benefit. 
The  greatness  of  a  people,  like  the  greatness  of  a  man, 
is  often  attended  quite  as  clearly  by  moderation  and  wis 
dom  in  using  a  triumph  as  by  the  triumph  itself."  2 

Roosevelt  was  modest  in  regard  to  his  part  in  the  trans 
action.  He  wrote  to  his  daughter :  "I  am  credited  with 
being  extremely  long-headed.  As  a  matter  of  fact  I 
took  the  position  I  finally  did  not  of  my  own  volition 
but  because  events  so  shaped  themselves  that  I  would 
have  felt  as  if  I  were  flinching  from  a  plain  duty  if  I  had 
acted  otherwise."  Thus  he  wrote  to  Whitelaw  Reid, 
our  Ambassador  in  London,  "The  Kaiser  stood  by 
me  like  a  trump"  ;  but  I  got  only  "indirect  assistance" 
from  the  English  Government.3 

1  Bishop,  i.  412  et  ante.  2  Bishop,  i.  415.  3  Bishop,   i.   415. 


CH.  XIII.]  THE   JAPANESE  309 

Roosevelt's  ideas  of  nations  and  of  men  are  always 
valuable.  He  wrote  to  Sir  George  O.  Trevelyan  on  Sep 
tember  12 :  "I  am  bound  to  say  that  the  Japs  have  im 
pressed  me  most  favorably,  not  only  during  these  three 
months  but  during  the  four  years  I  have  been  President. 
They  have  always  told  me  the  truth.  ...  I  cannot  say 
that  I  liked  Witte,  for  I  thought  his  bragging  and  bluster 
not  only  foolish  but  shockingly  vulgar  when  compared 
with  the  gentlemanly  self-respecting  self-restraint  of  the 
Japanese."  1  Witte  was  much  impressed  with  the  great 
prosperity,  wealth  and  industries  of  this  country;  the 
" barbaric  strength"  was  what  appealed  to  him.  Why 
all  this  talk  about  corruption?  he  inquired.  I  ask  what 
is  this  corruption  and  they  tell  me  that  Murphy,  the  boss 
of  New  York,  helps  great  financiers  and  then  accepts 
presents  from  them.  Why  shouldn't  he?  he  asked. 
Witte,  in  Roosevelt's  opinion,  was  thoroughly  selfish ; 
everything  for  himself,  the  country  second ;  while  the 
Japanese  were  patriotic,  so  much  so  that  they  desired  to 
withdraw  that  part  of  the  correspondence  in  which  they 
had  made  overtures  for  peace.  This  request  Roosevelt 
denied  and  then  they  were  surprised  that  he  was  going 
to  make  no  mention  of  the  matter  in  his  message.2 

Witte  said  of  Roosevelt:  "When  one  speaks  with 
President  Roosevelt  he  charms  through  the  elevation 
of  his  thoughts.  ...  He  has  an  ideal  and  strives  for 
higher  aims  than  a  commonplace  existence  presents." 
Rosen  wrote  that  Roosevelt  "had  the  moral  courage  to 
undertake  the  delicate  and  risky  task  of  mediation"; 


1  Bishop,    418. 

2  In  this  account,  I  have  been  assisted  by  my  conversation  with  the 
President  on  Nov.  16,  1905. 


310  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1905 

he  brought  about  "the  Portsmouth  Conference  and  the 
subsequent  termination  of  the  war  by  a  peace  of  justice 
and  conciliation."  Martens,  who  was  an  adviser  of  the 
Russians,  wrote,  "The  man  who  had  been  represented 
to  us  as  impetuous  to  the  point  of  rudeness  displayed  a 
gentleness,  a  kindness  and  a  tactfulness  mixed  with 
self-control  that  only  a  truly  great  man  can  com 
mand."  * 

For  his  services  Roosevelt  was  awarded  the  Nobel 
Peace  Prize  amounting  to  $36,734.79.2 

The  negotiations  were  conducted  entirely  by  the  Pres 
ident.  He  did  not  have  the  aid  of  his  official  Secretary 
of  State,  John  Hay,  who  was  in  Nauheim,  Germany,  seek 
ing  a  restoration  of  his  health  that  never  came,  as  on 
July  1,  1905,  he  passed  away.  Roosevelt  paid  a  sincere 
tribute  to  the  memory  of  his  friend  and  showed  an  attach 
ment  to  the  refined  gentleman  from  the  West.3  He  had, 
so  Roosevelt  wrote  to  Senator  Lodge,  a  "great  career 
in  political  life"  and  has  "also  left  a  deep  mark  in  litera 
ture";  to  Senator  Beveridge,  "Hay  was  a  really  great 
man."  Hay  wrote  in  his  diary  seventeen  days  before 
he  died :  "I  say  to  myself  that  I  should  not  rebel  at  the 
thought  of  my  life  ending  at  this  time.  ...  I  have  had 
many  blessings,  domestic  happiness  being  the  greatest  of 


1  Bishop,  i.  419  et  seq.;see  also  Impressions  of  Theodore   Roosevelt, 
Abbott,  131. 

2  For  the  disposition  of  the  money  see  Bishop,  i.  422 ;  also  Albert  Shaw, 
Review  of  Reviews,  151,  152.     The  Brooklyn  Times  says  under  the  car 
toon,  "'Teddy  the  Good'  in  a  new  role.     It  is  a  very  laudable  purpose 
but  would  anybody  but  Theodore  Roosevelt  ever  think  of  dedicating  a 
Christmas  windfall  of  $40,000  for  such  a  purpose?  "     [The  cause  of  indus 
trial  peace.] 

3  It  used  to  be  said  that  Hay  was  a  Western  man  with  Eastern  culture, 
Roosevelt  an  Eastern  man  with  Western  principles. 


CH.  XIII.]  HAY -ROOT  311 

all.  ...  I  have  had  success  beyond  all  the  dreams  of  my 
boyhood.  My  name  is  printed  in  the  journals  of  the  world 
without  descriptive  qualification,  which  may,  I  suppose, 
be  called  fame.  By  mere  length  of  service  I  shall  occupy 
a  modest  place  in  the  history  of  my  time.  ...  I  know 
death  is  the  common  lot  and  what  is  universal  ought 
not  to  be  deemed  a  misfortune ;  and  yet  —  instead  of 
confronting  it  with  dignity  and  philosophy,  I  cling  in 
stinctively  to  life  and  the  things  of  life  as  eagerly  as  if 
I  had  not  had  my  chance  at  happiness  and  gained  nearly 
all  the  great  prizes."  1 

Roosevelt  appointed  to  the  vacant  position,  Elihu 
Root.  "I  wished  Root,"  he  wrote  to  Senator  Beveridge, 
"  as  Secretary  of  State  partly  because  I  am  extremely  fond 
of  him  and  prize  his  companionship  as  well  as  his  advice, 
but  primarily  because  I  think  that  in  all  the  country  he 
is  the  best  man  for  the  position,  and  that  no  minister  of 
foreign  affairs  in  any  other  country  at  this  moment  in 
any  way  compares  with  him."  To  Senator  Lodge  he 
wrote,  "I  hesitated  a  little  between  Root  and  Taft,  for 
Taft,  as  you  know,  is  very  close  to  me."  2 

These  expressions  exhibit  Roosevelt  as  a  rare  judge 
of  men  and  how  deeply  he  prized  the  counsel  of  his  official 
advisers.  With  Root  and  Taft  to  be  called  on  for  ad 
vice,  he  felt  that  he  could  not  go  far  wrong;  they  were 
both  good  lawyers  and  men  of  affairs. 

An  opinion  prevails  among  diplomatists  that  President 
Roosevelt  averted  a  war  between  France  and  Germany 
in  1905.  The  story  is  told  in  a  modest  letter  of  the  Pres- 


1  Life  of  Hay,  Thayer,  ii.  408. 
'Bishop,  i.  369  et  seq. 


312  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1905 

ident  to  Whitelaw  Reid  dated  April  28,  1906,  and  first 
printed  by  Bishop  in  1920.  Included  in  this  is  Roose 
velt's  attitude  at  the  outset,  which  may  be  seen  in  a  letter 
to  W.  H.  Taft  of  April  20,  1905,  who,  while  Roosevelt  was 
on  a  bear  hunt  and  Hay  seeking  recuperation  in  Europe, 
was  acting  Secretary  of  State,  touching  which  Roosevelt 
wrote  to  him,  "Dear  Will:  I  think  you  are  keeping  the 
lid  on  in  great  shape !"  Roosevelt  further  said:  "The 
Kaiser's  pipe  dream  this  week  takes  the  form  of  Mo 
rocco.  Speck  [Baron  Speck  von  Sternburg,  German 
Ambassador  to  the  United  States]  has  written  me  an 
urgent  appeal  to  sound  the  British  Government  and  find 
out  whether  they  intend  to  back  up  France  in  gobbling 
Morocco.  ...  I  do  not  feel  that  as  a  Government  we 
should  interfere  in  the  Morocco  matter.  We  have  other 
fish  to  fry  and  we  have  no  real  interest  in  Morocco.  I 
do  not  care  to  take  sides  between  France  and  Germany 
in  the  matter.  At  the  same  time  ...  I  am  sincerely 
anxious  to  bring  about  a  better  state  of  feeling  between 
England  and  Germany.  Each  nation  is  working  itself 
up  to  a  condition  of  desperate  hatred  of  the  other ;  each 
from  sheer  fear  of  the  other.  The  Kaiser  is  dead  sure 
that  England  intends  to  attack  him.  The  English  Govern 
ment  and  a  large  share  of  the  English  people  are  equally 
sure  that  Germany  intends  to  attack  England."  On  the 
same  day  he  wrote  to  Sternburg,  "Our  interests  in  Morocco 
are  not  sufficiently  great  to  make  me  feel  justified  in  en 
tangling  our  Government  in  the  matter."  It  would 
(I  think)  have  been  better  for  Roosevelt  to  adhere  to  his 
first  position  and  absolutely  to  refuse  to  interfere  in  a  Eu 
ropean  dispute.  "The  Christian  nations  in  Africa, "  wrote 
Herbert  Spencer  in  1905,  are  "like  hungry  dogs  around 


CH.  XIII.]  MOROCCO  313 

a  carcass ;  they  tear  out  piece  after  piece,  pausing  only 
to  snarl  and  snap  at  one  another." 

As  long  as  a  different  view  obtained,  however,  Roose 
velt's  action  was  wise  and  just.  When  he  returned  to 
Washington  at  the  end  of  May,  1905,  he  found  Jusserand 2 
and  Sternberg  "  greatly  concerned  lest  there  should  be 
a  war  between  France  and  Germany."  Therefore  Roose 
velt  determined  to  do  his  best  to  avert  so  great  a  trouble. 
"It  really  did  look,"  he  wrote,  "as  if  there  might  be  a 
war  and  I  felt  in  honor  bound  to  try  to  prevent  the  war 
if  I  could,  in  the  first  place,  because  I  should  have  felt 
such  a  war  to  be  a  real  calamity  to  civilization  ;  and  in  the 
next  place,  as  I  was  already  trying  to  bring  about  peace 
between  Russia  and  Japan,  I  felt  that  a  new  conflict  might 
result  in  what  would  literally  be  a  world  conflagration; 
and  finally,  for  the  sake  of  France." 

To  settle  the  Morocco  difficulty,  the  Kaiser  desired  a 
Conference.  He  thought  France's  policy  aggressive ; 
that  France  and  Spain  were  a  "political  unity"  who 
wished  to  divide  up  Morocco  between  themselves ;  and 
he  feared  England's  support  of  France.  Therefore,  he 
deemed  war  with  France  a  possibility.  France  finally 
gave  way  and  accepted  "the  idea  of  a  Conference  in  spite 
of  serious  reasons,"  as  her  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
wrote,  "we  had  to  entertain  objections  to  such  a  project." 

1  Fortnightly,  June,  1895.     "Apart  from  the  satisfaction  of  a  somewhat 
childish  pride,  what  does  it  matter  to  either  France  or  Germany  which  of 
them   owns    Morocco.  ...     In   order   that   the   French   might   acquire 
Morocco,  England  and  France  in  1905  and  again  in  1911,  were  brought  to 
the  verge  of  war  with  Germany.  .  .  .     Viewed  as  a  means  of  obtaining 
any  tangible  gain,  a  diplomatic  contest,  such  as  that  waged  over  Morocco, 
is  a  childish   absurdity."     Bertrand   Russell,    Atlantic   Monthly,    March, 
1915,  371. 

2  Jusserand  had  been  French  Ambassador  to  the  United  States  since 
1902. 


314  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1906 

Meanwhile  in  Washington  Roosevelt's  efforts  were 
entirely  directed  to  the  maintenance  of  peace.  He  had 
the  confidence  of  both  nations  whose  ambassadors  to 
the  United  States  were  wise  and  peace-loving  men. 
" Jusserand,"  wrote  Roosevelt,  "is  a  man  of  such  ex 
cellent  judgment,  so  sound  and  cool-headed,  and  of  so 
high  a  standard  of  personal  and  professional  honor  that 
I  could  trust  him  completely.  Indeed  it  was  only  be 
cause  both  Jusserand  and  Sternberg  were  such  excellent 
men  that  I  was  enabled  to  do  anything  at  all  in  so  diffi 
cult  and  delicate  a  matter." 

The  Conference  was  held  at  Algeciras,  Spain,  and  began 
on  January  16,  1906.  After  it  opened,  the  Kaiser  by 
rattling  his  sword  in  the  scabbard  desired  to  sway  its  con 
clusions.  Nevertheless,  they  were  on  the  whole  against 
Germany  although  she  accomplished  all  that  she  pro 
fessed  to  want.  The  Kaiser  was  a  sincere  admirer  of 
Roosevelt,  who  wrought  earnestly  for  peace  and  who 
had  as  one  of  his  representatives  at  Algeciras  Henry 
White,  then  our  Ambassador  to  Italy.  White  saw  eye 
to  eye  with  the  President  and  operated  at  Algeciras  as 
the  other  did  in  Washington  with  the  view  of  preserving 
the  peace.  "Loyal  though  Sternberg  was  to  his  Govern 
ment,"  Roosevelt  wrote  soon  after  the  Conference  opened, 
"both  Root  and  I  became  convinced  that  down  in  his 
heart  the  honest,  brave  little  gentleman  did  not  really 
believe  Germany  was  acting  as  she  should  act."  Finally, 
however,  a  Treaty  was  accepted  by  the  Kaiser  and  on 
April  6  was  signed  by  all  the  powers  represented.1 


1  The  authority  for  this  account  and  the  citations  made  are  from 
Roosevelt's  letter  to  Whitelaw  Reid  printed  by  Bishop,  i.  467  et  seq.  See 
also  La  Conference  d' Algeciras,  Andre"  Tardieu.  "No  one  can  peruse 


CH.  XIII.]  ROOSEVELT -THE  KAISER  315 

It  will  be  germane  to  make  a  contrast  between  Theo 
dore  Roosevelt  and  the  German  Emperor  who  were  not 
infrequently  compared.  At  this  time  Roosevelt  was  an 
admirer  of  the  Kaiser,  writing  to  Sternberg  on  June  25, 
1905,  "I  feel  that  His  Majesty  stands  as  the  leader  among 
the  sovereigns  of  to-day  who  have  their  faces  set  towards 
the  future,  and  that  it  is  not  only  of  the  utmost  impor 
tance  for  his  own  people  but  of  the  utmost  importance 
for  all  mankind  that  his  power  and  leadership  for  good 
should  be  unimpaired."  l  Lapse  of  time  and  a  personal 
acquaintance  during  1910  modified  this  view.  The  only 
man  of  real  ability  I  saw,  speaking  of  his  trip  through 
Europe,  he  said,  among  the  crowned  heads  was  the 
German  Emperor  and  he  is  superficial  in  his  intelligence 
but  has  real  executive  ability.  He  was  eager  to  get  my 
opinion  of  himself  and  at  last  I  said,  If  you  were  an  Amer 
ican  and  lived  in  America  you  would  carry  your  own 
ward,  which  is  more  than  I  can  say  for  any  other  of  the 
crowned  heads.  The  Kaiser  understood  perfectly  the 
remark  and  knew  that  it  was  a  compliment.  And  he 
treated  all  the  other  kings  with  disdain  except  the  King 
of  England.  A  year  later  Roosevelt  expressed  himself 
as  not  being  friendly  to  Germany.  I  seem,  he  said,  to 
feel  less  near  to  them  than  to  any  of  the  peoples  I  met 
while  abroad.  They  are  not  capable  of  a  broad  humani 
tarian  impulse  like  the  English,  Americans  and  French. 


this  correspondence  without  a  wish  that  there  were  in  the  world  more 
diplomatists  of  the  Roosevelt  type.  Everything  he  wrote  was  clear  and 
concise  with  none  of  the  tedious  formalisms  and  conventional  phrases  of 
the  old  fashioned  diplomacy;  and  though  it  went  straight  to  the  point 
it  was  tactful  and  calculated  to  influence  those  for  whom  it  was  meant 
and  whose  idiosyncrasies  he  had  considered  and  allowed  for."  James 
Bryce,  Lit.  Rev.,  Feb.  19,  1921. 
1  Bishop,  i.  485. 


316  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1910 

The  German  Emperor  is  a  capable  administrator  of 
superficial  knowledge,  and  a  great  bluffer;  he  is  proud 
of  the  things  in  which  he  has  a  superficial  knowledge  and 
not  very  proud  of  the  matters  in  which  he  excels.1 

On  Roosevelt's  arrival  in  Berlin  during  May,  1910,  he 
took  luncheon  with  the  Kaiser  at  Potsdam,  who  invited 
him  next  day  to  see  some  remarkable  field  manoeuvres, 
of  which  Henry  White  gave  to  Abbott  an  account.  The 
Emperor  was  dressed  in  the  uniform  of  a  general  of  the 
army  while  Roosevelt  was  in  a  simple  riding  suit  of  khaki 
and  wore  a  black  slouch  hat.  During  the  review  the 
Emperor  surrounded  by  his  body-guard  of  officers  in  bril 
liant  uniforms  said  in  German,  "  Roosevelt,  mein  freund, 
I  wish  to  welcome  you  in  the  presence  of  my  guards ;  I 
ask  you  to  remember  that  you  are  the  only  private  citizen 
who  has  reviewed  the  troops  of  Germany."  2 

Punch,  in  a  well  known  cartoon  in  1904,  pictured  the 
two  as  talking  to  one  another  with  defiant  mien  and  la 
belled  it  "  Kindred  spirits  of  the  strenuous  life."  The 
page  containing  this  was  confiscated  by  the  Berlin  police, 
whereupon  the  same  artist  drew  one  respectable  Berlin 
citizen  and  three  soldiers  looking  at  a  representation 
of  the  same  cartoon  with  amused  expressions  of  laughter 
as  they  seemed  to  be  asking,  What  are  the  Berlin  police 
afraid  of  ?  3 

The  Kaiser  resembled  Roosevelt  in  being  a  wonderful 
talker.  Reverend  Francis  G.  Peabody  kindly  has  given 
me  this  exact  account  of  what  took  place :  "  At  the  Cen 
tenary  of  the  University  of  Berlin,  the  German  Em- 


1  Conversations  with  Mr.  Roosevelt  in  Dec.  1910  and  Dec.  1911. 
a  Impressions  of  Roosevelt,  Abbott,  248. 
3  Autobiography,  558,  562. 


CH.  XIII. J  ROOSEVELT  — THE  KAISER  317 

peror  gave  a  state  dinner  to  many  delegates  and  after  the 
dinner  received  them  in  a  '  Cercle , '  passing  from  one 
to  another  with  a  hospitable  word.  President  Hadley 
and  I  stood  together  as  the  Emperor  approached  and, 
after  a  few  formal  words,  Dr.  Hadley  delivered  a  message 
of  greeting  which  President  Roosevelt  had  asked  him 
to  convey.  Thereupon  I  added,  in  a  lighter  vein,  that 
the  question  had  been  raised  in  America,  in  the  light  of 
President  Roosevelt's  extraordinary  conversational  gift, 
whether  in  the  Emperor's  interview  with  him  there  had 
been  much  opportunity  for  His  Majesty  to  speak.  The 
Emperor  laughed  heartily  and  replied,  Til  tell  you. 
Some  of  my  people  looked  over  toward  the  corner  where 
we  were  talking  and  said  it  was  like  two  windmills  going 
around  like  this/  emphasizing  his  remark  with  a  violent 
waving  of  his  arm.  The  inference  was  that  the  conver 
sational  competition  was  practically  a  draw." 

The  Emperor  gave  Roosevelt  a  photograph  of  the  two 
on  horseback  talking  one  to  the  other  with  this  inscrip 
tion  on  the  back,  "The  Colonel  of  the  Rough  Riders 
lecturing  the  chief  of  the  German  Army."  1 

Many  Americans  who  visited  Berlin,  struck  with  the 
Emperor's  "very  marked  attractiveness  of  personality 
and  manner,"  2  scouted  before  the  Great  War  the  sug 
gestion  that  Roosevelt  was  his  equal  in  ability.  An  emi 
nent  diplomatist,  who  was  well  acquainted  personally 
with  both,  bore  contrary  witness ;  he  had  not  the  least 
doubt  that  Roosevelt  was  a  match  for  the  other  in  in 
tellectual  power.  Opinion  in  France  at  this  time  was 
that  the  two  attracted  more  attention  in  Europe  than 


1  Bishop,   ii.   252. 

2  Impressions  of  Roosevelt,  Abbott,  248. 


318  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1905 

any  other  men,  but  Roosevelt  was  trusted  and  the  Kaiser 
was  not.  It  is  impossible  to  conceive  of  Roosevelt  mak 
ing  such  a  shipwreck  of  his  life  and  career  as  did  the  Ger 
man  Emperor  when  he  precipitated  or  allowed  to  be 
precipitated  the  Great  War.  The  Kaiser  respected  and 
partly  feared  Roosevelt,  feeling  that  he  had  a  great  coun 
try  at  his  back.  It  is  the  opinion  of  some  very  well  in 
formed  persons  that  had  Roosevelt  been  President  the 
Great  War  would  not  have  occurred  during  his  occupancy 
of  the  White  House. 

Regarding  San  Domingo,  Roosevelt  acted  simply  as 
a  policeman.  The  story  was  the  usual  one  of  the  bor 
rower  getting  more  money  than  he  could  pay  and  of  for 
eign  powers  threatening  to  interfere  for  the  payment  of 
debts.  Naturally  Roosevelt's  action  convinced  his  op 
ponents  that  he  proposed  following  the  example  of  Grant 
thirty-five  years  previous,  and  that  the  result  would  be 
the  annexation  of  San  Domingo.  In  regard  to  annexa 
tion,  he  was  entirely  sincere  when  he  wrote  to  Bishop, 
11  As  for  annexing  the  island,  I  have  about  the  same  de 
sire  to  annex  it  as  a  gorged  boa  constrictor  might  have 
to  swallow  a  porcupine  wrong-end-to."  1 

At  the  request  of  the  San  Domingo  government,  the 
President  took  charge  of  their  custom-houses;  he  was 
to  turn  over  to  them  forty-five  per  cent  of  the  receipts 
and  distribute  the  rest  to  foreign  powers  that  had  claims ; 
he  made  a  Treaty  embodying  these  provisions  and  on 
February  15,  1905,  submitted  it  to  the  Senate.  The 
Senate  did  not  immediately  ratify  the  Treaty  but  the 
President  administered  San  Domingo  affairs  by  virtue 


Bishop,  i.  431. 


CH.  XIII.]  SAN  DOMINGO  319 

of  it  on  the  principle  that  the  President  might  do,  not 
only  what  the  Constitution  authorized  but  what  it  did 
not  distinctly  forbid.  Finally,  during  the  spring  of  1907, 
the  Senate  ratified  the  Treaty.  In  a  speech  to  the  Har 
vard  Union  Roosevelt  gave  a  true  tale  of  the  affair  :  "The 
arrangement  has  gone  on  for  two  years  now,  while  the 
coordinate  branch  of  the  Government  discussed  whether 
or  not  I  had  usurped  power  in  the  matter,  and  finally 
concluded  I  had  not  and  ratified  the  Treaty.  Of  the 
fifty-five  per  cent  we  have  been  able  to  put  two  and  a 
half  millions  towards  paying  their  debts ;  and  with  the 
forty-five  per  cent  that  we  collected  for  them,  they  have 
received  more  money  than  they  ever  got  when  they  col 
lected  one  hundred  per  cent  themselves ;  and  the  island 
has  prospered  as  never  before."  l 

In  diplomatic  action,  Roosevelt  had  an  opportunity 
to  show  the  true  magnanimity  of  his  soul.  As  a  result 
of  the  Boxer  rebellion  of  1900,  China  had  agreed  to  pay 
to  the  United  States  nearly  24  and  a  half  million  dollars 
as  an  indemnity  for  this  action  endangering  American 
lives  and  property.  It  occurred  to  Dr.  Arthur  H.  Smith, 
an  American  missionary  residing  in  China,  that  the 
United  States  might  remit  a  portion  of  her  claim  with 
the  understanding  that  China  should  use  the  money, 
or  the  income  from  it,  for  the  purpose  of  educating  young 
Chinese  in  American  institutions  of  learning,  thereby 
fostering  a  spirit  which  should  bear  good  fruit.  Smith 
came  to  see  Lyman  Abbott,  who  was  an  intimate  friend 
of  the  President,  and  who  asked  him  to  set  a  day  for  an 
interview.  On  the  day  appointed,  early  in  March,  1906, 


1  Bishop,   i,   435 ;    Autobiography,  548 ;    President's  Messages  to  the 
Senate,  Feb.  4,  1905.     March  6,  Review  of  Reviews  Co.,  ed.,  iii.  241,  273. 


320  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1907 

Lyman  Abbott  was  unable  to  keep  the  appointment, 
therefore  at  Roosevelt's  suggestion,  Lawrence  F.,  his 
son,  went  in  his  place  with  Dr.  Smith  to  plead  for  the  re 
mission  of  a  part  of  the  indemnity.  Their  visit  was  at 
tended  with  success.  This  story  is  interestingly  told  by 
Lawrence  F.  Abbott  who  refers  for  its  sequel  to  the  official 
document. 

By  June  1,  1907,  a  little  over  six  millions  had  been  paid 
and  on  June  15  the  Secretary  of  State,  Elihu  Root,  wrote 
to  the  Chinese  Minister  that  he  was  "  authorized  by  the 
President  to  say  that  ...  at  the  next  session  of  the  Con 
gress  he  will  ask  for  authority  to  re-form  the  agreement 
with  China  under  which  the  indemnity  is  fixed  by  re 
mitting  and  cancelling  the  obligation  of  China  for  the 
payment  of  all  that  part  of  the  stipulated  indemnity, 
which  is  in  excess  of  the  sum  of  $11,655,492.69  and  in 
terest  at  the  stipulated  rate."  1  This  the  President  did 
in  his  Message  of  December,"  1907,  and  on  May  25  follow 
ing,  Congress  adopted  a  joint  resolution  providing  "for 
the  remission  of  a  portion  of  the  Chinese  indemnity." 
While  there  is  no  specification  in  the  joint  resolution, 
it  was  a  tacit  agreement  that  the  proceeds  of  the  sum 
remitted  were  to  be  used  in  the  education  of  Chinese  in 
America.  As  one  goes  over  diplomatic  correspondence, 
in  which  so  much  of  it  seems  a  game  of  grab,  it  is  agree 
able  to  read  the  despatch  of  Prince  Ch'ing  to  our  Min- 


1  This  is  the  amount  as  stated  in  Root's  letter  but  as  given  in  the  joint 
resolution  and  in  the  President's  executive  order  of  Dec.  28,  1908,  it  is 
$13,655,492.69  and  interest.  The  difference  is  explained  in  the  resolution 
thus:  "the  sum  of  two  million  dollars  be  reserved  from  the  Chinese  in 
demnity  ...  for  the  payment"  of  American  claims  upon  the  Chinese 
indemnity  which,  having  been  rejected  by  the  U.  S.  commissioners  may 
be  submitted  de  novo  to  the  court  of  claims  and  approved  by  it,  the  bal 
ance  out  of  the  $2,000,000  to  be  returned  to  China. 


CH.  XIII.  ]  CHINA  321 

ister  in  Peking.  "I  was  profoundly  impressed,"  he  wrote, 
"with  the  justice  and  great  friendliness  of  the  American 
Government,  and  wish  to  express  our  sincere  thanks." 
At  such  small  cost  was  the  friendship  of  a  great  Asiatic 
country  purchased.1 


1  Impressions  of  Roosevelt,  Lawrence  F.  Abbott,  143  et  seq. ;    Doc. 
1275,  House  of  Reps.,  60th  Cong.  2d  Sess. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

"AMEKICA  had  reached  the  point,"  so  wrote  ex-Senator 
Albert  J.  Beveridge,  "  where  a  transition  from  an  outworn 
to  a  modern  economic  and  social  order  was  indispensa 
ble.  .  .  .  For  a  long  time  there  was  no  labor  congestion 
—  first,  because  there  was  so  much  work  to  be  done  and 
secondly,  because  free  land  constantly  drew  people  away 
from  industrial  centers.  .  .  .  Finally  this  outlet  was 
closed.  Free  land  was  all  gone/'  Labor  troubles  came. 
There  was  a  "  general  unrest  among  the  masses  of  the 
people."  Then  Theodore  Roosevelt  became  President, 
tackled  the  question  and,  according  to  Beveridge,  con 
stituted  "The  Roosevelt  Period."  l 

Roosevelt  appreciated  fully  the  task.  "At  this  mo 
ment,"  he  said,  "we  are  passing  through  a  period  of  great 
unrest  —  social,  political  and  industrial  unrest."  2  The 
railroads  were  the  largest  aggregate  of  capital  represent 
ing  fourteen  and  a  half  billions  of  dollars,  and  were  the 
most  salient  object  of  attack  by  the  reformer.  For  on 
the  old  theory,  they  were  built  on  the  King's  highway 
and  were  subject  to  the  State.  But  admitting  this,  with 
a  power  of  generalization  the  envy  of  all,  Senator  Lodge 
said,  "It is  the  railroads  which  have  made  the  rapid  yet 
solid  development  of  the  United  States  possible  "  ;  they  are 
a  great  "proof  of  the  energy  and  intelligence  of  the  Amer- 


1  Sat.  Eve.  Post,  Apr.  5,  1919,  10. 
8  Apr.  14,  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  718. 
322 


CH.  XIV.]  RAILROAD  RATE  LEGISLATION  323 

lean  people."  l  The  railroad  rate  legislation  of  1905 
and  1906  was  "  stimulated  by  the  aggressiveness  of  the 
Executive,"  2  and  it  is  a  proper  classification  to  call  it 
Roosevelt's  work,  although  by  the  progress  of  events  he 
was  led  to  a  more  radical  stand  than  he  at  first  proposed. 
On  December  6,  1904,  in  his  Annual  Message  to  Congress 
he  said,  "  While  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  at  present  it 
would  be  undesirable,  if  it  were  not  impracticable,  finally 
to  clothe  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  with 
general  authority  to  fix  railroad  rates,  I  do  believe  that, 
as  a  fair  security  to  shippers,  the  Commission  should  be 
vested  with  the  power,  where  a  given  rate  has  been  chal 
lenged  and  after  full  hearing  found  to  be  unreasonable, 
to  decide,  subject  to  judicial  review,  what  shall  be  a  rea 
sonable  rate  to  take  its  place ;  the  ruling  of  the  Commis 
sion  to  take  effect  immediately,  and  to  obtain  unless  and 
until  it  is  reversed  by  the  court  of  review."  3 

But  the  House  of  Representatives  was  more  radical 
than  the  President  and  by  a  very  large  majority  passed 
a  bill  on  the  principle,  "  Resolved,  That  we  don't  like 
railroads  and  wish  we  knew  some  way  to  bang  'em  good."  4 
This  is  known  as  the  Hepburn  bill  fathered  by  William 
P.  Hepburn,  a  representative  from  Iowa,  and  passed  the 
House  on  February  9,  1905.  There  the  matter  rested, 
as  it  was  the  short  session  of  Congress,  expiring  March 
4,  1905 ;  therefore  the  Senate  and  the  country  had  the 
opportunity  to  look  at  the  question  on  all  sides. 

Roosevelt  held  to  his  original  position.  "  My  proposal," 
he  wrote  in  his  Message  to  Congress  of  Decembers,  1905, 
"is  not  to  give  The  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 


1  Feb.  12,  1906,  Record,  2415.  2  Washburn's  Roosevelt,  129. 

3  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  iii.  134.       4  The  Nation,  Feb.  16,  1905,  126. 


324  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1906 

power  to  initiate  or  originate  rates  generally,  but  to  regu 
late  a  rate  already  fixed  or  originated  by  the  roads,  upon 
complaint  and  after  investigation."  1  Nevertheless,  as 
it  was  a  new  Congress,  the  House  repassed  the  bill  on 
February  8,  1906,  by  a  vote  of  346 : 7.  Three  answered 
"present,"  and  twenty-nine  did  not  vote.2 

The  discussion  in  the  Senate  was  illuminating.  Sena 
tor  Philander  C.  Knox  said,  "The  framers  of  this  bill 
have  succeeded  in  producing  a  measure  which  permits  an 
administrative  body  to  make  orders  affecting  property 
rights,  gives  no  right  to  the  owners  of  the  property  to 
test  their  lawfulness  in  proceedings  to  enforce  them  and 
penalizes  the  owner  of  the  property  in  the  sum  of  $5000 
a  day  if  it  seeks  a  supposed  remedy  outside  of  the  pro 
visions  of  the  bill  by  challenging  either  its  constitutional 
ity  or  the  lawfulness  of  the  acts  performed  under  its  pro 
visions."  Knox  referred  to  two  United  States  Supreme 
Court  decisions, one  of  which  was,  "When  we  recall  that 
as  estimated  over  ten  thousand  millions  of  dollars  are 
invested  in  railroad  property,  the  proposition  that  such 
a  vast  amount  of  property  is  beyond  the  protecting  clauses 
of  the  Constitution,  that  the  owners  may  be  deprived 
of  it  by  the  arbitrary  enactment  of  any  legislature,  State 
or  nation,  without  any  right  of  appeal  to  the  courts  is 
one  which  cannot  for  a  moment  be  tolerated."  3  Then 
Senator  Knox  went  on  to  say:  "From  the  decisions  of 
the  Supreme  Court  it  will  be  seen  that  railroads  have  a 
constitutional  right  to  just  compensation  for  services 
rendered,  and  that  by  direct  act  of  legislation  or  indirectly 
through  an  administrative  body,  as  through  the  Inter- 


1  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  iv.  568.  2  Record,  2303. 

•  1900,  176  U.  S.  167,  172. 


Cn.  XIV.]  FIXING  OF  RAILROAD  RATES  325 

state  Commerce  Commission,  they  cannot  be  deprived 
of  this  right.  They  are  entitled  to  their  day  in  court."  l 
Senator  John  C.  Spooner  said  on  the  day  that  the  bill 
passed  the  Senate,  "The  bill  as  it  came  to  us  from  the 
House  failed  to  provide  affirmatively  for  a  judicial  re 
view  of  the  order  of  the  Commission  fixing  rates.  That 
objection  has  been  eliminated."  The  Senate  made 
such  an  amendment  and  by  its  other  action  improved 
the  bill.  It  passed  on  May  18  by  a  vote  of  71 : 3 ;  not 
voting,  15.  Among  the  yeas  were  Knox  and  Lodge.  For- 
aker  made  one  of  the  three  nays.  Aldrich  and  Burton 
were  among  the  "  not  voting." 3  As  the  Senate  and  House 
disagreed,  the  bill  went  to  a  Committee  of  Conference 
and  the  report  of  the  Committee  was  adopted  by  both 
houses.  The  bill  was  approved  by  the  President  on  June 
29,  1906,  and  therefore  became  a  law. 

The  important  difference  between  advocates  and  op 
ponents  of  this  legislation  lay  in  the  question  :  Should  the 
Government  have  the  right  to  fix  rates  through  the  Inter 
state  Commerce  Commission?  Roosevelt  who  began 
with  tentative  recommendations  was  finally  brought  to 
the  position  that  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
should  have  that  power.  It  is  a  quality  of  great  minds 
that  when  they  set  out  on  a  reform  the  bent  of  their  think 
ing  runs  to  action  in  the  same  direction  and  carries  them 
further  than  they  at  first  intended.  I  would  not  venture 


1  March  28,  1900,  Record,  4377,  4381. 

2  May  18,  1906,  Record,  7065.     In  addition  to  other  authorities  cited 
see  Foraker,  Notes  of  a  Busy  Life,  ii.  210  et  seq.;  Cullom,  Fifty  Years  of 
Public  Service,  330. 

3  Record,  7088.     Aldrich  was  absent.     The  statement  was  made  that 
he  would  have  voted  yea;   his  general  pair,  Teller,  voted  yea.     Burton 
evidently  had  no  pair ;  no  statement  was  made  in  his  behalf.     Depew  was 
silent.     Tom  Platt  was  " unavoidably  absent";  he  would  have  voted  yea. 


326  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1906 

to  differ  with  so  great  a  man  as  Roosevelt  were  I  not  but 
tressed  by  the  opinion  of  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  Roosevelt's 
intimate  and  faithful  personal  and  political  friend.  If 
one  will  compare  the  German  assertions  favoring  com 
plete  action  by  the  State,  freely  indulged  in  before  the 
Great  War  of  1914,  with  Roosevelt's  arguments  in  favor 
of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  one  will  be 
struck  by  their  similarity  in  their  ascription  of  power 
respectively  to  the  State  and  a  creation  of  the  State.  It 
was  asserted  that  the  Hepburn  Act  led  to  socialism  but 
any  such  result  was  resisted  by  Roosevelt.  "  Public 
ownership  of  railroads,"  he  declared,  "is  highly  undesir 
able  and  would  probably  in  this  country  entail  far-reach 
ing  disaster."  l  As  to  this  result  the  President  and  the 
Senator  were  at  one,  the  Senator  referring  to  Govern 
ment  ownership  as  "the  worst  of  all  disasters."  2  Nor 
did  Roosevelt  alter  his  conviction.  In  a  speech  delivered 
on  October  4,  1906,  he  spoke  of  Government  ownership 
of  railroads  as  "a  policy  which  would  be  evil  in  its  re 
sults  from  every  standpoint."  "Great  corporations," 
he  said  in  his  Message  of  1904,  "are  necessary,  and  only 
men  of  great  and  singular  mental  power  can  manage  such 
corporations  successfully,  and  such  men  must  have  great 
rewards."  3  "The  corporation  has  come  to  stay  just  as 
the  trade  union  has  come  to  stay,"  he  said  a  year  later. 
"We  must  all  go  up  or  go  down  together."  I  have  no 
"hostility  to  the  railroads.  ...  On  the  whole  our  rail 
roads  have  done  well  and  not  ill.  .  .  .  The  question  of 
transportation  lies  at  the  root  of  all  industrial  success." 4 


1  Message  of  Dec.  5,  1905,  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  iv.  576. 

s  Feb.  12,  1906,  Record,  2422.     3  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  iii.  128,  V.  837. 

4  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  iv.  562,  572,  573,  575. 


CH.  XIV.]  HENRY  CABOT  LODGE  327 

Before  dilating  on  the  differences  between  Roosevelt 
and  Lodge  it  will  be  well  to  have  the  President's  opinion 
of  the  Senator  which  he  wrote  on  February  23,  1906. 
"Lodge  has  violent  enemies.  But  he  is  a  boss  or  the 
head  of  a  machine  only  in  the  sense  that  Henry  Clay  and 
Daniel  Webster  were  bosses  and  heads  of  political  ma 
chines  ;  that  is,  it  is  a  very  great  injustice  to  couple  his 
name  with  the  names  of  those  commonly  called  bosses. 
.  .  .  He  and  I  differ  radically  on  certain  propositions, 
as  for  instance  on  the  pending  rate  bill;  .  .  .  but  I  say 
deliberately  that  during  the  twenty  years  he  has  been 
in  Washington  he  has  been  on  the  whole  the  best  and 
most  useful  servant  of  the  public  to  be  found  in  either 
house  of  Congress.  .  .  .  Lodge  is  a  man  of  very  strong 
convictions.  .  .  .  Pie  has  a  certain  aloofness  and  cold 
ness  of  manner  that  irritates  people  who  don't  live  in 
New  England.  But  he  is  an  eminently  fit  successor  of 
Webster  and  Sumner  in  the  Senatorship  of  Massachu 
setts.  He  is  a  bigger  man  than  Sumner."  l 

Eleven  days  previous  to  this  letter  Lodge  had  made 
a  great  speech  in  the  Senate  opposing  in  the  main  the 
rate-making  power  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commis 
sion.  He  began  his  speech  by  a  citation  from  Coleridge's 
Table  Talk  in  reference  to  a  bill  before  Parliament:  "I 
have  heard  but  two  arguments  of  any  weight  adduced 
in  favor  of  passing  this  reform  bill,  and  they  are  in  sub 
stance  these:  1.  'We  will  blow  your  brains  out  if 
you  don't  pass  it.  2.  We  will  drag  you  through  a 
horsepond  if  you  don't  pass  it ' ;  and  there  is  a  good  deal 
of  force  in  both."  Lodge  in  this  citation  undoubtedly 

1  Impressions  of  Theodore  Roosevelt,  Abbott,  97 ;  Bishop,  ii.  6 ;  see 
Autobiography,  383. 


328  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1906 

referred  to  the  public  sentiment  which  demanded  that 
in  some  way  the  railroads  be  shorn  of  the  power  which 
they  possessed.  Such  a  sentiment  was  powerful  in  the 
country.  It  was  shared  by  most  shippers  who  desired 
lower  rates  on  their  products  and  who  were  apprehensive 
lest  large  competitors  had  in  some  way  intrigued  for 
greater  advantages.  Farmers  thought  that  their  grain 
and  meat  were  debarred  from  markets  by  a  high  railroad 
tariff.  Small  business  men  could  see  greater  profits  if 
a  reduction  of  rates  were  secured.  The  proletariat  looked 
upon  Wall  Street  with  suspicion  and  thought  that  a  blow 
at  the  railroads  was  one  at  the  evil  centre  that  might  in 
sure  them  a  greater  share  of  the  good  things  of  life.  All 
together  it  formed  a  potent  sentiment  that  had  great 
sway  in  the  House  of  Representatives.  And  the  Presi 
dent  deemed  it  necessary  to  warn  his  followers  that  an 
act  of  Congress  could  not  do  everything.  "  The  most 
perfect  laws/'  he  said,  "that  could  be  devised  by  the  wit 
of  man  or  the  wit  of  angels  would  not  amount  to  anything 
if  the  average  man  was  not  a  pretty  decent  fellow.  .  .  . 
Nothing  can  take  the  place  of  the  individual  factor,  of 
the  average  man's  quality  and  character,  his  industry, 
his  energy,  his  thrift,  his  decency,  his  determination  to 
be  a  good  man  in  his  own  home,  a  good  neighbor  and  a 
good  citizen  in  his  relations  to  the  State."  l 

To  return  to  Senator  Lodge's  speech.  "I  have  the 
gravest  doubts,"  he  said,  "as  to  the  wisdom  of  govern 
ment  rate  making  even  in  the  most  limited  form."  "We 
should  not  go  too  far  in  rate  making  by  the  government. 
The  lessons  to  be  learned  from  the  experience  of  other 


1  York,  Pa.     Oct.  4,  1906.     Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  v.  843. 


CH.  XIV.]  WHO  SHOULD   MAKE  THE  RATES  ?  329 

nations  confirm  this  view  and  admonish  us  to  proceed 
in  this  direction  with  the  utmost  caution."  "In  the 
desire  to  have  rates  fixed  in  some  form  by  an  executive 
commission,  exercising  powers  delegated  to  it  by  Con 
gress,  we  shall  fail  to  give  an  effective  remedy  for  the 
worst  evil  which  has  arisen,  that  known  as  '  personal 
discriminations.'"  l 

What  was  proposed  by  the  President  and  by  the  House 
was  to  have  rates  determined  and  prescribed  by  seven 
men  who  should  constitute  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  and  receive  an  annual  salary  of  ten  thousand 
dollars.  They  were  to  be  appointed  by  the  President 
who  would  naturally  be  governed  by  political  considera 
tions  ;  and  these  seven  men,  so  far  as  rate  making  was 
concerned,  were  to  take  the  place  of  experts  who  were 
fitted  by  training  and  long  experience  to  perform  that 
duty.  If  it  were  true  that  he  who  makes  the  rate  would 
own  the  road,  these  experts  who  had  risen  to  their  posi 
tion  by  merit  and  advancement  were  to  be  displaced  by 
appointees  of  the  President.  Among  the  ablest  men  in 
the  country  were  those  at  the  head  of  railroads  and  to 
secure  the  proper  amount  of  traffic  that  should  insure 
the  payment  of  interest  and  dividends  was  work  that 
demanded  fitness.  "Our  railroad  freight  rates  are  the 
lowest  in  existence,"  declared  Senator  Lodge.  "The 
prosperity  of  the  country  is  knit  up  with  the  well-being 
of  the  railroads,  but  it  is  also  to  be  remembered  that  the 
profitable  existence  of  the  railroads  depends  upon  the 
prosperity  of  the  country.  There  is  no  body  of  people 
—  and  they  constitute  one-seventh  of  our  population  — 


1  Feb.  12,  1906,  Record,  2422,  2423. 


330  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1908 

so  profoundly  interested  in  the  prosperity  of  the  United 
States  as  the  people,  great  and  small,  who  own  our  rail 
roads,  who  operate  them,  and  who  work  for  them.  It 
is  preposterous  to  suggest  tha;t  the  railroads  of  the  coun 
try  are  hostile  to  its  well-being  and  eaten  up  by  a  short 
sighted  selfishness  which  would  lead  them  to  destroy 
any  industry  or  injure  any  locality.7'  l 

Railroad  men  and  the  financiers  of  Wall  and  State 
streets  who  wrought  with  them  had  been  guilty  of  grave 
evils  which  were  fully  expanded  by  the  press.  These 
were  due  to  their  greed  for  money  and  power,  or  in  short 
to  selfishness.  But  selfishness  is  a  common  attitude  of 
humanity,  possessed  by  members  of  the  Interstate  Com 
merce  Commission  as  well  as  by  the  managers  of  rail 
roads  and  by  those  engaged  in  high  finance.  As  it  was 
finely  put  by  Senator  Lodge  on  the  day  that  the  vote 
was  taken  in  the  Senate:  "The  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  desire  power.  They  would  like  to  take  the 
powers  of  the  legislature  and  of  the  courts  alike.  They 
would  like  to  take  all  the  power  that  is  possible. "  2 

The  remedy  for  the  evils  was,  under  slight  limitations, 
the  natural  working  of  economic  forces.  As  Senator 
Lodge  stated  it,  "My  own  belief  is  that  the  natural  eco 
nomic  forces  will  settle  rates  so  far  as  an  excess  is  con 
cerned  by  the  competition  of  the  markets,  by  the  play 
of  natural  forces,  and  by  the  certainty  that  if  rates  are 
put  up  to  a  point  where  it  would  make  it  profitable  for 
someone  else  to  come  in,  he  will  come  in."  3 

It  is  remarkable  that  at  one  as  Roosevelt  and  Lodge 
seemed  in  their  public  utterances  they  should  differ  so 

February  12,  1906,  2417,  2421. 

2  May  18,  1906,  Record,  7068.          3  Record,  Feb.  12,  1906,  2423. 


CH.  XIV.]  ROOSEVELT  AND  THE  RAILROADS  331 

widely  when  their  professions  came  to  be  translated  into 
legislative  action.  Both  were  strongly  opposed  to  gov 
ernment  ownership ;  and  they  agreed  also  in  Roosevelt's 
statement,  that  this  Government  should  not  be  one  by 
a  plutocracy  nor  one  by  a  mob.  We  must  avoid,  he 
said  "a  contest  between  the  brutal  greed  of  the  'have- 
nots'  and  the  brutal  greed  of  the  'haves.'"  l 

The  President  said  that  the  small  investors  in  rail 
roads  deserved  consideration,2  apparently  ignoring  that 
to  some  extent  their  interests  were  bound  up  in  Big  Busi 
ness,  as  their  living  expenses,  their  deeds,  not  infrequently 
of  benevolence,  depended  upon  the  interest  and  dividends 
from  the  railroads  that  Roosevelt  attacked.  When  he 
made  the  comparison  between  members  of  the  Interstate 
Commerce  Commission  and  those  of  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court,3  he  was  not  fair  to  the  Supreme  Court 
whose  members,  although  appointed  by  the  President, 
received  their  appointments  largely  through  the  influence 
of  the  bar  and  formed  a  body  of  highly  trained  public 
servants.  The  likeness  to  the  National  Bank  Examiners 
was  more  apposite,  but  the  scope  of  the  Interstate  Com 
merce  Commission  was  far  greater  than  that  of  the  Bank 
Examiners.  The  work  of  the  one  was  positive  while 
that  of  the  other  was  negative,  being  largely  the  decision 
whether  certain  banks  were  solvent,  in  which  they  were 
directly  or  indirectly  assisted  by  competing  and  far- 
seeing  bankers  who  had  attested  suspicions  due  to  their 
machinery  of  operations. 

The  President  was  severe  on  E.  H.  Harriman,  who  is 
properly  called  by  Thayer  "the  railroad  czar  of  the  United 


Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  585,  719.         2  Ibid.,  572.        3  Ibid.,  406. 


332  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1906 

States,"  l  and  who  was  indignant  at  the  railway  rate 
bill  and  the  general  course  of  the  administration.  This 
came  out  when  J.  S.  Sherman,  a  Republican  member  of 
Congress  from  New  York  State,  asked  him  for  a  contri 
bution  to  the  autumn  campaign,  when  in  1906  Charles 
E.  Hughes  was  running  against  Hearst  for  governor  of 
New  York.  I  do  not  care  in  the  least,  said  Harriman, 
whether  the  Hearst  crowd  is  triumphant  or  not;  those 
people  are  crooks  and  I  can  buy  them.  Whenever  I 
want  legislation  from  a  State  legislature  I  can  buy  it. 
I  can  buy  Congress  and  if  necessary  I  can  buy  the  judi 
ciary.2  "At  the  same  time/'  so  wrote  Roosevelt  in  a 
private  letter,  "the  Standard  Oil  people  informed  Pen- 
rose  that  they  intend  to  support  the  Democratic  party 
unless  I  call  a  halt  in  the  suits  begun  against  the  Standard 
Oil  people  .  .  .  ;  and  they  gave  the  same  reason  as  Har 
riman,  namely,  that  rather  than  have  an  administration 
such  as  the  present  they  would  prefer  to  have  an  adminis 
tration  of  Bryans  and  Hearsts,  because  they  could  make 
arrangements  with  them.  But  they  did  not  use  the 
naked  brutality  of  language  which  Harriman  used."  3 
"The  Standard  Oil  Company,"  the  President  asserted 
in  a  Message  to  Congress  on  May  4,  1906,  "has  benefited 
enormously  up  almost  to  the  present  moment  by  secret 
rates,  many  of  these  secret  rates  being  clearly  unlawful. 
.  .  .  The  Standard  also  profits  immensely  by  open 
rates.  ...  It  has,  largely  by  unfair  or  unlawful  methods, 
crushed  out  home  competition."  4  The  President  also 
attacked  the  so-called  sugar  and  tobacco  trusts. 


1  P.  234.     2  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  857;    Bishop,  ii.  32. 

3  Bishop,  ii.  33.     *  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  740,  741,  743,  745. 


CH.  XIV.]  THEODORE  ROOSEVELT  333 

"  There  is  plenty  of  iniquity  in  business,  in  politics, 
in  our  social  life,"  he  said.  But  that  is  no  reason  why  we 
should  follow  the  "wild  apostles  of  unrest"  in  "their 
campaign  of  hysterical  excitement  and  falsehood."  Al 
though  "the  reactionaries  and  the  violent  extremists 
show  symptoms  of  joining  hands  against  us,"  this  legis 
lation  was  enacted  in  no  spirit  of  "hysteria  and  rancor." 
"Better  no  legislation  at  all  than  legislation  couched  in 
a  vindictive  spirit  of  hatred  towards  men  of  wealth." 
The  Hepburn  Act  drew  the  line  plainly  between  Big  Busi 
ness  and  Roosevelt.  High  Finance  thought  that  he  had 
inaugurated  a  campaign  of  hysteria,  while  he  himself 
deemed  that  he  had  pursued  a  middle  course  between 
the  reactionaries  and  those  who  looked  with  favor  on 
socialism.1  So  might  anyone  be  convinced  who,  affected 
by  the  magnetism  of  his  presence,  listened  to  his  argu 
ments  in  private  conference,  and  so  may  anyone  now 
think  who  bases  his  judgment  on  his  messages  to  Con 
gress  and  other  public  utterances.  He  had  the  country 
at  his  back;  "the  plain  people  who  think  —  the  me 
chanics,  farmers,  merchants,  workers  with  head  or  hand."  2 
Members  of  Congress,  who  while  in  Washington  toward 
the  end  of  the  session  swore  that  they  would  no  longer 
be  swayed  or  dictated  to  by  Theodore  Roosevelt,  re 
turned  at  the  commencement  of  the  next  session  ready 
to  follow  whither  he  led  because  meanwhile  they  had 
been  in  contact  with  their  constituencies.  Men  west 
of  the  Missouri  River  said  when  we  hear  that  a  week  has 

1  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  573,  794,  835,  837,  917,  931. 

2  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  919.     The  Minneapolis  Journal  gave  the  title 
to  their  cartoon:  ''The  country  is  back  of  him.     Go   ahead,   Teddy; 
whichever  path  you  choose  you  have  U.  S.  back  of  you."     See  also  Auto 
biography,  383. 


334  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1906 

passed  and  that  " Teddy"  has  smashed  no  evil  we  think 
he  must  be  ill  because,  owing  to  his  activity,  he  must 
be  crushing  something  that  bodes  no  good  to  the  body 
politic.  No  wonder  he  said,  I  love  those  Westerners.1 
A  veteran  senator  declared  that  he  had  only  one  objection 
to  the  President  —  with  his  restless  mind  he  was  always 
doing  something. 

"We  passed  a  law,"  wrote  Roosevelt  speaking  of  the 
work  of  Congress  and  himself  regarding  the  Hepburn 
Act,  "giving  vitality  to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com 
mission,  and  for  the  first  time  providing  some  kind  of 
efficient  control  by  the  National  Government  over  the 
great  railroads."  2 

President  Roosevelt  might  have  said  to  Senator  Lodge, 
"The  ill  that's  done  ye  can  compute  but  never  what's 
resisted"  ;  and  the  Senator  could  have  replied,  "Nature's 
patient  ways  shame  hasty  little  man." 

Whatever  criticism  may  be  meted  out  to  the  President 
for  his  action  giving  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commis 
sion  the  power  to  fix  railroad  rates  cannot  obtain  as  we 
consider  the  Meat  Inspection  Act  and  the  Pure  Food  law. 

By  special  message  to  Congress  of  June  4,  1906,  he  trans 
mitted  the  report  of  a  special  committee  and  urged  the 
"need  of  immediate  action  by  the  Congress  in  the  direc 
tion  of  providing  a  drastic  and  thorough-going  inspection 
by  the  Federal  Government  of  all  stock  yards  and  pack 
ing  houses  and  of  their  products,  so  far  as  the  latter  enter 

1 1  have  said  this  previously.  The  Toledo  Blade  has  a  cartoon  en 
titled  Roosevelt  "is  pretty  good  at  'winning  the  West'  himself."  Al 
bert  Shaw,  Review  of  Reviews,  172. 

2  Bishop,  ii.  131.  See  the  cartoon  "Then  and  Now.  The  Railroads 
and  Roosevelt.  (Before  and  after  the  long  struggle  for  anti-rebate  legis 
lation),"  Albert  Shaw,  Review  of  Reviews,  155. 


CH.  XIV.]  MEAT   INSPECTION  ACT  335 

into  interstate  or  foreign  commerce.  The  conditions 
shown,"  he  added,  "to  exist  in  the  Chicago  stock  yards 
are  revolting.  It  is  imperatively  necessary  in  the  in 
terest  of  health  and  of  decency  that  they  should  be  radi 
cally  changed.  .  .  .  The  stock  yards  and  packing  houses 
are  not  kept  even  reasonably  clean  and  the  method  of 
handling  and  preparing  food  products  is  uncleanly  and 
dangerous  to  health."  l  Senator  Albert  J.  Beveridge 
had  offered  an  amendment  to  the  appropriation  act  of 
the  Department  of  Agriculture  and  the  President  urged 
that  this  be  substantially  enacted.  It  is  a  mark  of  Roose 
velt  that  he  never  claimed  credit  unless  it  was  his  due 
and  an  evidence  of  this  is  seen  in  a  letter  to  Beveridge 
on  the  day  after  he  had  signed  the  bill.  "You  were  the 
man,"  he  said,  "who  first  called  my  attention  to  the 
abuses  in  the  packing  houses.  You  were  the  legislator 
who  drafted  the  bill  which  in  its  substance  now  appears 
in  the  Amendment  to  the  Agricultural  bill  and  which 
will  enable  us  to  put  a  complete  stop  to  the  wrong-doing 
complained  of." 

Senator  Beveridge  who  had  read  much  and  travelled 
much  and  was  yet  to  write  his  magnus  opus,  "The  Life 
of  Chief- Justice  Marshall,"  which  could  have  been  written 
only  by  a  man  of  letters  and  the  law,  was  not  outdone 
in  generosity,  declaring  in  open  Senate  that  the  act  "we 
owe  to  the  courage,  determination  and  the  absolutely 
unselfish  devotion  to  the  interest  of  the  people  of  President 
Roosevelt."  3  Of  the  same  mind  when  he  penned  his 
eulogy,  he  wrote,  "that  important  reform  never  would 


1  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  772. 

2  July  1,  1906.     The  Sat.  Eve.  Post,  Apr.  5,  1919. 
8  June  20,  Record,  8766. 


836  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1906 

have  had  the  slightest  chance  of  accomplishment  had 
not  President  Roosevelt  thrown  himself  into  the  fight 
with  every  ounce  of  his  personal  power  and  all  the  re 
sources  of  the  Administration. "  "The  fight  over  that 
measure,"  he  said,  "was  one  of  the  most  desperate  in 
our  legislative  history."  l 

"The  enactment  of  the  pure  food  bill,"  so  Roosevelt 
wrote  to  Congressman  Watson  on  August  18,  "and  the 
passage  of  the  bill  which  rendered  effective  the  control 
of  the  Government  over  the  meat  packing  industries 
are  really  along  the  same  general  line  as  the  passage  of  the 
interstate  commerce  law  and  are  second  only  to  it  in  im 
portance."  2  The  title  of  the  pure  food  law  was,  "An 
act  for  preventing  the  manufacture,  sale  or  transporta 
tion  of  adulterated  or  misbranded  or  poisonous  or  de 
leterious  foods,  drugs,  medicines  and  liquors  and  for  regu 
lating  traffic  therein."  This  applied  of  course  only  to 
foreign  and  interstate  commerce  and  was  approved  by 
the  President  on  June  30.  The  act  defined  precisely  what 
should  be  understood  by  adulterated  drugs,  confectionery 
and  food.  In  the  case  of  food  it  forbade  the  addition  of  any 
poisonous  or  deleterious  ingredient  "which  may  render 
such  article  injurious  to  health."  In  brief  the  act  was 
in  the  interest  of  the  health  of  the  community  and  was  a 
protection  to  the  purchaser  of  food  and  drugs. 

"Partly  by  law  and  partly  by  executive  order,"  Roose 
velt  wrote,  "we  have  completely  reorganized  the  consular 
service  of  the  United  States."  3  As  President,  he  was  as 
true  to  the  cause  of  Civil  Service  Reform  as  he  was  as  Civil 


1  The  Sat.  Eve.  Post,  Apr.  5,  1919. 

2  Current  Lit.  Pub.  Co.  401. 

3  Bishop,  ii.  131. 


CH.  XIV.]  MUCKRAKING  337 

Service  Commissioner.  "In  my  opinion,"  wrote  in  1919 
William  D.  Foulke,  a  veteran  in  the  cause,  "  Roosevelt 
was  more  consistent  and  energetic  than  any  other  Presi 
dent  in  advancing  the  reform."  1 

An  employers'  liability  act  for  corporations  engaged 
in  interstate  commerce  was  passed.  Declared  uncon 
stitutional  by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court,  a  law 
which  met  the  objections  of  the  Court  was  enacted  at 
a  subsequent  session  of  Congress.2 

11  Do  come  on  and  let  me  see  you  soon,"  Roosevelt  wrote 
to  Dooley  on  June  18.  "I  am  by  no  means  as  much  alone 
as  in  Cuba,  because  I  have  an  ample  surrounding  of 
Senators  and  Congressmen,  not  to  speak  of  railroad  men, 
Standard  Oil  men,  beef  packers  and  venders  of  patent 
medicines,  the  depth  of  whose  feelings  for  me  cannot 
be  expressed  in  words."  3 

Roosevelt's  muckrake  speech  attracted  much  attention 
from  the  people  and  from  the  press.  The  verb  to  muck 
rake  was  speedily  coined,  obtained  wide  currency  and 
finds  a  place  in  Webster's  New  International  Dictionary 
published  in  1909  with  a  direct  reference  to  this  very 
address.  The  speech  was  delivered  at  the  laying  of  the 
corner-stone  of  the  office  building  of  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives  on  April  14,  1906.  "In  Bunyan's  'Pilgrim's 
Progress/"4  he  said,  "you  may  recall  the  description 


1  Fighting  the  Spoilsmen,  257. 

2  Bishop,  ii.  80,  131.     The  original  act  was  passed  June  11,  1906;    it 
was  declared  unconstitutional  on  Jan.  6,   1908.     The  amended  act  was 
passed  April  22,  1908,  and  upheld  by  the  Court  on  Jan.  15,  1912.     The 
objection  to  the  original  act  was  that  it  was  not  limited  to  injuries  in 
curred  in  interstate  commerce. 

3  Bishop,  ii.  34. 

4  "  Bunyan's  '  Pilgrim's  Progress '  is  to  my  mind  one  of  the  greatest  books 
that  was  ever  written."     Roosevelt  to  Dr.  Milner,  Bishop,  ii.  115. 


338  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1906 

of  the  Man  with  the  Muckrake,  the  man  who  could  look 
no  way  but  downward  with  the  muckrake  in  his  hand; 
who  was  offered  a  celestial  crown  for  his  muckrake  but 
who  would  neither  look  up  nor  regard  the  crown  he  was 
offered  but  continued  to  rake  to  himself  the  filth  of  the 
floor."  Muckraking  leads  to  slander  that  may  untruth 
fully  "  attack  an  honest  man  or  even  assail  a  bad  man 
with  untruth.  An  epidemic  of  indiscriminate  assault 
upon  character  does  not  good  but  very  great  harm,"  de 
clared  the  President.  He  had  found  an  important  deterrent 
to  the  entrance  to  the  public  service  of  able  men  of  normal 
sensitiveness,  in  the  gross  and  reckless  assaults  on  their 
character  and  capacity  both  without  and  within  Congress. 
"  Hysterical  sensationalism  is  the  very  poorest  weapon 
wherewith  to  fight  for  lasting  righteousness,"  he  said. 
"  There  is  mighty  little  good  in  a  mere  spasm  of  reform." 
Sanity  as  well  as  honesty  is  needed.  Mud  slinging  is  as 
bad  as  whitewashing.1 

That  Roosevelt  should  know  his  Shakespeare  and  his 
Burke  is  not  surprising ;  that  this  preachment  should  be 
on  a  text  from  Bunyan  is  more  surprising ;  but  it  is  really 
amazing  that  one  of  his  illustrations  should  be  from  the 
" Ecclesiastical  Policy"  of  "that  fine  old  Elizabethan 
divine,"  Bishop  Hooker,  who,  one  might  suppose,  was 
read  only  by  students  of  terse  and  expressive  English. 

The  Constitution  makes  the  President  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States  and  Roosevelt 
manifested  that  this  was  to  him  an  earnest  provision. 
Near  midnight  on  August  13,  1906,  the  city  of  Browns 
ville,  Texas,  near  Fort  Brown,  was  shot  up ;  one  person 


For  the  muckrake  speech,  see  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  712. 


CH.  XIV.]  THE  BROWNSVILLE  AFFRAY  339 

was  killed,  a  number  were  assaulted  with  the  intent  to 
kill,  women  and  children  were  fired  at  and  nearly  every 
one  in  the  city  was  frightened.  As  Roosevelt  said  in  his 
second  Message  to  the  Senate,  "  These  crimes  were  cer 
tainty  committed  by  somebody."  l  After  making  a  thor 
ough  investigation  of  the  subject  through  officers  in  whom 
he  had  confidence,  he  and  the  Secretary  of  War,  William 
H.  Taft,  came  to  the  conclusion  that  "from  nine  to  fifteen 
or  twenty  of  the  colored  soldiers"  belonging  to  B.  C.  and 
D.  colored  of  the  25th  regular  infantry  took  part  in  the 
attack.  The  "  original  crime,"  declared  the  President, 
was  "  supplemented  by  another  ...  in  the  shape  of  a 
successful  conspiracy  of  silence  for  the  purpose  of  shield 
ing  those  who  took  part  in  the  original  conspiracy  of  mur 
der."  Therefore  "I  ordered  the  discharge  of  nearly 
all  the  members  of  Companies  B.  C.  and  D.  of  the  25th 
infantry  by  name  in  the  exercise  of  my  constitu 
tional  power  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  United  States 
Army."  3 

"It  appears  that  in  Brownsville,"  the  President  said, 
"the  city  immediately  beside  which  Fort  Brown  is  sit 
uated,  there  had  been  considerable  feeling  between  the 
citizens  and  the  colored  troops  of  the  garrison  companies. 
Difficulties  had  occurred,  there  being  a  conflict  of  evidence 
as  to  whether  the  citizens  or  colored  troops  were  to 
blame."  But  "any  assertion  that  these  men  were 
dealt  with  harshly  because  they  were  colored  men  is  ut 
terly  without  foundation."  "I  condemned  in  unstinted 
terms  the  crime  of  lynching  perpetrated  by  white  men, 


1  Jan.  14,  1907,  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  1097. 

2  Dec.  19,  1906,  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  1065,  1070. 

3  Ibid.,  1063. 


340  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1906 

and  I  should  take  the  instant  advantage  of  any  oppor 
tunity  whereby  I  could  bring  to  justice  a  mob  of  lynchers. 
In  precisely  the  same  spirit  I  have  now  acted  with  refer 
ence  to  these  colored  men  who  have  been  guilty  of  a  black 
and  dastardly  crime/7  l  "The  evidence  shows  beyond 
any  possibility  of  honest  question  that  some  individuals 
among  the  colored  troops  whom  I  have  dismissed  com 
mitted  the  outrages  mentioned/7 

Roosevelt's  private  letters  support  his  public  view. 
"I  have  been  amazed  and  indignant/7  he  wrote,  "at  the 
attitude  of  the  negroes  and  of  shortsighted  white  senti 
mentalists  as  to  my  action.  .  .  .  There  has  been  great 
pressure,  not  only  by  the  sentimentalists  but  by  the 
Northern  politicians  who  wish  to  keep  the  negro  vote.  .  .  . 
I  believe  in  practical  politics  .  .  .  but  in  a  case  like  this 
where  the  issue  is  not  merely  one  of  naked  right  and 
wrong  but  one  of  vital  concern  to  the  whole  country,  I 
will  not  for  one  moment  consider  the  political  effect. "  2 

Awarding  equal  sincerity  to  Senator  Foraker,  I  have 
read  carefully  the  three  chapters  in  his  book  which  he 
has  devoted  to  the  "Brownsville  Affray "  ;  but  I  am  not 
convinced  that  he  has  made  out  his  case.  The  contest  be 
tween  him  and  the  President  had  become  embittered 
from  some  other  cause,  and  his  sarcasm  directed  against 
the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War  does  not  add  to 
the  cogency  of  his  case.3  Military  matters  in  any  case 
require  prompt  decision  and  the  despotic  quality  nat 
urally  inheres  in  any  executive  action.  But  a  calm  re 
view  of  the  whole  matter  cannot  fail  to  convince  the  im- 


1  Review  of  Reviews,  1065,  1073,  1079,  1097. 

3  Bishop,  ii.  28. 

1  See  Foraker's  Notes  of  a  Busy  Life,  ii. ;  also  Fifty  Years,  Cullom,  356. 


CH*  XIV.]  THE  PRESIDENT  AND   JAPAN  341 

partial  observer  that  the  President  was  right  and  acted  on  the 
best  evidence,  both  legal  and  human,  that  was  obtainable. 

The  President's  tribute  to  Japan  in  his  Message  to 
Congress  of  December  3, 1906,  represented  fully  the  senti 
ment  of  the  American  people  as  it  was  during  the  war 
between  Japan  and  Russia,  when  public  opinion  was 
largely  on  the  side  of  Japan.  Since  that  time,  however, 
an  " attitude  of  hostility"  has  developed  which  though 
"  limited  to  a  very  few  places,  is  most  discreditable  to 
us  as  a  people  and  may  be  fraught  with  the  gravest  con 
sequences  to  the  Nation.  .  .  .  Since  Commodore  Perry, 
by  his  expedition  to  Japan  over  half  a  century  ago,  first 
opened  the  islands  to  western  civilization,  the  growth 
of  Japan  has  been  literally  astounding."  Then,  "  Japan's 
development  was  still  that  of  the  Middle  Ages ;  now  she 
stands  as  one  of  the  greatest  of  civilized  nations ;  great 
in  the  arts  of  war  and  in  the  arts  of  peace ;  great  in  mili 
tary,  in  industrial,  in  artistic  development  and  achieve 
ment.  .  .  .  We  have  as  much  to  learn  from  Japan  as 
Japan  has  to  learn  from  us.  ...  Throughout  Japan 
Americans  are  well  treated  and  any  failure  on  the  part 
of  Americans  at  home  to  treat  the  Japanese  with  a  like 
courtesy  and  consideration  is  just  so  much  a  confession 
of  inferiority  in  our  civilization.  ...  I  ask  for  fair  treat 
ment  for  the  Japanese  as  I  would  ask  fair  treatment  for 
Germans  or  Englishmen,  Frenchmen,  Russians  or  Ital 
ians.  ...  I  ask  it  as  due  to  humanity  and  civilization. 
I  ask  it  as  due  to  ourselves  because  we  must  act  uprightly 
toward  all  men."  l 

No  lover  of  peace  can  feel  otherwise  than  thrilled  when 

1  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  957,  958,  960,  961. 


342  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1908 

he  reads  that  part  of  the  President's  Message  of  Decem 
ber,  1906,  which  is  devoted  to  Secretary  Root's  visit  to 
South  America.  The  third  International  Conference  was 
held  at  Rio  Janeiro  from  July  23  to  August  29  and  the 
Secretary  of  State  was  sent  as  our  delegate.  It  was  con 
sidered  a  great  honor  by  the  South  American  republics 
that  we  should  send  so  high  an  official  and  one  of  such 
distinction.  He  was  cordially  received  and  made  an 
honorary  President.  How  well  Roosevelt  understood 
the  value  of  such  a  meeting  is  seen  in  the  words  of  his 
Message.  "The  example,"  he  wrote,  "of  the  representa 
tives  of  all  the  American  nations  engaging  in  harmonious 
and  kindly  consideration  and  discussion  of  subjects  of 
common  interest  is  itself  of  great  and  substantial  value 
for  the  promotion  of  reasonable  and  considerate  treat 
ment  of  all  international  questions."  After  the  Con 
ference  Root  "visited  Brazil,  Uruguay,  Argentina,  Chile, 
Peru,  Panama  and  Colombia.  He  refrained  from  visit 
ing  Paraguay,  Bolivia  and  Ecuador  only  because  the 
distance  of  their  capitals  from  the  seaboard  made  it  im 
practicable  with  the  time  at  his  disposal.  He  carried 
with  him  a  message  of  peace  and  friendship,  and  of  strong 
desire  for  good  understanding  and  mutual  helpfulness ;  and 
he  was  everywhere  received  in  the  spirit  of  his  message." 
There  was  a  misunderstanding  in  regard  to  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  The  prevalent  idea  was  that  it  involved  an 
assumption  of  superiority  and  the  right  to  exercise  some 
kind  of  protectorate  by  the  United  States  over  the 
South  American  republics.  "That  impression,"  said  the 
President,  "continued  to  be  a  serious  barrier  to  good 
understanding,  to  friendly  intercourse,  to  the  introduction 
of  American  capital  and  the  extension  of  American  trade." 


CH.  XIV.]  THE  INTERNATIONAL  CONFERENCE  343 

"It  was  part  of  Secretary  Root's  mission  to  dispel  this  un 
founded  impression ' ' ;  and  he  therefore  made  an  address 
at  Rio  on  July  31,  in  which  he  said  :  "  We  wish  for  no  vic 
tories  but  those  of  peace ;  for  no  territory  except  our  own ; 
for  no  sovereignty  except  the  sovereignty  over  ourselves. 
We  deem  the  independence  and  equal  rights  of  the  small 
est  and  weakest  member  of  the  family  of  nations  entitled 
to  as  much  respect  as  those  of  the  greatest  empire,  and 
we  deem  the  observance  of  that  respect  the  chief  guaranty 
of  the  weak  against  the  oppression  of  the  strong.  We 
neither  claim  nor  desire  any  rights  or  privileges  or  powers 
that  we  do  not  freely  concede  to  every  American  Re 
public.  .  .  .  Let  us  preserve  our  free  lands  from  the  bur 
den  of  such  armaments  as  are  massed  behind  the  frontiers 
of  Europe." 

The  arches  which  spanned  the  streets  in  the  city  of 
Buenos  Ayres  had  the  names  inscribed  on  them  of  Wash 
ington,  Jefferson  and  Marshall  and  also  those  of  James 
Monroe,  John  Quincy  Adams,  Henry  Clay  and  Richard 
Rush,  a  silent  testimony  to  the  friends  of  South  America 
who  had  labored  for  them  in  the  greater  republic.  It 
was  a  "graceful  courtesy"  on  the  part  of  the  Government 
of  Brazil  that  the  building  in  which  the  Conference  was 
held  was  labelled  "Palacio  Monroe." 

The  President  said,  "Our  grateful  acknowledgments 
are  due  to  the  Governments  and  the  people  of  all  the  coun 
tries  visited  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for  the  courtesy, 
the  friendship  and  the  honor  shown  to  our  country  in 
their  generous  hospitality  to  him."  l 

In  these  words  the  President  represented  the  senti 
ment  of  the  American  people. 

1  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  966,  967,  968,  969,  970. 


CHAPTER  XV 

NINETEEN  hundred  seven  may  be  called  the  Panic  Year. 
In  making  a  study  of  the  panic  of  1857  I  wrote,  "The 
reason  of  panics  lies  deep  in  the  human  heart."  Pass 
ing  through  the  panic  of  1873  as  a  business  man,  those 
of  1893  and  1907  as  an  investor,  I  have  seen  no  reason 
to  change  this  opinion.  Accepting  the  theory  of  perio 
dicity  of  panics  it  is  unnecessary  to  explain  fully  why  the 
period  is  not  always  the  same ;  sixteen  years  elapsed  be 
tween  1857  and  1873,  twenty  between  1873  and  1893, 
and  fourteen  between  1893  and  1907.  But  the  cause  is 
always  the  same.  If  men  were  always  wise,  if  they  them 
selves  or  corporations  in  which  they  held  stock  never 
ran  into  debt,  if  there  were  never  fluctuations  in  the  prices 
of  produce  —  in  short  if  all  business  was  done  for  cash, 
if  men  never  incurred  obligations  which  they  could  not 
at  once  meet,  if  they  did  not  spread  out  with  the  idea 
that  every  extension,  every  conversion  of  liquid  into  fixed 
capital  meant  a  larger  income  from  their  enterprise,  finan 
cial  panics  would  never  occur.  But  a  society  of  that  kind 
would  lack  commercial  energy,  would  cease  its  material 
progress  and,  in  fact,  would  be  impossible  in  one  based  on 
European  civilization. 

Taking  into  account  the  actual  state  of  affairs  debt 
seems  a  necessary  adjunct.  Certain  men  have  more 
energy  than  money;  others  more  money  than  energy. 
It  was  entirely  natural  then  that  out  of  this  condition 
should  be  developed  on  the  one  side  the  manager  and  the 

344 


CH.  XV.]  THE  PANIC   OF   1907  845 

promoter  and  on  the  other  the  investor.  Banks  are  the 
basis  of  all  financial  affairs  and  they  are  deeply  in  debt 
to  their  depositors.  It  is  a  commonplace  that  the  func 
tion  of  a  bank  is  to  lend  money  to  borrowers  at  a  higher 
rate  of  interest  than  it  pays  its  depositors.  Finan 
cial  panics  mean  a  loss  of  confidence,  and  one  of  its  marks 
is  that  Savings  Banks  depositors  start  a  run  on  banks 
where  their  savings  are  placed.  This  puts  a  strain  on 
National  Banks  which  have  a  large  amount  of  Savings 
Bank  money  and  besides  have  their  own  troubles  to  face  in 
the  vain  endeavor  to  collect  their  loans  and  to  meet  the 
demands  of  their  own  depositors.  So  far  as  I  know  such 
have  been  the  characteristics  of  the  panics  of  '57,  '73  and 
'93.  Theodore  Marburg  in  his  business  dissertation 
attempted  to  show  that  "each  recurring  panic  has  its 
own  special  causes"  l  but  to  my  mind  he  in  no  way  trav 
erses  the  general  law.  It  is  true  enough  that  1857  and 
1873  were  caused  by  the  too  rapid  building  of  railroads, 
that  the  operation  of  the  silver  purchase  provision  of  the 
Act  of  1890  was  a  contributing  cause  to  the  panic  of  1893, 
but  if  one  needs  one  word  to  describe  the  cause  of  all  these 
he  finds  it  in  " overtrading." 

A  Boston  banker  found  in  a  printed  description  of  the 
panic  of  1857  substantially  the  same  characteristics  as 
were  passing  before  his  eyes  in  1907.  A.  Piatt  Andrew, 
Assistant  Professor  of  Economics  at  Harvard  University, 
in  an  article  printed  in  the  New  Year's  number  of  the 
New  York  Journal  of  Commerce  on  January  2,  1907,  found 
a  close  parallel  between  the  situation  at  the  begin 
ning  of  the  year  1907  with  that  of  1857,  and  wrote  further 

1  Address  before  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science, 
April  10,  1908. 


346  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1907 

that  a  financial  panic  might  occur  during  the  year  as  it 
had  a  half  a  century  earlier.1 

The  devotees  of  high  finance  ascribed  the  panic  wholly 
to  the  Roosevelt  policies  both  "  legislative  and  execu 
tive."  A  cartoon  in  Life  pictured  Roosevelt  emerging 
from  a  bear  hunt  in  the  South  with  the  usual  eyeglasses, 
showing  his  front  teeth  on  the  broad  grin,  dancing  in 
high  glee  and  shooting  to  the  death  "Big  Game"  labelled 
" prosperity." 3  The  cartoon  represented  the  general 
feeling  among  financial  men  as  is  shown  in  Roosevelt's 
speeches  and  messages,  in  his  private  letters  and  in  varied 
recollections  of  the  period.  Everywhere  that  these  men 
congregated,  the  conversation  was  Roosevelt  and  the 
financial  ruin  which  he  had  brought  upon  the  country. 

A  glance  at  Roosevelt's  own  description  will  be  useful. 
"We  have  our  ups  and  downs,"  he  said  on  October  22, 
"no  law  and  the  administration  of  no  law  can  save  any 
body  of  people  from  their  own  folly.  If  a  section  of  the 
business  world  goes  a  little  crazy,  it  will  have  to  pay  for 
it ;  and  being  excessively  human,  when  it  does  pay  for 
it,  it  will  want  to  blame  someone  else  instead  of  itself. 
If  at  any  time  a  portion  of  the  business  world  loses  its 
head,  it  has  lost  what  no  outside  aid  can  supply.  If  there 
is  reckless  overspeculation  or  dishonest  business  manage 
ment,  just  as  sure  as  fate  there  will  follow  a  partial  col 
lapse.  There  has  been  trouble  in  the  stock  market,  in 
the  high  financial  world  during  the  past  few  months. 
The  statement  has  frequently  been  made  that  the  policies 
for  which  I  stand,  legislative  and  executive,  are  responsi- 

1  Letter  of  A.  Piatt  Andrew,  Oct.  15,  1921 ;  Boston  Daily  Advertiser, 
Nov.  2,  1907. 

» Roosevelt,  Speech,  Oct.  22,  1907,  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  1964. 
1  Life,  Oct.  31. 


CH.  XV.]  THE  PANIC  OF   1907  347 

ble  for  that  trouble."  1  In  another  speech  Roosevelt 
admitted  that  his  policies  might  have  possibly  been  a 
contributory  cause  to  the  panic ; 2  but  in  a  special  Mes 
sage  to  Congress  of  January  31,  1908,  he  said,  "So  far 
as  the  business  distress  is  due  to  local  and  not  world  wide 
causes  and  to  the  actions  of  any  particular  individuals, 
it  is  due  to  the  speculative  folly  and  flagrant  dishonesty 
of  a  few  men  of  great  wealth  who  seek  to  shield  them 
selves  from  the  effects  of  their  own  wrong-doing  by  ascrib 
ing  its  results  to  the  actions  of  those  who  have  sought  to 
put  a  stop  to  the  wrong-doing." 

The  panic  began  with  a  "flurry  in  stocks"  in  March, 
it  gained  new  strength  in  August 3  and  reached  its  height 
during  October  and  November.  On  the  22d  of  October 
the  Knickerbocker  Trust  Company  failed ;  the  Electric 
and  Manufacturing  Company,  of  which  George  Westing- 
house  was  President,  applied  for  the  appointment  of 
receivers.4  General  Electric  stock  which  had  sold  at 
162  during  the  year  went  to  90,  and  other  shares  suffered 
a  like  decline.  Banks  in  all  of  the  large  cities  issued 
clearing-house  certificates  of  which  84  million  dollars 
were  emitted  in  New  York  City  alone.  There  were  runs 
on  many  of  the  banks  and  practically  all  of  the  banks 
in  large  cities  requested  their  customers  to  make  their 
cheques  through  the  clearing  house  only  and  to  draw 
no  currency  unless  absolutely  needed.  Currency  went 
to  a  premium  of  4-J  per  cent,  which  lasted  from  the  first 
day  of  November  through  the  first  half  of  December. 
Money  on  call,  if  it  could  be  had  during  the  days  before 


1  Oct.  22,  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  1464.         2  Oct.  1,  ibid.,  1377. 

3  Bishop,  ii.  43;  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  1358. 

4  Oct.  23,  Life  of  George  Westinghouse,  Leupp,  208. 


348  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1907 

the  banks  issued  clearing-house  certificates,  was  lent  at 
125  per  cent.  Summoned  from  the  General  Episcopal 
Convention  in  Richmond,  where  he  was  a  diligent  reader 
of  the  newspapers,  J.  P.  Morgan  arrived  on  the  scene  and 
took  command.  Indeed  the  financiers  desired  a  general 
and  he  was  one  in  whom  all  had  entire  confidence.  Back 
of  Morgan  were  the  old  and  experienced  men  of  finance, 
who  had  regarded  with  no  favor  the  operations  of  the 
new  school  of  financiers  who  had  been  conspicuous  in 
the  overtrading  that  brought  on  the  panic.  They  might 
have  said  with  Prometheus,  "  Youthful  pilots  rule  Olym 
pus."  l  The  new  school  had  originated  the  system  of 
" chain  banking"  which  meant  the  buying  up  of  the  ma 
jority  of  shares  of  any  one  bank,  then  hypothecating  these 
shares  and  with  the  proceeds  purchasing  the  control  of 
another  bank  which  was  dealt  with  in  a  similar  manner  and 
so  on  until  a  coterie  controlled  a  number  of  banks  which 
assisted  them  in  their  wild  speculations  that  were  those  of 
" infatuated  promoters  and  grumbling  millionaires."  2 

Nightly  meetings  were  held  in  Morgan's  library  and 
methods  were  devised  to  allay  the  panic.  The  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,  George  B.  Cortelyou,  came  to  New  York 
and  gave  his  timely  aid.  The  President  took  a  hand 
in  the  same  direction  and  acted  with  his  usual  prompt 
ness.  One  evening  he  was  informed  that  two  representa 
tives  of  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation  desired  to 
see  him  early  next  morning,  when  in  company  with  Sec 
retary  of  State  Root  he  saw  them  and  gave  this  account 
of  the  interview  dated  November  4. 

"Judge  E.  H.  Gary  and  Mr.  H.  C.  Frick,  on  behalf 

1Lawton,   Atlantic  Monthly,  62,  215. 
a  Noyes,  Forum,  Jan.  1908,  313. 


CH.  XV.]         THE  PRESIDENT— STEEL  CORPORATION  349 

of  the  Steel  Corporation,  have  just  called  upon  me.  They 
state  that  there  is  a  certain  business  firm  (the  name  of 
which  I  have  not  been  told  but  which  is  of  real  impor 
tance  in  New  York  business  circles),  which  will  undoubt 
edly  fail  this  week  if  help  is  not  given.  Among  its  assets 
are  a  majority  of  the  securities  of  the  Tennessee  Coal  and 
Iron  Company.  Application  has  been  urgently  made  to 
the  Steel  Corporation  to  purchase  this  stock  as  the  only 
means  of  avoiding  a  failure.  Judge  Gary  and  Mr.  Frick 
informed  me  that  as  a  mere  business  transaction  they  do 
not  care  to  purchase  the  stock ;  that  under  ordinary  cir 
cumstances  they  would  not  consider  purchasing  the  stock, 
because  but  little  benefit  will  come  to  the  Steel  Corporation 
from  the  purchase ;  that  they  are  aware  that  the  purchase 
will  be  used  as  a  handle  for  attack  upon  them  on  the  ground 
that  they  are  striving  to  secure  a  monopoly  of  the  business 
and  prevent  competition  —  not  that  this  would  represent 
what  could  honestly  be  said,  but  what  might  recklessly  and 
untruthfully  be  said. 

"They  further  informed  me  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  policy  of  the  company  has  been  to  decline  to  acquire 
more  than  sixty  per  cent  of  the  steel  properties,  and  that 
this  purpose  has  been  persevered  in  for  several  years  past, 
with  the  object  of  preventing  these  accusations,  and,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  their  proportion  of  steel  properties  has 
slightly  decreased,  so  that  it  is  below  this  sixty  per  cent, 
and  the  acquisition  of  the  property  in  question  will  not 
raise  it  above  sixty  per  cent.  But  they  feel  that  it  is 
immensely  to  their  interest,  as  to  the  interest  of  every 
responsible  business  man,  to  try  to  prevent  a  panic  and 
general  industrial  smash  up  at  this  time,  and  that  they 
are  willing  to  go  into  this  transaction,  which  they  would 


350  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1907 

not  otherwise  go  into,  because  it  seems  the  opinion  of 
those  best  fitted  to  express  judgment  in  New  York  that 
it  will  be  an  important  factor  in  preventing  a  break  that 
might  be  ruinous;  and  that  this  has  been  urged  upon 
them  by  the  combination  of  the  most  responsible  bankers 
in  New  York  who  are  now  thus  engaged  in  endeavoring 
to  save  the  situation.  But  they  asserted  that  they  did 
not  wish  to  do  this  if  I  stated  that  it  ought  not  to  be  done. 
I  answered  that,  while  of  course  I  could  not  advise  them 
to  take  the  action  proposed,  I  felt  it  no  public  duty  of 
mine  to  interpose  any  objections/'  1 

The  President  acted  wisely,  and  was  completely  vindi 
cated  by  the  Courts ;  first  by  the  United  States  District 
Court  for  the  District  of  New  Jersey  and  then  by  the 
United  States  Supreme  Court.2  Judge  Gary  and  Frick 
had  told  the  President  the  truth.  Gary  had  then  begun 
to  gain  the  confidence  of  the  newspaper  reading  com 
munity  that  with  the  years  has  been  largely  augmented. 
Henry  Clay  Frick  had  worked  up  from  the  bottom,  was 
truthful,  cool  and  shrewd.  The  action  of  the  President 
which  was  announced  on  the  Stock  Exchange  at  its  open 
ing  that  morning  did  much  toward  allaying  the  disturbed 
confidence. 

Notwithstanding  the  financial  stress,  the  pressure  of 
various  kinds  brought  to  bear  upon  him,  Roosevelt  pro 
posed  to  pursue  his  policies.  If  they,  he  declared,  have 
been  a  contributory  cause  to  the  panic  they  "must  be 
accepted  as  a  disagreeable  but  unavoidable  feature  in  a 
course  of  policy  which  as  long  as  I  am  President  will  not 


1  Autobiography,    478. 

2  The  Supreme  Court  decision  was  in  1920  and  it  stood  4  to  3.     The 
decision  was  delivered  by  Justice  McKenna. 


CH.  XV.]  THE  PRESIDENT  — THE  PANIC   OF   1907  351 

be  changed."  1  " Everyone,"  he  said  in  his  special  Mes 
sage  to  Congress  of  January  31,  1908,  "must  feel  the 
keenest  sympathy  for  the  large  body  of  honest  business 
men,  of  honest  investors,  of  honest  wage-workers  who 
suffer  because  involved  in  a  crash  for  which  they  are  in 
no  way  responsible.  At  such  a  time  there  is  a  natural 
tendency  on  the  part  of  many  men  to  feel  gloomy  and 
frightened  at  the  outlook."  But  he  wrote  in  his  Annual 
Message  of  December  3,  1907,  "  swindling  in  stocks,  cor 
rupting  legislatures,  making  fortunes  by  the  inflation 
of  securities,  by  wrecking  railroads,  by  destroying  com 
petitors  through  rebates  —  these  forms  of  wrong-doing 
in  the  capitalist"  must  be  stopped. 3  "If  it  were  true," 
he  said  to  Congress  on  January  31,  1908,  "that  to  cut  out 
rottenness  from  the  body  politic  meant  a  momentary 
check  to  an  unhealthy  seeming  prosperity,  I  should 
not  for  one  moment  hesitate  to  put  the  knife  to  the  cor 
ruption."  4  "Our  main  quarrel,"  he  said  in  the  same 
Message,  "is  not  with  the  representatives  of  the  interests. 
They  derive  their  chief  power  from  the  great  sinister 
offenders  who  stand  behind  them.  They  are  but  puppets 
who  move  as  the  strings  are  pulled.  It  is  not  the  pup 
pets,  but  the  strong  cunning  men  and  the  mighty  forces 
working  for  evil  behind  and  through  the  puppets  with 
whom  we  have  to  deal.  We  seek  to  control  law-defying 
wealth."  5 

Roosevelt's  own  comment  is  highly  interesting.  Thus 
he  wrote  to  his  brother-in-law  during  November:  "Of 
course  I  am  gravely  harassed  and  concerned  over  the 


1  Oct.  1,  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  1377. 

2  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,   1636.        »  Ibid.,   1528.        4  Ibid.,   1637. 
6  Ibid.,  1619. 


352  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  (1907 

situation.  ...  I  am  doing  everything  I  have  power  to 
do ;  but  the  fundamental  fact  is  that  the  public  is  suffer 
ing  from  a  spasm  of  lack  of  confidence.  Most  of  this 
lack  of  confidence  is  absolutely  unreasonable  and  there 
fore  we  can  do  nothing  with  it.  There  is  a  part  for  which 
there  is  a  substantial  basis  however.  There  has  been 
so  much  trickery  and  dishonesty  in  high  places ;  the  ex 
posures  about  Harriman,  Rockefeller,  Heinze,  Barney, 
Morse,  Ryan,  the  insurance  men  and  others  have  caused 
such  a  genuine  shock  to  people  that  they  have  begun  to 
be  afraid  that  every  bank  really  has  something  rotten 
in  it.  In  other  words  they  have  passed  through  the  pe 
riod  of  unreasoning  trust  and  optimism  into  unreasoning 
distrust  and  pessimism.  I  shall  do  everything  I  can  up 
to  the  very  verge  of  my  power  to  restore  confidence,  to 
give  the  banks  a  chance  to  get  currency  into  circula 
tion."  i 

Roosevelt  was  especially  severe  in  his  criticism  of  Rocke 
feller  whom  I  have  already  considered ;  but  Rockefeller 
would  have  been  astonished  to  know  that  he  was  classed 
with  men  of  evil  intent ;  on  the  contrary  he  was  at  this 
time  working  at  the  back  of  Morgan  and  with  the  same 
purpose  in  view  as  that  of  the  President  "to  restore  con 
fidence."  It  was,  it  is  true,  a  selfish  purpose,  as  to  dis 
turb  the  complex  arrangements  of  business  and  of  finance 
was  worse,  so  far  as  the  amount  of  loss  is  concerned,  for 
the  large  financiers  than  for  the  wage-earner  and  small 
shop-keeper. 

By  February  1,  1908,  confidence  was  practically  re 
stored.  On  the  last  day  of  1907  the  premium  on  cur- 


Bishop,  ii.  48. 


CH.  XV.]  THE  PANIC  OF   1907  353 

rency  was  only  i  of  one  per  cent.  But  the  strain  had 
been  great.  One  week  during  November  the  deficit  in 
the  legal  reserve  was  54  millions ;  this  was  when  the 
weekly  statements  were  made  on  the  old  basis  before 
the  passing  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Act.  One  hundred 
million  dollars  of  gold  were  imported  from  Europe.  At 
the  close  of  the  year  the  Bank  of  England  rate  was  the 
highest  for  thirty-four  years.  So  far  as  New  York  City 
was  concerned  the  panic  according  to  Alexander  D.  Noyes 
was  not  approached  in  1893  and  hardly  paralleled  in 
1873 ;  although  the  remark  would  hardly  hold  true  of 
the  West.1 

In  the  West  was  a  large  amount  of  so-called  desert 
land.  But  "the  very  condition  of  aridity,"  wrote  George 
Wharton  James  in  his  useful  book,  "is  an  assurance  of 
great  fertility  when  water  is  applied.  .  .  .  The  most  fer 
tile  countries  are  the  arid  ones,  and  not  the  humid  and 


1  An  excellent  authority  is  Alex.  D.  Noyes  whose  articles  in  the  Forum 
for  July,  Oct.  1907,  and  Jan.,  April,  1908,  give  a  true  and  exact  account  of 
the  panic.  I  have  also  consulted  The  Nation  for  Oct.  and  Nov.  1907,  the 
financial  articles  in  which  were  probably  written  by  Noyes;  also  the  N.  Y. 
Tribune  for  Oct.  21,  22,  23,  24  and  Nov.  5. 

"During  the  panic  of  1893  no  bank  failure  of  any  consequence  occurred 
in  New  York  City.  In  October,  1907,  one  national  bank,  four  trust  com 
panies  and  six  state  banks  closed  their  doors  in  that  locality  and  in  the 
closing  week  of  January  the  suspension  was  announced  of  four  banks  do 
ing  business  in  Manhattan  Island.  These  were  not  institutions  of  the 
first  importance  but  at  the  start  they  threatened  complications  to  the 
general  situation.  .  .  .  All  of  these  January  bank  failures  represented 
the  cleaning  up  process  which  followed  an  experiment  in  reckless  and  un 
usual  banking  undertaken  during  the  recent  boom.  These  banks,  directly 
or  indirectly,  had  been  involved  in  the  process  known  as  'chain  bank 
ing.'  "  —  Noyes.  The  Forum,  April,  498. 

In  July,  1893,  in  New  York  City  only  one  national  bank  suspended  with 
assets  of  $800,000  and  one  state  bank  with  assets  $400,000.  During 
August,  1893,  two  more  state  banks  and  during  December  another  state 
bank  closed  their  doors. 


354  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1902 

well  watered  ones."  *  And  water  was  plenty  but  it  came 
from  the  mountains,  partly  from  the  melting  of  snow, 
and  during  the  late  winter  and  spring  rushed  down  the 
river-beds  in  torrents,  frequently  overflowing  the  plains 
and  sometimes  carrying  destruction  to  farms,  villages  and 
towns.  The  rain  descended  and  the  floods  came  and  the 
winds  blew.  The  problem  was  to  chain  this  force,  to 
store  the  water  when  it  was  plenty  and  let  it  loose  during 
the  intense  heat  of  the  summer  and  whenever  wanted. 
The  method  to  be  applied  was  well  known;  the  money 
and  the  ability  properly  to  spend  it  were  necessary  fac 
tors.  Something  had  been  done  by  private  companies 
and  by  State  and  other  official  organizations  but  they 
could  not  furnish  the  means  to  operate  irrigation  on  a 
large  scale.  Soon  after  Roosevelt  became  President, 
Gifford  Pinchot  and  Frederick  H.  Newell  called  upon 
him  and  presented  "  their  plans  for  National  irrigation 
of  the  arid  lands  of  the  West."  They  found  in  Roosevelt 
a  ready  listener  and  one  thoroughly  comprehending.  As 
a  young  man  he  had  passed  much  time  on  a  ranch  2  and 
understood  the  marvels  of  irrigation,  so  that  no  argument 
was  needed  to  convert  him  to  the  scheme  which  he  ad 
vocated  in  his  first  Message  to  Congress.  "The  forest 
and  water  problems,"  he  declared,  "are  perhaps  the  most 
vital  internal  problems  of  the  United  States.  !  3  On  June 
17, 1902,  he  had  the  satisfaction  of  signing  the  bill  which 
provided  for  the  work  being  done  by  the  Nation.  This  is 
known  as  the  Newlands  Act  from  its  author,  Senator  New- 
lands,  who  had  wrought  strenuously  to  effect  its  passage. 


1  Reclaiming  the  Arid  West,  25,  26. 

2  See  My  Brother,  T.  Roosevelt,  Mrs.  Robinson,  chap.  vi. 

3  Autobiography,  431. 


CH.  XV.]  IRRIGATION  355 

Part  of  James's  book  reads  like  a  magical  romance. 
"For  a  life- time/'  he  wrote,  "I  have  sung  the  majestic 
chorus  of  Mendelssohn  from  Elijah,  ' Thanks  be  to  God; 
he  laveth  the  thirsty  land/  Again  and  again  have  I 
thrilled  to  its  passionate  power,  but  never  did  I  dream 
of  its  full  significance  until  I  saw  water  pouring  through 
the  irrigation  canals  of  our  thirsty  West;  the  gentle 
murmuring  of  the  flowing  waters  suggesting  the  music 
made  by  the  land  as  it  soaked  up,  absorbed,  drew  into 
every  thirsty  pore,  the  life-giving,  stimulating,  seed- 
growing  fluid."  1 

When  one  thinks  that  the  United  States  is,  according 
to  European  opinions,  a  loosely  administered  country, 
one  reads  with  satisfaction  James's  tribute  to  the  "  knowl 
edge,  skill,  ingenuity,  tact,  patience  and  equanimity  of 
the  officials,  engineers  and  managers  of  the  Reclamation 
Service"  ; 2  and  one  cannot  help  thinking  that  nowhere  else 
could  so  large  an  undertaking  have  been  more  efficiently 
conducted.  James  is  not  a  Calif ornian,  possessed  with 
the  idea  that  his  is  the  greatest  country  on  earth  and 
full  of  blind  enthusiasm  for  the  Western  States,  as  he 
is  fully  conversant  with  the  English  work  in  Egypt  and 
India  and  the  irrigation  system  of  Argentina.3  Roose 
velt,  on  the  completion  of  the  Roosevelt  Dam  in  Arizona, 
thanked  the  engineers  present  "for  then:  admirable  work, 
as  efficient  as  it  was  honest  and  conducted  according  to 
the  highest  standards  of  the  public  service.  As  I  looked," 
he  said,  "at  the  fine,  strong,  eager  faces  of  those  of  the 

1  Reclaiming  the  Arid  West,  34. 

2  James  dedicates  his  book  to  John  W.  Powell,  Francis  G.  Newlands, 
Charles  D.  Walcott,  Frederick  H.  Newell,  William  E.  Smyth,  George  H. 
Maxwell,  Arthur  P.  Davis,  Franklin  K.  Lane. 

1  Reclaiming  the  Arid  West,  11,  37,  390. 


356  !  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1902 

force  who  were  present  and  thought  of  the  similar  men 
in  the  service,  in  the  higher  positions,  who  were  absent 
and  who  were  no  less  responsible  for  the  work  done,  I 
felt  a  foreboding  that  they  would  never  receive  any  real 
recognition  for  their  achievement."  l 

Roosevelt  had  a  clear  comprehension  of  what  was 
needed  when  he  became  President.  "The  idea  that  our 
natural  resources  were  inexhaustible,"  he  wrote,  " still 
obtained,  and  there  was  as  yet  no  real  knowledge  of  their 
extent  and  condition.  .  .  .  Our  magnificent  river  sys 
tem  with  its  superb  possibilities  for  public  usefulness 
was  dealt  with  by  the  National  Government  not  as  a 
unit  but  as  a  disconnected  series  of  pork-barrel  problems. 
...  On  June  17,  1902,  the  Reclamation  Act  was  passed. 
It  set  aside  the  proceeds  of  the  disposal  of  public  lands 
for  the  purpose  of  reclaiming  the  waste  areas  of  the  arid 
West  by  irrigating  lands  otherwise  worthless  and  thus 
creating  new  homes  upon  the  land.  The  money  so  ap 
propriated  was  to  be  repaid  to  the  Government  by  the 
settlers,  and  to  be  used  again  as  a  revolving  fund  contin 
uously  available  for  the  work."  2 

The  storage  dam,  called  after  Roosevelt,  at  the  canyon 
of  the  Salt  River  —  "  a  wild,  ragged  and  picturesque  spot," 
is  an  excellent  example  of  irrigation.  "To  create  a  dam 
here  of  sufficient  power  to  stop  and  tame  the  Salt  River, 
especially  at  flood  time,  meant  a  gigantic  piece  of  solid 
engineering."  3  Such  a  one  was  constructed  and  the 
result  is  best  told  by  a  citation  by  Charles  G.  Washburn 

1  Autobiography,  435.     The  men  whom  Roosevelt  held  up  especially 
for  honor  were  Gifford  Pinchot,  John  W.  Powell,  F.  H.  Newell,  Charles 
D.  Walcott,  Francis  G.  Newlands,  G.  H.  Maxwell,  Dr.  J.  W.  McGee. 

2  Autobiography,  430,  431. 

8  Reclaiming  the  West,  James,  71.     See  that  book  for  a  fine  account. 


CH.  XV.]  THE  ROOSEVELT  DAM  357 

from  an  Arizona  newspaper  printed  probably  about  1916  : 
"Ten  years  ago  farm  land  in  the  Salt  River  Valley  was 
worth  from  thirty-five  to  a  hundred  dollars  per  acre.  It  is 
now  worth  from  seventy-five  to  five  hundred  dollars.  .  .  . 
What  effected  the  change?  The  credit  should  be  given 
to  the  Roosevelt  Reservoir.  .  .  .  The  Roosevelt  Reser 
voir  right  now  has  more  water  in  it  than  it  ever  had  be 
fore,  giving  positive  insurance  of  crops  in  the  Salt  River 
Valley  for  years  to  come.  It  is  three-fourths  full  and 
will  be  entirely  filled  before  the  snow  stops  melting  this 
spring."1  The  Roosevelt  Dam  was  nearly  five  years 
in  construction,2  and  was  opened  by  ex-President  Roose 
velt  in  March,  1911. 

The  Colorado  River  is  the  Nile  of  America,  only  it  is 
not  navigable ;  it  was  dammed  at  Yuma,  251  miles  south 
east  of  Los  Angeles.3  The  results  were  excellent  and 
made  for  civilization.  "Every  item,"  wrote  Roosevelt 
in  1913,  "of  the  whole  great  plan  of  reclamation  now 
in  effect  was  undertaken  between  1902  and  1906.  By 
the  spring  of  1909  the  work  was  an  assured  success  and 
the  Government  had  become  fully  committed  to  its  con 
tinuance."  4 

James,  in  his  chapter  entitled  "A  Vision  of  the  Future," 
the  last  one  of  his  book  published  in  1917,  wrote,  "Who 
that  is  familiar  with  the  destructive  floods  of,  say,  three 
Western  rivers  alone,  the  Columbia,  Colorado  and  Sac 
ramento,  does  not  understand  that  the  real  conquest  of 
these  rivers  has  not  yet  even  begun."  There  are  80 


1  Washburn's  Roosevelt,  126. 

2  Sept.  20,  1906  to  March,  1911,  James,  80. 
s  For  a  full  account,  ibid.,  97. 

4  Autobiography,   432. 


358  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1907 

million  acres  of  swamp  lands  and  400  million  acres  of 
deserts,  mostly  public  domains,  in  the  United  States. 
li  Our  swamp  and  overflow  lands,"  he  continued,  " embrace 
an  area  greater  than  the  whole  superficial  area  of  the 
Philippines.  Their  reclamation  would  give  employment 
for  years  to  hundreds  of  thousands  of  laborers  and  later 
would  afford  opportunities  for  the  establishment  of 
approximately  two  and  a  half  million  families  in  homes 
of  their  own.  Two  or  three  harvests  from  these  lands 
would  suffice  to  pay  the  entire  cost  of  reclamation.  .  .  . 
The  Man  of  Destiny  is  the  hydraulic  engineer."  1 

Theodore  Roosevelt  was  no  engineer  but  he  appre 
ciated  fully  the  material  interests  of  his  country.  "A 
primeval  forest,"  he  wrote  while  governor,  "is  a  great 
sponge  which  absorbs  and  distils  the  rain  water.  And 
when  it  is  destroyed  the  result  is  apt  to  be  an  alternation 
of  flood  and  drought.  Forest  fires  ultimately  make  the 
land  a  desert."  "I  was  a  warm  believer  in  reclamation 
and  in  forestry,"  he  wrote  while  President.2  Forestry 
is  the  science  of  caring  for  and  cultivating  forests.  "  Con 
cerned  over  the  destruction  of  the  forests,"  Roosevelt 
as  President  did  what  he  could  for  their  preservation. 
He  was  attracted  to  Gifford  Pinchot  to  whom  he  paid  a 
warm  tribute.  "He  led,"  so  Roosevelt  wrote,  "and  in 
deed  during  its  most  vital  period  embodied  the  fight  for 
the  preservation  through  use  of  our  forests." 3  The 
enemies  of  the  forest  were  fires,  the  sawmill  and  other 
inventions  for  getting  timber  and  wood-pulp.  By  legis 
lation  which  he  furthered  and  by  executive  action  the 
President  had  always  in  mind  that  a  fight  must  be  made 

1  Pp.  389,  390,  393.  2  Autobiography,  339,  431. 

8  Autobiography,  429. 


CH.  XV.]  THE   MISSISSIPPI  RIVER  359 

for  the  preservation  of  the  forests.  They  are,  he  told 
the  people  of  Memphis,  on  October  4,  1907,  "the  most 
effective  preventers  of  floods ;  .  .  .  the  loss  from  soil  wash 
is  enormous.  ...  It  is  computed  .  .  .  that  one  billion 
tons  in  weight  of  the  richest  soil  matter  of  the  United 
States  is  annually  gathered  in  storm  rivulets,  washed 
into  the  rivers  and  borne  into  the  sea.  .  .  .  We  are  con 
suming  our  forests  three  times  faster  than  they  are  being 
reproduced.  .  .  .  Yet  forests,  unlike  mines,  can  be  so 
handled  as  to  yield  the  best  results  of  use,  without  ex 
haustion,  just  like  green  fields."  L 

The  President's  trip  down  the  Mississippi  River  on  a 
steamboat  was  a  notable  occurrence.  At  St.  Louis  on 
October  2,  1907,  he  said,  "I  am  taking  a  trip  on  the  great 
natural  highway  which  runs  past  your  very  doors  —  a 
highway  once  important  now  almost  abandoned."  In 
other  parts  of  the  country  the  railroad  development  had 
been  at  the  expense  of  the  rivers  and  of  canals,  natural 
and  artificial  waterways.  In  mercantile  traffic  we  must 
follow  the  prime  example  of  the  Great  Lakes  as  "the 
commerce  that  passes  through  the  Soo  far  surpasses  in 
bulk  and  value  that  of  the  Suez  Canal."  2  At  Memphis 
during  the  speech  from  which  I  have  already  quoted, 
he  said,  "The  Mississippi  Valley  is  a  magnificent  empire 
in  size  and  fertility."  In  it  there  are  "12,000  miles  of 
waterway  now  more  or  less  fully  navigable."  "This 
vast  stretch  of  country  lying  between  the  Alleghanies 
and  the  Rockies,  the  Great  Lakes  and  the  Gulf  will  largely 
fix  the  type  of  civilization  for  the  whole  Western  Hemi 
sphere."  3 

1  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  1429  et  seq.  2  Ibid.,  1390. 

3  Ibid.,  1420. 


360  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1907 

An  important  incident  on  this  voyage  was  that  the 
Inland  Waterways  Commission,  appointed  by  the  Presi 
dent  during  March,  1907,  asked  him  to  call  a  conference 
on  the  conservation  of  natural  resources  in  Washington. 
Roosevelt  carried  out  their  request  and  wrote  to  the  gov 
ernors  of  the  several  States  and  to  prominent  men  sum 
moning  them  to  Washington  to  attend  such  a  conference. 
"The  conservation  of  our  natural  resources,"  he  wrote 
in  a  special  Message  to  Congress  of  March  25,  1908,  "is 
literally  vital  for  the  future  of  the  Nation."  1  To  the 
imposing  conference  assembled  in  the  East  Room  of  the 
White  House  he  said  in  his  address  of  welcome:  "So 
vital  is  this  question  that  for  the  first  time  in  our  history 
the  chief  executive  officers  of  the  States  separately,  and 
of  the  States  together  forming  the  Nation,  have  met  to 
consider  it."  Men,  "chosen  for  their  special  acquaint 
ance  with  the  terms  of  the  problem  that  is  before  us, 
the  Senators  and  Representatives  in  Congress,  the  Su 
preme  Court,  the  Cabinet  and  the  Inland  Waterways 
Commission  have  likewise  been  invited  to  the  confer 
ence."  2  A  friendly  criticism  was  that  such  an  assem 
blage  was  perfectly  obvious.  But  no  President  had  ever 
initiated  it  before  and  it  remained  for  Roosevelt,  in  this 
case  as  in  many  others,  to  make  the  precedent. 

The  Convention  of  Governors  as  it  was  called  was  an 
interesting  assembly.  It  was  of  course  presided  over 
by  the  President  who,  as  he  stepped  into  the  East  Room, 
took  his  place  at  the  presiding  officer's  table  and  called 
the  meeting  to  order  by  a  rap  of  the  gavel,  could  not  help 


1  Review  of  Reviews  ed.,  1687. 
» Ibid.,  1739. 


CH.  XV.]  WILLIAM  J.  BRYAN  361 

reminding  one  of  the  Homeric  Council  at  which  Aga 
memnon,  King  of  men,  was  at  the  head.  Verily  Roosevelt 
was  in  this  assemblage  "King  of  men."  It  was  notable 
to  an  onlooker  from  the  East  to  see  the  representative 
men  of  the  South  and  West  gathered  together.  After 
much  discussion  the  Conference  adopted  a  report  and 
the  debate  on  it  was  instructive.  The  governors  of  the 
Southern  States  were  well  to  the  fore  and  seemed  to  en 
joy  speaking  of  the  President  as  a  man  of  large  brain 
and  great  heart  —  a  man  of  "inside"  views  and  generous 
ideas.  He  was  always  received  with  enthusiasm,  and 
next  to  this,  though  below  it  in  intensity,  was  that 
awarded  to  William  J.  Bryan,  who  came  by  invitation 
as  one  of  the  delegates.  The  Southern  governors  re 
ferred  often  to  the  indissoluble  union  of  indestructible 
States,  and  their  discussion  of  centralization  and  State 
rights  was  significant.  Bryan  read  his  paper  and  the  on 
looker  thought  he  was  a  poor  reader  and  was  disappointed 
that  he  did  not  speak  those  words  of  silver  eloquence,  of 
which  report  was  common.  Bryan  said :  "lam  a  strict 
constructionist,  if  that  means  to  believe  that  the  Federal 
Government  is  one  of  delegated  power  and  that  constitu 
tional  limitations  should  be  carefully  observed.  There 
is  no  twilight  zone  between  the  nation  and  the  State  in 
which  exploiting  interests  can  take  refuge  from  both,  and 
my  observation  is  that  most  —  not  all  but  most  —  of 
the  contentions  over  the  line  between  nation  and  State 
are  traceable  to  predatory  corporations  which  are  trying 
to  shield  themselves  from  deserved  punishment  or  en 
deavoring  to  prevent  needed  restraining  legislation.  The 
first  point  which  I  desire  to  make  is  that  earnest  men 
with  an  unselfish  purpose  and  controlled  only  for  the 


362  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1907 

public  good  will  be  able  to  agree  upon  legislation  -which 
will  not  only  preserve  for  the  future  the  inheritance  which 
we  have  received  from  a  bountiful  Providence  but  pre 
serve  it  in  such  a  way  as  to  avoid  the  dangers  of  cen 
tralization." 

Roosevelt  made  this  impromptu  reply:  "Just  a  word 
on  what  has  been  called  the  'Twilight  Land'  between 
the  powers  of  the  Federal  and  State  governments.  My 
primary  aim  in  the  legislation  that  I  have  advocated 
for  the  regulation  of  the  great  corporations  has  been  to 
provide  some  effective  popular  sovereign  for  each  cor 
poration.  I  do  not  wish  to  keep  this  twilight  land  one 
of  large  and  vague  boundaries,  by  judicial  decision  that 
in  a  given  case  the  State  cannot  act  and  then  a  few  years 
later  by  other  decisions  that  in  practically  similar  cases 
the  nation  cannot  act  either.  I  am  trying  to  find  out 
where  one  or  the  other  can  act,  so  that  there  shall  always 
be  some  sovereign  power  that  on  behalf  of  the  people 
can  hold  every  big  corporation,  every  big  individual  to  an 
accountability.  .  .  .  Give  an  ample  reward  to  the  cap 
tain  of  industry;  but  not  an  indeterminate  and  infinite 
reward.  ...  It  is  eminently  right  that  he  should  be  al 
lowed  to  make  ample  profit  from  his  development  of  the 
privilege ;  but  make  him  pay  something  for  it  and  make 
the  grant  for  a  fixed  period  so  that  when  the  conditions 
change,  as  in  all  probability  they  will  change,  our  chil 
dren,  the  Nation  of  the  future,  shall  have  the  right  to 
determine  the  condition  upon  which  that  privilege  shall 
be  enjoyed.  In  these  cases  the  State  has  not  acted  or 
cannot  act;  therefore  I  hold  the  Nation  should  act. 
Where  the  policy  I  advocate  can  be  carried  out  best  by 
the  State,  let  it  be  carried  out  by  the  State;  where  it 


CH.  XV.]  CONSERVATION   MOVEMENT  363 

can  be  carried  out  best  by  the  Nation,  let  it  be  carried 
out  by  the  Nation/'  l 

"The  conservation  movement  was  a  direct  out-growth 
of  the  forest  movement,"  wrote  Roosevelt.2  For  the 
results  of  this  Conference  on  the  conservation  of  natural 
resources,  the  reader  is  referred  to  Roosevelt's  Auto 
biography,  to  the  chapter  on  Conservation  in  Lewis's 
Life,  and  to  the  public  documents.  The  actual  effect 
on  public  sentiment  was  great.  It  directed  men's  atten 
tion  to  the  subject  and  made  them  feel  that  they  had 
been  wasting  Nature's  heritage  and  that  henceforward 
economy  and  not  waste  should  be  the  rule. 

"The  business  management  of  the  Forest  Service  be 
came  so  excellent  .  .  .  that  it  was  declared  by  a  well- 
known  firm  of  business  organizers  to  compare  favorably 
with  the  best  managed  of  the  great  private  corporations, 
an  opinion  which  was  confirmed  by  the  report  of  a  Con 
gressional  investigation  and  by  the  report  of  the  Presi 
dential  Committee  on  Departmental  method.  The  area 
of  the  National  Forests  had  increased  from  43  to  194 
million  acres ;  the  force  from  about  500  to  more  than 
3000.  There  was  saved  for  public  use  in  the  National 
Forests  more  Government  timberland  during  the  seven 
and  a  half  years  prior  to  March  4,  1909,  than  during  all 
previous  and  succeeding  years  put  together."  3 

"The  United  States  Supreme  Court,"  wrote  Lewis, 
"has  upheld  every  single  action  of  Roosevelt  for  con 
servation  that  has  been  brought  before  it.  With  one 
exception  all  these  decisions  were  unanimous."  4 


1  Washington  Post,  May  16,  1908;    Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  1754. 

2  Autobiography,    444. 

3  Ibid.,  441.  4  Life  of  Roosevelt,  299. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

AT  a  luncheon  given  to  Roosevelt,  when  he  was  still 
Vice-President,  at  the  Algonquin  Club  in  Boston,  the 
President  of  the  Club,  Charles  H.  Taylor,  who  was  like 
wise  the  presiding  officer  of  the  feast,  said,  that  if  by  any 
chance  Roosevelt  became  President,  men  would  lie  uneasy 
in  their  beds  with  sleepless  nights  finding  it  impossible 
to  get  it  out  of  their  heads  that  he  was  a  Jingo  and  would 
involve  us  in  trouble;  if  the  opportunity  did  not  come 
he  would  make  it.  Roosevelt  became  President  and  had 
an  excellent  chance  to  " gobble"  Cuba  when  an  insurrec 
tion  broke  out  there  during  August,  1906.  The  story 
is  best  told  in  Roosevelt's  own  words :  "For  seven  years 
Cuba  has  been  in  a  condition  of  profound  peace  and  of 
steadily  growing  prosperity.  For  four  years  this  peace 
and  prosperity  have  obtained  under  her  own  independent 
government.  Her  peace,  prosperity  and  independence 
are  now  menaced;  for  of  all  possible  evils  that  can  be 
fall  Cuba  the  worst  is  the  evil  of  anarchy,  into  which 
civil  war  and  revolutionary  disturbances  will  assuredly 
throw  her."  1  When  he  met  the  Congress  in  December, 
1906,  he  told  the  whole  story.  "Last  August,"  he  wrote, 
"an  insurrection  broke  out  in  Cuba  which  it  speedily 
grew  evident  that  the  existing  Cuban  government  was 
powerless  to  quell.  This  Government  was  repeatedly 
asked  by  the  then  Cuban  government  to  intervene,  and 
finally  was  notified  by  the  President  of  Cuba  that  he  in- 

1  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  821. 
364 


CH.  XVI.]  CUBA  365 

tended  to  resign ;  that  his  decision  was  irrevocable ;  that 
none  of  the  other  constitutional  officers  would  consent 
to  carry  on  the  government  and  that  he  was  powerless 
to  maintain  order.  It  was  evident  that  chaos  was  im 
pending.  .  .  .  Thanks  to  the  preparedness  of  our  Navy, 
I  was  able  immediately  to  send  enough  ships  to  Cuba 
to  prevent  the  situation  from  becoming  hopeless;  and 
I  furthermore  despatched  to  Cuba  the  Secretary  of  War 
[William  H.  Taft]  and  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  State 
[Robert  Bacon]  in  order  that  they  might  grapple  with 
the  situation  on  the  ground.  All  efforts  to  secure  an 
agreement  between  the  contending  factions  by  which 
they  should  themselves  come  to  an  amicable  understand 
ing  and  settle  upon  some  modus  vivendi  —  some  pro 
visional  government  of  their  own  —  failed.  Finally  the 
President  of  the  Republic  resigned.  The  quorum  of 
Congress  assembled  failed  by  deliberate  purpose  of  its 
members,  so  that  there  was  no  power  to  act  on  his  resigna 
tion  and  the  government  came  to  a  halt.  In  accordance 
with  the  so-called  Platt  amendment,  which  was  embodied 
in  the  constitution  of  Cuba,  I  therefore  proclaimed  a 
provisional  government  for  the  island,  the  Secretary  of 
War  acting  as  provisional  governor  until  he  could  be  re 
placed  by  Mr.  Magoon,  the  late  minister  to  Panama  and 
governor  of  the  Canal  Zone  on  the  Isthmus ;  troops  were 
sent  to  support  them  and  to  relieve  the  Navy,  the  expedi 
tion  being  handled  with  most  satisfactory  speed  and 
efficiency.  The  insurgent  chiefs  immediately  agreed  that 
their  troops  should  lay  down  their  arms  and  disband  and 
the  agreement  was  carried  out.  The  provisional  govern 
ment  has  left  the  personnel  of  the  old  government  and 
the  old  laws,  so  far  as  might  be,  unchanged,  and  will  thus 


366  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1907 

administer  the  island  for  a  few  months  until  tranquillity 
can  be  restored,  a  new  election  properly  held  and  a  new 
government  inaugurated.  Peace  has  come  in  the  island, 
and  the  harvesting  of  the  sugar-cane  crop,  the  great  crop 
of  the  island,  is  about  to  proceed."  1 

"In  Cuba,"  he  told  the  Harvard  Union  in  February, 
1907,  "I  am  doing  my  best  to  persuade  the  Cubans  that 
if  only  they  will  be  good  they  will  be  happy ;  I  am  seeking 
the  very  minimum  of  interference  necessary  to  make 
them  good."  2  During  April,  1907,  he  wrote  to  Andrew 
Carnegie,  "The  United  States  Army  is  at  this  moment 
in  Cuba,  not  as  an  act  of  war,  but  to  restore  Cuba  to  the 
position  of  a  self-governing  republic."  3  Roosevelt  was 
exactly  right.  He  lived  up  fully  to  his  promise.  Cuba 
was  turned  over  again  to  its  inhabitants  in  January,  1909, 
the  last  months  of  his  two  administrations.4 

Next  to  his  fight  against  high  finance  and  his  work 
for  the  conservation  of  resources,  Roosevelt  is  associated 
in  the  public  mind  with  his  attitude  to  the  Navy.  "The 
United  States  Navy,"  he  wrote  in  his  Message  of  Decem 
ber,  1906,  "is  the  surest  guarantor  of  peace  which  this 
country  possesses."  This  declaration  must  be  borne  in 
mind  as  we  recount  his  constant  urging,  care  and  atten 
tion  to  this  branch  of  the  service.  He  would  be  a  rare 
man  in  the  Navy,  whether  officer,  midshipman,  marine  or 
seaman,  who  did  not  regard  Roosevelt  with  veneration  and 
was  not  willing  to  follow  whither  he  led.  Such  unstinted 
confidence  in  a  civilian  is  remarkable  and  as  the  same 
feeling  was  shared  by  the  Army  it  is  the  sort  of  enthusi- 


1  Review  of  Reviews,  ed.,  962.  2  Ibid.,  1178. 

•Ibid.,  1193.  4Life  of  Roosevelt,  Lewis,  244. 


CH.  XVI.]  THE  WAR   OF   1812  367 

asm  evoked  by  a  great  military  leader.  Roosevelt  was 
a  profound  student  of  naval  operations,  writing  his  first 
book  on  the  subject  at  twenty-four,  so  that  his  advice 
to  study  our  failures  was  the  result  of  scholastic  inquiry 
as  well  as  practical  observation.  There  was  only  one 
way,  he  affirmed,  in  which  the  War  of  1812  could  have 
been  avoided  as  is  well  shown  in  Captain  Mahan's  his 
tory.  "If,"  Roosevelt  wrote,  "during  the  preceding 
twelve  years,  a  navy,  relatively  as  strong  as  that  which 
the  country  now  has,  had  been  built  up  and  an  army 
provided  relatively  as  good  as  that  which  the  country 
now  has,  there  never  would  have  been  the  slightest  neces 
sity  of  fighting  the  war ;  and  if  the  necessity  had  arisen, 
the  war  would  under  such  circumstances  have  ended 
with  our  speedy  and  overwhelming  triumph.  But  our 
people  during  those  twelve  years  refused  to  make  any 
preparations  whatever  regarding  either  the  Army  or  the 
Navy.  They  saved  a  million  or  two  of  dollars  by  so  do 
ing;  and  in  mere  money  paid  a  hundredfold  for  each 
million  they  thus  saved  during  the  three  years  of  war 
which  followed  —  a  war  which  brought  untold  suffering 
upon  our  people,  which  at  one  time  threatened  the  gravest 
national  disaster,  and  which,  in  spite  of  the  necessity  of 
waging  it,  resulted  merely  in  what  was  in  effect  a  drawn 
battle,  while  the  balance  of  defeat  and  triumph  was  al 
most  even."  l 

In  1906  he  asked  Congress  "for  the  building  each  year 
of  at  least  one  first-class  battle-ship."  2  But  one  year 
later  he  had  changed  his  opinion  and  asked  for  four  battle- 

1  Review  of  Reviews  ed.,  983. 

2  Annual  Message,  ibid.,  984.     The  American  Navy  at  that  time  had 
nine  battleships  and  eight  more  in  course  of  construction.     Life  of  Roose 
velt,  Lewis,  201. 


368  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1907 

ships.  The  second  Hague  Conference,  that  held  from 
June  to  October,  1907,  meanwhile  had  declined  to  limit 
naval  armaments;  therefore  "it  would  be  most  unwise 
for  us  to  stop  the  upbuilding  of  our  Navy.  To  build  one 
battle-ship  of  the  best  and  most  advanced  type  a  year 
would  barely  keep  our  fleet  up  to  its  present  force.  This 
is  not  enough.  .  .  .  The  only  efficient  use  for  the  Navy 
is  for  offence.  The  only  way  in  which  it  can  efficiently 
protect  our  own  coast  against  the  possible  action  of  a 
foreign  navy  is  by  destroying  that  foreign  navy/'  l 

"This  is  a  very  rough-and-tumble,  workaday  world," 
Roosevelt  wrote  in  a  private  letter ; 2  and  we  peace-lovers 
must  admit  that  he  comprehended  Europe  in  1907  better 
than  we  did.  Nobody  could  assert  that  he  foresaw  the 
terrible  conflict  which  began  in  1914,  but  he  believed  in 
being  ready  for  any  emergency  and  was  less  trustful  of 
our  European  contemporaries  than  were  we  who  sat  in 
comfortable  libraries  and  constructed  theories.3  There 
fore  the  years  have  demonstrated  that  he  was  supremely 
right  when  he  asked  for  four  battleships,  and  we  were 
wrong  when  we  cut  him  down  to  two.4  "Our  army  and 
navy/'  he  wrote,  "and  above  all  our  people  learned  some 
lessons  from  the  Spanish  War  and  applied  them  to  our 
own  uses.  During  the  following  decade  the  improvement 
in  our  army  and  navy  was  very  great;  not  in  material 
but  also  in  personnel,  and,  above  all,  in  the  ability  to 
handle  our  forces  in  good-sized  units.  By  1908  .  .  .  the 
navy  had  become  in  every  respect  as  fit  a  fighting  instru- 


1  Message  of  1907,  Review  of  Reviews  ed.,  1573. 

2  Bishop,  ii.  23. 
'Ibid. 

4  Act  of  May  13,  1908,  "to  cost,  exclusive  of  armor  and  armament, 
not  exceeding  six  million  dollars  each." 


CH.  XVI.]  THE  VOYAGE  'AROUND  THE  WORLD  369 

ment  as  any  other  navy  in  the  world,  fleet  for  fleet.  Even 
in  size  there  was  but  one  nation,  England,  which  was 
completely  out  of  our  class ;  and  in  view  of  our  relations 
with  England  and  all  the  English-speaking  peoples,  this 
was  of  no  consequence."  1  For  the  efficient  use  of  the 
money  which  Congress  gave  him  Roosevelt  could  be 
thoroughly  trusted  when  he  comprehended  matters  — 
and  it  is  amazing  the  number  that  he  did  comprehend  - 
and  in  his  work,  as  we  look  at  it  now,  he  was  above  criti 
cism  when  it  is  understood  with  what  materials  he  had 
to  work.2  But  he  always  had  at  his  back  the  rank  and 
file  of  the  Navy  and  Army  whose  attitude  toward  him 
was  almost  one  of  worship.  He  was  now  to  give  the 
greatest  proof  of  the  efficiency  of  the  Navy  in  the  voyage 
around  the  world. 

This  was  so  stupendous  a  feat  that  it  is  well  that  Roose 
velt  himself  should  tell  the  story.  "In  my  own  judg 
ment,"  he  wrote  in  his  Autobiography,  "the  most  im 
portant  service  that  I  rendered  to  peace  was  the  voyage 
of  the  battle  fleet  round  the  world.  I  had  become  con 
vinced  that  for  many  reasons  it  was  essential  that  we 
should  have  it  clearly  understood,  by  our  own  people 


1  Autobiography,  276.     On  March  9,  1905,  he  wrote  to  General  Leonard 
Wood:    "When  I  became  President  three  years  ago  I  made  up  my  mind 
that  I  should  try  for  a  fleet  with  a  minimum  strength  of  forty  armor  clads; 
and  though  the  difficulty  of  getting  what  I  wished  has  increased  from 
year  to  year  I  have  now  reached  my  mark  and  we  have  built  or  provided 
for  twenty-eight  battle-ships  and  twelve  armored  cruisers.     This  navy 
puts  us  a  good  second  to  France  and  about  on  a  par  with  Germany ;  and 
ahead  of  any  other  power  in  point  of  material,  except,  of  course,  England." 
Bishop,  i.  366. 

2  "I  have  had  on  occasions  to  fight  bosses  and  rings  and  machines; 
and  have  to  get  along  as  best  I  could  with  bosses  and  rings  and  machines 
when  the  conditions  were  different."     And  he  wrote  to  Sir  George  Trevel- 
yan  on  May  13,  1905,  "In  practical  life  we  have  to  work  with  the  instru 
ments  at  hand."     Bishop,  ii.  13,  150. 


370  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1907 

especially,  but  also  by  other  peoples  that  the  Pacific  was 
as  much  our  home  waters  as  the  Atlantic  and  that  our 
fleet  could  and  would  at  will  pass  from  one  to  the  other 
of  the  two  great  oceans.  It  seemed  to  me  evident  that 
such  a  voyage  would  greatly  benefit  the  navy  itself; 
would  arouse  popular  interest  in  and  enthusiasm  for  the 
navy ;  and  would  make  foreign  nations  accept  as  a  matter 
of  course  that  our  fleet  should  from  time  to  time  be  gath 
ered  in  the  Pacific  just  as  from  time  to  time  it  was  gath 
ered  in  the  Atlantic,  and  that  its  presence  in  one  ocean 
was  no  more  to  be  accepted  as  a  mark  of  hostility  to  any 
Asiatic  power  than  its  presence  in  the  Atlantic  was  to 
be  accepted  as  a  mark  of  hostility  to  any  European 
power."  l  On  July  4  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  in  a 
speech  at  Oakland,  California,  said  the  Pacific  coast 
would  shortly  receive  a  visit  from  the  Navy.2  But  a 
letter  to  Secretary  Root  from  Oyster  Bay  nine  days  later 
showed  a  further  reaching  program  in  Roosevelt's  busy 
brain  and  also  the  most  important  reason  for  his  deter 
mination. 

"I  am  more  concerned,"  he  wrote  to  Secretary  Root, 
"over  the  Japanese  situation  than  almost  any  other. 
Thank  Heaven  we  have  the  Navy  in  good  shape.  It 
is  high  time  however  that  it  should  go  on  a  cruise  around 
the  world.  In  the  first  place  I  think  it  will  have  a  pacific 
effect  to  show  that  it  can  be  done ;  and  in  the  next  place, 
after  talking  thoroughly  over  the  situation  with  the  naval 
board  I  became  convinced  that  it  was  absolutely  neces 
sary  for  us  to  try  in  time  of  peace  to  see  just  what  we 
could  do  in  the  way  of  putting  a  big  battle  fleet  in  the 


1  P.  592.  2  Life  of  Roosevelt,  Lewis,  266. 


OH.  XVI.]  THE  JAPANESE  QUESTION  371 

Pacific  and  not  make  the  experiment  in  time  of  war. 
Aoki  and  Admiral  Yamamoto  were  out  here  yesterday 
at  lunch.  .  .  .  Yamamoto,  an  ex-Cabinet  Minister  and 
a  man  of  importance,  evidently  had  completely  misunder 
stood  the  situation  here  and  what  the  possibilities  were. 
I  had  a  long  talk  with  him  through  an  interpreter.  He 
kept  insisting  that  the  Japanese  must  not  be  kept  out 
save  as  we  keep  out  Europeans.  I  kept  explaining  to 
him  that  what  we  had  to  do  was  to  face  facts ;  that  if 
American  laboring  men  came  in  and  cut  down  the  wages 
of  Japanese  laboring  men,  they  would  be  shut  out  of 
Japan  in  one  moment ;  and  that  Japanese  laborers  must 
be  excluded  from  the  United  States  on  economic  grounds. 
I  told  him  emphatically  that  it  was  not  possible  to  admit 
Japanese  laborers  into  the  United  States.  ...  I  pointed 
out  that  under  our  present  treaty  we  had  explicitly  re 
served  the  right  to  exclude  Japanese  laborers.  I  talked 
freely  of  the  intended  trip  of  the  battle-ship  fleet  through 
the  Pacific,  mentioning  that  it  would  return  home  very 
shortly  after  it  had  been  sent  out  there ;  at  least  in  all 
probability.  1  also  was  most  complimentary  about 
Japan."  1 

The  fleet  of  sixteen  battleships,  all  of  them  commis 
sioned  since  the  Spanish-American  War,  sailed  from 
Hampton  Roads  on  December  16,  1907.  Their  officers 
and  crews  numbered  about  12,000  men.  They  were  re 
viewed  before  their  departure  by  President  Roosevelt, 
when  it  was  generally  supposed  that  they  were  going 
to  San  Francisco  and  possibly  as  far  north  as  Seattle. 
But  after  Roosevelt  had  returned  to  the  White  House 


1  Bishop,  ii.  64. 


372  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1907 

"it  was  announced  that  the  fleet  would  continue  on  to 
our  insular  possessions  and  return  home  by  the  Suez 
Canal."  l 

"I  determined  on  the  move,"  wrote  Roosevelt,  " with 
out  consulting  the  Cabinet.  ...  A  council  of  war  never 
rights  and  in  a  crisis  the  duty  of  a  leader  is  to  lead  and 
not  take  refuge  behind  the  generally  timid  wisdom  of  a 
multitude  of  councillors.  At  that  time  as  I  happen  to 
know,  neither  the  English  nor  the  German  authorities 
believed  it  possible  to  take  a  fleet  of  great  battle-ships 
round  the  world.  They  did  not  believe  that  their  own 
fleets  could  perform  the  feat  and  still  less  did  they  believe 
that  the  American  fleet  could.'7  In  1910  he  had  a  con 
firmation  of  this  which  he  related  in  his  celebrated  letter 
to  Sir  George  0.  Trevelyan:  "Von  Tirpitz  [Secretary  of 
the  Imperial  Admiralty]  was  particularly  interested  in 
the  voyage  of  the  battle  fleet  round  the  world  and  he 
told  me  frankly  that  he  had  not  believed  we  could  do  it 
successfully  and  added  that  the  English  Naval  Office  and 
Foreign  Office  had  felt  the  same  way.  ...  He  then  said 
that  he  expected  that  Japan  would  attack  us  while  the 
fleet  was  on  its  way  round  and  asked  me  if  I  had  not  also 
expected  this.  I  told  him  that  I  had  not  expected  such 
an  attack  but  that  I  had  thought  it  possible ;  in  other 
words  that  I  thought  the  chances  were  against  it,  but 
there  was  a  chance  for  it.  ...  I  had  been  doing  my  best 
to  be  polite  to  the  Japanese,  and  had  finally  become  un 
comfortably  conscious  of  a  very,  very  slight  undertone 
of  veiled  truculence  in  their  communications  in  connec 
tion  with  things  that  happened  on  the  Pacific  Slope; 


JLife  of  Roosevelt,  Lewis,  268. 


CH.  XVI.)  THE  JAPANESE  QUESTION  373 

and  I  finally  made  up  my  mind  that  they  thought  I  was 
afraid  of  them.  ...  I  found  that  the  Japanese  war  party 
firmly  believed  that  they  could  beat  us,  and,  unlike  the 
Elder  Statesmen,  thought  I  also  believed  this."  l 

During  1907  and  possibly  a  part  of  1908  the  friction 
between  California  as  the  leader  of  the  Pacific  coast 
and  Japan  became  acute.  The  question  of  excluding 
the  Japanese  from  the  public  schools  was  to  the  fore  and 
there  was  also  a  hostile  feeling  regarding  the  Japanese 
possession  of  land.  The  opposition  to  the  immigration 
of  the  Japanese  was  not  on  account  of  their  inferiority 
as  being  of  the  yellow  race,  but  on  account  of  their  su 
periority.  They  could  live  for  less,  work  for  less  than 
the  Caucasian  and  did  they  become  actual  possessors  of 
land  could  cultivate  it  better  and  get  more  from  it.  Any 
one  who  will  take  the  trouble  to  compare  the  square  miles 
and  population  of  Japan  with  the  area  of  California, 
Oregon  and  Washington  and  their  number  of  inhabitants 2 
can  see  at  once  the  reason  of  the  covetousness  of  Japan 
and  the  resistance  of  the  Caucasian.  It  was  fortunate 
that  in  the  presidential  chair  was  a  man  of  culture  who 
appreciated  the  Japanese  civilization  and  at  the  same 
time  was  a  true  American  full  of  sympathy  for  the  West 
and  who  understood  the  view  of  the  Californians. 

To  continue  the  story  from  the  Autobiography:  "I 
made  up  my  mind  that  it  was  time  to  have  a  show  down 
in  the  matter;  because  if  it  was  really  true  that  our 
fleet  could  not  get  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific  it  was 
much  better  to  know  it  and  be  able  to  shape  our  policy 

1  Bishop,  ii.  249. 

2  Japan,  148,000  square  miles,  population  over  48  millions ;  California, 
Oregon  and  Washington,  318,000  square  miles,  estimated  population  in 
1907,  three  millions. 


374  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1908 

in  view  of  the  knowledge.  Many  persons  publicly  and 
privately  protested  against  the  move  on  the  ground  that 
Japan  would  accept  it  as  a  threat.  To  this  I  answered 
nothing  in  public.  In  private  I  said  that  I  did  not  be 
lieve  Japan  would  so  regard  it  because  Japan  knew  my 
sincere  friendship  and  admiration  for  her  and  realized 
that  we  could  not  as  a  Nation  have  any  intention  of  at 
tacking  her.  .  .  .  When  in  the  spring  of  1910  I  was  in 
Europe  I  was  interested  to  find  that  high  naval  authori 
ties  in  both  Germany  and  Italy  had  expected  that  war 
would  come  at  the  time  of  the  voyage.  They  asked  me 
if  I  had  not  been  afraid  of  it,  and  if  I  had  not  expected 
that  hostilities  would  begin  at  least  by  the  time  that  the 
fleet  reached  the  Straits  of  Magellan?  I  answered  that 
I  did  not  expect  it;  that  I  believed  that  Japan  would 
feel  as  friendly  in  the  matter  as  we  did ;  but  that  if  my 
expectations  had  proved  mistaken,  it  would  have  been 
proof  positive  that  we  were  going  to  be  attacked  anyhow 
and  that  in  such  event  it  would  have  been  an  enormous 
gain  to  have  had  the  three  months'  preliminary  prepara 
tion  which  enabled  the  fleet  to  start  perfectly  equipped. 
In  a  personal  interview  before  they  left,  I  had  explained 
to  the  officers  in  command  that  I  believed  the  trip  would 
be  one  of  absolute  peace,  but  that  they  were  to  take  ex 
actly  the  same  precautions  against  sudden  attack  of  any 
kind  as  if  we  were  at  war  with  all  the  nations  of  the  earth ; 
and  that  no  excuse  of  any  kind  would  be  accepted  if  there 
were  a  sudden  attack  of  any  kind  and  we  were  taken 
unawares.  .  .  . 

"  The  cruise  did  make  a  very  deep  impression  abroad.  .  .  . 
But  the  impression  made  on  our  own  people  was  of  far 
greater  consequence.  No  single  thing  in  the  history  of 


CH.  XVI.]  THE  VOYAGE  AROUND  THE  WORLD  375 

the  new  United  States  Navy  has  done  as  much  to  stimu 
late  popular  interest  and  belief  in  it  as  the  world  cruise. 

"I  first  directed  the  fleet  of  sixteen  battle-ships  to  go 
round  through  the  Straits  of  Magellan  to  San  Francisco. 
From  thence  I  ordered  them  to  New  Zealand  and  Aus 
tralia,  then  to  the  Philippines,  China  and  Japan  and 
home  through  Suez.  .  .  .  Admiral  Evans  commanded 
the  fleet  to  San  Francisco ;  there  Admiral  Sperry  took 
it.  ...  The  coaling  and  other  preparations  were  made 
in  such  excellent  shape  by  the  Department  that  there 
was  never  a  hitch,  not  so  much  as  the  delay  of  an  hour, 
in  keeping  every  appointment  made.  All  the  repairs 
were  made  without  difficulty,  the  ship  concerned  merely 
falling  out  of  the  column  for  a  few  hours,  and  when  the 
job  was  done  steaming  at  speed  until  she  regained  her 
position.  Not  a  ship  was  left  in  any  port ;  and  there 
was  hardly  a  desertion.  As  soon  as  it  was  known  that 
the  voyage  was  to  be  undertaken  men  crowded  to  enlist, 
just  as  freely  from  the  Mississippi  Valley  as  from  the 
seaboard,  and  for  the  first  time  since  the  Spanish  War  the 
ships  put  to  sea  overmanned  —  and  by  as  stalwart  a 
set  of  men-of-war's  men  as  ever  looked  through  a  port 
hole,  game  for  a  fight  or  a  frolic,  but  also  self-respect 
ing  and  with  such  a  sense  of  responsibility  that  in  all  the 
ports  in  which  they  landed  their  conduct  was  exemplary. 
The  fleet  practised  incessantly  during  the  voyage  both 
with  the  guns  and  battle  tactics  and  came  home  a  much 
more  effective  fighting  instrument  than  when  it  started 
sixteen  months  before. l.  .  . 

"It  was  not  originally  my  intention  that  the  fleet  should 
visit  Australia  but  the  Australian  Government  sent  a 

1  For  the  torpedo  boat  destroyers  incident  see  Autobiography,  596. 


376  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1908 

most  cordial  invitation  which  I  gladly  accepted.  .  .  .  The 
reception  accorded  the  fleet  in  Australia  was  wonderful 
and  it  showed  the  fundamental  community  of  feeling 
between  ourselves  and  the  great  commonwealth  of  the 
South  Seas.  The  considerate,  generous  and  open-handed 
hospitality  with  which  the  entire  Australian  people 
treated  our  officers  and  men  could  not  have  been  sur 
passed  had  they  been  our  own  countrymen.  .  .  . 

"The  most  noteworthy  incident  of  the  cruise  was  the 
reception  given  to  our  fleet  in  Japan.  In  courtesy  and 
good  breeding,  the  Japanese  can  certainly  teach  much 
to  the  nations  of  the  Western  world.  I  had  been  very 
sure  that  the  people  of  Japan  would  understand  aright 
what  the  cruise  meant  and  would  accept  the  visit  of  our 
fleet  as  the  signal  honor  which  it  was  meant  to  be,  a  proof 
of  the  high  regard  and  friendship  1  felt  and  which  I  was 
certain  the  American  people  felt  for  the  great  Island  Em 
pire.  The  event  even  surpassed  my  expectations.  I 
cannot  too  strongly  express  my  appreciation  of  the  gen 
erous  courtesy  the  Japanese  showed  the  officers  and  crews 
of  our  fleet  and  I  may  add  that  every  man  of  them  came 
back  a  friend  and  admirer  of  the  Japanese.  On  October 
28,  1908,  Admiral  Sperry  wrote  me  that  in  Yokohama  as 
many  as  a  thousand  English-speaking  Japanese  college 
students  acted  as  volunteer  guides.  ...  In  Tokyo  there 
were  a  great  many  excellent  refreshment  places,  where 
the  men  got  excellent  meals  and  could  rest,  smoke  and 
write  letters  and  in  none  of  these  places  would  they  allow 
the  men  to  pay  anything  though  they  were  more  than  ready 
to  do  so.  The  arrangements  were  marvellously  perfect. "  l 

1  Autobiography,  592  et  seq.  This  citation  and  the  other  citations 
which  I  have  made  from  the  Autobiography  are  from  the  Macmillan 


CH.  XVI.]  THE  JAPANESE  QUESTION  377 

On  the  return  of  the  fleet  from  their  voyage  round  the 
world  President  Roosevelt  on  February  22,  1909,  ten  days 
before  he  was  to  give  up  the  cares  and  delights  of  office, 
reviewed  the  fleet,  addressing  the  officers  and  men  in 
fitting  words.1 

President  Roosevelt  was  fully  alive  to  the  Japanese 
situation.  We  cannot  let  in  the  Japanese,  he  said  in 
private  conversation  during  May,  1908,  while  the  fleet 
was  on  its  way  round  the  world  but  before  it  visited  Ja 
pan.  I  once  thought  that  we  could  but  I  have  given  up 
that  idea.  My  efforts  have  been  to  get  the  Japanese  to 
stop  emigration.  The  agreement  which  I  now  have  is 
working  fairly  well  but  not  perfectly.  An  exclusion  Act 
may  have  to  come  and  that  may  cause  trouble.  One 
reason  for  my  desire  of  the  increase  of  the  Navy  was  the 
Japanese  situation.  We  know  what  the  Japanese  are 
saying  in  their  cups  and  there  is  a  desire  on  the  part  of 
a  certain  class  in  Japan  to  go  to  war  with  us.  But  the 
Elder  Statesmen  are  opposed  to  it.  The  sending  of  the 
fleet  to  the  Pacific  stopped  the  Japanese  talk  of  war. 


Co.  edition  of  1913.  George  P.  Brett  wrote  to  me  under  date  of  Dec.  23, 
1921,  that  the  Macmillan  Company  parted  with  their  publishing  rights 
in  the  Roosevelt  Autobiography  some  two  years  ago  and  the  reference 
in  my  manuscript  to  that  book  should  therefore  credit  its  publication  to 
the  Messrs.  Scribner  instead  of  to  the  Macmillan  Company. 
1  Autobiography,  602. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

NINETEEN  hundred  eight  was  the  year  for  the  election 
of  a  President  and  it  seemed  almost  a  foregone  conclusion 
that  the  Republican  candidate  could  be  chosen,  and  he 
would  be  named  by  the  Republican  Convention  which 
met  in  Chicago  during  June.  No  man  stood  so  strong 
with  the  people  as  Theodore  Roosevelt  and  no  doubt 
remains  that  he  could  have  been  nominated  and  elected 
by  an  overwhelming  majority.  But  he  insisted  publicly 
and  privately  that  on  no  account  whatever  would  he  be 
a  candidate.  "  There  has  never  been  a  moment/'  he 
wrote  to  Lyman  Abbott  on  May  29,  "when  I  could  not 
have  had  the  Republican  nomination  with  practical  una 
nimity  by  simply  raising  one  finger. "  1  There  can  be  no 
question  that  this  statement  was  absolutely  true.  Roose 
velt  would  not  accept  the  presidency  because  he  had  a 
high  regard  for  Washington's  example  which  had  dictated 
his  pronouncement  on  election  day,  1904,  and  for  the  fur 
ther  reason  that,  as  he  felt  now  that  the  people  were  back 
of  him,  they  might  say  that  he  had  prevailed  upon  their 
support  in  order  to  further  his  own  ends  should  he  now 
stand  for  a  third  term.  But  he  was  in  no  respect  tired 
of  his  job.  "I  have  had  an  exceedingly  good  time,"  he 
wrote  to  William  Allen  White ;  "I  have  been  exceedingly 
well  treated  by  the  American  people ;  and  I  have  en 
joyed  the  respect  of  those  for  whose  respect  1  care  most." 2 
He  would  have  liked  to  remain  President.  He  loved 


Bishop,  ii.  86.      2  Nov.  26,  1907,  Bishop,  ii.  51. 
378 


CH.  XVII.  ]  ROOSEVELT   CHOSE  TAFT  379 

power  and  place  and  was  in  no  way  ashamed  to  own  it. 
"I  have  finished  my  career  in  public  life,"  he  wrote  to 
E.  S.  Martin,  the  editor  of  Life.  "I  have  enjoyed  it 
to  the  full ;  I  have  achieved  a  large  proportion  of  what 
I  set  out  to  achieve."  l 

Despite  many  and  various  influences  that  were  brought 
to  bear  upon  him  he  was  inflexible  and  resisted  every 
attempt  to  induce  him  to  stand  for  a  third  term.  But 
as  he  would  not  be  a  candidate  himself  he  could  within 
certain  limits  name  his  successor.  He  had  an  unbounded 
admiration  for  Elihu  Root  and  thought  he  would  be 
exactly  the  sort  of  man  he  would  like  to  follow  him. 
I  have  never  been  so  impressed  with  the  praise  of  one 
great  man  by  another  as  when  I  have  heard  Roosevelt 
speak  of  Root  and  I  may  add  that  this  praise  was  con 
curred  in  by  the  Ambassador  of  Great  Britain  to  the 
United  States,  James  Bryce.  But  as  Roosevelt  wrote 
to  Lawrence  F.  Abbott  in  1912,  "I  found  that  the  West 
erners  would  not  stand  Root." 2  It  was  exceedingly 
improbable  that  Root  could  be  nominated  and,  were  he 
placed  before  the  people,  his  election  against  Bryan  was 
doubtful.  Therefore  Roosevelt  dropped  Root.  Two 
other  men  were  prominent  as  candidates,  William  H.  Taft 
and  Charles  E.  Hughes.  "I  could  not  have  nominated," 
wrote  Roosevelt  to  Abbott  in  1912,  "an  extreme  pro 
gressive  or  an  extreme  conservative  but  I  could  by  a  turn 
of  the  hand  have  thrown  the  nomination  to  either  Taft 
or  Hughes.  The  only  way  to  prevent  my  own  nomina 
tion  was  for  me  actively  to  champion  and  to  force  the 
nomination  of  someone  else;  I  chose  Taft  rather  than 


1  Bishop,  ii.  123.  2  Impressions,  65. 


380  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1908 

Hughes/' l  with  the  result  that  there  were  only  two  candi 
dates  really  at  the  Chicago  convention,  Taft  and  Roose 
velt.  "As  a  matter  of  fact/'  he  wrote  to  Lyman  Abbott 
on  May  29,  "I  doubt  if  Taft  himself  could  be  more  anx 
ious  than  I  am  that  Taft  be  nominated  and  that  any 
stampede  to  me  be  prevented."  2 

The  Convention  was  held  in  Chicago  and  was  presided 
over  with  dignity  and  force  during  his  chairmanship 
by  Senator  Henry  Cabot  Lodge.3  Roosevelt  wrote  to 
Mrs.  Lodge  on  June  19,  after  Taft's  nomination  was  made : 
"In  point  of  judgment,  taste  and  power  it  would  be 
literally  impossible  to  better  either  Cabot's  words  or  his 
actions.  He  was  in  a  peculiar  sense  the  guardian  not 
only  of  the  national  interests  but  of  my  own  personal 
honor ;  and  to  do  his  full  duty  as  guardian  it  was  necessary 
for  him  effectively  to  thwart  the  movements  not  merely 
of  my  foes  but  of  the  multitude  of  well-meaning  friends 
who  did  not  think  deeply  or  who  were  not  of  very  sensi 
tive  fiber.  It  was  absolutely  necessary  that  any  stam 
pede  should  be  prevented  and  that  I  should  not  be  nomi 
nated."  4  Five  days  later  he  wrote  to  Senator  Lodge 
himself,  "On  every  side  I  hear  of  the  great  success  you 
made  as  chairman.  .  .  .  You  rendered  a  great  public 
service  and  you  rendered  me  a  personal  service."  5 

On  June  19  he  wrote  a  letter  to  Sir  George  0.  Trevelyan, 
a  copy  of  which  he  sent  to  me  that  shows  his  intimate 
thought  at  the  time. 


1  Impressions,  66.     2  Bishop,  ii.  87. 
*  It  met  June  16.    Lodge  was  permanent  chairman. 
4  Bishop,  ii.  91.    James  S.  Sherman  of   New  York  was  nominated  for 
Vice-President. 
6  Ibid.,  92. 


CH.  XVII.]  ROOSEVELT  AND  TAFT  381 

"Well,"  so  Roosevelt  wrote,  "the  convention  is  over 
and  Taft  is  nominated  on  a  platform  which  I  heartily 
approve.  No  one  can  prophesy  in  politics,  and  so  I  can 
not  be  sure  that  we  shall  elect  him,  but  the  chances  I 
believe  favor  it,  and  most  certainly  it  will  show  unwisdom 
in  the  country  if  he  is  not  elected.  For,  always  except 
ing  Washington  and  Lincoln,  I  believe  that  Taft  as  Presi 
dent  will  rank  with  any  other  man  who  has  ever  been 
in  the  White  House. 

"  It  has  been  a  curious  contest,  for  I  have  had  to  fight 
tooth  and  nail  against  being  renominated  myself,  and 
in  the  last  three  weeks  it  has  needed  very  resolute  effort 
on  my  part  to  prevent  a  break  among  the  delegates,  which 
would  have  meant  a  stampede  for  me  and  my  nomination. 
I  could  not  have  prevented  it  at  all  unless  I  had  thrown 
myself  heart  and  soul  into  the  business  of  nominating 
Taft  and  had  shown  to  the  country  that  he  stood  for  ex 
actly  the  same  principles  and  policies  that  I  did,  and  that 
I  believed  with  all  my  heart  and  soul  that  under  him  we 
should  progress  steadily  along  the  road  this  administra 
tion  has  traveled.  He  and  I  view  public  questions  ex 
actly  alike.  In  fact,  I  think  it  has  been  very  rare  that 
two  public  men  have  ever  been  so  much  at  one  in  all  the 
essentials  of  their  beliefs  and  practices. 

"When  I  made  my  announcement  three  years  ago  last 
November,  just  after  the  election,  that  I  would  under 
no  circumstances  again  be  a  candidate,  I  of  course  acted 
on  a  carefully-thought-out  and  considered  theory.  Hav 
ing  made  it  and  having  given  my  word  to  the  people  at 
large  as  to  what  I  would  do,  and  other  men,  including 
Taft,  having  entered  the  field  on  the  strength  of  this 
statement  of  mine,  I  never  felt  the  slightest  hesitancy, 


382  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1908 

the  slightest  wavering,  as  to  the  proper  course  to  follow. 
But  the  developments  of  the  last  year  or  two  have  been 
so  out  of  the  common  that  at  times  I  have  felt  a  little 
uncomfortable  as  to  whether  my  announced  decision 
had  been  wise.  Yet  I  think  it  was  wise ;  and  now  I  want 
to  give  you  my  reasons  in  full. 

"In  the  first  place,  I  will  freely  admit  what  there  is  to 
say  against  it.  I  do  not  like  any  man  who  flinches  from 
work,  and  I  like  him  none  the  better  if  he  covers  his 
flinching  under  the  title  of  self-abnegation  or  renuncia 
tion  or  any  other  phrase,  which  may  mean  merely  weak 
ness,  or  also  that  he  is  willing  to  subordinate  great  and 
real  public  interests  to  a  meticulous  and  fantastic  moral 
ity,  in  which  he  is  concerned  chiefly  for  the  sake  of  his 
own  shriveled  soul.  There  is  very  much  to  be  said  in 
favor  of  the  theory  that  the  public  has  a  right  to  demand 
as  long  service  from  any  man  who  is  doing  good  service 
as  it  thinks  will  be  useful;  and  during  the  last  year  or 
two  I  have  been  rendered  extremely  uncomfortable  both 
by  the  exultation  of  my  foes  over  my  announced  inten 
tion  to  retire,  and  by  the  real  uneasiness  and  chagrin 
felt  by  many  good  men  because,  as  they  believed,  they 
were  losing  quite  needlessly  the  leader  in  whom  they 
trusted,  and  who  they  believed  could  bring  to  a  successful 
conclusion  certain  struggles  which  they  regarded  as  of 
vital  concern  to  the  national  welfare.  Moreover,  it  was 
of  course  impossible  to  foresee,  and  I  did  not  foresee, 
when  I  made  my  public  announcement  of  my  intention, 
that  the  leadership  I  then  possessed  would  continue  (as  far 
as  I  am  able  to  tell)  unbroken,  as  has  actually  been  the 
case ;  and  that  the  people  who  believed  in  me  and  trusted 
me  and  followed  me  would  three  or  four  years  later  still 


CH.  XVII.j  ROOSEVELT  AND   THIRD   TERM  383 

feel  that  I  was  the  man  of  all  others  whom  they  wished 
to  see  President.  Yet  such  I  think  has  been  the  case; 
and  therefore,  when  I  felt  obliged  to  insist  on  retiring 
and  abandoning  the  leadership,  now  and  then  I  felt  ugly 
qualms  as  to  whether  I  was  not  refusing  to  do  what  I 
ought  to  do,  and  abandoning  great  work  on  a  mere  fan 
tastic  point  of  honor. 

"  These  are  strong  reasons  why  my  course  should  be 
condemned ;  yet  I  think  that  the  countervailing  reasons 
are  still  stronger.  Of  course  when  I  spoke  I  had  in  view 
the  precedent  set  by  Washington  and  continued  ever 
since,  the  precedent  which  recognizes  the  fact  that,  as 
there  inheres  in  the  Presidency  more  power  than  in  any 
other  office  in  any  great  republic  or  constitutional  mon 
archy  of  modern  times,  it  can  only  be  saved  from  abuse 
by  having  the  people  as  a  whole  accept  as  axiomatic  the 
position  that  one  man  c"an  hold  it  for  no  more  than  a  lim 
ited  time.  I  don't  think  that  any  harm  comes  from  the 
concentration  of  power,  in  one  man's  hands,  provided  the 
holder  does  not  keep  it  for  more  than  a  certain,  definite 
time,  and  then  returns  to  the  people  from  whom  he 
sprang.  In  the  great  days  of  the  Roman  Republic  no 
harm  whatever  came  from  the  dictatorship,  because 
great  as  the  power  of  the  dictator  was,  after  a  compara 
tively  short  period  he  surrendered  it  back  to  those  from 
whom  he  gained  it.  On  the  other  hand,  the  history  of 
the  first  and  second  French  Republics,  not  to  speak  of 
the  Spanish-American  Republics,  not  to  speak  of  the 
Commonwealth,  in  Seventeenth  Century  England,  has 
shown  that  the  strong  man,  and  even  the  strong  man 
who  is  good,  may  very  readily  subvert  free  institutions 
if  he  and  the  people  at  large  grow  to  accept  his  continued 


386  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1908 

years,  indeed  for  some  years  previously,  because  they 
thought  they  recognized  in  me  certain  qualities  in  which 
they  believed,  because  they  regarded  me  as  honest  and 
disinterested,  as  having  courage  and  common  sense. 
Now  I  wouldn't  for  anything  in  the  world  shatter  this 
belief  of  theirs  in  me,  unless  it  were  necessary  to  do  so 
because  they  had  embarked  on  a  wrong  course,  and  I 
could  only  be  really  true  to  them  by  forfeiting  their 
good  will.  For  instance,  if  they  made  up  their  minds 
that  they  would  repudiate  their  debts,  or  under  a  gust 
of  emotion  decided  to  follow  any  course  that  was  wrong, 
1  could  show  loyalty  to  them  only  by  opposing  them  tooth 
and  nail,  without  the  slightest  regard  to  any  amount  of 
unpopularity  or  obloquy.  But  this  of  course  isn't  what 
I  mean  when  I  say  I  do  not  want  to  shatter  their  belief 
in  me.  What  I  mean  is  that  I  do  not  want  to  make  them 
think  that  after  all  I  am  actuated  by  selfish  motives, 
by  motives  of  self-interest,  that  my  championship  of 
their  cause,  that  my  opposition  to  the  plutocracy,  is 
simply  due  to  the  usual  demagog's  desire  to  pander  to 
the  mob,  or  to  the  no  more  dangerous,  but  even  more 
sinister,  desire  to  secure  self-advancement  under  the 
cloak  of  championship  of  popular  rights.  Of  course  I 
may  be  wrong  in  my  belief,  but  my  belief  is  that  a  great 
many  honest  people  in  this  country  who  lead  hard  lives 
are  helped  in  their  efforts  to  keep  straight  and  avoid  envy 
and  hatred  and  despair  by  their  faith  in  me  and  in  the 
principles  I  preach  and  in  my  practice  of  these  principles. 
I  would  not  for  anything  do  the  moral  damage  to  these 
people  that  might  come  from  shattering  their  faith  in 
my  personal  disinterestedness.  A  few  months  ago  three 
old  back-country  farmers  turned  up  in  Washington  and 


CH.  XVII.]  ROOSEVELT  AND  THE  PEOPLE  387 

after  awhile  managed  to  get  in  to  see  me.  They  were 
rugged  old  fellows,  as  hairy  as  Boers  and  a  good  deal  of  the 
Boer  type.  They  hadn't  a  black  coat  among  them,  and 
two  of  them  wore  no  cravats ;  that  is,  they  just  had 
on  their  working  clothes,  but  all  cleaned  and  brushed. 
When  they  finally  got  to  see  me  they  explained  that  they 
hadn't  anything  whatever  to  ask,  but  that  they  believed 
in  me,  believed  that  I  stood  for  what  they  regarded  as 
the  American  ideal,  and  as  one  rugged  old  fellow  put  it, 
'We  want  to  shake  that  honest  hand.'  Now  this  anec 
dote  seems  rather  sentimental  as  I  tell  it,  and  I  do  not 
know  that  I  can  convey  to  you  the  effect  the  incident 
produced  on  me ;  but  it  was  one  of  the  very  many  in 
cidents  which  have  occurred,  and  they  have  made  me 
feel  that  I  am  under  a  big  debt  of  obligation  to  the  good 
people  of  this  country,  and  that  I  am  bound  not  by  any 
unnecessary  action  of  mine  to  forfeit  their  respect,  not 
to  hurt  them  by  taking  away  any  part  of  what  they  have 
built  up  as  their  ideal  of  me.  It  is  just  as  I  would  not 
be  willing  to  hurt  my  soldiers,  to  destroy  my  influence 
among  men  who  look  up  to  me  as  leader,  by  needlessly 
doing  anything  in  battle  which  would  give  the  idea  that 
I  was  not  personally  brave ;  even  though  some  given 
risk  might  seem  a  little  unnecessary  to  an  outsider. 
However  certain  I  might  be  that  in  seeking  or  accept 
ing  a  third  term  I  was  actuated  by  a  sincere  desire  to 
serve  my  fellow  countrymen,  I  am  very  much  afraid 
that  multitudes  of  thoroughly  honest  men  who  have  be 
lieved  deeply  in  me  (and  some  of  them,  by  the  way,  until 
I  consented  to  run  might  think  that  they  wished  me  to 
run)  would  nevertheless  have  a  feeling  of  disappoint 
ment  if  I  did  try  to  occupy  the  Presidency  for  three 


388  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1908 

consecutive  terms,  to  hold  it  longer  than  it  was  deemed 
wise  that  Washington  should  hold  it. 

"  I  would  have  felt  very  differently,  and  very  much  more 
doubtful  about  what  to  do,  if  my  leaving  the  Presidency 
had  meant  that  there  was  no  chance  to  continue  the  work 
in  which  I  am  engaged  and  which  I  deem  vital  to  the 
welfare  of  the  people.  But  in  Taft  there  was  ready  to 
hand  a  man  whose  theory  of  public  and  private  duty  is 
my  own,  and  whose  practice  of  this  theory  is  what  I  hope 
mine  is ;  and  if  we  can  elect  him  President  we  achieve 
all  that  could  be  achieved  by  continuing  me  in  the  office, 
and  yet  we  avoid  all  the  objections,  all  the  risk  of  creating 
a  bad  precedent." 

The  President  used  the  utmost  exertion  for  Taft's 
election  consistent  with  the  dignity  of  his  office.  Taft's 
Democratic  opponent  was  William  J.  Bryan.  But  he 
was  elected  receiving  321  electoral  votes  against  162  for 
Bryan  and  a  plurality  of  over  1,269,000  in  the  popular 
vote. 

"Toward  the  end  of  his  term  (the  second)  the  relations 
between  Roosevelt  and  Congress  became  somewhat 
strained/'  wrote  Charles  G.  Washburn,  a  member  of  the 
House  at  this  time  and  a  devoted  friend  of  Roosevelt's. 
"  This  was  due  to  a  variety  of  causes.  The  President  was, 
very  properly,  constantly  pressing  an  elaborate  pro 
gramme  of  legislation.  Congress  could  never  meet  his 
expectations  or  the  expectations  of  the  people,  and  the 
legislative  body  came  to  feel  that  its  efforts  were  not 
properly  appreciated  and  that  the  Executive  held  a  place 
in  the  confidence  of  the  people  that  properly  belonged 
to  Congress.  The  President  preferred  pretty  direct 


CH.  XVII.]  THEODORE  ROOSEVELT  389 

methods  to  the  arts  of  diplomacy.  I  think  that  the  coun 
try  rather  enjoyed  his  controversies  with  Congress  and 
as  a  rule  sided  with  him."  l 

Whoever  writes  the  story  of  Roosevelt's  seven  and 
one-half  years  of  administration  must  necessarily  re 
count  that  part  of  his  life,  for  he  so  pervaded  the  admin 
istration  that  the  two  are  essentially  one.  At  the  outset 
we  must  bear  in  mind  what  William  H.  Taft  wrote  of 
him  in  1919:  Theodore  Roosevelt  was  "the  most  com 
manding,  the  most  original,  the  most  interesting  and 
the  most  brilliant  personality  in  American  public  life 
since  Lincoln."  2  He  was  all  of  that  and  a  man  also  of 
signal  ability.  One  gets  an  idea  of  a  man  from  a  long 
personal  and  friendly  acquaintance  and  in  bearing  my 
testimony  I  represent  simply  that  of  a  thousand  others 
in  writing  that  in  all  my  life  I  have  never  met  one  per 
sonally  with  whose  ability  I  have  been  so  impressed. 

Roosevelt  was  a  loveable  man.  He  loved  children 
and  children  were  at  once  attracted  to  him ;  he  gained 
their  confidence  and  made  on  them  a  lasting  impression. 
His  letters  to  his  own  children  show  the  relation  of  a 
father  that  many  would  gladly  imitate,  but  imitation 
of  Theodore  Roosevelt  was  impossible.  The  President 
playing  bear  with  his  youngest  daughter  in  an  upper 
hall  of  the  White  House  surprised  a  martinet  on  a  visit 
who  could  not  comprehend  how  a  man  dealing  with  the 
most  serious  affairs  of  life  could  so  unbend.  Roose 
velt  could  do  it  in  the  most  natural  manner  but  it  is  im 
possible  to  conceive  any  other  President  who  occupied 
the  White  House  indulging  in  such  a  playful  episode. 

1  P.  138. 

2  Life  of  Roosevelt,  Lewis,  xxii. 


390  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1908 

Children  are  better  than  books,  he  said.  He  preached 
continually  to  women  their  duty  of  bearing  children. 
In  a  noble  tribute  to  the  farm  and  farmer  he  pleaded  that 
the  life  of  the  farmer  should  be  made  happier  and  so  the 
drift  to  the  city  stopped;  nevertheless  he  declared, 
"  There  is  plenty  that  is  hard  and  rough  and  disagreeable 
in  the  necessary  work  of  actual  life."  He  laid  emphasis 
on  the  fact  that  the  men  who  tilled  the  soil  fed  and  clothed 
the  towns  and  cities;  but  "the  best  crop  is  the  crop  of 
children."  l 

Roosevelt  was,  in  the  most  appropriate  sense  of  the 
word,  a  bookish  man.  "I  find  reading  a  great  comfort," 
he  wrote  to  Sir  George  0.  Trevelyan.2  The  list  of  books 
that  he  had  read  within  two  years  that  he  furnished  Dr. 
Nicholas  Murray  Butler  and  his  discussion  with  Sir 
George  O.  Trevelyan  of  Ferrero's  "La  Grandeur  et 
Decadence  de  Rome"  are  amazing  from  a  man  in  the 
presidential  office.  He  joined  in  the  present  of  a  silver 
loving  cup  to  Trevelyan  inscribed,  "To  the  Historian 
of  the  American  Revolution  from  his  friends  —  Theodore 
Roosevelt,  Henry  Cabot  Lodge  and  Elihu  Root."  Tre- 
velyan's  History  struck  him  as  one  of  the  very  few  his 
tories  that  can  be  called  great  and  after  a  re-reading  of 
it  he  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  historian  "had 
painted  us  a  little  too  favorably."  3  Roosevelt,  wrote 
Lawrence  F.  Abbott,  who  knew  him  intimately,  "was  a 
voracious  and  omniverous  reader."  4  He  was  likewise 


1  Review  of  Reviews  ed.,  1291  et  ante;  also  1531. 

2  Bishop,  ii.  142. 

3  Bishop,  i.  265,  ii.  144,  163,  166. 

4  Impressions,    183.     He   published  at  least  30   books.     His  life   of 
Gouverneur  Morris  contains  about  60,000  words ;  his  African  Game  Trails, 
about  200,000.     Making  an  average  of  75,000  words,  he  wrote  2,250,000 


CH.  XVII.]  ROOSEVELT    OMNIVOROUS  READER  391 

a  rapid  one  but  his  quick  perusal  did  not  prevent  his 
seizing  upon  the  salient  points  of  any  book.  He  dis 
cussed  Henry  Osborne  Taylor's  "Mediaeval  Mind"  with 
a  scholar  in  terms  common  to  them  both.  He  desired 
to  read  all  that  was  written  about  the  Mongols.  He  was 
a  great  admirer  of  Morley's  "Gladstone."1  He  was  fond 
of  Milton,  being  especially  attracted  to  his  prose.  He 
told  Sir  George  Trevelyan  that  he  had  been  reading  Taci 
tus  and  further  said,  "  You  who  are  so  blessed  as  to  read 
all  the  best  of  the  Greeks  or  Latins  in  the  original  must 
not  look  down  too  scornfully  upon  us  who  have  to  make 
believe  that  we  are  contented  with  Emerson's  view  of 
translations."  Apparently  he  knew  well  Greek  life,  as 
he  was  disposed  to  agree  with  Galton  in  placing  the  aver 
age  Athenian  in  point  of  intellect  "above  the  average 
civilized  man  of  our  countries."  An  author  knows  his 
own  book  best  and  I  confess  my  delight  at  his  knowledge 
of  my  fifth  volume  which  I  knew  he  had  thoroughly  read 
amid  many  distractions.3  His  reference  to  Martin  Chuz- 
zlewit  in  a  speech  at  Cairo,  Illinois,  on  October  3,  1907 
exhibited  the  fullness  of  the  presidential  mind.  The 
region  where  we  arc  now  standing,  he  said,  was  the  seat 
of  Dickens's  forlorn  "Eden."  "It  would  be  simply  silly 
to  be  angry  over  '  Martin  Chuzzlewit/  on  the  contrary, 
read  it,  be  amused  by  it,  profit  by  it ;  and  don't  be  misled 
by  it."  I  was  surprised  at  his  knowledge  of  a  recent  "Life 
of  Fessenden"  whence  he  derived  an  animated  and  full 
account  of  the  Cabinet  crisis  of  1862. 


words    in    permanent   literary    form.     It    is    estimated    that    during   his 
governorship  and  Presidency  he  wrote  150,000  letters ;    on  an  average  of 
100  words  to  the  letter  this  amounts  to  15  million  words.     Ibid.,  169. 
1  Bishop,  i.  268.       2  Bishop,  ii.  154,  160.         3  See  Mrs.  Robinson,  219. 


392  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1908 

This  was  in  1908  when  I  was  invited  to  make  him  a 
visit  to  hear  his  criticism  of  my  vi  and  vii  volumes. 
After  luncheon  at  the  White  House  he  asked  his  cousin 
W.  Emlen  Roosevelt,  Francis  D.  Millet,  Clifford  Rich 
ardson  and  myself  to  accompany  him  on  the  rear  veranda 
of  the  White  House.  In  your  last  work,  he  said,  you  have 
stepped  down  from  your  impartial  judgment  seat  of 
the  earlier  volumes  and  become  something  of  an  advocate. 
During  the  Civil  War  you  held  the  scales  even,  and  while 
you  have  perhaps  properly  criticised  the  North  for  her 
Reconstruction  policy  you  have  not  blamed  the  South 
for  the  course  she  took  that  made  radical  measures  possi 
ble.  Her  conduct  prevented  any  proper  policy.  I  am 
inclined  to  think  that  the  XIV  amendment  plan  was 
the  best  proposed. 

It  was  a  fine  day  and  stimulated  by  the  air  and  the 
success  of  his  Conservation  Conference,  which  was  just 
ending,  he  talked  freely  and  well.  I  blame  E.  L.  Godkin 
and  Carl  Schurz,  he  declared,  because  after  having  sup 
ported  the  negro  suffrage  policy,  they  condemned  the 
results  of  it.  It  was  all  right  if  they  had  avowed  their 
mistake  but  that  they  did  not  do.  They  still  held  to 
the  negro  suffrage  policy  as  being  the  best.  Even  now 
the  Evening  Post  condemns  the  President's  action  in  the 
Brownsville,  Texas  matter  from  purely  sentimental  rea 
sons.  The  negro  has  been  hurt,  therefore  the  President 
is  wrong.  But  Carl  Schurz  and  The  Nation  never  stimu 
lated  the  best  young  men  to  go  into  politics  and  they 
never  had  any  influence  with  the  crowd. 

It  was  perhaps  all  right,  he  continued,  for  you  to  say 
that  Carl  Schurz  was  almost  an  ideal  senator,  but  on  that 
level  you  failed  to  do  justice  to  Oliver  P.  Morton.  Roose- 


CH.  XVII.]  ROOSEVELT,  PERSONALLY  393 

velt  then  told  with  great  spirit  and  enthusiasm  Morton's 
course  during  the  Civil  War,  speaking  of  the  Copperheads 
as  bitterly  as  if  he  had  been  their  personal  antagonist. 
It  was  the  appreciation  of  one  fighter  by  another.  The 
men  at  the  East,  he  said,  have  books  written  about  them 
in  good  literary  style ;  they  receive  the  adulation  of 
writers  and  so  get  a  larger  share  of  commendation  than 
they  are  entitled  to.  When  talking  of  Morton  the  Pres 
ident  said  to  his  cousin,  Because  Winslow,  Lanier  &  Co. 
advanced  money  to  Morton  in  his  time  of  trouble  I  am 
disposed  to  forgive  a  member  of  their  firm  for  saying  that 
I  am  crazy,  indulge  immoderately  in  drink  and  further 
more  that  I  am  an  opium  fiend. 

There  is  no  foundation  whatever  for  any  of  the  finan 
cier's  alleged  charges ;  that  of  immoderate  indulgence  in 
drink  has  lasted  the  longest  but  has  finally  been  set  to 
rest.  The  truth  is  that  he  rarely  drank  at  luncheon  and 
that  when  he  drank  wine  at  dinner,  he  drank  with  the 
moderation  of  a  gentleman  and  never  to  excess.1 

Next  morning  the  President  continued  his  talk :  I 
have  not  gained  the  support  of  the  cultivated  class  and 
there  are  points  where  I  should  have  done  so.  But  I 
have  received  the  support  of  the  plain  people,  of  the  "one 
suspender  men."  And  yet  I  have  done  things  that  might 
have  aroused  a  demagogic  feeling.  I  have  shut  the  people 
out  from  the  White  House  grounds  in  the  rear;  I  have 
stopped  the  public  receptions  and  have  done  a  great  deal 
in  the  limitation  of  others. 

The  relations  of  some  of  the  cultivated  class  with  men 
of  wealth  were  close  and  it  may  be  regretted  that  so  much 


1  See  Bishop,  ii.  118. 


394  ROOSEVELT'S   ADMINISTRATION  [1909 

acerbity  developed  in  the  conflict  which  Roosevelt  had 
with  high  finance.  He  came  at  them,  they  thought, 
"with  axe  and  crowbar."  l  But  the  fault  was  more  with 
the  financial  interests  than  with  the  President.  They 
should  have  cooperated  with  him  to  a  certain  extent  and, 
when  expediency  would  not  permit  them  to  go  further 
they  might  have  managed  matters  so  that  the  fighting 
instinct  would  not  have  developed  in  Roosevelt.  They 
opposed  his  re-nomination  and  re-election  in  a  manner 
irritating  and  yet  the  results  were  abortive.  For  they 
accomplished  naught  but  an  increase  of  the  bitterness, 
as  Roosevelt  was  human  and  did  not  love  his  personal 
opponents.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  it  did  not  contrib 
ute  to  the  amenity  of  the  discussion  for  the  rich  men  to 
be  told  that  they  were  corrupt  and  if  they  did  not  behave 
they  would  be  sent  to  jail.  Nor  were  they  pleased  with 
his  invention  of  the  Ananias  Club  in  which  he  put  all  men 
who,  according  to  him,  did  not  tell  the  truth.  It  was 
abundantly  easy  in  the  way  of  retort  to  point  out  the 
inconsistencies  of  Roosevelt  himself.  No  man  could 
speak  as  often  and  as  much  as  he  did  covering  a  series 
of  years  and  be  absolutely  consistent ;  but  he  was  always 
truthful  and  sincere  and  the  discovery  of  his  inconsisten 
cies  did  not  in  any  way  affect  his  hold  upon  the  mass. 

Elihu  Root  was  a  good  medium  between  the  President 
and  the  financial  interests.  Devoted  to  Roosevelt  he 
could  at  the  same  time  see  the  point  of  view  of  high  fi 
nance  and  when  he  said  to  a  wealthy  crowd  in  New  York 
City  that  the  President  was  "really  the  great  conserva 
tor  of  property  and  rights,"  2  he  spoke  with  a  wise  fore- 


1  Emerson,  Representative  Men,  Lecture  iv. 
2 1  am  aware  that  this  is  a  quasi-repetition. 


CH.  XVII.]  THEODORE  ROOSEVELT  395 

sight  of  the  future.  No  stronger  statement  of  the  right 
of  private  property  can  be  found  than  in  Roosevelt's 
public  and  private  utterances.  He  thoroughly  believed 
that  the  protection  of  private  property  and  the  family 
were  the  bases  of  civilization.  Thoroughly  opposed  to 
socialism,  the  difference  between  him  and  the  financial 
men  was  that  they  believed  in  a  more  intense  form  of 
individualism  than  he  did.  He  thought  that  the  State 
had  certain  powers  which  they  denied.  He  also  believed 
that  the  President  did  not  require  a  specific  authorization 
of  the  Constitution  to  act  in  a  manner  that  he  conceived 
to  be  the  welfare  of  the  public.  When  he  talked  of  bad 
corporations  and  good  corporations,  of  good  men  of 
wealth  and  bad  men,  the  question  who  should  decide 
between  the  two  arose.  Roosevelt  arrogated  to  himself 
the  decision  but  at  the  same  time  he  said,  "Our  judges, 
as  a  whole,  are  brave  and  upright  men."  1  He  believed 
that  the  reason  of  the  failure  of  the  Grecian,  Roman, 
and  Italian  republics  was  that  when  the  rich  got  the 
power,  they  exploited  the  poor,  and  when  the  poor  got 
the  power  they  plundered  the  rich.  He  was  to  stand 
midway  between  the  two  and  prevent  excess.  A  favor 
ite  expression  of  his  was  he  desired  to  give  everybody  a 
square  deal.  He  quoted  from  Burke  with  the  assurance 
that  such  was  his  policy:  "If  I  cannot  reform  with 
equity,  I  will  not  reform  at  all.  .  .  .  There  is  a  state  to 
preserve  as  well  as  a  state  to  reform."  Roosevelt  added, 
"The  bulk  of  our  business  is  honestly  done;.  .  .  the 
great  mass  of  railroad  securities  rest  upon  safe  and  solid 


1  Special  Message  to  Congress,  Jan.  31,  1908.      Review  of  Reviews  ed., 
628. 


396  ROOSEVELT'S    ADMINISTRATION  (1907 

foundations."  1  As  high  finance  and  Roosevelt  agreed 
upon  these  general  propositions  they  ought  to  have  made 
a  basis  for  a  certain  cooperation.  Of  course  it  is  difficult 
to  say  how  far  men  will  cooperate  when  they  apply 
general  truths  to  concrete  cases.  The  President  was 
thoroughly  satisfied  with  the  Speaker,  Joseph  Cannon, 
for  his  work  in  the  Congress  that  adjourned  in  1906,  writ 
ing,  "  With  Mr.  Cannon  as  Speaker  the  House  has  accom 
plished  a  literally  phenomenal  amount  of  good  work"2; 
but  two  years  later  he  was  far  from  being  content  with 
the  Speaker. 

So  far  as  I  know  his  liking  for  Andrew  Jackson  first  be 
came  public  during  his  trip  down  the  Mississippi  River  in 
the  autumn  of  1907,  but  at  the  Hermitage  where  Jackson 
lived  and  died  it  became  enthusiasm.  "  Andrew  Jackson 
was  an  American,"  he  said.  "I  draw  a  sharp  distinction 
between  Old  Hickory  and  a  great  many  other  Presidents. 
The  Hermitage  was  the  home  of  one  of  the  three  or 
four  greatest  Presidents  this  Union  has  ever  had.  .  .  . 
Andrew  Jackson  was  a  mighty  National  figure."  3  From 
this  time  on  Roosevelt  was  possessed  with  this  admira 
tion  that  he  many  times  set  forth.  Before  1907  he  con 
trasted  the  Washington-Lincoln  theory  of  the  presiden 
tial  powers  with  the  Jefferson-Buchanan ;  but  afterwards 
it  became  the  Jackson-Lincoln  example  to  justify  his 
use  of  the  office.  He  may  have  been  attracted  to  Jack 
son  on  account  of  his  war  against  the  financial  magnates 
of  the  country,  and  through  his  forceful  personality,4 

1  May  30,  1907,  Review  of  Reviews  ed.,  1255,  1263. 

2  Aug.  18,  1906,  ibid.,  801. 
8  Review  of  Reviews  ed.,  1458. 

4  See  Life  of  Jackson,  Bassett,  chap,  xxvii ;  Channing,  History  of  the 
United  States,  v.  356,  379,  388,  401. 


CH.  XVII.]  THEODORE  ROOSEVELT  397 

but  it  was  inconsistent  with  his  admiration  for  Jackson 
to  remark,  "I  think  the  worship  of  Jefferson  a  discredit 
to  my  country," as  in  my  opinion  he  was,  "not  even  ex 
cepting  Buchanan,  the  most  incompetent  chief  executive 
we  ever  had."  But  Roosevelt  always  stuck  to  Lincoln. 
"I  like  to  see  in  my  mind's  eye,"  he  said  in  the  White 
House,  "the  gaunt  form  of  Lincoln  stalking  through  these 
halls."  1 

Roosevelt  was  a  broad-minded  man.  Intensely  de 
voted  to  the  Northern  cause  he  could  see  the  other  side. 
Of  Lee  he  said,  "General  Lee  has  left  us  the  memory  not 
merely  of  his  extraordinary  skill  as  a  general,  his  daunt 
less  courage  and  high  leadership  in  campaign  and  battle, 
but  also  of  that  sound  greatness  of  soul  characteristic 
of  those  who  most  readily  recognize  the  obligations  of 
civic  duty."  Many  would  have  joined  him  in  this  trib 
ute  to  Lee  but  it  was  noteworthy  that  a  Republican 
President  should  speak  of  Jefferson  Davis  as  the  favorite 
son  of  the  South,  and  should  add,  "The  whole  country 
grows  to  feel  the  same  stern  pride  in  the  deeds  alike  of 
those  who  fought  so  valiantly  for  what  they  believed  to 
be  right  and  triumphed,  and  of  those  who  fought  so  val 
iantly  for  what  they,  with  equal  sincerity,  believed  to 
be  right,  and  lost."  3 

John  Morley,who  spent  a  number  of  days  with  Roose 
velt  at  the  White  House,  said  of  him,  "He  has  many  of 
Napoleon's  qualities  —  indomitable  courage,  tireless  per 
severance,  great  capacity  for  leadership  —  and  one  thing 


1  Historical  Essays,  235 ;   Life  of   Roosevelt,  Thayer,  273.     Regard 
ing  Jefferson  see  Channing,  History  of  the  United  States,  iv,  248 ;  v.  453  ; 
John  T.  Morse,  Jefferson,  215,  264,  302. 

2  Bishop,  ii,  69. 

3  Vicksburg,  Oct.  21,  1907,  Review  of  Reviews  ed.,  1442. 


398  ROOSEVELT'S  ADMINISTRATION  [1909 

that  Napoleon  never  had  —  high  moral  purpose!" 
James  Bryce  said  that  he  had  "  never  in  any  country 
seen  a  more  eager,  high-minded  and  efficient  set  of  public 
servants,  men  more  useful  and  creditable  to  their  country 
than  the  men  then  doing  the  work  of  the  American  Gov 
ernment  in  Washington  and  in  the  field."  1 

Roosevelt  was  rarely,  if  ever,  impulsive  in  action.  Sen 
ator  Eugene  Hale,  who  was  generally  among  the  Repub 
lican  opposition,  said  that  "in  all  his  very  long  experience 
in  public  life  he  had  never  known  a  man  who  sought  coun 
sel  so  much  as  did  President  Roosevelt.  And  yet," 
he  added,  "most  people  think  he  is  impulsive  and  won't 
even  listen  to  advice,  much  less  take  it."  2 

He  was  a  lover  of  beauty  as  his  association  with  Saint 
Gaudens,  Francis  D.  Millet  and  Charles  McKim  abun 
dantly  shows. 

Albert  J.  Beveridge,  who  knew  Roosevelt  intimately 
said,  "Had  he  lived  in  the  age  of  chivalry  he  would  have 
been  called  Great  Heart."  3  More  than  ten  years  pre 
viously  Roosevelt  himself  had  written,  "Abraham  Lin 
coln  is  the  ideal  Great  Heart  of  public  life."  4 

Taking  him  by  and  large  Roosevelt  was  a  great  man. 
He  would  have  made  an  ideal  war  President.  But  as 
he  himself  wrote :  "When  I  left  the  Presidency  I  finished 
seven  and  a  half  years  of  administration,  during  which 
not  one  shot  had  been  fired  against  a  foreign  foe.  We 
were  at  absolute  peace  and  there  was  no  nation  in  the 
world  with  whom  a  war-cloud  threatened,  no  nation  in 


1  Life  of  Roosevelt,  Lewis,  258. 

2  A.  J.  Beveridge's  Eulogy,  Sat.  Eve.  Post,  Apr.  5,  1919 ;   see  Henry 
Cabot  Lodge's  address,  Feb.  9,  1919,  47. 

8  Feb.  10,  1919,  Boston  Evening  Transcript.  4  Bishop,  ii.  115. 


CH.  XVII.]  THEODORE  ROOSEVELT  399 

the  world  whom  we  had  wronged,  or  from  whom  we  had 
anything  to  fear."  His  carrying  out  of  "the  homely 
old  adage,"  "Speak  softly  and  carry  a  big  stick:  you 
will  go  far"  had  proved  effective  during  his  administra 
tion.1 

Roosevelt  had  a  wonderful  brain;  an  indomitable 
capacity  for  work.  His  mistakes  were  few;  his  accom 
plishments  many.  Rudyard  Kipling  wrote  thus  to 
Brander  Matthews  in  1910:  "I  saw  him  for  a  hectic 
half  hour  in  London  and  a  little  at  Oxford.  Take  care  of 
him.  He  is  scarce  and  valuable."  2 


1  The  first  mention  that  Bishop  found  was  while  he  was  governor,  i.  240. 

2  Bishop,  ii.  259. 

I  am  much  indebted  to  Edward  L.  Burlingame,  Charles  Scribner's  Sons, 
Joseph  B.  Bishop  and  William  R.  Thayer. 

D.  M.  Matteson  has  rendered  me  valuable  assistance  in  historical  re 
search.  I  acknowledge  the  aid  of  my  secretary,  Miss  Wyman,  that  of 
Charles  K.  Bolton,  librarian,  Miss  Wildman,  Miss  Fowle  and  Miss  Gerald, 
assistants  of  the  Boston  Athenaeum.  I  am  indebted  to  George  A.  Myers 
of  Cleveland  for  useful  suggestions. 


INDEX 


ABBOTT,  L.  F.,  and  Boxer  indemnity 
fund,  320;  on  Roosevelt  as  reader, 
390. 

Abbott,  Lyman,  and  Boxer  indemnity 
fund,  319. 

Adams,  C.  F.,  on  private  letters  on 
foreign  affairs,  252. 

Adams,  Henry,  on  Roosevelt's  energy. 
231 ;  on  Hay,  on  St.  Louis  World 
Fair,  300. 

Adee,  A.  A.,  on  Panama  Revolution, 
272 

Agriculture,  and  election  of  1890,  27; 
prosperity,  118;  corn  crop  (1901), 
155 

Aguinaldo,  Emilio,  and  surrender  of 
Manila,  96-  insurrection,  111,  139, 
192 ;  capture,  201 ;  takes  oath, 
advises  peace,  202. 

Alaska,  British  boundary  claim,  reason 
for  it,  254,  255 ;  Roosevelt  and  ar 
bitration,  255  ;  convention,  Tribunal, 
personnel,  256  ;  Roosevelt's  attitude 
and  intentions,  257-259 ;  decision, 
conduct  of  Canadian  members,  259. 

Aldrich,  N.  W.,  arid  Dingley  Bill,  38; 
Roosevelt  on,  and  trust  legislation, 
279,  and  Hepburn  Bill,  325. 

Algeciras  Conference,  Morocco  im 
broglio,  312 ;  Roosevelt's  good  offices, 
conference,  313,  314;  results,  314. 

Alger,  Russell,  and  Spanish  War,  59 ; 
on  call  for  volunteers,  81 ;  as  scape 
goat,  83. 

Alverstone,  Baron,  Alaskan  Boundary 
Tribunal,  257,  259. 

American  Bridge  Company,  and 
merger,  145  n. 

American  Line,  combine,  156. 

Ananias  Club,  394. 

Andrew,  A.  P.,  on  panics,  345. 

Andrews,  Samuel,  patent  and  begin- 
ing  of  Standard  Oil,  158. 

Anthracite  coal,  strike  and  election  of 
1900,  140,  239;  strike  (1902),  236; 


efforts  of  Mitchell,  Hanna,  and 
Roosevelt  to  settle,  236,  237,  245; 
operating  companies  and  leaders, 
bituminous  workers  and  strike,  237 ; 
threatened  famine,  238 ;  operators 
refuse  to  treat,  238,  239  ;  Roosevelt's 
futile  conference,  239 ;  Cleveland's 
suggestion,  240;  miners  and  return 
pending  a  commission,  241  ;  pro 
posed  federal  investigation  and 
extra-constitutional  action,  241 ;  vio 
lence,  state  troops  in  region,  242 ; 
commission  agreed  to,  personnel, 
243-246  ;  return  of  miners,  246  ;  re 
port  of  commission,  recognition  of 
union,  246,  247;  premanent  results 
of  commission,  247. 

Arbitration,  McKinley  and  British 
treaty,  40;  rejected  by  Senate,  41. 

Arid  lands.     See  Reclamation. 

Army,  Brownsville  affair,  338-340; 
and  Roosevelt,  366,  369  ;  Roosevelt 
and  preparedness,  367,  368.  See 
also  Philippines  ;  Spanish  War. 

Art,  Roosevelt  and,  398. 

Atlantic  Transport  Company,  combine, 
156. 

Australia,  and  American  battleships, 
375. 

Austria-Hungary,  and  American-Span 
ish  crisis,  64. 

Aylesworth,  A.  B.,  Alaskan  Boundary 
Tribunal,  257,  259. 

BACON,  ROBERT,  in  Cuba,  365. 

Baer,  G.  F.,  and  coal  strike,  237,  239, 

245. 
Baker,  R.  S.,  on  agricultural  prosperity, 

118. 
Balfour,  Arthur,  on  Venezuelan  affair, 

249  ;   and  Alaskan  boundary,  257. 
Banks,    chain   banking    and   panic   of 

1907,  348. 
Barney,    C.    T.,    and    panic   of    1907, 

352. 


401 


402 


INDEX 


Beaupre,  A.  M.,  and  canal  treaty,  267, 
272. 

Beveridge,  A.  J.,  on  Hanna,  290 ;  on 
rise  of  Roosevelt  Period,  322 ;  and 
Meat  Inspection  Act,  Life  of  Mar 
shall,  335 ;  on  Roosevelt  as  Great 
Heart,  398. 

Bigelow,  John,  on  battle  of  San  Juan 
Hill,  85. 

Bill  of  Rights,  Philippine,  199. 

Bishop,  J.  B.,  on  Roosevelt  and  coal 
strike,  247 ;  acknowledgment  to, 
399  n. 

Blanco,  Ramon,  Cuban  policy,  52  ; 
and  Cervera's  fleet,  88,  89,  95. 

Bland,  R.  P.,  presidential  candidacy 
(1896),  17. 

Bliss,  C.  N.,  on  Hanna's  presidential 
candidacy,  287 ;  and  campaign  of 
1904,  293. 

Blount,  J.  H.,  on  Philippines,  212. 

Bolton,  C.  K.,  acknowledgment  to, 
399  n. 

Boston  Herald,  on  Standard  Oil  and 
big  business,  157. 

Boutelle,  C.  A.,  on  Congress  and  war 
feeling,  55,  60. 

Boxer  uprising,  Boxer  society,  progress, 
127;  siege  of  legations  at  Peking, 
128-130;  relief,  130;  attitude  and 
achievement  of  American  adminis 
tration,  130,  131 ;  southern  viceroys 
and,  131 ;  partial  cancellation  of 
American  indemnity,  319-321. 

Brewer,  D.  J.,  Northern  Securities 
decision,  224  ;  on  Booker  Washington 
incident,  228. 

Bridge,  J.  H.,  on  Jones,  152. 

Brooklyn,  battle  of  Santiago,  91,  92. 

Brown,  H.  B.,  in  Northern  Securities 
decision,  224  n. 

Brownsville  affray,  Roosevelt's  action, 
338-340. 

Bryan,  W.  J.,  free-silver  speech, 
presidential  nomination  (1896),  18; 
campaign,  20-22,  28 ;  and  discon 
tent  as  issue,  27;  defeat,  29;  and 
Spanish  peace  treaty,  111,  136;  and 
issues  in  1900,  135 ;  renomination, 
136  ;  in  campaign,  anti-Imperialism, 
136-138,  142;  defeat,  143;  at 
Governors'  Convention,  on  "twi 
light  zone,"  361 ;  defeat  (1908),  388. 

Bryce,  James,  on  people  as  final  tri 
bunal,  61 ;  and  Root,  214;  on  Root, 


215  n. ;  on  social  influences  on 
politics,  256;  on  fortification  of 
Panama  Canal,  263 ;  on  Canal  as 
achievement,  276-278 ;  on  Roose 
velt  as  diplomatist,  315  n.;  on 
Roosevelt's  administration,  398. 

Buenos  Ayres,  Root's  visit,  343. 

Buffalo,  Exposition,  assassination  of 
McKinley,  169-171. 

Bunau-Varilla,  Philippe,  and  Panama 
Revolution,  268 ;  on  United  States 
and  Revolution,  270 ;  canal  treaty, 
275  ;  on  work  on  canal,  276. 

Bureau  of  Corporations,  creation,  296. 

Burlingame,  E.  L.,  acknowledgment 
to,  399  n. 

Burton,  T.  E.,  and  offer  of  senatorship 
(1897),  34 ;  and  Hepburn  Bill,  325. 

Bushnell,  Asa,  arid  senatorial  appoint 
ment  of  Hanna,  34,  35. 

Butler,  N.  M.,  and  Congress  of  Arts 
and  Science,  301. 

Butterworth,  Benjamin,  and  Hanna,  10. 

CABINET,  Hanna  and  portfolio,  30,  34  ; 

Sherman's  appointment,  31-34,  41 ; 

Hay   in,    124;    Root   in,    184,    195, 

311;  Roosevelt  and,  219,  233,  311; 

Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor, 

296. 
California,  Japanese  question,  341,  371, 

373,  377. 
Cambon,  Jules,  and  American-Spanish 

crisis,  63 ;    and  protocol  of  Spanish 

War,  97,  100,  101 ;   Root  on,  97  n. 
Canada.     See  Alaska. 
Cannon,  J.  G.,  and  Roosevelt,  396. 
Carlisle,    J.    G.,    on   postponement   of 

gold  standard  measure,  36. 
Carnegie,  Andrew,  as  iron  master,  118  ; 

career  and  character,  145-148;    and 

merger,  148,  153 ;  and  his  subor 
dinates,  152,  152  n. ;  and  peace,  153  ; 

ethics   of   career,    168 ;     on   Booker 

Washington,  228. 
Carnegie  Steel  Company,  and  merger, 

145,  148. 
Carter,  J.  C.,  on  Panama  Revolution, 

273. 
Cervera,  Pasqual,  cruise,  at  Santiago, 

82;    sortie  and    battle,  88-94;    on 

conduct  of  Americans,  94. 
Chadwick,  F.  E.,  on  Cuban  insurgents, 

46;    value  of  book,  50,  81  n.,  98  n. ; 

on  Maine  inquiry,  50;     on  Spanish 


INDEX 


403 


procrastination,  54 ;  on  Santiago 
expedition,  85  n.,  86  n. ;  on  the 
Oregon  voyage,  98  n. ;  on  acquiring 
Philippines,  105. 

Chain  banking  and  panic  of  1907,  348. 

Chamberlain,  D.  H.,  on  Panama 
Revolution,  272. 

Chamberlain,  Joseph,  and  Alaskan 
boundary,  257. 

Chamberlain,  L.  T.,  on  Panama  Revo 
lution,  273. 

Charles  Scribners'  Sons,  acknowledg 
ment  to,  399  n. 

Charleston,  Exposition,  Roosevelt  at, 
231. 

Chicago,  Hanna  on  stump  in,  141. 

Chicago,  Burlington,  and  Quincy  Rail 
road.  See  Northern  Securities. 

Chichester,  Sir  Edward,  at  Manila 
Bay,  80. 

China,  foreign  attitude,  American  trade 
and  spheres  of  influence,  125;  Hay 
and  open  door,  126;  Boxer  uprising. 
127-131  ;  partial  concellation  of 
American  indemnity,  319-321. 

Ch'ing,  Prince,  on  American  Boxer 
indemnity  reliquishment,  320. 

Civic  Federation,  Hanna  in,  238. 

Civil  Service  reform,  Hanna's  attitude, 
3,  175;  McKinley  and,  174,  175; 
under  Roosevelt,  330. 

Clarendon,  Lord,  on  Spanish  procras 
tination,  5S. 

Clark,  C.  E.,  Oregon  voyage,  98  n. 

Clark,  E.  E.,  Anthracite  Coal  Com 
mission,  243,  246. 

Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  abrogation, 
261. 

Cleveland,  Grover,  on  postponement 
of  gold  standard  measure,  36 ;  and 
McKinley,  36,  39;  and  Cuban 
Insurrection,  44,  45 ;  and  Hawaii, 
113  ;  and  anthracite  coal  strike,  240, 
241,  245  ;  and  candidacy  (1904),  293  ; 
and  old-age  pension,  297  n. 

Cleveland,  Hay  and  the  Vampire  Club, 
120,  121 ;  oil  refineries,  development 
of  Standard  Oil,  158-160. 

Coal.     See  Anthracite. 

Coin's  Financial  School,  22,  23. 

Colombia,  rejection  of  canal  treaty, 
266-268.  See  also  Panama  Canal. 

Colonies.     See  Imperialism. 

Commerce,  American  invasion  of 
Europe,  117;  increase  of  exports, 


118;  American,  in  China  and  open 
door,  125,  126  ;  Morgan's  steamship 
combine,  156 ;  Department  created, 
296.  See  also  Railroads;  Tariff; 
Trusts. 

Concas  y  Palau,  V.  M.,  on  naval  battle 
of  Santiago,  95. 

Conger,  E.  H.,  and  Boxer  siege  of 
Peking,  128-130. 

Congress,  Fifty-fourth:  and  Cuba,  44. 
— Fifty-fifth:  Hanna's  appointment 
as  senator,  30-35 ;  extra  session, 
silver  in,  36;  tariff,  37-39;  and 
British  arbitration  treaty,  41 ; 
Cuban  belligerency,  46 ;  Proctor's 
Cuban  speech,  51-53  ;  war  feeling, 
54,  55 ;  Cuban  intervention  resolu 
tions,  Teller  Amendment,  65-67; 
and  Cuban  Republic,  uproar,  68 ; 
declaration  of  war,  69 ;  thanks  to 
Dewey,  74 ;  war  finances,  82 ; 
treaty  of  peace,  110,  136;  Hawaii, 
113. 

Fifty-sixth:  gold  standard  act, 
119  ;  Puerto  Rico,  Foraker  Act,  176  ; 
Cuba,  Platt  Amendment,  179-181; 
Philippines,  Spooner  Amendment, 
185,  200,  201 ;  Hay-Pauncefote 
draft  treaty,  261,  262. 

Fifty-seventh:  Philippines,  201  ; 
Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty,  262 ; 
isthmian  canal  route,  263-266; 
reclamation,  354.  —  Fifty-eighth: 
Cuban  reciprocity,  183  ;  canal  treaty 
with  Panama,  275 ;  railroads,  Elkin 
Art,  296,  323;  Department  of 
Commerce  and  Labor,  296. 

Fifty-ninth:  complexion,  295  ;  old- 
age  pension,  297  n. ;  railroads,  Hep 
burn  Act,  323-334  ;  meat  inspection 
and  pure  food,  334-336  :  employers' 
liability,  337.  —  Sixtieth:  "and 
Roosevelt,  388. 

Congress  of  Arts  and  Science,  301  n. 

Conservation,  Governors'  Convention 
on  conservation,  360,  363 ;  division 
of  powers  and  control,  361-363; 
judicial  support  of  policy,  363.  See 
also  Forest  reserves  ;  Reclamation. 

Consular  service,  reform,  336. 

Coolidge,  A.  C.,  on  Puerto  Rico,  176 ; 
on  Cuba,  177  ;  on  lack  of  exploitation 
of  Philippines,  186 ;  on  results  of 
American  rule  in  Philippines,  215. 

Coolidge,  L.  A.,  on  Platt,  ISO. 


404 


INDEX 


Corn,  crops  (1900-2),  155  n.;  export 
(1870-1900),  162  n. 

Corporations,  Bureau  created,  296. 
See  also  Trusts. 

Cortelyou,  G.  B.,  and  Hanna's  presi 
dential  candidacy,  286  ;  as  campaign 
manager,  and  contributions,  293 ; 
Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor, 
297 ;  and  panic  of  1907,  348. 

Cotton,  export  (1870-1900),  162  n. 

Cox,  J.  D.,  on  probabilities  (1896),  28 ; 
and  Spanish  mission,  42 ;  and 
Spanish  War,  56. 

Crane,  W.  MM  and  campaign  of  1904, 
293. 

Cristdbal  Col6n,  battle  of  Santiago, 
91,  92. 

Croly,  Herbert,  as  Hanna's  biographer, 
8 ;  on  campaign  of  1896,  26 ;  on 
Hanna  on  stump,  140 ;  on  mandate 
of  election  of  1900,  144. 

Cuba,  Teller  Resolution  on,  American 
renunciation,  66,  70,  71 ;  Spain 
relinquishes,  97,  99,  110;  war  debt 
in  peace  negotiations,  101,  110; 
American  attitude  and  administra 
tion,  177,  182,  183  ;  sanitation,  178  ; 
population,  education,  training  for 
self-government,  179  ;  relations  with 
United  States,  Platt  Amendment, 
179-181,  183;  inauguration  of  civil 
government,  Root  on  results,  182 ; 
reciprocity  with,  182,  183;  dis 
turbances,  American  intervention 
and  control,  364-366.  See  also 
Spanish  War. 

Cullom,  S.  M.,  on  McKinley  and  Con 
gress,  172 ;  on  Hay-Pauncefote 
treaties,  263  ;  on  Hanna  and  Panama 
Canal,  265 ;  on  Hoar  and  Panama 
Revolution,  274 ;  on  Roosevelt  and 
trust  regulation,  295. 

Cunard  Line,  and  combine,  156. 

DALZELL,  JOHN,  and  tariff,  38. 

Davis,  A.  P.,  and  reclamation,  355  n. 

Davis,  C.  K.,  peace  commissioner,  101 ; 
and  Philippines,  102. 

Davis,  R.  H.,  on  Puerto  Rico  expedi 
tion,  96. 

Day,  W.  R.,  as  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State,  41 ,  becomes  Secretary,  42 ; 
on  de  Lome  incident,  49 ;  and 
Proctor's  Cuban  speech,  53 ;  dis 
patch  on  reconcentration,  53 ;  on 


ultimatum,  54 ;  and  protocol,  97, 
100 ;  peace  commissioner,  101 ;  and 
Philippines,  104,  108;  in  Northern 
Securities  decision,  224  n. 

Debt,  public,  Spanish  War  loan,  82. 

Democratic  Party.  See  Congress ; 
Elections. 

Denby,  Charles,  Philippine  Commis 
sion,  191,  193. 

Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor, 
creation,  Bureau  of  Corporations, 
296. 

Department  of  State.  See  Day,  W.  R. ; 
Hay,  John;  Root,  Elihu,  Sherman, 
John. 

Depew,  C.  M.,  on  Hanna  and  Panama 
Canal,  265  n. ;  and  Hepburn  Bill, 
325  n. 

Dewey,  George,  appointment  to 
Asiatic  Squadron,  69,  70 ;  war 
preparations,  70,  71 ;  battle  of 
Manila  Bay,  71-74  ;  honors,  74,  78  ; 
on  his  officers  and  men,  75 ;  effect 
of  victory,  75-78 ;  blockade  of 
Manila,  and  Germans,  78-80 ;  sur 
render  of  city,  96 ;  and  acquisition 
of  Philippines,  103  ;  on  insurrection, 
111 ;  Philippine  Commission,  191, 
193  ;  and  Venezuelan  affair,  251. 

Dick,  Charles,  on  Hanna  and  Panama 
Canal,  265  n. 

Diedrichs,  Otto  von,  at  Manila  Bay, 
79,  80. 

Dingley,  Nelson,  tariff  bill,  37-39; 
and  Treasury  portfolio,  38 ;  and  up 
roar  in  House,  68 ;  war  finances,  82. 

Dingley  Tariff  Act,  37-39  ;  rates  under, 
39 ;  reciprocity  under,  173. 

Discontent,  as  issue  in  1896,  27. 

Division  of  powers,  Bryan  and  Roose 
velt  on  "twilight  zone,"  361-363. 

Dolliver,  J.  P.,  on  Hanna  on  stump,  141 . 

Dominion  Line,  combine,  156. 

"Dooley,"  on  Buffalo  Exposition,  170; 
on  Imperialism,  206. 

Dunne,  F.  P.     See  "Dooley." 

ECONOMIC  CONDITIONS,  revival  and 
boom  (1897-99),  114;  revival  of 
industry,  117  ;  as  issue  in  1900,  138, 
140,  143;  speculative  mania  (1901), 
154,  155,  157;  depression  of  1903, 
157;  McKinley's  second  inaugural 
on,  169;  rise  of  Roosevelt  Period, 
322  ;  meat  inspection  and  pure  food 


INDEX 


405 


laws,  334-336.  See  also  Agricul 
ture  ;  Commerce  ;  Conservation  ;  Fi 
nances  ;  Labor ;  Trusts. 

Education,  in  Cuba,  179 ;  promotion 
in  Philippines,  199. 

Edward  VII.,  on  Roosevelt  and  Russo- 
Japanese  peace  negotiations,  307. 

El  Caney,  battle,  85-87. 

Elections,  1896:  Hanna  and  Mc- 
Kinley's  candidacy,  4  ;  McKinley's 
candidacy  and  financial  failure,  11  ; 
Hanna 's  efforts  for  McKinley's  nom 
ination,  12 ;  silver  question  in  Re 
publican  Convention,  13-16 ;  Re 
publican  nominations,  16 ;  Hanna's 
attitude  toward  campaign,  17,  18 ; 
Democratic  Convention,  free  silver 
and  Bryan's  nomination,  17,  IS ; 
silver  and  tariff  as  issues,  18-20 ; 
party  secessions,  19 ;  Bryan's  cam 
paign,  20-22  ;  free  silver  literature, 
22;  Hanna's  conduct  of  campaign, 
23  ;  Republican  campaign  and  litera 
ture,  24,  26  ;  McKinley  in  campaign, 
24-26 ;  period  of  Republican 
doubt,  26,  27 ;  sectarian  attitude, 
influence  of  crops,  discontent  as 
issue,  27 ;  period  of  Republican 
ascendancy,  28 ;  results,  29. 

1900:  Republican  platform, 
Philippines,  McKinley's  renomina- 
tion,  132,  133  ;  Roosevelt's  nomina 
tion  for  Vice-President,  133-135; 
Democratic  Convention,  free  silver 
and  anti-Imperialism,  135,  136 ; 
issues,  Imperialism,  136-139 ; 
Hanna  as  campaign  manager,  139 ; 
and  coal  strike,  140,  238,  239; 
Hanna  on  stump,  140,  141 ;  Roose 
velt  on  stump,  141 ;  Bryan  on 
stump,  Democratic  strange  bed 
fellows,  142  ;  influence  of  economic 
conditions,  results,  143 ;  mandate 
for  business  expansion,  144 ;  and 
Philippine  Insurrection,  201. 

1904:  Hanna  as  timber,  his 
support,  279-281,  286-288;  Ohio 
indorsement  incident,  281-284 ; 
labor  and  Roosevelt,  285 ;  Hanna's 
attitude  toward  candidacy,  286-288, 
291 ;  Roosevelt's  confidence  in 
renomination,  288:  Hanna's  death, 
289 ;  Roosevelt  nominated,  his 
letter  of  acceptance,  Democratic 
nomination,  issue,  292 ;  campaign 


contribution  personalities,  293-295; 
results,  295 ;  as  trust  regulation 
mandate,  296. 

1908:  Roosevelt's  disclaimer  of 
candidacy  (1904),  295;  his  refusal 
to  be  a  candidate,  his  reasons,  378- 
388 ;  Republican  Convention,  Taft 
as  Roosevelt's  candidate,  379-381 ; 
result,  388. 

Electricity,  and  Buffalo  Exposition, 
169. 

Eliot,  C.  W.,  and  Cuban  teachers, 
179  ;  on  Roosevelt,  232. 

Elliott,  C.  B.,  on  beginning  of  Philip 
pine  Insurrection,  111  n. ;  litera 
ture  on  Philippines,  183  n. 

Employers'  liability,  interstate 
commerce  acts,  337. 

Evans,  R.  D.,  on  battle  of  Santiago, 
91 ;  at  the  battle,  94;  command  in 
battleship  voyage,  375. 

Exports,  increase,  118;  development  of 
petroleum,  162 ;  grain,  cotton,  and 
petroleum  (1870-1900),  162  n. 

FAIRBANKS,   C.   W.,   on  Hanna,   290. 

Finances,  big  interests  and  Roosevelt, 
224,  227,  296,  299,  333,  351-353, 
394-396.  See  also  Economic  condi 
tions  ;  Money  ;  Panics ;  Trusts. 

Flagler,  H.  M.,  and  beginning  of 
Standard  Oil,  158. 

Flour,  export  (1870-1900),  162  n. 

Food,  pure  food  law,  336. 

Foraker,  J.  B.,  and  silver,  13 ;  and 
Bushnell,  34;  Puerto  Rico  bill, 
176 ;  and  Hanna,  281  ;  on  Hanna, 
290;  and  Hepburn  Bill,  325;  and 
Brownsville  affair,  340. 

Foraker  Act,  176. 

Forbes,  W.  C.,  on  American  rule  in 
Philippines,  212. 

Forest  reserves,  creation,  358 ;  ad 
ministration,  363. 

Foster,  J.  W.,  and  Spanish  mission, 
42 ;  on  Spanish  War  as  unnecessary, 
64  n. ;  on  Hawaii,  112,  113  ;  on  Alas 
kan  boundary,  259 ;  on  Panama 
Revolution,  273. 

Foulke,  W.  D.,  on  McKinley  and 
Civil  Service  reform,  174  ;  on  reform 
under  Roosevelt,  337. 

Fowle,  Miss,  acknowledgment  to,  399  n. 

Fox,  G.  L.,  on  Panama  Revolution, 
273. 


406 


INDEX 


France,  Anatole,  on  battle  of  Manila 
Bay,  77,  78. 

France,  and  American-Spanish  crisis, 
64;  and  Spanish  War,  76-78;  and 
blockade  at  Manila,  79 ;  and  open 
door,  126.  See  also  Algeciras  Con 
ference. 

Friars'  lands  in  Philippines,  206. 

Frick,  H.  C.,  as  iron  master,  118,  153 ; 
and  Tennessee  Coal  and  Iron  Co. 
purchase,  348-350. 

Frye,  W.  P.,  peace  commissioner,  101 ; 
and  Philippines,  102. 

Fuller,  M.  W.,  Northern  Securities 
dissent,  225  n. ;  Knight  case,  226  n. 

Funston,  Frederick,  captures  Agui- 
naldo,  Roosevelt  on,  201. 

GAGE,  L.  J.,  Treasury  portfolio,  34 ; 
retirement,  219  n. 

Garfield,  J.  A.,  and  silver,  14. 

Gary,  E.  H.,  as  head  of  steel  trust,  151 ; 
and  Tennessee  Coal  and  Iron  Co. 
purchase,  348-350. 

General  Electric,  and  panic,  347. 

Gerald,  Miss,  acknowledgment  to, 
399  n. 

Germany,  and  American-Spanish  crisis, 
64 ;  and  Spanish  War,  76 ;  and 
Manila  blockade,  79,  80;  and 
Philippines,  110;  and  open  door, 
126;  Kiaochow  Bay,  248  n.  See 
also  Algeciras  Conference ;  Vene 
zuela  ;  Wilhelm  II. 

Gibbs,  Philip,  on  war,  57. 

Gloucester,  in  battle  of  Santiago,  91,  92. 

Godkin,  E.  L.,  and  Reconstruction, 
392. 

Goethals,  G.  W.,  and  Panama  Canal, 
277. 

Gold  Democrats  in  campaign  of  1896, 
19. 

Gold  standard,  naming  in  Republican 
platform,  15;  McKinley's  post 
ponement  of  measure,  36,  119;  act, 
119.  See  also  Silver. 

Gompers,  Samuel,  and  Roosevelt,  285. 

Gorgas,  W.  C.,  and  conquest  of  yellow 
fever,  178;  sanitation  of  Canal 
Zone,  278. 

Governors'  Convention,  360 ;  effect, 
363. 

Grace,  W.  R.,  and  steel  merger,  154. 

Grant,  Robert,  on  Buffalo  Exposition, 
169. 


Gray,  George,  peace  commissioner, 
101;  and  Philippines,  104,  105,  110, 
189 ;  opinion  on  American  rule  in 
Philippines,  205;  Anthracite  Coal 
Commission,  246. 

Great  Britain,  Democratic  denuncia 
tion  (1896),  18,  23  ;  and  international 
bimetallism,  37 ;  draft  general  ar 
bitration  treaty,  40 ;  and  Ameri 
can-Spanish  crisis,  64  ;  and  Spanish 
War,  76  ;  and  Manila  blockade,  78 ; 
and  Philippines,  109,  110;  and  open 
door,  126;  Venezuelan  affair,  247- 
250,  253  ;  Roosevelt's  attitude,  253, 
260 ;  Roosevelt  on  navy  as  peace 
factor,  260 ;  abrogation  of  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty,  261-263;  and 
Russo-Japanese  peace  negotiations, 
308 ;  and  Algeciras  Conference, 
mutual  fear  of  Germany,  312.  See 
also  Alaska. 

Great  Northern  Railroad.  See 
Northern  Securities. 

Great  Heart,  Roosevelt  as,  398. 

Greene,  F.  V.,  and  acquiring  Philip 
pines,  103. 

Guam,  ceded  to  United  States,  97, 
99,  110. 

HADLEY,  A.  T.,  at  Berlin  University 
Centenary,  316. 

Hague  Tribunal,  Venezuelan  case,  251, 
253. 

Hale,  E.  E.,  on  Hanna,  289. 

Hale,  Eugene,  and  Philippines,  111 ; 
on  Roosevelt,  398. 

Halifax  Fisheries  Arbitration,  259. 

Hamburg- American  Line,  and  combine, 
156. 

Hanna,  M.  A.,  career  and  character, 
1-10 ;  early  years  in  politics,  2,  3 ;  as 
business  man,  2,  4 ;  and  Civil  Serv 
ice  reform,  3,  175 ;  in  national 
conventions,  4 ;  and  money  in 
politics,  5-7 ;  temperance,  6 ;  and 
literature,  7 ;  morals,  biography, 
8 ;  personal  relations  with  McKinley, 
9,  10,  13;  and  tariff,  10;  large- 
heartedness,  10;  and  McKinley's 
financial  failure,  11;  efforts  for 
McKinley's  nomination,  12,  13 ; 
and  silver  question,  13-16;  in 
campaign,  as  chairman  of  National 
Committee,  17-19,  23,  26,  30;  and 
silver  as  issue,  19;  and  Cabinet, 


INDEX 


407 


30,  34 ;  senatorship  and  Sherman's 
Cabinet  appointment,  30—35 ; 
McKinley's  visit  (1897),  42;  and 
war  sentiment,  56,  64  ;  and  Hay  and 
English  mission,  123 ;  and  Roose 
velt's  nomination  for  Vice-President, 
133,  134;  in  campaign  of  1900, 
chairmanship,  on  stump,  139-141 ; 
and  coal  strike  (1900),  140,  238,  239  ; 
advice  to  Roosevelt,  220,  221 ;  and 
organized  labor,  237,  280,  288,  290 ; 
and  coal  strike  (1902),  238,  244,  245  ; 
and  route  of  isthmian  canal,  264, 
265;  and  Panama  Revolution,  271; 
and  Roosevelt's  trust  attitude,  279 ; 
labor  and  other  political  support, 
279-281,  286,  288;  Ohio  indorse 
ment  incident,  281-284 ;  personal  re 
lations  with  Roosevelt,  284 ;  reelec 
tion  to  Senate,  285  ;  attitude  toward 
presidential  candidacy,  286-288,  291 ; 
and  Roosevelt  as  leaders,  288 ; 
death,  Roosevelt  and  last  illness, 
289;  tributes,  289,  290;  end  of  a 
dynasty,  291. 

Harlan,  J.  M.,  Northern  Securities 
decision,  224  ;  in  Knight  case,  226  n. ; 
as  arbitrator,  259. 

Harper,  W.  R.,  and  Congress  of  Arts 
and  Science,  301. 

Harriman,  E.  H.,  contest  for  Northern 
Pacific,  155 ;  and  campaign  of 
1904,  294;  and  rate  legislation,  on 
venal  government,  331 ;  and  panic  of 
1907,  352. 

Harrison,  Benjamin,  and  Hawaii,  112. 

Hart,  Sir  Robert,  on  Boxer  uprising, 
127. 

Harvard  University,  and  Cuban  teach 
ers,  179  ;  Roosevelt  at  Commence 
ment,  232. 

Hawaii,  revolt  and  annexation  treaty, 
112;  area  and  population,  112  n.; 
withdrawal  of  treaty,  republic,  113; 
annexation  by  joint  resolution,  113. 

Hay,  John,  on  McKinley  in  campaign 
of  1896,  25  n. ;  on  Hanna  as  cam 
paign  manager,  30  ;  on  Sagasta,  47  ; 
and  war,  58 ;  on  Spanish  procrasti 
nation,  59  ;  on  Dewey's  victory,  74  ; 
and  acquisition  of  Philippines,  102, 
106,  110;  Secretary  of  State,  102  n., 
124;  on  Hawaii,  114;  character, 
120,  300;  Vampire  Club,  120,  121; 
as  historian,  121-123 ;  in  politics, 


English  mission,  123  ;  and  McKinley, 
124,  125;  culture,  124;  open  door 
policy,  126 ;  and  Boxer  uprising, 
129-131 ;  in  campaign  of  1900,  139, 
143 ;  Roosevelt's  tributes,  232,  310; 
on  Roosevelt,  233 ;  on  Alaskan 
boundary,  254,  258  ;  and  abrogation 
of  Clay  ton-Bui  wer  Treaty,  261-263  ; 
and  Senate,  attempt  to  resign,  261, 
262 ;  on  canal  route,  263 ;  canal 
treaty  with  Colombia,  266 ;  and 
rejection  of  it,  267 ;  and  Panama 
Revolution,  274 ;  canal  treaty  with 
Panama,  275 ;  on  Roosevelt  as 
gentleman,  299  ;  and  St.  Louis  World 
Fair,  300 ;  death,  on  his  own  career, 
310. 

Hay-Bunau-Varilla  Treaty,  275. 

Hay-Herran  Treaty,  Colombia's  re 
jection,  266,  267. 

Hay-Pauncefote  treaties,  first,  criticism 
and  rejection,  261 ;  second,  fortifica 
tion  of  canal,  262,  263. 

Hearst,  W.  R.,  Harriman  on,  332. 

Heinze,  F.  A.,  and  panic  of  1907,  352. 

Henry  of  Prussia,  Prince,  on  Cuba, 
70. 

Hepburn,  W.  P.,  railroad  rate  legisla 
tion,  323. 

Hepburn  Act,  323-325;  justice  of  it, 
325-331 ;  big  business  and,  331-333; 
public  support,  333. 

Herrick,  M.  T.,  and  McKinley's 
financial  failure,  11;  election  as 
governor,  285. 

Herschell,  Lord,  and  Alaskan  boundary, 
254. 

Higgins,  F.  W.,  campaign  for  governor, 
294. 

Hill,  J.  J.,  contest  for  Northern  Pacific, 
155;  Northern  Securities,  221-226; 
and  Roosevelt,  222,  223. 

Hoar,  G.  F.,  and  acquisition  of  Philip 
pines,  103,  111;  on  Bryan  and 
Imperialism,  136 ;  as  anti-Imperial 
ist,  189;  Roosevelt  on,  232;  on 
Hanna  and  Panama  Canal,  264; 
and  Panama  Revolution,  273,  274. 

Hobart,  G.  A.,  vice-presidential  nomi 
nation,  16;  elected,  29;  and  war, 
60.  63;  death,  133. 

Hobson,  R.  P.,  exploit,  98  n. 

Holleben,  Baron  von,  and  Venezuelan 
affair,  250,  251. 

Holmes,     O.     W.,     appointment    and 


408 


INDEX 


Northern  Securities  decision,  225 ; 
and  Alaskan  boundary,  257. 

Hooker,  Richard,  Roosevelt's  knowl 
edge,  338. 

Hughes,  C.  E.,  candidacy  for  governor, 
332;  and  presidential  candidacy 
(1908),  380. 

IDE,  H.  C.,  Philippines  Commission, 
196. 

Imperialism,  development  of  decision 
to  acquire  Philippines,  100-107 ; 
Commissioner  Gray's  argument 
against,  104,  105  ;  justice  of  decision 
considered,  107-110,  112;  Repub 
lican  platform  on  Philippines,  132 ; 
as  issue  (1900),  136-139  ;  McKinley's 
aim,  184-187 ;  anti-Imperialists 
considered,  187-190;  Root  as  colo 
nial  minister,  195 ;  constitutionality, 
206.  See  also  Philippines. 

Indiana,  battle  of  Santiago,  91. 

Industry.     See  Economic  conditions. 

Infanta  Maria  Teresa,  battle  of 
Santiago,  91,  92. 

Inland  Waterways  Commission,  360. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission, 
and  railroad  rates,  323-325  ;  justice 
of  power,  325-334.  See  also  Rail 
roads. 

Iowa,  battle  of  Santiago,  91. 

Ireland,  John,  and  Spanish  War,  62. 

Iron  and  steel,  revival  of  industry,  117  ; 
American  steel  rails,  117;  Carnegie 
as  master,  118  ;  effects  of  competitive 
system,  144 ;  inception  of  merger, 
145 ;  career  and  character  of  Carne 
gie,  145-148 ;  Carnegie  Works  and 
merger,  148 ;  terms  of  merger,  water, 
149,  156;  results  of  merger,  150- 
153,  156 ;  Rockefeller  interests  and 
merger,  ore  fields,  157. 

Irrigation.     See  Reclamation. 

Isthmian  transit.     See  Panama  Canal. 

Italy,  and  American-Spanish  crisis,  64 ; 
and  open  door,  126 ;  Venezuelan 
affair,  247. 

JACKSON,  ANDREW,  Roosevelt's  appreci 
ation,  396. 

James,  G.  W.,  on  reclamation,  353, 
355,  357. 

Japan,  and  Manila  blockade,  79 ; 
and  open  door,  126 ;  attitude  and 
voyage  of  American  battleships, 


370-374,    377;     reception    of    fleet, 

376.     See  also  Russo-Japanese  War. 
Japanese,    Roosevelt    and,    in    United 

States,  341,  371,  372,  377;    basis  of 

problem,  373. 
Jefferson,    Thomas,    and   Imperialism, 

200 ;   Roosevelt  on,  397. 
Jett6,     L.     A.,     Alaskan     Boundary 

Tribunal,  257,  259. 
Jingoism,  fear  of  Roosevelt's,  364. 
Joint  High  Commission,  and  Alaskan 

boundary,  254,  255. 
Jones,  W.  B.,  as  iron  master,  152. 
Judiciary,  Roosevelt  on,  395. 
Jusserand,  J.  J.,  and  Morocco,  314. 

KANSAS,  prosperity,  118. 

Kasson,    J.    A.,    reciprocity    treaties, 

173. 
Keneko,    Baron,    on    Roosevelt    and 

peace  negotiations,  307. 
Kentucky,  in  election  of  1896,  29. 
Ketteler,  Baron  von,  murdered,  128. 
Keystone    Bridge    Works,    beginning, 

146. 

Kiaochow  Bay,  German  lease,  248  n. 
Kipling,  Rudyard,  on  Roosevelt,  399. 
Klondike,  gold  discovery  and  Alaskan 

boundary,  255. 
Knickerbocker  Trust  Company,  failure, 

347. 
Knox,  P.  C.,  and  Northern  Securities, 

223,  224  ;   and  coal  strike,  241 ;   and 

Panama,     271 ;      on    railroad    rate 

legislation,  324 ;    vote  on  Hepburn 

Bill,  325. 
Kohlsaat,    H.    H.,     and    McKinley's 

financial  failure,  11. 
Komura,     Baron,     peace     conference, 

306,  307,  309. 

LABOR,  Roosevelt  on  organized,  235 ; 
Mitchell  on  organized,  236 ;  Hanna's 
attitude,  237,  280,  288,  290 ;  political 
support  of  Hanna,  280 ;  Roosevelt 
antagonizes  organized,  285  ;  Depart 
ment  created,  296;  employers'  lia 
bility  in  interstate  commerce,  337. 
See  also  Anthracite  coal. 

Ladrones.     See  Guam. 

Lake  Superior  Consolidated  Iron  Mines, 
and  merger,  157. 

Lane,  F.  K.,  and  reclamation,  355  n. 

Lansdowne,  Lord,  on  Venezuelan  affair, 
250. 


INDEX 


409 


LatanS,  J.  H.,  on  Cuba,  178;  on 
constitutionality  of  colonial  govern 
ment,  206. 

Lazear,  J.  W.,  martyr  in  cause  of 
humanity,  178. 

Lee,  Fitzhugh,  and  the  Maine,  47 ; 
and  delay  in  war  message,  61. 

Lee,  R.  E.,  Roosevelt  on,  397. 

Leo  XIII.,  and  Spanish  War,  62. 

Le  Roy,  J.  A.,  on  beginning  of  Philip 
pine  Insurrection,  111  n. 

Lewis,  W.  D.,  on  Roosevelt  and  con 
servation,  363  n. 

Leyland  Line,  combine,  156. 

Life,  on  Roosevelt  and  panic,  345. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  Roosevelt  on,  298, 
381,  384,  397,  398. 

Lloyd,  H.  D.,  on  Standard  Oil,   165. 

Lodge,  H.  C.,  and  silver,  13,  15 ;  and 
war  feeling,  58 ;  on  Congress  and 
diplomacy,  60 ;  on  battle  of  Manila 
Bay,  73 ;  on  battle  of  San  Juan  Hill, 
86  ;  on  Washington  and  Santiago  ex 
pedition,  87  ;  and  Imperialism,  139  ; 
as  chairman  of  Philippine  Committee, 
193  n. ;  on  administration  of  Philip 
pines,  200 ;  Alaskan  Boundary 
Tribunal,  256-259  ;  on  railroads  and 
national  development,  322  ;  vote  on 
Hepburn  Bill,  325  ;  Roosevelt  on,  327  ; 
on  power  to  fix  railroad  rates,  327- 
330 ;  as  chairman  of  Republican 
Convention  (1908),  380;  and  Tre- 
velyan,  390. 

Lome,  E.  D.  de,  indiscretion  and  recall, 
48. 

London  Times,  on  Boxer  uprising,  129. 

Long,  J.  D.,  on  destruction  of  the 
Maine,  50 ;  on  McKinley  and  war, 
61 ;  order  to  Dewey,  71 ;  and 
Santiago,  90 ;  on  credit  for  Santiago 
naval  victory,  93  n. ;  on  the  Oregon's 
voyage,  98  n. ;  retirement  from 
Cabinet,  219  n. ;  Roosevelt  on,  232. 

Low,  Seth,  and  Spanish  mission,  42. 

Lowell,  J.  R.,  on  Spanish  procrastina 
tion,  58. 

MACARTHTJR,  ARTHUR,  on  Spain  and 
Philippines,  109  n. 

McGee,  J.  W.,  and  reclamation,  356  n. 

McKenna,  Joseph,  in  Northern  Securi 
ties  decision,  224  n. ;  Tennessee 
Coal  and  Iron  Co.  decision,  350  n. 

McKim,  Charles,  and  Roosevelt,  398. 


McKinley,  William,  Hanna  and  presi 
dential  possibility,  4 ;  temperance, 
6 ;  personal  relations  with  Hanna, 
9,  10,  13 ;  financial  failure,  rescue, 
11 ;  Hanna  and  nomination  cam 
paign,  12,  13  ;  and  silver  question  in 
convention,  13-16;  nomination,  16; 
and  silver  as  issue,  19  ;  in  campaign, 
"front-porch  "  speeches,  24-26  ;  pre 
pared  to  stump,  27 ;  election,  29 ; 
and  Hanna  for  Cabinet,  30,  34  ;  and 
appointment  of  Sherman,  31-35; 
inauguration,  address,  35,  40 ;  tariff 
priority  over  gold  standard,  36 ; 
and  international  bimetallism,  faith 
fulness  to  gold  standard,  36,  37,  119  ; 
and  Cleveland,  36,  39;  and  British 
arbitration  treaty,  40 ;  and  Cuban 
problem,  Day  and  Sherman,  41 ; 
and  Spanish  mission,  42 ;  trips 
(1897),  popularity,  42;  waiting  at 
titude  toward  Cuba,  46,  48 ;  and 
de  Lome  incident,  48  ;  and  Proctor's 
speech,  52 ;  ultimatum  to  Spain, 
53,  54  ;  war  pressure  on,  59  ;  averse 
to  war,  60  ;  yields,  unnecessary  war 
message,  60-65 ;  reply  to  powers, 
64  ;  and  Teller  Amendment,  67,  99  ; 
blockade  order,  no  privateering, 
calls  for  volunteers,  81 ;  and  Philip 
pine  insurgents  against  Spain,  96; 
and  protocol,  97 ;  first  and  later 
attitudes  on  acquiring  Philippines, 
100,  102-110,  184,  191,  197;  and 
peace  negotiations,  101 ;  and  Hawaii, 
113;  gold  standard  act,  119;  and 
Hay,  124,  125,  202 ;  and  Boxer  up 
rising,  129-131 ;  renomination,  132, 
133 ;  and  Roosevelt's  nomination, 
134,  135 ;  letter  of  acceptance  and 
Imperialism,  138;  reflected,  143; 
second  inaugural,  enjoyable  fruits 
of  office,  169 ;  assassination,  170, 
171 ;  Roosevelt  and  continuance  of 
policies,  171,  218-221;  and  Con 
gress,  popularity,  172,  196;  and 
reciprocity,  173 ;  and  Civil  Service 
reform,  174,  175;  and  Platt  Amend 
ment,  181 ;  aim  in  Philippines,  184— 
187;  and  Hoar,  189;  first  Philip 
pine  Commission,  190;  and  Root, 
195  ;  second  Commission,  196,  201  ; 
instructions  to  Commission,  197 ; 
and  old-age  pensions,  297  n. 

Magoon,  C.  E.,  in  Cuba,  365. 


410 


INDEX 


Maine,  sent  to  Havana,  48 ;  destruc 
tion,  cause,  influence,  49-51,  55-58, 
65. 

Manila,  surrender,  96  ;  population,  101. 

Manila  Bay,  Dewey's  appointment  and 
preparations,  69-71 ;  battle,  71-73  ; 
credit  for  victory,  73-75 ;  moral 
effect  on  American  people,  75 ; 
diplomatic  effect,  76-78 ;  blockade, 
conduct  of  Germans,  78-80  ;  troops 
sent,  surrender  of  city,  96. 

Marburg,  Theodore,  on  panics,  345. 

Marroquin,  Jose,  and  canal  treaty, 
266,  272. 

Martens,  Frederic  de,  on  Roosevelt, 
310. 

Maryland,  in  election  of  1896,  29 ;  of 
1904,  295. 

Massachusetts,  and  battle  of  Santiago, 
91. 

Matteson,  D.  M.,  on  old-age  pensions, 
297  n. 

Matthews,  Brander,  on  attic  nights, 
121. 

Maxwell,  G.  H.,  and  reclamation, 
355  n.,  356  n. 

Meat  Inspection  Act,  334-336. 

Merritt,  Wesley,  at  Manila,  96 ;  and 
acquisition  of  Philippines,  103. 

Methodist  Church,  in  campaign  of 
1896,  27. 

Meyer,  G.  von  L.,  and  Russo-Japanese 
peace  negotiations,  305. 

Miller,  W.  A.,  discharge  and  reinstate 
ment,  285. 

Millet,  F.  D.,  and  Roosevelt,  398. 

Mississippi  River,  Roosevelt's  trip  and 
speech,  359. 

Missouri,  in  election  of  1904,  295. 

Mitchell,  John,  and  coal  strike  (1902), 
236,  238,  241,  242;  on  organized 
labor,  236;  on  Commission  and  or 
ganized  labor,  247 ;  as  interpreter  of 
Roosevelt  to  labor,  299. 

Mommsen,Theodor,on  SpanishWar,  76. 

Money.     See  Gold  standard  ;   Silver. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  and  acquisition  of 
Philippines,  109 ;  and  Venezuelan 
affair,  249 ;  South  America  and,  342. 

Montague,  G.  H.,  on  effect  of  Standard 
Oil,  165. 

Morgan,  J.  P.,  character,  115;  and 
railway  combinations,  116;  steel 
merger,  144,  145,  148-151,  154,  156, 
157 ;  contest  for  Northern  Pacific, 


155 ;  ship  combine,  156 ;  on  crisis 
of  1903,  157;  and  Roosevelt  and 
Northern  Securities,  222,  223;  and 
anthracite  coal  strike,  237,  238, 
243-245  ;  and  panic  of  1907,  348. 

Morgan,  J.  S.,  and  "bulling"  on 
America,  116. 

Morgan,  J.  T.,  as  arbitrator,  259 ;  and 
isthmian  canal,  271. 

Morley,  John,  on  Roosevelt,  397. 

Morocco.     See  Algeciras  Conference. 

Morse,  C.  W.,  and  panic  of  1907,  352. 

Morton,  O.  P.,  Roosevelt  on,  392. 

Moses,  Bernard,  Philippine  Commis 
sion,  196. 

Muckraking,  Roosevelt's  speech  on, 
337. 

Municipal  government,  as  preparation 
for  self-government  in  Cuba,  179 ; 
and  in  Philippines,  198. 

Mutsuhito,  on  Roosevelt  and  peace 
negotiations,  Roosevelt's  letter  prais 
ing  Japan,  308. 

Myers,  G.  H.,  acknowledgment  to, 
399  n. 

NAPOLEON  I.,  Roosevelt  and,  397. 

Nashville,  and  Panama  Revolution, 
270. 

Nation,  on  Hanna  and  money  in  politics, 
6  ;  on  Sherman,  33  ;  on  Standard  Oil, 
166,  167;  on  McKinley  and  reci 
procity,  174 ;  on  campaign  con 
tributions,  294  ;  on  St.  Louis  World 
Fair,  301. 

Natural  resources.     See  Conservation. 

Navy,  American,  preparedness  (1898), 
83;  and  Roosevelt,  366,  369; 
Roosevelt's  building  programme, 
367-369  ;  purpose  of  world  voyage, 
and  Japan,  369-374,  377;  effect  of 
voyage,  374  ;  its  success,  receptions, 
375,  376  ;  review  on  return,  377. 

Navy,  British,  and  peace,  260. 

Nebraska,  prosperity,  118. 

Negro  suffrage,  Roosevelt  on,  392. 

Negroes,  and  Booker  Washington 
incident,  229 ;  Brownsville  affair, 
338-340. 

New  York,  and  battle  of  Santiago,  91. 

New  York  City,  Bryan's  speech  (1896), 
20. 

New  York  Evening  Post,  in  campaign 
of  1896,  24;  Roosevelt  on  "crowd," 
290. 


INDEX 


411 


Newell,  F.  H.,  and  reclamation,  354. 
355  n.,  356  n. 

Newlands,  F.  G.,  and  reclamation,  354, 
355  n.,  356  n. 

Newlands  Act,  354,  356. 

Newspapers,  yellow,  and  war  feeling, 
55  ;  Roosevelt  on  American,  304. 

Nicaragua,  and  route  for  canal,  263- 
266,  271. 

Nicholas  II.,  Roosevelt's  characteriza 
tion,  303 ;  on  Roosevelt  and  peace 
negotiations,  308. 

Nicolay,  J.  G.,  as  historian,  122. 

Nobel  Peace  Prize,  award  to  Roose 
velt,  310. 

Northern  Pacific  Railroad,  contest  for 
control,  155.  See  also  Northern 
Securities. 

Northern  Securities  Company,  forma 
tion,  221,  222;  Roosevelt's  opposi 
tion,  financiers'  misunderstanding 
of  it,  222-224  ;  dissolution  ordered, 
224  ;  decision  considered,  225. 

Noyes,  A.  D.,  in  campaign  of  1896,  24  ; 
on  revival  of  prosperity,  114,  115; 
on  speculative  mania,  154 ;  on 
panic  of  1907,  353. 

OBALDIA,  J.  D.  DE,  and  canal  treaty, 
272. 

Ohio,  in  campaign  of  1896,  28,  29; 
Republican  indorsement  incident 
(1903),  281-284;  Republican  suc 
cess  (1903),  285. 

Olcott,  C.  S.,  on  Congress  and  war,  60. 

Olney,  Richard,  and  Cuban  Insur 
rection,  44,  45. 

Olympia,  Dewey's  flagship,  70. 

Omaha  Trans-Mississippi  Exposition, 
103. 

"Open  door,"  Hay  and  policy  in  China, 
126. 

Oqucndo,  battle  of  Santiago,  91,  92. 

Oregon,  battle  of  Santiago,  91,  92; 
voyage,  and  Panama  Canal,  98  n., 
261. 

Osier,  William,  on  conquest  of  yellow 
fever,  178. 

Ostrogorski,  Moisei,  on  national  con 
ventions,  132. 

Otis,  E.  S.,  command  in  Philippines, 
184 ;  Philippine  Commission,  191, 
193. 

PACIFIC  COAST,  Japanese  question, 
341,  371-373,  377. 


Panama  Canal,  abrogation  of  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty,  fortification,  261- 
263;  public  support,  263;  route 
question,  Hanna  and  choice  of 
Panama,  263-266,  271 ;  draft  treaty 
with  Colombia,  Colombia's  rejection, 
266-268 ;  Panama  Revolution, 
Roosevelt  and,  268-275;  construc 
tion  treaty  with  Panama,  provisions, 
275 ;  construction,  Bryce  on,  as 
achievement,  sanitation,  276-278 ; 
bibliography,  276  n. ;  lock  type,  278  ; 
cost,  278  n. 

Panama  Republic,  revolt,  Roosevelt 
and,  268-275 ;  recognition,  guaran 
tee,  275.  See  also  Panama  Canal. 

Pan-Americanism,  Root's  visit  and, 
342,  343. 

Panics,  periodicity,  114;  little,  of 
1903,  157;  cause,  344-346;  Roose 
velt's  policies  and  (1907),  346,  350- 
352;  events  in  1907,  347;  and 
chain  banking,  administration  and, 
348 ;  Tennessee  Coal  and  Iron  Co. 
incident,  348-350 ;  restoration  of 
confidence,  352 ;  severity,  353 ; 
compared  with  1903,  353  n.  See  also 
Economic  conditions. 

Parker,  A.  B.,  nomination  for  President, 
and  silver,  292 ;  campaign  personal 
ities,  293 ;  defeat,  295. 

Parker,  E.  W.,  Anthracite  Coal  Com 
mission,  246. 

Pauncefote,  Lord,  canal  treaties,  261, 
262. 

Payne,  S.  E.,  and  tariff,  38. 

Peabody,  F.  G.,  on  Wilhelm  II.,  316. 

Peace,  Carnegie's  advocacy,  153 ; 
Roosevelt  and,  398. 

Peckham,  R.  W.,  Northern  Securities 
dissent,  225  n. 

Peking,  Boxer  siege  and  relief,  128-131. 

Penrose,  Boies,  and  Standard  Oil,  332. 

Pensions,  old-age  liability  order,  297. 

People,  the,  and  Roosevelt,  298,  333, 
385-388,  393. 

Percy,  Eustace,  on  Puerto  Rico,  176. 

Petroleum.     See  Standard  Oil. 

Philip,  J.  W.,  at  battle  of  Santiago,  94. 

Philippine  Government  Act,  201. 

Philippines,  insurgents  and  American- 
Spanish  War,  96;  Spanish  War 
protocol  on,  McKinley's  first  at 
titude,  98,  100 ;  area  and  popula 
tion,  101 ;  development  of  decision  to 


412 


INDEX 


acquire,  102 ;  Commissioner  Gray's 
opposition,  104  ;  justice  of  acquisition 
considered,  107-110,  112;  in  peace 
treaty,  payment  for,  debt  not 
assumed,  110;  beginning  of  insur 
rection,  cost  of  insurrection,  111; 
responsibility  for  beginning,  111  n. ; 
Republican  platform  on  (1900),  132; 
as  issue,  136-139  ;  diverse  literature 
on,  183 ;  Root  as  authority  on,  184  ; 
American  aim,  no  exploitation,  184- 
187 ;  anti-Imperialists  considered, 
187-190 ;  first  Commission,  purpose, 
190,  191 ;  progress  and  reason  for 
insurrection,  Aguinaldo  as  leader, 
191-194 ;  findings  of  first  Commis 
sion,  193 ;  Root  as  minister,  195, 
201,  204;  appointment  of  second 
Commission,  Taft,  196;  instructions - 
to  Commission,  government,  197- 
200 ;  education,  language,  199  ;  prece 
dents  of  rule,  200  ;  congressional  ap 
proval  of  government,  201 ;  guerilla 
warfare  and  election  of  1900,  capture 
of  Aguinaldo,  201 ;  his  peace  procla 
mation,  202 ;  inauguration  and 
progress  of  civil  government,  202, 
205  ;  end  of  insurrection,  conduct  of 
American  soldiers,  202-204 ;  friars' 
lands,  206 ;  Taft  as  Governor,  207- 
212 ;  cost  of  ruling,  212 ;  results  of 
American  rule,  212—216  ;  peace  army 
in,  212  n. ;  economic  disasters,  215  n.  ; 
future,  216  ;  bibliography,  217  n. 

Pinchot,  Gifford,  and  reclamation, 
354,  356  n. ;  and  forest  reserves, 
358. 

Pipe  lines,  development  of  oil,  164. 

Platt,  O.  H.,  and  Platt  Amendment, 
180,  181 ;  and  Cuban  reciprocity, 
183 ;  on  duty  in  Philippines,  184 ; 
on  Hanna,  290. 

Platt,  T.  C.,  and  McKinley's  candidacy, 
12 ;  and  Roosevelt's  nomination  as 
Vice-President,  133,  134 ;  arid  Hep 
burn  Bill,  325  n. 

Platt  Amendment,  provisions  and 
authorship,  179-181,  183. 

Politics,  Hanna  and  commercial  spirit, 
5-7 ;  Roosevelt  on  accomplishments 
under  practical,  369  n.  See  also 
Elections. 

Polo  y  Bernabe,  Luis,  on  Proctor's 
speech,  52. 

Population,     Philippines,     101,     191 ; 


Hawaii,  112  n.  •  Cuba,  179;  density 

in  Orient,  191  n. 

Portsmouth  Navy  Yard,  peace  negotia 
tions  at,  306,  307. 
Powell,  J.  W.,  and  reclamation,  355  n., 

356  n. 
Preparedness,   contrast  of  navy     and 

army     (1898),     82-85;     Roosevelt's 

advocacy,  367. 
President,  Roosevelt's  interpretation  of 

powers,  242,  319,  383-385,  388,  395. 
Pritchett,  H.  S.,  on  Hanna,  5. 
Proctor,  Redfield,  speech  on  Cuba,  51- 

53 ;    and  Dewey,  69,  70 ;    on  Dewey 

as  diplomatist,  78. 
Property,   Roosevelt  and  rights,   299, 

395. 

Property.     See  Economic  conditions. 
Public  debt.     See  Debt. 
'•Public    lands.     See    Forest    reserves ; 

Reclamation. 
Publicity,  Roosevelt  and,  as  weapon, 

296,  299. 
Puerto   Rico,  occupation,  95 ;    ceded, 

97,   99,    110;    and  free  trade,    173; 

American    rule,    Foraker  Act,    176 ; 

constitutionality,  206. 
Punch,  on  acquisition  of  Philippines, 

109 ;    on  Roosevelt  and  the  Kaiser, 

316. 
Pure  food  law,  336. 

QUAY,  M.  S.,  and  McKinley's  candi 
dacy,  12;  and  coal  strike,  241. 

RAILROADS,  Morgan  and  combinations, 
116;  American  rails,  117;  contest 
for  control  of  Northern  Pacific,  155 ; 
oil  rebates,  160 ;  Elkins  Act  for 
bidding  rebates,  296 ;  problem,  and 
national  development,  322 ;  Roose 
velt's  original  position  on  rate 
legislation,  323 ;  Hepburn  Act, 
power  to  fix  rates,  323-325 ;  justice 
of  it,  325-331,334  ;  public  ownership, 
326 ;  public  opinion  on,  328 ;  Big 
Business  and  Hepburn  Act,  331-333  ; 
public  support  of  act,  333 ;  em 
ployers'  liability,  337.  See  also 
Northern  Securities. 

Reciprocity,  McKinley's  advocacy, 
173  ;  Cuban,  182,  183. 

Reclamation,  problem  of  arid  lands, 
353  ;  Roosevelt's  interest,  Newlands 
Act,  354  ;  effect,  efficiency  of  Service, 
355-357 ;  future,  357. 


INDEX 


413 


Reconstruction,  Roosevelt  on,  392. 

Reed,  T.  B.,  presidential  candidacy 
(1896),  12,  16;  Speaker,  37;  and 
Cuba,  46 ;  and  war  feeling,  63. 

Reed,  Walter,  and  conquest  of  yellow 
fever,  178. 

Red  Star  Line,  combine,  156. 

Reid,  Whitelaw,  peace  commissioner, 
101 ;  and  Philippines,  102. 

Republican  Party.  See  Congress ; 
Elections ;  Hanna  ;  McKinley  ; 
Roosevelt. 

Reyes,  Rafael,  and  canal  treaty,  266, 
272. 

Rhodes,  D.  P.,  and  Hanna,  11  n. 

Rio  Janeiro,  Pan-American  Conference, 
Root  at,  342. 

Robertson,  J.  A.,  on  American  rule  in 
Philippines,  216. 

Rockefeller,  J.  D.,  and  steel  merger, 
157;  business  methods,  160-164; 
judge  of  men,  162  ;  suppression  of 
middlemen,  163  ;  and  pipe  lines,  164  ; 
public  ethics  of  career,  165-168 ; 
and  panic  of  1907,  352. 

Roman  Catholic  Church,  in  campaign 
of  1896,  27  ;  in  Philippines,  102  n. ; 
friars'  lands  there,  206 ;  support  of 
Hanna,  281. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  on  Hanna,  10, 
289;  and  war  feeling  (1898),  57;  and 
appointment  of  Dewey,  69,  70 ;  on 
Dewey's  victory,  74  ;  on  war  panic, 
76  ;  on  military  unpreparedness  and 
mismanagement,  82-84  ;  in  Spanish 
War,  Rough  Riders,  84  n. ;  battle  of 
San  Juan  Hill,  86 ;  and  Shafter's 
demoralization,  87 ;  on  credit  for 
Santiago  naval  victory,  93,  93  n. ; 
and  McKinley's  renomination,  133  ; 
nomination  for  Vice-Prcsident,  133- 
135;  on  stump,  141;  election,  143; 
becomes  President,  171  ;  and  con 
tinuation  of  McKinley's  policies,  171, 
218-221  ;  and  Cuban  reciprocity, 
on  American  conduct  toward  Cuba, 
183  ;  and  Philippines,  on  Funston's 
capture  of  Aguinaldo,  201 ;  on  con 
duct  of  soldiers  in  Philippines,  204 ; 
and  Taft  and  justiceship,  208-211; 
on  Taft  as  colonial  administra 
tor,  212 ;  on  rule  and  future  of 
Philippines,  216;  Hanna's  advice, 
218,  220;  political  attitude  on 
assuming  presidency,  218;  and 


McKinley's  Cabinet,  attitude  to 
ward  advisers,  219,  233,  311;  and 
tariff,  220,  292  ;  and  trusts,  221,  222 ; 
fight  against  Northern  Securities, 
222-227 ;  and  opposition  of  large 
financial  interests,  224,  227,  299,  333, 
351-353,  394-396  ;  Booker  Washing 
ton  incident,  227-230;  restless 
energy,  230 ;  at  Charleston,  expan 
sionist,  231 ;  on  the  South,  232,  361, 
397 ;  at  Harvard,  tribute  to  assist 
ants,  232 ;  speeches  on  regulation 
of  trusts,  233,  234  ;  on  legislation  and 
thrift,  234,  328;  accident,  on  or 
ganized  labor,  gospel  of  work,  235 ; 
and  anthracite  coal  strike,  237,  238  ; 
futile  conference  on  strike,  239 ; 
proposed  commission  and  investiga 
tion,  241 ;  and  extra-constitutional 
action,  and  violence,  242 ;  and 
personnel  of  commission,  243-246 ; 
and  credit  for  settlement  of  strike, 
245-247  ;  Venezuelan  incident,  248- 
253  ;  on  Henry  White,  250  ;  attitude 
toward  England,  253,  260;  and 
Alaskan  boundary,  255-260;  on 
British  navy  and  peace,  260 ;  on 
importance  of  Panama  action, 
on  first  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty, 
261 ;  and  Colombia's  rejection 
of  canal  treaty,  267 ;  and  Panama 
Revolution,  268-275;  and  lock- 
type  canal,  278 ;  Hanna  and  trust 
legislation,  279;  Hanna  and  Ohio 
indorsement  incident,  281-284  ;  per 
sonal  relations  with  Hanna,  284 ; 
antagonism  of  organized  labor,  285 ; 
and  Hanna's  presidential  candidacy, 
286 ;  confidence  in  rcnomination, 
288;  and  Hanna  as  leaders,  289; 
and  Hanna's  last  illness,  289 ;  on 
Westerners,  290,  334  ;  renomination, 
290 ;  partisan  letter  of  acceptance, 
292  ;  as  issue,  292 ;  and  campaign 
manager,  293 ;  and  campaign  con 
tributions,  293-295;  reelected,  dis 
claimer  of  third-term  candidacy 
(1904),  295;  trust-regulation  man 
date,  on  publicity  as  trust-regulation 
weapon,  Elkins  Act  and  Department 
of  Commerce  and  Labor,  296 ;  and 
old-age  pension  liability,  297 ;  and 
"common  people,"  298,  333,  385- 
388,  393 ;  and  property  rights,  299, 
395 ;  and  Russo-Japanese  War,  302 ; 


414 


INDEX 


knowledge  of  European  conditions, 
characterization  of  Kaiser  and  Czar, 
303 ;  on  battle  of  Sea  of  Japan,  on 
character  of  warring  nations,  304 ; 
and  arranging  of  peace  conference, 
305 ;  reception  of  envoys,  306  ;  and 
negotiations,  307 ;  credit  and  praise, 
307,  308;  letter  on  wisdom  of 
Japan,  308 ;  on  envoys,  envoys  on, 
309;  Peace  Prize,  disposal,  310; 
tribute  to  Hay's  memory,  310 ; 
appointment  of  Root,  on  it, 
311;  and  Morocco  imbroglio,  311- 
314;  compared  with  Wilhelm  II., 
315-318 ;  Bryce  on,  as  diplomatist, 
315  n. ;  would  have  prevented 
World  War,  318 ;  and  San  Domingo, 
318 ;  interpretation  of  presidential 
powers,  319,  383-385,  388,  395; 
and  Boxer  indemnity  fund,  319-321 ; 
Roosevelt  Period  on  economic  prob 
lems,  322 ;  original  position  on 
railroad  rate  legislation,  323 ;  and 
Hepburn  Act,  325,  330-334;  on 
public  ownership  of  railroads, 
325;  on  Lodge,  327,  380;  and 
meat  inspection  and  pure  food 
legislation,  334-336  ;  and  Civil  Serv 
ice  reform,  336 ;  on  opponents, 
muckrake  speech,  337 ;  on  Pilgrim's 
Progress,  337  n.  ;  literary  knowledge, 
338 ;  and  Brownsville  incident, 
338-341 ;  and  Japanese  question, 
341,  371,  377;  on  Root's  visit  and 
Pan-Americanism,  342,  343  ;  policies 
and  panic  of  1907,  346-348,  350-352  , 
and  Tennessee  Coal  and  Iron  Co. 
incident,  348-350 ;  and  reclamation, 
354-357;  and  forest  reserves,  358; 
trip  on  Mississippi  River,  359 , 
and  conservation,  Governors'  Con 
vention,  360,  363;  on  division  of 
powers  and  twilight  zone,  362 ;  and 
jingoism,  364 ;  and  intervention  in 
Cuba,  364-366;  Navy  and  Army 
and,  366,  369 ;  and  preparedness, 
naval  building  programme,  367- 
369 ;  on  accomplishments  under 
practical  politics,  369  n. ;  purpose 
of  world  voyage  of  fleet,  and  Japan, 
369-374,  377 ;  on  success  of  voyage, 
374-376 ;  review  on  return,  377 ; 
reasons  for  refusing  to  be  a  candidate 
(1908),  378-388;  enjoyment  of 
presidency,  378 ;  choice  of  successor, 


379,  381 ;  on  Lodge  as  chairman  of 
Convention,  380 ;  later  relations 
with  Congress,  388;  personality, 
ability,  389,  399 ;  and  children,  389  ; 
bookishness,  390 ;  literary  labors, 
390  n. ;  criticism  of  Rhodes's  His 
tory,  on  Reconstruction,  392 ;  tem 
perance,  and  cultivated  classes,  393 ; 
appreciation  of  Jackson,  396  ;  on  Jef 
ferson,  397;  on  Lincoln,  397,  398; 
Napoleonic  traits,  397  ;  deliberation, 
seeks  counsel,  and  art,  Great  Heart, 
398 ;  greatness,  and  peace,  398,  399. 

Roosevelt  Dam,  356. 

Root,  Elihu,  on  Cambon,  97  n. ;  on 
McKinley,  172,  196 ;  and  Cuba,  177 ; 
on  sanitation  there,  178 ;  and  Platt 
Amendment,  181 ;  on  success  in 
Cuba,  on  commercial  relations  with 
her,  182;  as  Cabinet  officer,  184; 
as  colonial  minister,  195,  201,  204; 
instructions  to  Philippine  Commis 
sion,  198-200 ;  address  to  soldiers 
in  Philippines,  202 ;  on  peace 
army  in  Philippines,  212  n. 
on  results  in  Philippines,  213 
character,  214 ;  Bryce  on,  215  n. 
Roosevelt's  tribute,  232;  and 
coal  strike,  241,  243;  Alaskan 
Boundary  Tribunal,  256-259;  and 
Panama  Revolution,  274  ;  on  Roose 
velt  as  issue,  292 ;  and  campaign  of 
1904,  293;  on  Roosevelt  and 
property  rights,  299,  394 ;  appoint 
ment  to  State  portfolio,  Roosevelt 
on,  311 ;  South  American  tour,  342, 
343 ;  and  presidential  candidacy 
(1908),  379;  and  Trevelyan,  390. 

Rosen,  Baron,  peace  conference,  306, 
307,  309  ;  on  Roosevelt,  309. 

Rough  Riders,  84  n. ;  in  battle  of  San 
Juan  Hill,  86. 

Russell,  Bertrand,  on  control  of 
Morocco,  313  n. 

Russia,  and  American-Spanish  crisis, 
64 ;  and  open  door,  126 ;  Roosevelt 
on  the  Czar,  303.  See  also  Russo- 
Japanese  War. 

Russo-Japanese  War,  Roosevelt's 
interest,  302 ;  Japan's  victories  and 
peace  overtures,  304,  308;  Roose 
velt  on  character  of  combatants, 
304;  Roosevelt  and  arranging  for 
peace  conference,  304-306 ;  his 
reception  of  envoys,  306;  negotia- 


INDEX 


415 


tions,    Roosevelt's    influence,    307; 
credit     to     Roosevelt,     307,     308; 
Roosevelt  on  envoys,  309. 
Ryan,  T.  F.,  and  panic  of  1907,  352. 

SAGASTA,  P.  M.,  and  Cuba,  character, 

47. 

Saint  Gaudens,  Augustus,  and  Roose 
velt,  398. 

St.  Louis  World  Fair,  300,  301 ;    Con 
gress  of  Arts  and  Science,  301. 
Salvation   Army,    support   of    Hanna, 

281. 

Sampson,  W.  E.,  Maine  inquiry,  50; 
war  command,  81 ;  and  Shafter, 
absence  at  battle  of  Santiago,  89, 90  ; 
blockade,  90;  and  the  victory,  92, 
93  n. ;  on  rescue  of  prisoners,  94  ; 
on  the  Oregon's  voyage,  98  n. 

San  Domingo,  Roosevelt  and  financial 
administration,  318. 

San  Juan  Hill,  battle,  85-87. 

Sanitation,  in  Cuba,  178 ;  at  Canal 
Zone,  278. 

Santiago,  Cuba,  Cervera  at,  82 ; 
American  military  expedition,  mis 
management,  82-87;  battle  of  El 
Caney  and  San  Juan  Hill,  85-87 ; 
demoralization  of  American  com 
mander,  87 ;  sortie  of  Spanish  fleet, 
88,  89;  friction  between  American 
naval  and  military  forces,  89,  90 
American  blockade  and  naval  orders 
90;  naval  battle,  91,  92;  credit  for 
naval  victory,  92,  93;  decisiveness 
of  naval  victory,  results,  93,  95 
American  humanity,  94;  surrender 
of  city,  95. 

Schofield,  J.  M.,  and  coal  strike 
242. 

Schurman,  J.  G.,  Philippine  Commis 
sion,  190,  193. 

Schurz,  Carl,  in  campaign  of  1896,  24 
of  1900,  142;  as  anti-Imperialist 
188,  190,  194;  and  Reconstruction 
392. 

Schurz  nuggets,  24. 

Schwab,  C.  M.,  on  American  stee 
rails,  117;  and  steel  merger,  151 
and  Carnegie,  152  n. 

Scott,  T.  A.,  and  Carnegie,  146. 

Sectionalism,  disappearance,  169. 

Shafter,  W.  R.,  expedition  command 
unfitness,  85  ;  demoralized,  87,  90  n. 
and  Sampson,  89. 


herman,  J.  S.,  and  Harriman,  332; 
nomination  for  Vice-President,  380  n. 

Sherman,  John,  Hanna's  support  (1884, 
1888),  4;  appointment  as  Secretary 
of  State,  unfitness,  31,  41 ;  candor  of 
appointment,  32-34 ;  appointment 
and  Spanish  War,  35 ;  relegation, 
resignation,  41,  42. 

Sherman  Anti-Trust  Act.  See  North 
ern  Securities ;  Trusts. 

Silver,  question  in  Republican  Con 
vention  (1896),  13-16;  Democratic 
plank  for  free,  17,  18 ;  as  issue  in 
campaign,  18-20 ;  Bryan's  campaign 
presentation,  20-22,  28  ;  Democratic 
campaign  literature,  22,  23 ;  Re 
publican  literature,  24-26;  Senate 
resolution  for  payment  of  bonds  in, 
36 ;  failure  of  international  bi 
metallism,  37  ;  in  campaign  of  1900, 
132,  136  ;  eliminated  as  issue  (1904), 
292.  See  also  Gold  standard. 

Skagway,  as  port  for  Klondike,  255. 

Smith,  A.  H.,  and  Boxer  indemnity 
fund,  319. 

Smith,  C.  E.,  retirement  from  Cabinet, 
219  n. 

Smith,  Goldwin,  on  Bryan,  22,  28. 

Smyth,  W.  E.,  and  reclamation,  355  n. 

South,  and  Booker  Washington  inci 
dent,  229,  230 ,  Roosevelt's  attitude, 
232,  361,  397. 

South  America,  Root's  tour,  342,  343. 

South  Carolina  Interstate  and  West 
Indian  Exposition,  231. 

South  Improvement  Company,  160  n. 

Spalding,  J.  L.,  Anthracite  Coal 
Commission,  243,  244,  246. 

Spanish  War,  and  appointment  of 
Sherman,  35  ;  McKinley  and  Cuban 
problem,  41 ;  appointment  of  minis 
ter  to  Spain,  42 ;  Cuban  Insurrec 
tion,  Weyler'sreconcentration  policy, 
44;  Cleveland  and  Cuban  belliger 
ency,  44,  45  ;  Congress  and  belliger 
ency  (1907),  conduct  of  insurgents, 
46;  McKinley's  waiting  policy, 
46,  48 ;  Sagasta's  reform  measures, 
47 ;  disturbances  in  Havana,  send 
ing  of  the  Maine,  47,  48  ;  de  Lome's 
indiscretion,  48 ;  destruction  of 
the  Maine,  cause,  influence,  49—51, 
55-58,  65 ;  Proctor's  speech  on 
Cuban  conditions,  51-53;  Day's 
dispatch  on  reconcentration, 


416 


INDEX 


McKinley's  ultimatum,  53  ;  Spanish 
procrastination,  54,  58,  59 ;  Day's 
warning  against  delay,  54 ;  public 
attitude,  influence  of  yellow  press, 
54-56;  attitude  of  leaders,  56-58; 
pressure  on  McKinley,  59 ;  his 
attitude  and  war  message,  60 ; 
evidences  of  Spanish  submission, 
McKinley's  yielding  to  war  con 
sidered,  61-65 ;  McKinley's  reply 
to  the  powers,  64 ;  intervention  resolu 
tions,  65,  66;  Teller  Amendment 
renouncing  Cuba,  66,  70,  71 ; 
question  of  recognizing  Cuban  Re 
public,  68  ;  declaration,  69  ;  Dewey's 
appointment  to  Asiatic  Squadron, 
70  5  his  preparations,  70,  71 ;  battle 
of  Manila  Bay,  credit  for  victory, 
71-75  ;  effect  of  victory  on  American 
morale,  75 ;  diplomatic  effect,  75- 
78 ;  blockade  of  Manila,  conduct 
of  Germans,  78-80;  blockade  of 
Cuba,  no  privateering,  calls  for 
volunteers,  Sampson's  command,  81 ; 
finances,  82 ;  Cervera's  cruise  to 
Santiago,  82 ;  American  Santiago 
expedition,  lack  of  preparation, 
mismanagement.  82-87 ;  battle  of 
El  Caney  and  San  Juan  Hill,  85- 
87 ;  demoralization  of  American 
commander,  gloom  at  Washington, 
87,  90  n. ;  sortie  of  Cervera's  fleet, 
Santiago,  naval  battle,  88-92; 
credit  for  naval  victory  at  Santiago, 
92,  93 ;  decisiveness  of  victory, 
results,  93,  95  ;  American  humanity, 
94 ;  surrender  of  Santiago,  95 ; 
occupation  of  Puerto  Rico,  95; 
Spanish  reserve  fleet,  96 ;  troops 
to  Manila,  surrender  of  city,  96 ; 
protocol,  terms,  97-101 ;  bibliog 
raphy,  98  n. ',  McKinley's  first 
attitude  on  Philippines,  100 ;  peace 
commissioners,  101 ;  development 
of  decision  to  acquire  Philippines, 
100-107;  Cuban  debt,  101 ;  justice 
of  decision  to  acquire  Philippines 
considered,  107-110;  treaty  of 
peace,  Senate's  ratification,  110, 
136;  cost,  112. 

Speck  von  Sternburg,  Baron,  and 
Morocco,  312,  314. 

Speculation,  mania  (1901),  and  contest 
for  Northern  Pacific,  154,  157.  See 
also  Panics. 


Spencer,  Herbert,  on  business  and  war, 
158,  161. 

Sperry,  C.  S.,  command  in  battleship 
voyage,  375,  376. 

Spooner,  J.  C.,  Philippine  amendment, 
201 ;  and  isthmian  canal  route,  265 ; 
and  railroad  rate  legislation,  325. 

Spooner  Amendment,  185,  201. 

Standard  Oil,  and  Big  Business,  157 ; 
and  steel  merger,  157 ;  beginning, 
158-160 ;  development,  rebates, 
business  methods,  160-162  ;  develop 
ment  of  export,  efficiency,  162 ; 
suppression  of  middleman,  success 
and  dictation,  163 ;  pipe  lines,  164 ; 
litigation,  165 ;  economic  effect, 
ethics,  165-168  ;  and  rate  legislation, 
Roosevelt  on,  332. 

Stanwood,  Edward,  on  Dingley  Bill,  39. 

Steamship  combine,  156. 

Steel.     See  Iron. 

Storey,  Moorfield,  as  anti-Imperialist, 
188  ;  on  Panama  Resolution,  272. 

Sumner,  W.  G.,  on  government,  166  n. 

Supreme  Court,  on  constitutionality 
of  colonial  government,  206 ;  Taft 
declines  appointment,  208-210 ; 
Northern  Securities  decision,  224- 
226 ;  on  Tennessee  Coal  and  Iron 
Co.  purchase,  350 ;  and  conserva 
tion,  363. 

TAFT,  W.  H.,  on  Spanish  War  as  altru 
istic,  66  ;  appointment  to  Philippines 
Commission,  196 ;  as  head  of  Com 
mission,  201 ;  Civil  Governor, 
202 ;  character  as  Governor,  206, 
207,  211;  and  friars'  lands,  206; 
puts  aside  judicial  honors,  208-211 ; 
on  results  of  American  rule,  212 ; 
Roosevelt  on,  232,  381 ;  and 
Brownsville  affair,  339 ;  in  Cuba, 
365 ;  Roosevelt's  choice  as  presi 
dential  candidate,  379-381 ;  elected, 
388  ;  on  Roosevelt,  389. 

Takahira,  Kogoro,  peace  conference, 
306,  307,  309. 

Talmage,  T.  de  W.,  on  distress,  21. 

Tammany  Hall,  in  election  of  1900,  142. 

Tampa,  Santiago  expedition  at,  83. 
84  n. 

Tarbell,  I.  M.,  on  awe  of  Rockefeller, 
161 ;  as  historian  of  Standard  Oil, 
166. 

Tariff,  Hanna's  attitude,  10;   in  cam- 


INDEX 


417 


paign  of  1896,  12,  19,  20;  priority 
over  gold  standard,  36 ;  Dingley 
Act,  37-39 ;  Silverites  and,  rates 
under  Dingley  Act,  39  ;  McKinley 
and  reciprocity,  173 ;  Puerto  Rico 
and  free  trade,  173 ;  Cuban  reci 
procity,  182,  183;  Roosevelt's  atti 
tude,  220,  292. 

Taussig,  F.  W.,  on  Dingley  Act, 
39  n. 

Taxation.     See  Tariff. 

Taylor,  C.  II.,  on  Roosevelt  and 
jingoism,  364. 

Teller,  H.  M.,  and  free  silver,  secedes 
from  Republican  Convention,  16 ; 
Cuban  resolution,  66  ;  and  Hepburn 
Bill,  325  n. 

Teller  Amendment,  66 ;  adhered  to, 
99. 

Tennessee  Coal  and  Iron  Company 
incident,  348-350. 

Texas,  battle  of  Santiago,  91. 

Thayer,  W.  R.,  on  Hay  and  China, 
131;  on  Roosevelt  on  stump,  142; 
on  Venezuelan  affair,  249  ;  acknowl 
edgment  to,  399  n. 

Tirpitz,  A.  P.  F.  von,  and  American 
battleship  voyage,  372. 

Tovar,  General,  and  Panama  revolt, 
270. 

Townsend,  J.  B.,  on  Charleston  Ex 
position,  231. 

Trevelyan,  Sir  G.  O.,  Roosevelt's 
appreciation,  390. 

Trusts,  as  issue  (1900),  136;  steam 
ship  combine,  156 ;  Roosevelt's 
attitude,  221 ;  Roosevelt's  speeches 
on  regulation,  233 ;  election  of 
1904  as  mandate  for  regulation,  296  ; 
publicity  as  remedy,  Bureau  of 
Corporations,  296 ;  Roosevelt  and 
property  rights,  299,  395;  "twilight 
zone"  and  regulation,  361-363. 
See  also  Finances ;  Iron  and  steel ; 
Railroads ;  Standard  Oil. 

Turner,  George,  Alaskan  Boundary 
Tribunal,  256-259. 

"Twilight  zone,"  Bryan  and  Roose 
velt  on,  361-363. 

UNITED  STATES  STEEL  CORPORATION, 
and  Tennessee  Coal  and  Iron  Co., 
348-350.  See  also  Iron  and  steel. 

United  States  v.  Knight,  and  Northern 
Securities  case,  226. 


VAMPIRE  CLUB,  120,  121. 

Vanderbilt,  W.  H.,  financial  position, 
160;  on  Standard  Oil,  161. 

Venezuela,  European  claims,  247 ; 
coercion,  Roosevelt's  suspicions  of 
Germany,  248-250  ;  British  attitude, 
250  ;  Roosevelt's  demand  and  threat 
to  Germany,  250-252 ;  arbitration, 
settlement,  251,  253;  accuracy  of 
Roosevelt's  account,  253. 

Vizcaya,  battle  of  Santiago,  91,  92. 

WALCOTT,  C.  D.,  and  reclamation,  355 
n.,  356  n. 

Wall  Street,  crisis  (1901),  155.  See 
also  Finances ;  Panics. 

War  of  1812,  and  lack  of  preparedness, 
367. 

Wash  burn,  C.  G.,  on  Hanna's  presi 
dential  candidacy,  288,  291 ;  on 
Roosevelt  Dam,  356 ;  on  Roosevelt 
and  Congress,  388. 

Washington,  Booker,  White  House 
dinner  incident,  227-230. 

Washington,  George,  Roosevelt  and 
third-term  precedent,  377,  383; 
Roosevelt  on,  as  President,  381,  384. 

Water-cure  in  Philippines,  203. 

Watkins,  T.  H.,  Anthracite  Coal 
Commission,  246. 

West,  in  campaign  of  1896,  17,  19,  29 ; 
Roosevelt  and,  290,  334. 

W'est  Virginia,  in  election  of  1896, 
29  ;  of  1904,  295. 

Westinghouse,  George,  and  panic,  347. 

Weyler,  Valeriano,  policy  in  Cuba,  44. 

Wheat,  export  (1870-1900),  162  n. 

White,  A.  D.,  on  Germans  and  Spanish 
War,  76. 

White,  E.  D.,  Northern  Securities 
dissent,  225  n. ;  on  Hanna,  290. 

White,  Henry,  and  Venezuelan  affair, 
250  ;  Roosevelt  on,  250 ;  and  Alaskan 
boundary,  257 ;  on  Roosevelt,  279 ; 
and  Algeciras  Conference,  314;  on 
Roosevelt  at  Potsdam,  316. 

White  Star  Line,  combine,  156. 

Wildman,  Miss,  acknowledgment  to, 
399  n. 

Wilhelm  II.  of  Germany,  and  Philip 
pines,  188 ;  Roosevelt's  characteriza 
tion,  303  ;  and  Russo-Japanese  peace 
negotiations,  304,  308  ;  and  Roosevelt 
and  peace,  307;  and  Morocco,  312- 
314;  mutual  fear  of  Geat  Britain, 


418 


INDEX 


312 ;  compared  with  Roosevelt, 
315-318. 

Williams,  D.  R.,  on  friars'  lands, 
206  n. 

Willoughby,  W.  F.,  on  Hawaii,  112  n. ; 
on  Foraker  Act,  177. 

Wilson,  H.  W.,  on  naval  battle  of 
Santiago,  93. 

Wilson,  J.  M.,  Anthracite  Coal  Com 
mission,  246. 

Winslow,  Lanier  &  Co.,  and  Morton, 
and  Roosevelt,  393. 

Witte,  Count,  peace  conference,  306, 
307 ;  Roosevelt  on,  on  America,  on 
Roosevelt,  309. 

Wood,  Leonard,  Rough  Riders,  84  n. ; 
brigade  command,  86  n. ;  as  Gover 
nor  of  Cuba,  178,  179,  182;  Roose 
velt's  tribute,  232. 

Woodford,  S.  L.,  minister  to  Spain,  42  ; 
and  American  ultimatum,  53,  54 ; 


on  Spanish  yielding,  61-63  ;  conduct 

of  negotiations,  63  n. 
Worcester,     D.     C.,     first    Philippine 

Commission,      191,      193 ;       second 

Commission,  196. 

Work,  Roosevelt  on  gospel,  234,  235. 
Wright,  C.  D.,  and  coal  strike  (1902), 

241,  246. 
Wright,  L.  E.,  Philippine  Commission, 

196,  232. 
Wu  Ting  Fang,  and  Boxer   uprising, 

129,  131. 
Wyman,    Miss,    acknowledgment    to, 

399  n. 

YALE  UNIVERSITY,  Booker  Washington 

at  Bi-Centennial,  228. 
Yamamoto,  Gombei,  and  Japanese  in 

America,  371. 

Yellow  fever,  conquest  in  Cuba,  178. 
Yellow  press,  and  Spanish  War,  55. 


This  Index  was  made  for  me  by  D.  M.  Matteson. 


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